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by Gabrio Forti
CONTENTS: 1. ‘Epistemic’ Dominance of Corporate Organisations, ‘Epistemic
Injustice’ for Victims. – 2. Salience of the Victim and Prevention of
Corporate Violence. – 3. The Victimological Paradigm Shift. – 4. The
Long Way, Mostly Ahead, to Real Victim Protection.
1. ‘Epistemic’ Dominance of Corporate Organisations, ‘Epistemic
Injustice’ for Victims
There are many sound reasons why, in considering the Directive
2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support,
and protection of victims of crime, and being conscious of its great
relevance and ground-breaking implications, we decided to undertake
a research project which focuses on a very peculiar kind of victim
(‘peculiar’, at least as seen from the perspective most frequently
found, if not indeed taken for granted, in the scholarship and
legislation).
We could indeed have drawn on the massive repository of
research—as well as the vast national, international, and EU legal
framework—dealing with women and children as victims of physical
abuse, or victims of violent crime in general. We resolved instead to
devote our efforts to the victims of corporate crimes, and particularly
of corporate violence. This notion (and the ambiguity thereof) is
especially analysed in chapter six. It encompasses those criminal
offences committed by corporations in the course of their legitimate
activities, which result in harms to natural persons’ health, integrity, or
life. As described therein, the fact that ‘managers murder and
corporations kill’ (Punch 2000) has been acknowledged in the
criminological literature for several decades, and the term ‘corporate
violence’ has come to be used to refer to that ‘specific subset of
corporate deviance’ (Punch 2000: 243) that causes deaths, injuries, or
illnesses to physical persons through illegal or harmful behaviours that
occur in the course of the legitimate business activity of such economic
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organisations—primarily through violations of health and safety
regulations and the consequent harm to workers; the production and
marketing of unsafe products; and the pollution of air, water, and soil
by industrial production or waste disposal.
More specifically, we focused our research on three main strands
of corporate violence victimisation, namely environmental crime, food
safety violations, and offences in the pharmaceutical industry. Part I of
this volume (chapters one to five) addresses the fundamental principles
as enshrined in the relevant treaties and inscribed in EU policy, before
examining the relevant EU secondary legislation. Chapters three and
four highlight, in particular, the protection of certain core values,
namely human life and health (and the corresponding human rights as
affirmed in the ECHR), which are actually or potentially affected by
the illicit conduct of corporations particularly in the three abovemen-
tioned sectors.
This field of choice stemmed from the idea of exploring—and
possibly exploiting—intersections and potential synergies between the
Directive 2012/29/EU and the existing body of EU legal tools in these
three sectors, which, it must be said, currently focus on a different,
preventive, risk-based approach, coupled with remedies based on
compensation and reparation. This was an approach, we assumed,
which could benefit from a comparison and coordination with the ex
post facto, victim-centred approach of the new Victims Directive.
Such a focus, however, is also quite consistent with the main
competences of the three institutions involved in the ‘Victims and
Corporations’ project, namely the ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for
Research on Criminal Justice and Policy of the Catholic University
in Milan (Centro Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia penale e la
Politica criminale—CSGP), whose researchers have contributed to the
coordination as well as to the accomplishment of this project; the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law of
Freiburg im Breisgau (Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und
internationales Strafrecht—MPICC); and the Leuven Institute of
Criminology, established within the University of Leuven Faculty of
Law (LINC). Crucially, given the complexity of the issues arising from
the implementation of the Victims Directive to corporate violence,
these three research institutions were able to integrate their
interdisciplinary expertise on a wide range of issues pertaining to
white-collar and corporate crimes: corporate liability and compliance,
EU law in general and EU criminal law, international and comparative
criminal law, criminal procedure, victimology, restorative justice,
management of industrial and technological risks, causes and effects of
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criminal negligence, and the precautionary principle. Throughout the
research, the partners kept clear sight of the need for an innovative and
mainly organisational approach to criminal events arising within
complex organisations.
But perhaps the main reason for concentrating our research on this
kind of suffering from the wrongdoings of complex organisations, is
that the victims have an urgent need—quoting from the Directive—to
‘receive appropriate information, support and protection’, and to be
‘able to participate in criminal proceedings’, as detailed from various
perspectives in chapters one, two and seven. We were well aware of the
need to advance knowledge and awareness about victims who find
themselves, more often than not, thrown into the quandary of simply
not being able—whether in fact, or not in a manner that is sufficiently
timely—to perceive their own condition of being victims.
Using, and somewhat adjusting, a category developed by Miranda
Fricker (2007) that is ‘innovative to the point of initiating a conceptual
shift as it has traditionally been practiced’ (Code 2008), we could say
that these victims suffer a kind of ‘epistemic injustice’. This epistemic
injustice is constituted by the failure of victims to be recognised as
victims, and the wider failure of the victims themselves to perceive the
victimisation they have suffered (or even that they could suffer in a
foreseeable future) in a prompt and appropriate manner.
Such a predicament stems from victims being confronted with at
least three dire hindrances—we might even say ‘adversaries’—along
the path they must tread to achieve recognition of their status as
victims, and hence pursue the satisfaction of needs which such status
entails: complexity (scientific, social, ethical, and organisational), time
lag, and the power of corporations.
These adversaries are made even more formidable by the
connections and alliances among them, which are bound—often
intentionally—to blur responsibilities, as well as to impede the
recognition of the causes of harms (Forti 2009). Indeed, such ‘alliances’
are in a sense constitutive of the very notion of victim which concerns us
here, since they give stark expression to features which are present,
albeit perhaps less vividly, in other cases of victimisation (including that
stemming from violence between individuals). These features can all too
easily be bypassed or brushed aside, when onlookers are distracted by
the spectacle of overt violence or other shocking features of the event.
Indeed, these three influential factors—complexity, time lag, and
corporate power—are so intertwined that they come to form a kind of
cybernetic system: the power of corporations is able to enhance and
deepen the natural impairments, arising from the passing of time
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(Centonze and Manacorda 2017) and overweening (scientific, etc)
complexity, which degrade the ability of people (and thus witnesses,
prosecutors, judges) to remember past facts. Moreover, such a
condition of oblivion or confusion becomes an ideal medium in which
organised or organisational power can flourish and assert its
dominance. If ‘we are often ignorant about what might happen, but
also even about “the area of possible outcomes”’ (Innerarity 2012: 6),
it is easy for organisations possessing only a little more knowledge
than the general public to exploit this advantage so as to avoid
responsibility.
As Costas and Grey have recently observed in an extended
meditation on the subject, secrecy ‘is about the drawing of
boundaries—boundaries around knowledge, yes, but also boundaries
between knowers’. Moreover, the fact that ‘secrets are held by some
people and not others implies that secrecy is both about concealment
from some and sharing with others’; thus, ‘secrecy does not just occur
within organizations, but in some important ways it can make
organizations’ (Costas and Grey 2016: ep 233).
We could even say that the epistemic injustice or impairment
suffered by victims of corporate malfeasance arises before any
practical management of situational knowledge in the place where
the harm has taken place, and stems rather from the sheer epistemic
architecture of the organisations bringing about the harm.
Secrecy entails, on the one hand, keeping knowledge from people—those
outside an organization, perhaps, or from particular groups within an
organization—and, on the other hand, sharing knowledge within an
organization or among particular groups therein. Thus we can think of
organization itself as having a kind of ‘epistemic’ architecture in which
boundaries between the inside and outside of an organization, or
subsections of an organization, are constructed. We can envisage this as
epistemic compartmentalization, metaphorically constructing external or
internal walls—and not always necessarily metaphorically because, in
some cases, the possession of secrets may itself be marked by a physical
architecture (e.g., access to laboratories). At the same time we can think
of organizations as having an epistemic cabling, rather like the wiring of
a building, through which secret knowledge flows, when people for
various reasons and in various ways share secrets. Again one can think of
this literally—for example, in terms of differential access to, say,
networked databases of confidential information—as well as metaphor-
ically, as when informal networks to share confidential organizational
gossip are constituted. Thus we are not talking here about knowledge-
sharing in the normal and generic sense of the word, but about the
sharing of, specifically, secret knowledge. These senses of a hidden
architecture are intended to suggest that although organizations are in all
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kinds of ways creators of secrets—generating, for example, trade secrets
or utilizing confidential discussions as part of politicking—they are also
in some way created by secrecy. (Costas and Grey 2016: ep 266)
And as Chomsky has recently remarked (2017: ep 89) ‘privileged
and powerful sectors have never liked democracy and for very good
reasons. Democracy puts power into the hands of the general
population and takes it away from the privileged and the powerful.
It’s a principle of concentration of wealth and power’; and, he adds,
‘concentration of wealth yields concentration of power’.
This is a setting that principled lawyers, scholars, or practitioners
cannot allow themselves to ignore; they will therefore feel compelled,
within a discourse centred on victims, to locate where the real source
of victimisation lies. It is certainly true that ‘the wealthy always did
have an inordinate amount of control over policy’ and that ‘they make
sure that their own interests are very well cared for, however
“grievous” the impact on the people’; and Chomsky observes that
today it is the financial institutions and multinational corporations that
play the role of those that Adam Smith called the ‘masters of
mankind’, who stick to the ‘vile maxim’: ‘all for ourselves and nothing
for anyone else’ (Chomsky 2017: ep 98).
We must also be aware, as discussed by Sutherland, that white-collar
workers have a huge cultural influence on societies:
The rationalistic, amoral, and nonsentimental behavior of the corporation
was aimed in earlier days at technological efficiency; in later days more
than previously it has been aimed at the manipulation of people by
advertising, salesmanship, propaganda, and lobbies. With this recent
development the corporation has developed a truly Machiavellian
ideology and policy. It has reached the conclusion that practically
anything is possible if resources, ingenuity, and strenuous effort are used.
It has appropriated the physical and biological sciences and applied them
to its objectives of technological efficiency and in the process has made
significant contributions to those sciences. Similarly, it has appropriated
the social and psychological sciences and applied them to the objective
of manipulating people. (Sutherland 1983: 236)
Confronted by corporations, which can be deemed not only legally
(Glaasbeeck 2007) but also epistemically and culturally created ‘sites
of irresponsibility’, even the best-organised victims are definitely the
underdogs.
The victims of corporate crimes are seldom in a position to fight against
the management of the corporation. Consumers are scattered, unor-
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ganized, lacking in objective information as to qualities of commodities,
and no one consumer suffers a loss in a particular transaction which
would justify him in taking individual action. Stockholders seldom know
the complex procedures of the corporations which they own, cannot
attend annual meetings, and receive little information regarding the
policies or the financial status of the corporation. Even if stockholders
suspect illegal behavior by the management, they are scattered,
unorganized, and frequently cannot even secure access to the names of
other stockholders. In their conflicts with labor, the corporations have the
advantage of a friendly press and of news commentators whose salaries
are paid by business corporations, so that their unfair labor practices can
be learned generally only by consulting official reports. (Sutherland
1983: 237)
In spite of some advancements in the empowerment of the victims
of corporations since the days when Sutherland described their lot, the
situation they still confront, before as well as after having perceived
the harm they have suffered, remains blighted by a darkness which
verges on outright opacity. And this disadvantage is particularly
agonizing in the context of what has been called our current
‘knowledge society’ (Innerarity 2012). Knowledge in such a society
more and more comes to resemble a commodity, or indeed an essential
economic resource: thus any unequal distribution thereof impairs
severely human rights (suffice to consider how deeply the so-called
digital divide can hinder access to fundamental services and human
development resources). Lack or scarcity of knowledge vitiates the
possibility of awareness which allows access to the procedural rights
granted to victims of crime (see chapters one and two), where the latter
make up the protection mechanisms provided by European Convention
on Human Rights and EU law (as considered in chapter four). If a
victim is deprived of relevant knowledge, their ability to participate in
criminal proceedings is impaired at source. Even if the right to be
heard (Directive 2012/29/EU, art 10) is fully guaranteed to them, and
even if according to the Victims Directive they are ‘permitted to make
statements or explanations in writing’, there is little meaningful they
can say to judges and prosecutors in order to receive adequate
recognition and respectful treatment from wider society.
2. Salience of the Victim and Prevention of Corporate Violence
In view of the preceding considerations, we can easily grasp how
daunting is the challenge facing any attempt to comply in a substantive
way with the need for—and right to—protection of these rather special
6 INTRODUCTION
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
victims. Specifically, the challenge pertains to meeting the require-
ments of art 22 of Directive 2012/29/EU, which affirms the duty of
Member States to ‘ensure that victims receive a timely and individual
assessment’ aimed at identifying such specific needs, as well as at
determining ‘whether and to what extent they would benefit from
special measures in the course of criminal proceedings’ provided for
under arts 23 and 24 (see chapters two and six).
This is a challenge which, for policy-makers as well as legal and
social practitioners, entails first and foremost that they be equipped
with adequate knowledge of the issues relevant to the predicament of
victims, in order to make their decisions properly enforceable and,
hence, speed their implementation. We could even say that all legal
subjects today must take on the vantage point of victims as an essential
prerequisite for their normative decisions.
Indeed, what has been said about ‘paths of application’ in
psychology, namely the significance of the interlacement between a
phenomenon (the social field) and expert knowledge (a specific
science) (Bosio 2012), could also be deemed relevant to law, in so far
as we consider the law an ‘expert agent’ (actually an institutional
agent) facing demands for intervention in the social field—where the
latter plays the role of receptor of the knowledge as well as of the aims
of law, and is where such intervention is expected to take effect.
The heightened awareness (van Bavel et al 2013: 3; Holden 2016)
that ‘policy-making can greatly benefit from a better understanding of
people’s behavior’ and that ‘well-designed behavioural studies can
offer useful insights to policy-makers by generating the evidence
required to improve policies’, is relevant also in the field of criminal
justice (and for all agents involved therein, namely lawyers, public
prosecutors, judges, police, social practitioners, lawmakers). In such a
field this awareness highlights the need to take into account not only
criminological knowledge in general, but also specialized insights into
the most relevant features of the phenomena with which criminal law
(and related legal regulation) has to deal. We could thus say that here
the ‘paths of application’ should focus on what is most representative,
namely on what is really at issue in social matters—first and foremost,
the imbalances in power relationships among the people (and
organisations) embroiled in the criminal case.
As suggested some years ago, when we analyse corporate crime,
and especially corporate violence, one area ‘worth considerably more
research is the study of corporate cultures and decision-making
processes from the viewpoints of those involved in them’ (Yeager
2007: 39). This is an area which promises a huge ‘potential payoff to
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knowledge’, and which, as regards the victims of corporate violence,
seems one of the best ways to check (or regulate) the momentous
decisions of the most powerful actors on the criminal stage, namely the
corporations.
As recently discussed, such a viewpoint cannot help evoking
Adam Smith’s well-known example of the earthquake in China (and
the reaction of people living far from China on hearing news of the
disaster), or the dilemma posed in the ‘trolley scenario’: a railway car
is running out of control and heading toward five people making
repairs to the tracks; you have the choice of flipping the rail switch and
diverting the trolley onto another track where it will kill only one
worker rather than five. These two examples contrast with the ‘patient
killing’ and ‘pushing a man over a rail’ scenarios, which involve a
more intimate act of violence. In this regard, Soltes comments as
follows:
Although violence has occurred throughout human history, evidence also
suggests that it is not something we’re especially keen on doing. [...]
Until quite recently in our history, it was difficult to cause direct harm to
another person unless that individual was physically close to us. Harm
was not only physical but intimate. As the ability to communicate and
influence others from greater distances became possible, however, new
and different ways of inflicting harm emerged as well. Notably, these
innovations permitted the perpetration of newfangled kinds of harm
against individuals—namely, economic harms, which are less physical
and more abstract. Economic harms fundamentally differ from other acts
in that they do not trigger gut feelings of actually doing harm, as was the
case with intimate, physical harm. Yet, they injure others—albeit
economically rather than physically—all the same. (Soltes 2016: ep
2031)
Corporate executives are not exempt from the popular maxim that
‘out of sight’ is ‘out of mind’. Moreover, while most such executives
seem to favour cost–benefit calculations in their decision-making,
according to recent experiences, few make much effort to deliberate on
the consequences of their actions.
They seem to have reached their decisions to commit crimes with little
thought or reflection. In many cases, it was difficult to say that they had
ever really ‘decided’ to commit a crime at all. I struggled to understand
why they didn’t anticipate the adverse and often extraordinary
consequences of their decisions. Their failure to see the personal and
professional consequences of their choices seemed deeply myopic and
inconsistent with the very traits that made their prior success possible.
[...] They put little effort into these decisions because they never deeply
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felt that the decisions were actually harmful to themselves or others.
Because they didn’t perceive this harm, they had little reason to pause
and reconsider their course of action. It wasn’t that these executives
recognized that other people were going to be harmed and simply didn’t
care. Rather, they never even stopped to consider that their actions would
harm, even devastate, real people. It may seem hard to believe that an
intelligent executive could fail to see the harm created by fraud,
embezzlement, or price-fixing. To victims, the negative ramifications of
such crimes are readily apparent. The perpetrator sees the victim, physically
touches his property, and witnesses his immediate reaction after being
robbed. But manipulative corporate conduct lacks all these sensations
associated with theft. Executives never need to get close—physically or
psychologically—to their victims. Instead, the victims of financial crimes
often remain distant and amorphous. The distance between individuals in
modern business dealings creates a problem for managers and executives.
The human ability to sense the potential for harm is significantly affected
by physical and psychological proximity. [...] Proximity deeply affects our
instinctive ability to sense and react to harm. As distance grows, our ability
to empathize with others shrinks. In business, where many transactions
occur at ‘arm’s length’ among unrelated parties, there is often no natural
tendency to empathize with individuals on the other side of a transaction,
let alone those derivatively affected second- or third-hand. The nature of
modern commerce has made it perilously easy to wander into the
penumbra—that ‘gray zone’ between right and wrong. (Soltes 2016: ep
175; emphasis added)
It is not only in committing financial crimes that executives find
themselves wandering ‘into the penumbra’, the ‘gray zone between
right and wrong’. Also gray (perhaps rather less gray and more shifted
toward black) is the vast territory in which the risk of committing
corporate crimes and thus doing physical harm to other people can
arise. In fact, on the basis of various studies and associated empirical
evidence, questions have been asked about whether there is any
association at all between sophisticated moral judgment and de facto
ethical behaviour.
The ability to behave morally isn’t necessarily as ingrained in a
person’s character as researchers once thought. As further support,
researchers asked students at the Princeton Theological Seminary to
give a short talk on the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan. The
parable describes several individuals hurrying past an injured person,
before one Samaritan finally stops to take care of the despondent
man—an act that Jesus commends. Seminarians were asked to deliver a
talk on the parable in an adjacent building, on whose path the
researchers had positioned a groaning ‘victim’ slumped over in the
doorway. The seminarians were precisely the kind of individuals who
espoused that they would stop to help. Under time pressure, however,
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many of the seminarians ignored the victim or were not inclined to offer
aid. In several instances, they even literally stepped over the victim as
they rushed to give their talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan.
Seminarians were so engaged with delivering their speech that they
failed to even recognize the moral dilemma directly in front of them.
Helping the victim required not only believing that it is one’s abstract
duty to help but also recognizing the problem in the first place. This
experiment, along with others like it, helped psychologists see that
moral decision making is actually far more complicated than they
initially envisioned. People have to successfully complete a whole
series of steps—becoming aware of a problem, forming a judgment,
establishing intent, and engaging in moral behavior—to behave
ethically. Those prone to succeed at one step might find themselves
overlooking at others, and failing at any one step leads to failure at the
end. (Soltes 2016: ep 1494; emphasis added)
The ability to see the possible victims of one’s own actions in
advance seems paramount in prodding corporate bosses into the
‘successful completion’ of these steps and thus preventing harm and
organisational crime. And this ability can and must be cultivated and
fostered while also paying due attention to the victim after a crime has
been committed and—one would hope—legally ascertained. This
could bring into effect a kind of victim ‘salience’ which should
retrospectively help people to consider the personal, human repercus-
sions of their choices and deeds exactly when they are beginning to
devise them. The more vividly such victims are fixed in the mind, the
more we may hope they will be enshrined in the heart.
Thus a central pillar of our research has been the (written but
especially visual) collection of narratives and testimony of victims of
corporate violence; and these have been all the more edifying and
moving, the less they were charged with denunciatory overtones,
grievance, and thirst for vengeance, and the more they were simply
presented as human stories. Their poignancy stems from the facts
described, and they are meaningful in so far as they reveal the need for
people to be heard and to receive assistance during their ordeal.
In order to be salient in the thoughts of potential offenders, victims
must be made present in public perception not only as categories of
victims (consumers, investors, workers, etc) but as individuals. In this
respect, a crucial part of the Victims Directive is art 22 which deals
with ‘individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection
needs’, and proposes that account be taken of (a) the personal
characteristics of the victim, (b) the type or nature of the crime, and (c)
the circumstances of the crime.
Such ‘individual assessment’ is actually one of the most
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challenging novelties of the Directive (as analysed in chapters one,
two, and six), as it represents a change in the approach adopted by the
previous Framework Decision 2001/220 JHA, where the notion of
‘particular vulnerability’ (art 2(2)) referred to macro-categories of
victims determined by the type of crime or subjective characteristics
(and thus risked leaving without protection victims who fail to fall
under such categories). Being aimed at protection from secondary and
repeat victimisation, intimidation, and retaliation, such individual
assessment requires the building of an appropriate methodology as
well as specialised skills and frameworks.
Transposed to the field of corporate violence, the requirement
stated in art 22 of the Victims Directive, that ‘particular attention shall
be paid to victims who have suffered considerable harm due to the
severity of the crime’ and also to ‘victims whose relationship to and
dependence on the offender make them particularly vulnerable’, calls
for the mobilisation of a great deal of criminological knowledge and
experience.
The harm caused by corporations is often considerable in intensity,
duration, and extension, and people suffering thereby are bound to
experience secondary victimisation (the negative consequences
stemming from the way in which eg law enforcement agencies,
primary groups, and the broader community deal with their case), as
detailed in chapters six and seven. But it is also typical of these crimes
that victims find themselves in a condition of ‘dependence’ on the
offender (see chapter one). And this is the case not only when they are
workers whose wages and well-being rely on the power and will of the
entrepreneurs, managers, and business people in charge. Such
dependence is also constituted, as remarked above, as epistemic
dependence and disadvantage (Govier 2015: 97–100), due in part to
the ‘architectural secrecy’ of organisations and the privileged position
of white-collar criminals before the law (Sutherland 1983), but
stemming first and foremost from the corporations’ unique knowledge
of the often complex paths which led to the ‘final’ harm, including the
specific ‘structure of risk’ as well as the kind of exposure to harm that
their activities had engendered.
3. The Victimological Paradigm Shift
The retrospective gains in sensitivity toward the victim has the
potential to provoke a far-reaching shift in perspectives, attitudes, and
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deeds, thus materially affecting decisions within organisations; and we
think the Victims Directive could contribute to making this happen.
We chose to explore the difficult field of corporate violence in part
because we had a sense—a sense which is even stronger now, at the
end of our research—that a renewed victimological view, extending
beyond the traditional boundaries of the public discourse on victims,
would be apt to effect a paradigm shift in criminal justice (and in
justice tout court), in the well-known epistemological sense intended
by Thomas Kuhn (1970).
The usual example of a paradigm shift, namely the replacement of
the Ptolemaic cosmos by the Copernican one, is rather apt as a
metaphor for our case, since here the victim is put at the centre of the
criminal law perspective, replacing the ‘normal’ offender-centred
paradigm which segregated the victim on the margins of criminal
justice. And the metaphor seems yet more apt once we take due
account of the impact which the Copernican revolution in astronomy
then effected in the cultural and anthropological panorama of the time,
and how these shifts emerged from a long and protracted crisis.
The awareness of anomaly had lasted so long and penetrated so deep that
one can appropriately describe the fields affected by it as in a state of
growing crisis. Because it demands large-scale paradigm destruction and
major shifts in the problems and techniques of normal science, the
emergence of new theories is generally preceded by a period of
pronounced professional insecurity. As one might expect, that insecurity
is generated by the persistent failure of the puzzles of normal science to
come out as they should. Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a
search for new ones. (Kuhn 1970: 67–68)
The ‘pronounced professional insecurity’ we are experiencing in
criminal justice is evident to both the professional and popular eye,
being intertwined with the crisis arising from a deep transformation of
societies that is affecting public policies and the cultural meaning of
crime and criminals. Thus has criminal justice been in the grip of
dilated individual freedoms and relaxed social controls, of a massive
increase in the popular demand for security amid fears of a loss of
effectiveness, coupled with a crisis of State sovereignty and a squeeze
on public resources and welfare (Garland 2001).
Among the several outcomes of the paradigm shift that might be
effected by the development of victim-protection-oriented criminal
justice, one might consist in the promotion of more opportunities for
reflection and consideration of alternative viewpoints, as well as a
more problematised approach among corporate decision-makers. The
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latter might comprise a kind of cognitive revolution, enabling white-
collars to become aware of their limits and thus encouraging their
organisations to abstain from conducts which would have disgraceful
impacts on communities.
As concluded in a really thought-provoking study on white-collar
crime:
Appreciating our lack of invincibility—our inherent weakness and
frailty—offers us the best chance of designing the appropriate
mechanisms to help manage these limitations. If we learn to be more
suspicious of gut feelings when placed in new or difficult situations, we
can acknowledge the need to create more opportunities for reflection and
to bring in viewpoints of others to question us. If we humbly recognize
that we might not always even notice the choices that will lead us astray,
we are more likely to develop ways to identify and control those
decisions. But it’s when we realize that our ability to err is much greater
than we often think it is that we’ll begin to take the necessary steps to
change and improve. (Soltes 2016: ep 5843)
4. The Long Way, Mostly Ahead, to Real Victim Protection
If we needed clear proof of the need for a paradigm shift in the
protection and assistance for victims of corporate violence, we might
consider that at least two of the main legal documents providing for
criminal penalties for infringements of environmental law—namely
the Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through
criminal law (the ‘Environmental Crime Directive’) and the Directive
2009/123/EC on ship-source pollution and the introduction of penalties
for infringements (amending Directive 2005/35/EC)—substantially
neglect the status and rights of victims (as described in chapter three).
In fact, the Environmental Crime Directive targets unlawful
conducts that cause or are likely to cause death or injury, thereby
expressly punishing the endangering of or harm to human life and
health. However, despite dealing directly with the impact of
environmental criminal offences on individuals, not only does it
refrain from defining the ‘victim’ (thus also neglecting the conditions
of her/his vulnerability and any need for protection against secondary
and repeat victimisation), but it refrains from providing any outline of
the protected values to which individuals are entitled.
The study of the needs for protection on the part of the victims of
corporate crimes, and especially of the obstacles to responding to
victims’ expectations of the criminal justice system arising before,
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during, and after criminal proceedings (as detailed in chapter seven),
provides an insight into the condition of many other kinds of victims.
As said above, the suffering experienced by victims of corporate
violence is exacerbated by the fact that harms are made more serious
and enduring by the imbalance of power and knowledge—we might
say the imbalance in the power of knowledge—which they experience
when confronting organisational behemoths and their well-equipped
legal staff.
Being aware of these victims’ increased and, we could say,
epistemic needs for protection, it has been all the more astonishing to
see how Italy has implemented the Directive 2012/29/EU into its
domestic system through d lgs 15 December 2015 n 212. In fact it
seems that a full set of fundamental safeguards has been completely
left out: especially the Victims Directive’s requirement of a right to
access victim support services (art 8), the kind of assistance offered by
the support services (art 9), and certain obligations included in the right
to protection of victims with specific protection needs during criminal
proceedings (art 23). In other words, irrespective of their importance to
the European institutions, the Italian lawmakers have not implemented
such safeguards, nor were they already provided for by the Italian
justice system.
On account of this, d lgs 15 December 2015 n 212 is a ‘missed
opportunity’, as already clearly stated in the Project’s first findings
report (Mancuso 2016: 46). It narrowed its scope to the integration of
few, limited, procedural, and conventional amendments, falling far
from the European demand for all-embracing and substantial
protection of victims’ individual needs in connection with criminal
proceedings.
This can only partially be explained by reference to the peculiar
features of the Italian criminal justice system and the limited role
played therein by the victim—who is considered merely as a person
involved in the criminal proceedings, with less powers and rights than
the defendant and without the legal status of a party.
Regrettably, not enough attention has been paid to the implications
for restorative justice (whose practical relevance in cases of corporate
violence is discussed in chapter nine), or to the creation of adequate
victims’ support services (see chapter eight, including for references to
different national legal frameworks). Italy has not yet established
offices or structures specifically designed to provide support for
victims’ needs. During the examination of the draft proposal, the
Parliamentary Justice Commission did propose the inclusion of a
provision aimed at creating, within every court’s premises, a ‘help desk
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for victims of crime’, directed by a magistrate in collaboration with
social care services and victims’ associations. But the suggestion was
not welcomed by the Italian Government because of its financial and
bureaucratic impact.
The fact that d lgs 15 December 2015 n 212 has not effectively
implemented the goals set by the Directive 2012/29/EU could trigger
disputes against the Italian State, especially by non-resident victims
who cannot rely on the minimum standards of protection offered by the
Victims Directive or granted to them in their Member State of
residence. The Italian situation constitutes just one example of the
many differences in the implementation of the Victims Directive
amongst Member States, albeit possibly the most apparent case of
incomplete transposition amongst the countries examined by our
Project (ie Italy, Germany, and Belgium). More generally, it can be
observed that these differences also have strong implications for
victims’ rights with respect to corporate violence offences with
transnational features (see chapter two)—which possibly comprise the
majority of corporate violence cases.
Thus we must conclude that the task of making victims’ rights
effective—even when conceived in a legally binding way at EU
level—remains a challenge. The existing legal framework of criminal
justice poses obstacles to integrating the victim’s perspective, and new
steps must be taken in order to advance along the course plotted by the
Directive 2012/29/EU. All these steps—which are sketched here in a
set of recommendations for national lawmakers and policymakers (see
Annex)—must be conceived within a broader legal and cultural frame
apt to take seriously the victimological ‘paradigm shift’ and to build
the ‘paths of application’ most suitable to the social, cultural,
economic, and personal conditions of each country.
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PART I
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK,
BETWEEN PRESENT CHALLENGES
AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER I
VICTIMS OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
CHALLENGES FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND POTENTIALS FOR EUROPEAN POLICY
by Claudia Mazzucato * 1.
CONTENTS: 1. Victims of Crime in the European Union and the Directive 2012/
29/EU. – 1.1. Victims Matter: A Priority for the European Union. – 1.2.
A Priority within the Priority: Vulnerable Victims and Victims with
‘Specific Protection Needs’: Light and Shades – 1.3. A Comprehensive
and Multi-Level System. – 1.4. Protection: The Bridge Between
‘Support’ and ‘Justice’. – 1.5. Suspects, Accused Persons, and Offenders
(Must) Matter Too. – 2. The Challenge of Implementing the Directive
2012/29/EU with Victims of Corporate Crime and Corporate Violence. –
2.1. Building Bridges. – 2.2. Revealing the Common Features of
Corporate Violence to Better Assess/Address these Victims’ Special
Needs. – 2.3. A Closer Look at the Directive 2012/29/EU through the
Lens of Corporate Violence Victimisation. – 2.3.1. The Scope of the
Victims Directive. – 2.3.2. The Notion of ‘Victim’ and Their
Recognition. – 2.3.3. The Right to Information. – 2.3.4. The Right to
Protection. – 2.3.5. The Dependence on the Offender. – 2.3.6. Crime as a
Violation of Individual Rights. – 3. Open Issues.
* This chapter builds on, and develops, the findings presented in Mazzucato
2016: c II (s 1) and c IV. Davide Amato, PhD, Paola Cavanna, PhD, Marina Di Lello,
PhD, and Biancamaria Spricigo, PhD, contributed to the initial bibliographical
research behind the analysis presented in this chapter.
Official links (such as http://eur-lex.europa.eu) to the legal resources, summaries
of the legislation, and case law quoted and mentioned in this chapter can be found in
European and International Selected Legal Resources and Case Law: Appendix to
Mid-Term Report, 2016 (updated 2017), available from the project website,
www.victimsandcorporations.eu.
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1. Victims of Crime in the European Union and the Directive
2012/29/EU
1.1. Victims Matter: A Priority of the European Union
‘Victims matter’: this apparently simple—yet not obvious, and
indeed problematic and disputed—declaration stands at the very
beginning of the 2011 European Commission Communication titled
Strengthening Victims Rights in the EU (where it is explained why victims
do matter). 1 This EC Communication contained a ‘legislative package’
(‘Victims Package’) of proposals ‘as a step towards putting victims at the
heart of the EU criminal justice agenda’ (emphasis added). The
Communication was immediately followed by the EU Council Resolution
of 10 June 2011 concerning a roadmap for strengthening the rights and
protection of victims, in particular in criminal proceedings (Budapest
Road Map): the opening recital of the Council Resolution solemnly states
that ‘[t]he active protection of victims of crime is a high priority for the
European Union and its Member States’. The Budapest Road Map, in
turn, has led to the approval of the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European
Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum
standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. Furthermore, the
2013 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and
implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU stresses once again that ‘The
rights, support, protection and participation of victims in criminal
proceedings are a European Commission priority’. 2
Victims are no more to be left ‘on the periphery of the domestic
and international political agenda’ (de Casadevante Romani 2012: 3).
Victims matter to the European Union.
The path that resulted in a comprehensive ‘horizontal package of
measures’ for all victims is an interesting one. 3 It shows the evolution
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of
the Regions Strengthening Victims’ Rights in the EU (COM(2011) 274 final, 18 May
2011).
2 European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European
Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the
rights, support, and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA, December 2013, p 3.
3 See again European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to
the transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 3.
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of European law in a legally, politically, and socially ‘sensitive’ field; it
displays a picture of the EU agenda and policies; and it offers a sort of
‘thermometer’ of the stage reached in the complex process of
European integration and in the delicate harmonisation in criminal
matters.
The origins of this quite long and progressive path date back to the
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the Amsterdam
Treaty (1997), and culminate in the Lisbon Treaty, whose entry into
force in 2009 overcame the intergovernmental ‘Third Pillar’, thus
creating inside the EU (inside its ‘policies and internal actions’: part III
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—now on
TFEU) the ‘Area of freedom, security and justice’ (title V) within
which ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ (chapter 4) has its
place (Vervaele 2014). Here, in the ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal
matters’, the ‘rights of victims of crime’ receive their most formal, and
up to now final, recognition within Europe’s system of law, as a topic
that, again, matters to the European Union. Art 82(2) of the TFEU is
the primary source and the first legal basis for the European legislation
on the rights of victims of crime (see, eg Allegrezza 2015: 4;
Allegrezza 2012: 5; Bargis and Belluta: 2017; Mitsilegas 2015;
Mitsilegas 2016: ep 6466; Savy 2013: 23).
The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union and
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also provide
‘foundations’ for the rights of victims, as pointed out, for instance, in
recital 66 of the Directive 2012/29/EU: ‘the right to dignity, life,
physical and mental integrity, liberty and security, respect for private
and family life, the right to property, the principle of non-
discrimination, the principle of equality between women and men,
the rights of the child, the elderly and persons with disabilities, and the
right to a fair trial’ are among the fundamental rights recognised by the
EU that may be violated, infringed, or otherwise come to be at stake
when someone falls victim of a crime. This is why victims matter.
Alongside the development of this broad roadmap linking the
above-mentioned treaties, the Charter, and the ECHR, several other
steps towards the establishment of a legal set (or a legal system) of
rights of victims in the EU have been taken (eg the 1998 Action Plan of
the Council and the Commission on how to best implement the
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security,
and justice; the 1999 Communication by the Commission titled Crime
Victims in the EU: Reflections on Standards and Action; the 1999
Tampere Council Conclusions; the European Council’s 2005 Hague
Programme). In addition to the aforementioned Council Framework
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Decision 2001/220/JHA, to the 2011 Victims Package, and to the
Budapest Road Map, the adoption of the Victims Directive was
‘prepared’ by the European Council’s Stockholm Programme entitled
An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens (2010/C
115/01), and its Action Plan (2010–2014). 4
Through Basic Principles and various recommendations, soft law
provisions by the United Nations and the Council of Europe have also
influenced the EU legislators, who considered them when drafting
normative instruments in favour of victims of crime in general. 5
At the European Union level, this ‘horizontal’ system of protection
of all victims of all crimes, culminating in the Directive 2012/29/EU,
is further complemented by a series of other binding legal provisions,
both in criminal and civil matters, that must be applied in close
coordination with the implementation of the Victims Directive, within
a comprehensive approach to victims’ protection and support (Savy
2013: 93). These are:
- Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to
compensation to crime victims;
- Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 2011 on the European protection order;
- Regulation (EU) n 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 12 June 2013 on mutual recognition of protection
measures in civil matters.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law is also of
paramount importance in understanding the reach (and the limits) of
victims support and protection, and of the role of victims’ rights in
criminal proceedings in the EU (Gialuz 2015; Mitsilegas 2015: 329;
Savy 2013: 39; Venturoli 2015: 120). In fact, in framing the Victims
Directive the European lawmakers have taken into consideration the
jurisprudence of the European courts. One example which is relevant
for the scope of this project and research is the definition in the
Directive of ‘victim’ as (only) ‘a natural person’ (art 2(1)(a) Dir), thus
4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of
the Regions Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe’s
Citizens—Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme (COM(2010) 171
final, 24 April 2010).
5 See in this volume chapter four by Marc Engelhart, and chapter five, by
Gabriele Della Morte.
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confirming the exclusion of legal persons stated by the ECJ in
Dell’Orto and Eredics. 6
The replacement of the Third Pillar’s Framework Decision 2001/
220/JHA and the enrichment of its provisions thanks to the adoption of
the ‘post-Lisbon’ and ‘more supranational’ Victims Directive (Mitsi-
legas 2015: 318, 326) have attracted, as a ‘side effect’, the whole set of
judicial competences of the ECJ (and the correspondent possibilities to
resort to the Court). This will probably further inspire the European
jurisprudence on victims’ rights. ECJ case law, in fact, has been very
relevant for—and sometimes has truly instructed—European law, as
with Pupino, 7 but thus far it has centred (mainly by necessity) on cases
solely concerning the interpretation and application of the 2001
Framework Decision. Furthermore, the very nature of a directive
produces a more effective penetration of European law into national
legal systems: this pervasiveness, in fact, is not limited to the control of
complete transposition and actual fulfilment of obligations, but of
course also includes the possibility of the direct application of the
directive’s self-executing provisions by national judges, who, by the
way, are compelled to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU
law (Allegrezza 2015: 5; Mitsilegas 2015: 333; Mitsilegas 2016: ep
6869; Pemberton and Groenhuijsen 2012).
A 1989 landmark decision of the ECJ had indeed anticipated the
actions of the European legislature: the Cowan case 8 framed victims’
rights (and particularly the right to compensation) within the principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and residence status,
as a condition for freedom of movement in the EU. Still, today this
issue remains one of the primary concerns of European institutions, as
highlighted by its position in the opening article of the Directive 2012/
29/EU (art 1(1)). Non-discrimination, incidentally, is strictly linked
nowadays to the principle of ‘mutual recognition of judgment and
judicial decisions’, and to the constant need to enhance ‘approximation
of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ in order to ensure
‘judicial cooperation in criminal matters’, as stated by art 82 TFEU
(Mitsilegas 2015: 315; Mitsilegas 2016: ep 6392). The prevention of
discrimination in order to ensure freedom of movement, mutual trust as
regards national criminal justice systems, and European citizens’
6 ECJ, Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto [2007]; ECJ, Case C-205/09 Eredics – Sápi
[2010].
7 ECJ, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005].
8 ECJ, Case 186/87 Cowan v Trésor public [1989].
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confidence in justice, are among the main reasons, together with
humanitarian concerns and reasons of solidarity, why victims matter,
and why their protection falls within the ‘policies and internal action’
of the EU, seen as an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ for all. Yet
doubts have been raised by scholars as to whether the Victims
Directive actually ‘meets the legality criteria set out by art 82(2)
TFEU’ (Mitsilegas 2015: 325; Mitsilegas 2016: ep 6594), which
attribute to the EU competence to ‘establish minimum rules’, by means
of directives, ‘to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of
judgements and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension’. Others point out
how post-Lisbon cooperation in criminal matters ‘has become,
compared to art 2 of the Amsterdam TEU, an objective that is related
to rights and duties of citizens, not only related to free movement of
persons’ (Vervaele 2014: 38) or mutual recognition of judicial
decisions.
1.2. A Priority within the Priority: Vulnerable Victims and Victims with
‘Specific Protection Needs’: Light and Shades
Vulnerable victims are a priority within the priority (Gialuz 2012:
60). The notion of vulnerable victims in international and European
legal documents and tools is broad, depending either on the
‘subjective’ condition of the person, or the ‘objective’ nature of the
crime, or a combination of both (Ippolito and Iglesias Sánchez
2015b). 9 Vulnerability, though, is one of the main fields in which the
2012 Victims Directive represents a turning point in EU victims’
legislation.
Throughout international and European legal documents, the
following are often cited as persons in need of specific protection
(whether considered individually, or as ‘typical’, yet abstract, groups of
persons), and therefore expressly deserving specific attention and
tailored protective actions:
- children,
- women,
- the elderly,
- people with disabilities;
9 See also in this volume chapter six, by Arianna Visconti.
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- victims of crimes occurred in a country of which they are not
nationals or residents,
- victims of gender-based violence,
- victims of violence in close relationships and domestic violence,
- victims of sexual violence and other sexual offences,
- victims of trafficking in human beings,
- victims of terrorism,
- victims of organised crime,
- victims of crimes committed with a bias or discriminatory motive.
Interestingly, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the
European Union have often devoted attention to these kinds of
situation, due to common protection priorities (such as the primary
consideration of the best interest of the child), or the need to combat
certain transnational crimes (such as terrorism or trafficking in human
beings), or due to an increased sensitivity towards specific forms of
violence and criminal phenomena (such as gender-based violence,
violence in close relationships, violence against women).
In various hard and soft legal documents, the United Nations, the
Council of Europe, and the EU have taken into account other forms of
victimisation, such as, respectively, victims of abuse of power and
victims of torture, victims of genital mutilation (Stockholm Pro-
gramme), and victims of road traffic accidents (Victims Package).
Minorities who can be victims of hate crimes also receive special
consideration by the international community and the EU (Ippolito and
Iglesias Sánchez 2015b). 10 Victims of international core crimes are the
focus of increased attention, and the beneficiaries of a set of
international provisions (as described in chapter five of this volume). 11
Through the years, some of the above-mentioned ‘specific
10 On racial discrimination, see Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or
ethnic origin. This Directive addresses, among others, the following issues relevant to
the topics of this volume: (a) protection of natural persons against discrimination on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin (recital 16); (b) adequate judicial protection against
victimisation (recital 20); (c) concrete assistance for the victims (recital 24); (d)
victimisation (art 9). See also Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28
November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and
xenophobia by means of criminal law.
11 de Casadevante Romani (2012: 39), while provocatively asserting that there
are ‘almost as many concepts of victim as categories of victims’, lists the following
‘different international categories of victims’ according to international soft or
conventional law: (a) victims of crime; (b) victims of abuse of power; (c) victims of
gross violations of international human rights law; (d) victims of serious violations of
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situations’ 12 of typically ‘vulnerable’ victims in ‘areas of crime’ of
particular concern to the EU, now falling under art 83(1) TFEU, have
become the objective of ad hoc—‘vertical’—binding provisions and
measures at the European Union level, which complement the Council
of Europe Istanbul, Lanzarote, and Warsaw European Conventions. 13
These EU legal instruments are:
- Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking
in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA;
- Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA;
- Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.
Directive 2011/36/EU is the first legislative initiative taken under
art 83(1) TFEU (Vervaele 2014: 44). Both Directive 2011/36/EU on
trafficking in human beings and Directive 2011/92/EU on sexual
offences against children combine a threefold objective: prevention,
repression, and protection. Therefore, protection of these particular
victims—in terms of assistance, support, protection from secondary
victimisation, and so on—comes together with prevention and,
primarily, with the binding criminalisation on the part of Member
States of the acts described in those directives. These two directives
‘go beyond’ the ‘classic content as foreseen under the Council’s model
provisions’, including inter alia ‘many aspects of victim protection and
victim rights’ (Vervaele 2014: 45). And in fact both directives’
preambles refer to art 82(2) and art 83(1) TFEU. This combination is
quite unique in the panorama of the European legislation, where either
international humanitarian law; (e) victims of enforced disappearance; (f) victims of
trafficking; (g) victims of terrorism.
12 European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 3.
13 Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence (CETS n 210), Istanbul 2011; Convention on the
Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS n 201),
Lanzarote, 2007; Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS n 196), Warsaw,
2005.
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criminalisation and repression of offences or victims’ protection are
usually set forth, as separate areas of intervention.
As stated in art 1, the recent Directive (EU) 2017/541 also
establishes minimum rules concerning the criminalisation of offences
related to terrorism, terrorist groups, and terrorist activities, ‘as well as
measures of protection of, and support and assistance to, victims of
terrorism’, in accordance with the (‘horizontal’) Victims Directive: yet
Directive (EU) 2017/541 is framed as having regard ‘in particular’ to
art 83(1) TFEU, a sign which places this Directive in the light of the
EU crime policy ‘in the areas of particularly serious crimes with a
cross-border dimension’, rather than in the light of ‘the rights of
victims of crime’ following art 82(2)(c) TFEU.
As described by Stefano Manacorda and Irene Gasparini in
chapter three of this volume, policies in fields such as environmental
protection, while sometimes compelling the criminalisation and
punishment of conducts causing death and/or injury to physical
persons, do not contemplate victims and victims’ rights as such. Pour
cause, one might provisionally add.
The Victims Directive, on the other hand, has the sole purpose of
protecting, supporting, and assisting victims of criminal offences and
of ensuring they are entitled to certain procedural rights in criminal
justice. The Directive 2012/29/EU Guidance Document clearly affirms
that ‘its object is not to criminalise certain acts or behaviours in the
Member States’. 14 This said, the above-mentioned European Com-
mission’s Communication presenting the 2011 Victims Package of
proposals clearly states that the needs of crime victims are a ‘central
part of the justice system, alongside catching and punishing the
offenders’ (p 2)—a controversial statement, as Mitsilegas points out
(2015: 335).
On the contrary, criminalisation, as the obligation of a Member
State under the ECHR to effectively protect its citizens, is deeply
embedded in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(and not without debate) (Gialuz 2012: 29). 15 In the Strasbourg
Court’s decisions, criminalisation comes in combination with another
affirmed obligation of Member States: that of a thorough investigation,
capable under due conditions of reaching the disclosure of criminal
14 See again European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to
the transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 7 (emphasis
added).
15 See chapter four in this volume.
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facts and the conviction and punishment of the offender found guilty
(Gialuz 2015: 29; Allegrezza 2012: 21). 16 Conviction and punishment,
though, are in no way among the rights of victims. Much thought is
still needed on the issue of a State’s obligation to investigate, which is
echoed, for instance, in international and EU ‘vertical’ provisions
regarding specific vulnerable groups of victims. For instance,
according to art 9 of the Directive on trafficking in human beings,
investigation and prosecution of such offences are ‘not dependent on
reporting or accusation by a victim’, and ‘criminal proceedings may
continue even if the victim has withdrawn his or her consent’. Another
example of similar provisions is offered by art 8 of the Framework
Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia, with the
motivation that victims of these crimes ‘are often particularly
vulnerable and reluctant to initiate legal proceedings’ (recital 11)
(Gialuz 2012: 68). Proactive enforcement may be a necessity in certain
areas of crime, including in order to adequately protect victims of such
crime. Yet proactive criminal enforcement may trap victims into the
vicious cycle of secondary victimisation resulting from criminal
proceedings, especially if during those proceedings the vulnerability of
each individual victim to secondary victimisation is not carefully and
accurately assessed and appropriate action taken.
There is another series of decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights on a parallel, yet different, topic, which is of signal
importance for our project: this is the ECtHR case law concerning the
lack (or failure) of action on the part of national authorities to protect
fundamental rights such as life, health, and private and family life,
under arts 2 and 8 ECHR, in cases inter alia of exposure to polluted
sites and industrial emissions, dangerous industrial activities, natural
disasters, and so on. Interestingly, these judgments are not—or not
entirely—focused on the lack of investigation, but more openly and
directly focused on the State’s positive obligation to protect
individuals’ rights via appropriate and effective measures that, in the
given situation, would have prevented harm in the first place, and the
lack of which resulted in an infringement of the said rights. 17
Tracing the issue of ‘vulnerability’ throughout the European
legislation is a fascinating task. The term ‘vulnerability’/‘vulnerable’
appears quite early in the development of European law concerning
victims’ rights, and is present throughout its evolution: we find the
16 Eg, chapter four in this volume.
17 See chapter four in this volume.
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word ‘vulnerability’ (and its various declinations) in legal instruments
concerning both ‘general’ victims and ‘specific groups’ of victims, as
identified above: from the ‘general’ Framework Decision 2001/220/
JHA (arts 2, 8, 18), to the Stockholm Programme, to the ‘specific’
2011/36/EU Directive on human trafficking (recitals 2, 8, 12, 22, 23;
art 2) etc. The reference to the ‘particular vulnerability’ of (certain)
victims appears expressly four times even in the Directive 2012/29/EU
(recitals 38, 58; art 22(1)(3) Dir), a directive known for its overcoming
of abstract categories in favour of the notion of the ‘individual
assessment’ of the ‘specific protection needs’ of each victimised
person (arts 22, 23) (Parizot 2015: 284).
In some ways, the term ‘vulnerability’ is even contradictory.
First, ‘vulnerability can be considered as an attribute inherent to
human nature’ (Ippolito and Iglesias Sánchez 2015a: 1): we are all
vulnerable in many ways. Second, vulnerability is not exclusively a
characteristics of victims of crime: as Ippolito and Iglesias Sánchez
point out (2015a: 5), the conception of vulnerability concerns,
individually or collectively, several groups of people: from asylum
seekers to the elderly in nursing homes. This aspect emerges as
significant for the scope of this project and research: there are many
references to vulnerable populations or vulnerable subjects (pregnant
women, unborn, infants, workers etc), for instance, in EU product
safety law. 18 Third, victims of crime are not only vulnerable, but are
persons who have in the archaic usage already been ‘vulnerated’ (or
violated). The idea of the ‘vulnerable victim’ is yet another ‘paradox’
(Gialuz 2012: 91) 19 of the victim’s condition alongside other
paradoxes, such as the need to be heard which provokes the risk of
secondary victimisation that often stems from criminal proceedings;
or the need to be protected not only from the offender, but also from
the process of justice itself.
One of the core novelties of the 2012 Victims Directive is
precisely that it (partly) overcomes abstract ‘macro’ categories of
vulnerable subjects (the elderly, women, etc) in favour of the key idea
that every victim may be ‘vulnerable’, even if they do not belong to
(objective or subjective) vulnerable ‘groups’. The Directive therefore
focuses on an individualised and personalised comprehensive approach
in which the individual ‘protection needs’ must be singularly assessed
18 See chapter three in this volume.
19 Stitt and Giacopassi (1993: 71) also refer to the ‘paradox of victimization’ in
relation to victims of corporate harms.
VICTIMS OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE IN THE EU 31
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
and taken into account (FRA 2014: 47, 77). 20 This assessment must
guide competent authorities (police and judicial authorities) and victim
support services in dealing with victims case by case, and in offering
them the most adequate and tailored protection, assistance, and support
(Rafaraci 2015: 221).
Arts 22 and 23 of the 2012 Directive open a whole new space for
reflection and research. The implication of the individual assessment of
(each) victim’s protection needs is, in fact, still largely unexplored by
both scholars and practitioners. 21 The effectiveness of this approach
requires significant competence, sensitivity, attention, and care on the
part of the police, the judiciary, and victim support organisations.
Sufficient time will therefore have to be spent by practitioners with
every single victim, in order to carefully listen to (and understand)
their personal narratives. Only tailored, active listening to their story
and deposition—including what remains untold or unspeakable—will
reveal the actual needs for protection of that very person. These are
important aspects of the victim’s right ‘to be recognised and treated in
a respectful, sensitive, tailored, professional and non-discriminatory
manner’ (art 1(1)), ‘to be understood’ (art 3), and ‘to be heard’ (art 10).
We may wonder (or indeed doubt) whether the criminal justice
system and the victim support services are sufficiently equipped with
the aforementioned precious, yet scarce, resources of time, attention,
etc. 22 A real fulfilment of the Victims Directive’s provisions, though,
depends on the individual assessment being taken seriously by national
legislators and competent authorities (see, eg Pemberton and
20 See chapter six in this volume.
21 On this topic, among reports and publications stemming from previous EU co-
funded projects, see, ex multis, eg: IVOR Report (Biffi et al 2016); Victims Support
Europe reports and manuals (www.victimsupport.eu); Good Practices for Protecting
Victims Inside and Outside the Criminal Process, research project coordinated by the
University of Milano (Lupária 2015) (www.protectingvictims.eu, last accessed 15
January 2018); Centre for European Constitutional Law & Institute for Advanced
Legal Studies (sine dato), Protecting Victims’ Rights in the EU: The Theory and
Practice of Diversity of Treatment During the Criminal Trial: Comparative Report and
Policy Recommendations (www.victimsprotection.eu, last accessed on 15 December
2016); EVVI Guide: EVvaluation of VIctims, 2015 (available at http://www.justice.-
gouv.fr/aide-aux-victimes-10044/un-guide-pour-levaluation-des-victimes-28155.html,
last accessed on 15 January 2018). On the assessment of specific groups of victims’
needs, see, eg the INASC project Make It Happen: European Toolkit to Improve Needs
Assessment and Victims Support in Domestic Violence Related Criminal Proceedings
(http://www.inasc.org/pdf/INASC-international-Brochure-EU-Make_it_happen.pdf,
last accessed 15 January 2018).
22 The topic of victim support is crucial: see chapter eight in this volume.
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Groenhuijsen 2012; Aertsen 2016; Victims and Corporations 2017).
The diffuse lack of awareness and of specialised training must still be
rectified, especially in those EU Member States where victims’ rights
do not matter (yet) as much as they do for the European Union itself.
Awareness-raising campaigns, education, research, and exchange
of information are in fact among the indications given by the 2012
Directive (recital 62 and art 26). Training of practitioners is another
important part of the Victims Directive provisions (art 25 and recital
61), particularly since the EU norms underline the necessity of
appropriate training to enable all the relevant practitioners (police
officers, court staff, prosecutors, judges, public services) ‘to
recognise victims and to treat them in a respectful, professional and
non-discriminatory manner’ (art 25(5) Dir). Timely recognition of
victims—and moreover of victims with specific needs—is both a
duty and a mission that the Directive puts in the hands of Member
States and of national authorities and professionals. Recognition of
victims is indeed crucial, and it is in fact a condition to ensure
victims’ effective access to support, protection, and to the exercise of
their rights.
This said, new problems arise. Issues concerning victims’ rights are
in fact invariably ‘complex, multifaceted and controversial’ (Bottoms
and Roberts 2010: xx). The individual assessment of protection
needs—one of the main highlights of the Directive 2012/29/EU—brings
about what has been stigmatised as an ‘individualisation of security’,
involving a ‘potential reconfiguration of the relationship between the
individual and the State’, and having ‘profound justice implications’,
especially in regards to the defendants (Mitsilegas 2015: 334; Mitsilegas
2016: ep 6791; see also Tonry 2010). Moreover, according to this
analysis, individualising security fosters a possible expansion of State
power, which requires the most careful scrutiny, especially in times
when freedom is in constant tension with the need for security
(Mitsilegas 2015: 334; Tonry 2010). The issues raised by these critical
voices are relevant and deserve attention, also in light of another
significant—yet again complex and multifaceted—aspect of the Victims
Directive: that is, its definition of crime as ‘a wrong against society as
well as a violation of the individual rights of the victims’ (recital 9). This
definition opens another set of philosophical, juridical, and political
questions with which criminal law scholars have been engaged for
centuries.
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1.3. A Comprehensive and Multi-Level System
Much has been written about the contents of the Victims Directive
and its enrichment of Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, which it
replaces. Instead of focusing on a description of the individual
provisions, 23 it is preferable here to briefly concentrate on a more
general view of the changes in policies, culture, and practices that the
adoption of the Directive triggers in addressing victims’ rights.
According to Mitsilegas (2015: 320; 2016: ep 6491), the Directive
2012/29/EU ‘introduces a multi-level system of protection of the
victim’, while constituting ‘an attempt to establish minimum standards
rules on the rights of victims in face of the considerable diversity in
national criminal justice system as regards the position and rights of
the victim’. The Directive in fact builds a ‘comprehensive’ 24 system,
which takes into account the multiple needs of the victims
(corresponding to their multiple rights and interests), such as:
- recognition,
- recognition of vulnerability and/or of specific protection needs,
- respect,
- information,
- support,
- protection,
- access to justice and participation in criminal proceedings,
- access to compensation and restoration.
Within this system, which has already achieved considerable
articulation through the work of the various legal bodies, two major
axes interestingly intersect. On the one hand, there is a constant call to
tailor and target each intervention to the individual victim’s condition
and needs, as mentioned above. On the other, the implementation of
the Directive 2012/29/EU requires looking at ‘the wider picture’: that
is, to combine ‘legislative, administrative and practical measures’, as
stated in the Guidance Document, 25 and to coordinate the ‘horizontal’
system of rights attributed by the Victims Directive with the whole
European set of legal instruments concerning victims of crime, such as
Directives 2004/80/EC (compensation) or 2011/99/EU (European
protection order in criminal matters), but also, for instance, Regulation
23 Addressed in particular by Enrico Mancuso, chapter two in this volume.
24 European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 4.
25 European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 4.
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606/2013 (mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters).
In addition, the Commission’s transposition and implementation
Guidance Document calls resoundingly for a coordination among ‘all
stakeholders’: 26 from national legislators (in the exercise of their
discretion when transposing the Directive) to criminal justice
authorities in day-to-day activities, ‘including the police, judicial
authorities, relevant administrative bodies (such as legal aid admin-
istration, probation and mediation service) and victims’ support
providers’ ending with NGOs and civil society. 27 The Victims
Directive multi-level system has to be implemented within a wider
network of subjects, legal tools, and actions, at international,
European, and national levels.
1.4. Protection: The Bridge Between ‘Support’ and ‘Justice’
Following art 8 of the Directive 2012/29/EU, one of the primary
rights of victims is that of being able to access confidential victim
support services, and if necessary specialist support (Gialuz 2012: 73).
These services are charged with ‘acting in the interests of victims’ (art
8(1)). 28
For a victim, the right to access support services is of extreme
practical importance; nevertheless, this right is widely neglected by
many of the EU Member States. Interestingly, access to victim support
is entirely parallel to and independent from criminal justice, having to
be ensured ‘before, during and for an appropriate time after criminal
proceedings’, irrespective of whether the victim has made a formal
complaint (arts 8(1), 8(5) Dir). This significant right of the victim does
not create tensions vis à vis the rights and interests of the suspects, the
accused persons, and the offenders. As outlined by Lupária (2012: 39)
with reference to the US Parallel Justice Project (Herman 2010), 29 the
idea of ‘parallel obligations’ towards victims and offenders is
26 Ibid p 3.
27 Ibid pp 33, 49.
28 See chapter eight in this volume.
29 Following the core idea that ‘Justice not only requires a fair and appropriate
response to people who commit crimes; it also requires helping victims of crime
rebuild their lives’, the Parallel Justice Project aims at implementing a ‘new framework
for responding to crime—two separate, parallel paths to justice—one for victims and
one for offenders. [...] [T]here would always be a separate set of responses for victims
of the crime. [...] These responses would not depend on whether the offender is ever
identified or convicted. In all cases, the harm experienced by victims of crime would
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promising, since it manages to separate the focus on the needs of actual
victims from (punitive) criminal justice. Bottoms and Roberts (2010:
xx) note how ‘the victims’ right movement cannot be seen as a
monolithic enterprise [...], exercis[ing] a unidimensional influence on
criminal justice policy-making’ in a punitive direction: there is in fact a
perspective that primarily ‘seeks to ensure that victims [...] receive
their service rights’. There is a lot that can (and must) be done in
favour of victims outside criminal justice, and independently from it.
In the European ‘horizontal’ system of protection of each and
every victim, as comprehensively outlined by both EU law and the
ECtHR-ECJ case law, the relationship between victims and ‘justice’ is
multi-faceted, and not limited to criminal justice. It comprises, in fact,
a wide range of profiles, which correspond to the equally widely
ranging rights or interests of the victim. They can be summarised as
follows:
- access to information, including access to simple and accessible
communication, to translation and interpretation (arts 3 ff of the
Directive 2012/29/EU);
- an articulated series of rights set out by the Directive 2012/29/EU
in relation to victims’ ‘interaction’ with competent authorities,
inside or/and outside criminal justice;
- an articulated series of rights attributed by the Directive 2012/29/
EU in relation to victims’ participation in criminal proceedings
(chapter 4 of the Directive);
- access to: (a) criminal, administrative, or civil measures of
protection which include protection orders in criminal and civil
matters; (b) measures of protection tailored on an individualised
assessment to identify specific protection needs; and (c) special
measures in case of particular vulnerability (arts 18 ff of the
Directive 2012/29/EU; Directive 2011/99/EU, Regulation (EU)
606/2013). Protection of victims further includes measures
(diverse in nature) that the State has to take in order to safeguard
the rights granted under the ECHR (ECtHR case law);
- the right to compensation from the offender, which includes the
right to a decision on this issue in the course of criminal
proceedings (art 16); the right to compensation from a Member
State’s authority in case of violent intentional crimes having a
cross-border dimension (Directive 2004/80/EC);
- a set of rights and interests related to situations having a cross-
be acknowledged and addressed separately and apart from the criminal justice
process’: see www.paralleljustice.org (last accessed on 25 January 2018).
36 CHAPTER I
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
border dimension which might affect free movement and non-
discrimination on grounds of residence status (Directive 2012/29/
EU; Directive 2011/99/EU; Directive 2004/80/CE etc);
- an interest in investigating on the part of the State, corresponding
to its positive obligation to protect individual rights under ECHR
(ECtHR case law).
From the list above it appears that the issue of protection is ideally
located between service rights and procedural rights, so as to seal those
two aspects of the European targeted system in favour of victims.
Victim protection seems to be two-sided: it has something in common
with victim support, because of its forward-looking aim to sustain the
victim and to avoid further negative consequences, such as repeat and
secondary victimisation. But it also has something in common with
access to justice in the broad sense, since protection measures are made
available by resorting to the ‘competent authorities’ (be they criminal,
administrative, or civil), and especially to the judiciary because of
these measures’ actual or potential negative effect on other people’s
fundamental liberties and freedoms. In addition, some of the protection
measures envisaged by the Victims Directive take place inside criminal
justice, and during criminal investigations or criminal proceedings.
Finally, protection measures are concerned in many ways with the
position of the victims in the relevant criminal proceeding. It is not by
chance, perhaps, that ‘one of the major achievements’ 30 of the Victims
Directive concerns precisely the ‘individual assessment of victims’ in
order to identify their ‘specific protection needs’ (art 22): it is in this
ground-breaking provision that all the levels and dimensions of the
protection of victims seem to be concentrated.
1.5. Suspects, Accused Persons, and Offenders (Must) Matter Too
The European Union is clearly victim-sensitive. One may argue
that the European Union nowadays is also victim-centred. But is this
happening at the expense of the suspect, the accused person, or of the
convicted offender?
The topic is thorny and contested. Attention to victims because of
their suffering and harm is due for many noble reasons (including the
freedom of movement without discrimination throughout the EU),
30 European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 44.
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reasons that the European Union has decided to put ‘at the heart of its
criminal justice agenda’. Up to now, protection and respectful
treatment—not repression per se—have expressly been the core
objectives of the EU in making victims matter. Nevertheless, putting
the victim at the centre of criminal justice and of criminal policies may
challenge fundamental principles, guarantees, and safeguards (Alle-
grezza 2012: 8, 26; Mitsilegas 2015: 313; Mitsilegas 2016: ep 6786;
Tonry 2010; Venturoli 2015: 117). This challenge has many pitfalls,
and it therefore requires constant attention and considerable wisdom on
the part of policymakers, European and national legislators, Justices in
Strasbourg and Luxembourg, national judges and prosecutors, and
enforcement agencies in general throughout the Union.
The ‘victim paradigm’, in fact, may everywhere steer criminal
justice towards enemy criminal law, penal populism, and excessive
severity in punishments (Garland 2001: 11, 103). It may distort the
guarantee to a fair trial and other fundamental procedural and penal
guarantees in favour of the victims of crime instead of the potential
victims of justice, as we may call them (Dubber 2002; Spangher 2017;
Stella 2003). According to some analyses, excessive attention to the
rights of victims may transform the culture of human rights into a
‘culture of complaint’ (Huges 1993), and at the extreme may run the
risk of transforming vulnerable, defenceless, victims of crime into the
‘heroes of our times’ (Giglioli 2014), the ‘étoiles de la scène pénale’
(Wyvekens 1999, as quoted by Gialuz 2015: 21), entitled to political
power and to some sort of celebrity status (Eliacheff and Soulez
Larivière 2007). Of course, populist victimism tends to ‘use’ victims
for purposes other than their true protection and the respect for their
dignity.
The formal recognition of and respect for the rights of the suspect,
the accused, and the offender is therefore of utmost importance.
European Union legal instruments and other documents, and the
jurisprudence by both the European Court of Human Rights and the
Court of Justice of the European Union, lay emphasis on the need to
respect both the rights and interests of the victims and the rights,
interests, and guarantees of the accused person and the offender. This
must in fact be a permanent concern, since only a system capable of
ensuring the protection of both those who harmed and those who were
harmed, regardless of nationality and residence status, is a true, non-
discriminatory, justice system (Eusebi 2013).
Yet the rights of victims and the rights of defendants do
(sometimes) conflict.
Due to the enormous diversity in criminal justice systems in
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different States, and especially as regards their criminal procedures,
national legislators still have great discretion in framing the turning
point at which the rights and safeguards of the accused overcome the
rights of protection and participation in the criminal proceedings of the
victims (Allegrezza 2015: 6; Lupária 2012; Mitsilegas 2015: 330).
And—even more thornily—vice versa.
The European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ also greatly
contribute in designing the ‘impact’ which victims will have in
criminal trials and setting the limits to their role, and consequently in
fixing the actual balance of the scale. How to conduct hearings
involving victims in the course of criminal trials, protection of
vulnerable ‘categories’ of victims, and the need to shelter victims from
secondary victimisation are some of the frequently disputed matters.
The issue of the balance between victims’ rights and the rights and
safeguards of the suspected or accused is especially present in the
extensive Court of Human Rights case law, 31 whereas the Luxem-
bourg Court primarily devoted itself to defining the exact frame of the
notion of ‘victim’ and to interpreting the scope of the (then)
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, mainly as far as victims’
testimony and the protection of vulnerable persons are concerned.
According to Tonry (2010), the very idea of ‘balancing’—or ‘re-
balancing’—criminal justice ‘in favour of the victim’ must be
contested, if (or when, or because) it comes along with punitive
victims’ movements that manage to shift policies towards repression.
On the contrary, as Tonry further argues, ‘few will disagree that
victims should be dealt with sympathetically and supportively. That
implies nothing, however, about treating defendants and offenders
badly’ (Tonry 2010: 76). Not to mention the fact that offenders, and
especially imprisoned offenders, can immediately become ‘vulnerable’
subjects—and even proper vulnerable victims of crime—if improper
forms of authority or unjustified rights restrictions are imposed on
them (the ECtHR case law is clear on this topic).
Arts 5, 6, and 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights and
arts 47–50 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights comprise
the rights and safeguards of defendants. Besides legal tools to protect
victims, the European Union has increasingly set (minimum) binding
standards ‘to ensure that the basic rights of suspects and accused
persons are protected sufficiently’ 32 (although the balance in the scale
31 See chapter four in this volume.
32 European Commission webpage affirming the EU commitment to the ‘rights
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of European priorities when it comes to rights of victims and rights of
defendants is still a matter of scholarly dispute). In the period 2010–13,
three directives have been adopted with regards to procedural rights in
criminal proceedings in favour of the suspects and the accused persons
(right to interpretation and translation; right to information; right of
access to a lawyer) (FRA 2016; Mitsilegas 2016: ep 5487).
Interestingly, in 2016 three more directives were devoted to the rights
of the defendants, with the purposes, respectively, of ensuring the
effectiveness of the right of access to a lawyer as provided for under
the 2013 Directive, strengthening the presumption of innocence and
other aspects of the fair trial, and establishing procedural safeguards
for children in conflict with the law. This set of directives is worth
mentioning in its entirety:
- Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and
translation in criminal proceedings;
- Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal
proceedings;
- Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in
criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings,
and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of
liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular
authorities while deprived of liberty;
- Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children
who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings;
- Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused
persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in
European arrest warrant proceedings;
- Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of
the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the
trial in criminal proceedings.
Returning to the Victims Directive provisions, recital 12 clearly
states that the rights of victims set out by the EU binding instrument
of suspects and accused’: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/criminal-justice/rights-suspects-and-accused_en (last accessed on 15 January
2018).
40 CHAPTER I
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
‘are without prejudice to the rights of the offender’: this is a necessary
and due affirmation which requires some clarification.
The service rights of victims (advice, support, and assistance) do
not pose problems per se with regards to the rights of defendants.
These service rights, in fact, are in principle to be directed to the victim
in accordance with a tailored and professional approach (as required by
the Directive) and they do not (or should not) cause immediate
limitations on the freedoms and rights of the accused person or the
convicted offender, nor rebalance fair trial safeguards in favour of the
victim.
The procedural rights of the victims, however, are (much) more
controversial, since they expressly assign the victim a participatory
‘role in the relevant criminal proceeding’. This role challenges
adversarial rules and the right to confrontation (and procedures
thereafter); it may restrain the action of the defence council during
interviews with victims and in witness hearings, especially in case of
vulnerable people or people with special needs of protection from
secondary victimisation (Mitsilegas 2016: ep 6512). Victims’ impact
statements and other forms of participation in the proceedings may
even influence decisions about conviction, punishment, and release of
a person in custody. It is with special regards to procedural rights,
though, that the Victims Directive has ‘hedged’ the European contours
of victims’ interests, by conferring national legislators ample discretion
(Allegrezza: 2015; Mitsilegas 2015: 333).
The right to protection and the adoption of protection measures
or special measures resulting from the individual assessment of
specific needs of the victim (chapter 4 of the Directive) raise further
questions. Victims have the right to the protection of their dignity and
to be protected from ‘secondary and repeat victimisation’, from
‘intimidation and retaliation’, and ‘against the risk of emotional or
psychological harm’ (arts 18, 22). It is not in their rights to say how
this protection should occur, although according to art 22(6) victims
must be closely involved and their wishes should be taken into
account, including their wish not to benefit from protective
measures. 33 One may argue that the references to ‘measures’ (art
33 The provisions of art 22(6) raise the question of whether a future shift will
occur in ECJ jurisprudence from the precedent of Joined cases C-483/09 and C-1/10
Gueye – Sanchez [2011] (both cases resulting in the irrelevance of the victim’s will to
be approached by the offender in the frame of a judicial decision confirming an
ancillary penalty enjoining a domestic violence offender not to do so).
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18) and ‘special measures’ of protection (arts 22, 23) mark the climax of
the conflicting relationship between victims’ rights and defendants’
rights in the frame of Directive 2012/29/EU. These measures, in fact,
might have a substantial impact on the defendant’s procedural rights and
might significantly constrain his/her freedoms, as is the case with
protection orders. And yet the rationale and the explicit protective (not
punitive) purpose of these measures are actually grounds for legitimately
balancing the two conflicting interests. References to ‘victims’ concerns
and fears’ (recital 58), to ‘emotional and psychological harm’ (art 18),
and to ‘wishes’ (art 22(6)), though, are indeed problematic: these aspects
are too subjective to meet the robust criteria needed to ascertain the
actual necessity of issuing protection measures that limit or restrict one
or more of the defendant’s rights and freedoms. Recital 58 and arts 18
and 23 of the Victims Directive fix the insuperable limits of this balance
of conflicting interests: ‘without prejudice to the rights of the defence
and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion’. These safeguards
accompany those already envisaged, for instance, by the Directive 2011/
99/EU concerning the European protection order in favour of the
‘person causing the danger’ (recitals 17, 37, art 9, etc).
History records the conflictual relation between criminal justice
and victims of crime: from private ‘eye for eye’ retributive justice at
the hands of those who have been harmed, through the long period in
which victims were ‘forgotten’, and thence to the recent period in
which they are being ‘re-discovered’ (Forti 2000: 252). Both the
‘wrongful’ inclusion and the ‘wrongful’ exclusion of victims has
deep consequences for the legitimacy of the criminal justice system,
and the search for the proper and ‘right’ role of victims in criminal
justice often poses ‘intractable dilemmas’ (Bottoms and Roberts
2010: xix).
Victims may be an ‘uncomfortable’ presence in criminal justice
systems: their presence compels us to face suffering and vulnerability.
Yet it is precisely victims’ ‘unconfortable-ness’ that raises questions
about criminal justice: its abstract technicalities; its incapability to give
reasonable responses to crime; its brutality, often, towards actual
persons (offenders, who may fall victims of an ‘unjust’ justice;
innocents, who may fall victims of judicial miscarriages; victims of
crime stricto sensu, who may encounter secondary victimisation). This
questioning, though, offers in return a unique opportunity for criminal
justice to change. It is in fact true that a wise victim-sensitive criminal
justice system may have a ‘positive impact on individual victims and
on society as a whole’, as stated by the European Commission in its
2011 Communication.
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A possible ‘right’ direction of change may be borrowed from the
South African Constitutional Court’s landmark decision invalidating
capital punishment: ‘It is only if there is a willingness to protect the
worst and the weakest amongst us, that all of us can be secure that our
own rights will be protected’. 34 This is ‘the test of our commitment to
a culture of rights’, as eloquently put in South African Justice Langa’s
concurrent opinion in ‘dialogue’ with us. This is echoed in Michael
Tonry’s words too: ‘treating offenders well, better, or sympathetically
does no damage to victims. Victims have the same interests as other
citizens in having a criminal justice system that is fair, efficient and
humane’ (Tonry 2010: 76).
2. The Challenge of Implementing the Directive 2012/29/EU with
Victims of Corporate Crime and Corporate Violence
2.1. Building Bridges
Borrowing some thoughts from the literature concerning the
victims of international crimes, we too wonder whether victims of
corporate violence have thus far ‘received “second class” treatment’
(de Casadevante Romani 2012: 4). And if indeed they have, we wonder
if this is because of the complex forms of their victimisation and the
many obstacles they encounter when accessing justice, or rather
because of corporate violence being one of the ‘crimes of the powerful’
(Rothe and Kauzlarich 2016; Leonard 2015: 61).
Significant attention has recently been paid by the United Nations
and the EU to the violations of human rights in business conduct in the
framework of so-called ‘Business and Human Rights’, 35 whether those
34 Constitutional Court of South Africa, S v Makwanyane and Another [1995]
CCT/3/94 [88].
35 See especially the UN (2011) Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrin-
ciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, last accessed on 25 January 2018) and the OECD
(2011) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing, available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en, last accessed on 25 January 2018).
The major legal sources related to Business and Human Rights are available in
section (D) of the European and International Selected Legal Resources and Case
Law. Appendix to the Mid-Term Report, at www.victimsandcorporations.eu (last
accessed 15 January 2018).
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violations be criminal offences or not. Business and Human Rights is
an interesting field for policies and practices that are currently
developing (including judiciary practices), and a far-reaching field for
research especially with a focus on victims of corporate violence
(Engelhart 2016; Engehart 2017).
However, victims of corporate crime and corporate violence as
such are not—or at least not yet—formally recognised as belonging to
a ‘vulnerable group’ in either international or European (soft or hard)
legal sources, despite the studies now available about the specific
character of corporate victimisation and the many cases occurring
worldwide (Victims and Corporations 2017; Visconti 2017). 36 Nor are
these victims cited among the examples of the ‘typically’ vulnerable,
such as the elderly, the victims of gender-based violence or of
organised crime, and other categories.
Although every victim ostensibly matters to the European Union,
victims of corporate violence per se seem entirely absent in its
official documents regarding victims and victims’ rights. The
Stockholm Programme, for example, is rich in references to victims
of crime and to several vulnerable groups, and it also makes direct
reference to economic crime, mainly understood as financial
crime—but not to the victims of it. Similarly, the European Internal
Security Strategy (ISS) 37 refers to economic crime as one of the
‘main crime-related risks and threats facing Europe today’, but when
it come to victims, corporate victims are not expressly highlighted.
Among the European principles and values that inspired its drafting,
the ISS recalls the ‘protection of all citizens, especially the most
vulnerable, with the focus on victims of crimes’ (emphasis added): yet
it is other groups of victims who are referred to explicitly (ie ‘victims
of crimes such as trafficking in human beings or gender violence,
including victims of terrorism who also need special attention,
support and social recognition’), even though corporate violence
seems to fit perfectly within the majority of the ‘main challenges for
the internal security of the EU’ listed in the ISS. The list, in fact,
comprises the following: ‘economic crime’, which is included in the
36 See chapter six in this volume.
37 European Council, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union:
Towards a European Security Model (Doc 7120/10 CO EUR-PREP 8 JAI 182, March
2010); European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps
Towards a More Secure Europe (COM(2010) 673 final of 22.11.2010).
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item dedicated to ‘serious crime’; ‘cross border crime’; ‘violence
itself’; and ‘man-made disasters’. While reaffirming the validity of
the ISS objectives, the 2015 European Agenda on Security sets out
three priorities: terrorism, organised crime, and cybercrime. Inter-
estingly, the Agenda underlines the ‘huge human, social and
economic costs’ caused by ‘crimes such as trafficking in human
beings, trade in firearms, drug smuggling, and financial, economic
and environmental crime’ (emphasis added), which are ‘clearly
interlinked and cross-border threats’ (emphasis added) with a ‘multi-
faceted and international dimension’ requiring ‘an effective and
coordinated response at the EU level’. 38 Moreover, connections
between corporate violence and typical areas of crime of EU concern
may clearly exist, as is the case, for instance, for corporations
involved in human trafficking within the broader context of labour
exploitation (see, eg in US literature, Rothe and Kauzlarich 2016:
91). 39 Still, when it come to victims, corporate victims are again not
expressly highlighted. It truly seems that corporate violence is ‘silent’
and ‘invisible’, and that this situation is perpetuated by the many
misconceptions about it which are still prevalent (Leonard 2016: 62).
There is of course a significant EU commitment in areas such as
corporate governance and sustainability, 40 disclosure of non-financial
38 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions The European Agenda on Security (Strasbourg, 28.4.2015
COM(2015) 185 final) pp 2, 12–13.
39 See also, eg, the South African cases of victims’ claims against international
companies and foreign banks accused of having financed, ‘backed, and profited from
the crime of apartheid’: Kesserling 2017, 38–39. Kesserling stresses how complex the
situation is for victims ‘when it comes to the obligations of nonstate actors, who do not
have the state’s duty to protect its citizens from harm, so that breaches of human rights
committed by them are often difficult to prove. Also, the justiciability of corporate
human rights breaches is more complicated and much less tested in courts, most of all
when it comes to companies’ “mere” aiding and abetting of human rights violations
committed by the state. Applicants need to prove a causal connection between the
companies’ actions or omissions and the injuries’ (p 39).
40 See, eg, the overview presented in the European Commission’s webpage
dedicated to ‘Company Law and Corporate Governance’: https://ec.europa.eu/
info/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/company-law-and-corporate-go-
vernance_en (last accessed 25 January 2018). See in particular the 2012 Action
Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance—A Modern Legal
Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies
(Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
COM/2012/0740 final).
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information, 41 consumer protection, 42 and others. Additionally, there
are many important legal instruments in the fields, for instance, of
product safety and of environmental protection, as further described by
Stefano Manacorda and Irene Gasparini in chapter three of this
volume. But there appears to be no connection—or no explicit
connection—between the European law of victims and European legal
instruments in the aforementioned corporate-sensitive areas. Briefly,
there seems to be some sort of gap between the system of rights set out
for victims in the European Union and those in other sectors of EU
legal intervention, which are significantly oriented towards risk
assessment, crime prevention, and criminalisation, but apparently not
addressed to victims’ direct protection. Those sectorial European laws
appear focused more on potential victims than actual victims. Hence,
up to now the protection of actual victims of corporate crime and
corporate violence is addressed only by the Directive 2012/29/EU, and
only because this Directive ‘horizontally’ concerns victims of crime in
general.
A normative ‘dialogue’, we believe, is needed not only between
European Courts, but perhaps also among European legal sources too.
41 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial
and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups. The Directive is of
utmost importance for the topics of this research. In fact, the Directive 2014/95/EU, as
summarised in the Eur-lex portal, ‘requires certain large companies to disclose relevant
non-financial information to provide investors and other stakeholders with a more
complete picture of their development, performance, and position and of the impact of
their activity. [...] Such companies are required to give a review of policies, principal
risks and outcomes, including on: environmental matters; social and employees
aspects; respect for human rights; anti-corruption and bribery issues; diversity on
boards of directors. [...] If companies do not have a policy on one of these areas, the
non-financial statement should explain why not. [...] Companies are given the freedom
to disclose this information in the way they find useful or in a separate report. In
preparing their statements, companies may use national, European or international
guidelines such as the UN Global Compact. The European Commission will produce
non-binding guidelines on how to report non-financial information by December 2016’
(available at ht tp:/ /eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=CE-
LEX:32014L0095, last accessed on 25 January 2018). Disclosure of non-financial
information is extremely relevant in the frame of both the prevention of victimisation
and the protection of actual, potential, and future victims of corporate violence: for the
purposes of this particular research, see especially Caputo 2017.
42 For a brief overview of actions and legal tools in the EU see, eg, the European
Commission webpage on ‘Consumers’ protection’ (consumers’ safety; consumers’
rights and law): https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/consumers/consumer-protection_en
(last accessed on 25 January 2018).
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It will be worth exploring ways to bridge the ‘horizontal’, general, EU
provisions (and their national transpositions) concerning victims’
rights, and the ‘vertical’ EU provisions (and their national transposi-
tions) regarding consumer protection, product safety, environmental
protection, disclosure of non-financial information, etc. The interaction
between existing EU legal instruments appears to be important in terms
of the effective protection of actual victims throughout the European
Union. These legal ‘bridges’ and the normative ‘dialogue’ among
European legal sources (and their national transpositions) fit into the
comprehensive approach to victims’ protection that is at the heart of
the Directive 2012/29/EU, and may contribute to better implementing
it. Moreover, creating legal synergies may even help in overcoming
other types of gaps that greatly affect the successful protection of
corporate victims, such as the immense problem of scientific
uncertainty (for instance uncertainty about the harmful or hazardous
nature of a given chemical substance). Finally, legal interconnections
among the diverse relevant European instruments and their national
transpositions may help in the process of harmonisation and trust-
building within EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
In building those bridges, a few warnings are necessary. The
‘fundamental’ and constitutional stability—and righteousness, dare we
say—of those legal connections rests on the firm commitment by those
in charge of implementing the law to taking the rights and the interests
of all the subjects involved seriously. In particular, the commitment to
take victims’ rights and victims’ protection needs in due consideration
must come together with an equal, or fair, consideration for the rights
and the interests of the counterparts, and especially of corporate
individual suspects, accused persons and offenders.
We know only too well how hard this task is to accomplish. The
research literature has taught us that corporate violence is a dense
jungle of problems and, sometimes, an inextricable enigma. Caution
and wisdom are required when exploring this field and offering
proposals.
The dilemmas about how to respond to corporate violence, in
order to better protect its victims (see section 2.3.4), do not seem to
find answers in ‘conventional’ (ie, punitive) forms of (criminal)
justice: this is one of the first findings from this project. 43 The relevant
cases of corporate victimisation, which we made the objects of our
43 See in this volume the Annex ‘Policy Recommendations for National
Lawmakers and Policymakers’.
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theoretical and empirical research, offer some examples in this respect
(Giavazzi 2016a; Visconti 2017). 44 Punishment-oriented criminal
proceedings and corporate criminal-liability-related proceedings often
appear ineffective in ascertaining offences, holding corporations and
corporate offenders responsible, and preventing further negative
consequences for citizens and communities as a whole, and they also
end up being costly in terms of secondary victimisation. Out-of-court
settlements and non-prosecution agreements, where admissible within
national legal systems, present other problems and difficulties, and
may also cause secondary victimisation or entail a lack of recognition
of the victims of corporate violence, with indirect adverse con-
sequences on victims’ access to support and welfare/medical services.
In all likelihood, in order to implement the Victims Directive in the
field of corporate violence a new strategy has to be developed:
provisionally, in fact, it seems that ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and
Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2002)—which is compliance focuse-
d—and similar forms of preventive/restorative dynamism in justice
systems (Braithwaite 2016; Nieto Martín 2016) offer responses that are
worth deeper investigation and perhaps also worth experimenting with
in the European Union.
2.2. Revealing the Common Features of Corporate Violence to Better
Assess/Address these Victims’ Special Needs
The Directive 2012/29/EU requires a personalised and tailored
approach to each individual victim by assessing their individual
protection needs, and taking the consequent protective countermeasures.
In some ways, as often repeated, the Victims Directive partly abandons
abstract categories of vulnerability in favour of an actual, concrete,
analysis of the individual person’s exposure to risks of repeat
victimisation, retaliation, and secondary victimisation. From burglary
to sexual assault, from financial fraud to manslaughter, from
pickpocketing to domestic violence: every victim falling into the
definition of art 2 of the Directive deserves, and must receive, the proper
consideration together with an individualised assessment of his/her
‘special protection needs’ as provided by art 22. If this task is properly
and fully accomplished, then one may argue that there is no real
44 See chapter seven in this volume.
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necessity to focus on another category—or group—of victims (ie
corporate victims).
When scrutinised further, though, the system of support/
protection/rights of victims resulting from European law combines
the consideration of three relevant elements, identifiable as the
following: needs that are common to all victims of crime; needs that
are specific to some groups of victims; special needs that are specific to
the individual victim. Looking at the EU legal context, in fact, the
system set out by the European legislation now comprises:
- a set of common minimum standards established by the Directive
2012/29/UE;
- the obligation by Member States to ensure ‘a timely and individual
assessment’ of (personal) ‘specific protection needs’, as envisaged
by art 22(1) of the Victims Directive;
- a series of ‘satellite Directives’ concerning ‘specific situations’ of
vulnerability or of victimisation (trafficking in human beings,
sexual offences against children, terrorism). 45
According to art 22(2) of the Victims Directive in particular, the
individual assessment of specific protection needs is to be carried out
by taking into account ‘the type and nature of the crime’ (lett (b))
(emphasis added), alongside the unique ‘personal characteristics of the
victim’ (lett (a)) and the ‘circumstances of the crime’ (lett (c)). Hence,
the Directive’s step towards an actual case-by-case assessment of
protection needs does not exclude the importance of learning from the
phenomenology of corporate victimisation(s), in order to focus on
relevant common features (‘type and nature’) which are specific to the
sectors of corporate crime and corporate violence, therefore enhancing
the correct implementation of the Directive in those particular fields in
favour of the individual corporate victim.
Knowledge of the criminological and victimological features of
corporate crime and corporate violence 46 at least enables policymakers
and practitioners to rely on epistemological ‘hints’ drawn from
experience. By building on these broad characteristics—we may call
them ‘schemes’—of corporate victimisation, the personal condition
and the individual needs of the actual victim may be more easily
identified and better assessed. In addition to needs that are ‘common to
all categories of victims’, in fact, there are needs ‘specifically
connected to some particular categories of victims’ (de Casadevante
45 See section 1 of this chapter.
46 Addressed in particular by Arianna Visconti, chapter six in this volume.
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Romani 2012: 7). Knowledge of common features of corporate
victimisation is therefore helpful to put the ‘general’ Victims Directive
into practice in this ‘particular’ field.
2.3. A Closer Look at the Directive 2012/29/EU through the Lens of
Corporate Violence Victimisation
In section 1, a brief overview of the provisions of the Directive
2012/29/EU was provided. Our lenses in examining the Directive now
change: our interest is now focused on its implementation in the
specific field of corporate crime and corporate violence. In brief, we
now read through the Victims Directive again, bearing in mind the
criminological and victimological features of corporate crime and
corporate violence and the needs of corporate victims. 47 We briefly
point out (only) those provisions of the Victims Directive that most
directly pertain to the scope of our research, and we will select only a
few major aspects of the many issues emerging from the perspective of
implementing the Directive 2012/29/EU in cases of corporate
(violence) victimisation.
This analysis stems from the project’s findings, 48 which await
further validation and/or enrichment. Several of the topics treated here
lead to more questions and problems than answers and solutions. Hard
as it may be, these problems and open issues do not and must not
prevent us from trying to implement the Victims Directive in the
ground-breaking and far-reaching field of corporate violent crimes—and
doing so immediately. Of course, in all this we must constantly seek to
maintain a sound respect for both the rights of corporate victims and the
rights of the defendants, whether these be corporate legal entities or
individual persons who have acted in the interest of the corporation
concerned.
47 See chapter six in this volume.
48 Our analysis is based on the following: (a) European Commission DG Justice
Guidance Document; (b) desk research about corporate victimisation (see references);
(c) findings from the interviews and focus groups carried out in the frame of the
project’s empirical research (Victims and Corporations 2017; Visconti 2017); (d)
findings from the study of some ‘leading cases’ (Giavazzi 2016a; Giavazzi 2016b; see
also chapter seven in this volume).
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2.3.1. The Scope of the Victims Directive
As stated in recital 13, the Victims Directive (only)
applies in relation to criminal offences committed in the Union and to
criminal proceedings that take place in the Union. It confers rights on
victims of extra-territorial offences only in relation to criminal
proceedings that take place in the Union.
For the Directive to be applied, and therefore for a person claiming
to be a ‘victim’ to see it implemented in his/her situation, it is
necessary first for the act committed to be a criminal offence envisaged
by the national law. From the very beginning of the criminological
analysis on white-collar crime, one of the major problems with these
crimes is precisely their equivocal status as ‘crimes’—ie criminal
offences—in the strict legal meaning of the term (Sutherland 1949).
The topic is extensively discussed in the criminological literature: it
will suffice here to recall that, despite their harmful consequences on
physical persons, conducts related to the notion of corporate violence
may not always be considered criminal offences by national laws,
which excludes the applicability of the Directive. Not all types of
breach of law by a corporation is a ‘proscribed breach of the criminal
law’ (Hall 2013: 58). This is especially true in certain economic sectors
that are regulated more by civil or administrative provisions than by
criminal law. In the context of Business and Human Rights, however,
international legal documents refer to the broader notion of ‘violations
of human rights’. The United Nations has coined the term ‘victim of
abuse of power’ 49 to refer to persons who have suffered the
consequences of ‘acts or omissions that do not constitute violation of
national criminal law but of internationally recognized norms relating
to human rights’ (point 18) (de Casadevante Romani: 43). In both
cases, these victims of human rights violations are not included in the
system set out by the Directive 2012/29/EU, unless those violations are
actually criminal offences under national law.
As stated by Matthew Hall with specific regards to environmental
victims, ‘That the Directive should exclude victims in this way is
somewhat puzzling, given the pedigree of this instrument’ (Hall 2013:
59).
49 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power (1985): see chapter five in this volume.
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A second condition for the Directive to find application is that the
criminal offences must be committed in the EU or that criminal
proceedings take place in the European Union, irrespective of the
nationality or residence status of the potential victims. Art 1(2) and
recitals 9 and 10, in fact, affirm that the rights set out in the Directive
do not depend on the victim’s residence status, citizenship, or
nationality, and furthermore stress that these latter are not to be made
conditions for benefiting from the rights attributed by the Directive.
It is unnecessary to reiterate how huge and complex the cross-
border dimension of corporate crime may be, especially in cases of
multinational corporations or of enterprises that rely on international and
transnational supply chains, or of firms that sell their products all over
the EU. It can also be complex to determine where a certain corporate
offence has taken place and which, consequently, is the applicable legal
system and country where the criminal proceeding has to take place.
2.3.2. The Notion of ‘Victim’ and Their Recognition
Provided there actually is a national law establishing a criminal
offence, the path of corporate violence victims towards accessing
support, protection, and justice is still long and difficult.
This topic is replete with dense philosophical, juridical, and
practical implications, and here we can sketch only a few aspects. Who
are corporate victims, according to the Directive 2012/29/EU? When
do they become victims? Who is actually entitled to access the system
of rights set forth by the Directive? From when? And on the basis of
which conditions?
Some of these questions find answers in both the Directive’s
provisions and the ECJ case law (Gialuz 2015: 22; Mitsilegas 2015:
320; Venturoli 2015: 99; Savy 2013: 11). Others do not.
The definition of victim stands in art 2(1) of the Directive, which
has enriched the Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on this topic. Art
2(1) provides quite a clear definition, although advocates of victims
rights criticise it as being too narrow, as do advocates of corporate
victims, although even more vociferously (Hall 2013: 58). The UN
1985 Basic Principles provide, for instance, a wider notion which
includes ‘persons’ who ‘individually or collectively’ (emphasis added)
have suffered harm resulting from a criminal offence. 50 Although
50 See also chapter five in this volume.
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crime victims are of course sheltered by the protection system designed
by the Directive 2012/29/EU as a community of individuals,
underlining the collective dimension of certain forms of corporate
violence can be important when assessing protection needs and
implementing protection measures.
Under the Directive 2012/29/EU (and the former 2001 Framework
Decision), ‘victims’ are only ‘natural persons’ (art 2(1)(a)). Ruling on
the Third Pillar Victims’ Framework Decision, the Court of Justice of
the European Union has in the past excluded that legal persons can fall
under the notion of ‘victim of crime’. 51 The reasons for this exclusion
lie in the intimate bond that links the ‘victim’ to the (exclusively)
human experience of suffering from a harm. In brief: corporations are
not to be considered victims under the Directive 2012/29/EU; natural
persons who are victims of illicit conducts carried out by corporations,
however, are. Yet in Giovanardi 52 the Court of Justice ruled that
persons ‘harmed as a result of an administrative offence committed by
a legal person [...] cannot be regarded [...] as the victims of a criminal
act who are entitled to obtain a decision, in criminal proceedings, on
compensation by that legal person’, because of the administrative
nature, in that particular national legal system under scrutiny (Italy), of
the liability of legal persons. Corporate legal bodies, on the other hand,
may be included in the interpretation of the broader concept of ‘victim’
for the (different) purposes of the Directive 2004/80/EC (Dell’Orto).
The notion of ‘victim of crime’ poses other relevant questions that
challenge juridical and judicial logic. Oddly, though, there is little
analysis about the ‘relational’ nature of the concept of ‘victim of
crime’. No crime, no victim. Yet crime is a strange entity: it depends
on a criminal law envisaging it as an offence; it tries to remain hidden;
it takes place in the moment it is committed, but it is declared so only
following a conviction beyond any reasonable doubt. For a victim of
crime to exist, there must have been a crime in the first place. But for a
victim of crime a full recognition of his/her victimisation depends on
the fact that the crime is not only committed, but is also discovered and
the illicit facts ascertained in their criminal relevance. And this is the
task of criminal justice.
Very interestingly and importantly, though, recital 19 of the
Directive clearly states that ‘A person should be considered to be a
51 ECJ, Case C-205/09 Eredics – Sápi [2010]; ECJ, Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto
[2007].
52 ECJ, Case C-79/11 Giovanardi [2012].
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victim regardless of whether an offender is identified, apprehended,
prosecuted or convicted’ (emphasis added).
There seems therefore to be a sort of presumption of victimisation:
to be entitled to information and support, and—to some extent—to be
entitled to protection and to participation in criminal proceedings, it is
sufficient that a (natural) person claims to be a victim. This sort of
presumption perhaps counterbalances the presumption of innocence on
the part of the defendant. Yet there also appears to be a duty of
attention (and of care) on the part of the ‘competent authorities’ (ie
police, prosecutors, judges, support services etc): according to recital
37, in fact, ‘support should be available from the moment the
competent authorities are aware of the victim’ (emphasis added).
Among the noblest provisions of the Directive 2012/29/EU are those
dedicated to the recognition of victims. The Directive insists on the
importance for the victim to be recognised: recital 9, art 1(2), and
chapter 4 stress that victims of crime and their protection needs should
be recognised.
These articles and recitals of the Victims Directive are highly
relevant in respect to victims of corporate violence. Corporate
violence, in fact, is hard to prosecute because of its criminological
specificity, and because of many other ‘technical’ reasons that range
from rules of evidence, to proof of causation, to time limitations, to the
inner complexity which is related to the organisational and structural
nature of a corporation (Leonard 2016: 71; Boggio 2012).
In addition, scientific uncertainty, scientific controversies, and
controversial science cast a further shadow on the relationship that
victims of corporate violence have with crime and justice. Frequently,
what is at stake is the very recognition of a victim as a victim: Is this
substance really toxic? Is this illness caused by that exposure to this
substance? Within the confines of this shadow, victims of corporate
violence may become, or remain, invisible: the harm they suffer may
be manifest, but its illicit and criminal nature may on the contrary be
unknown, or unseen. 53 It is worth pointing out that, following recital
19, recognition of the victim does not—and should not—require per se
the activation of criminal justice, convictions, and punishments.
Recognition as a victim of crime, though, is essential to accessing
relevant information, victim support, and protection measures when
needed.
53 See the Introduction in this volume, and also Fricker 2007.
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The awareness of competent authorities, as a part of the duty to
recognise victims and so to offer support and address their needs,
nonetheless raises the issue of reporting and proactive enforcement.
Victims of corporate violence may not realise they have been
victimised. Since corporate crime occurs, by definition, during the
legitimate activity of a corporation, it is often difficult—if not
impossible—for an individual person to ‘uncover’ it, except when it is
too late. In the case of corporate violence, delays in reporting criminal
offences by the victims may depend on the common reasons recalled in
recital 25 of the Victims Directive—ie fear of retaliation or
stigmatisation—especially when the victim is the employee and the
corporation the employer. But delays in reporting may also depend on
more complex reasons, such as scientific uncertainty and/or long
latency periods before the actual physical harm is manifest.
Protection from repeated or increased victimisation (see section
2.3.4) necessarily implies a proactive role by enforcement agencies:
such is the case, for instance, for food frauds, selling of defective drugs
or food, exposure to toxic substances, and exposure to polluted areas,
where investigations and prosecutions are seldom dependent on the
initiative of victims. Omissions in crime reporting on the part of public
officials or any other subjects tasked with so reporting result in a
factual lack of recognition of the corporate victims, and in a lack of
their protection. At the same time, the reporting of administrative
violations and/or of minor criminal offences is of signal importance in
preventing small issues escalating into cases of corporate violence that
result in harms to life, physical integrity, health, and safety.
Investigative and judicial attention to ‘warning crimes’ (such as
bribery in public procurement, corruption, money laundering, financial
crimes, etc) is also of paramount relevance in addressing corporate
violence at an early stage, and in avoiding more severe harms and
consequences. 54
2.3.3. The Right to Information
Within the system designed by the Directive 2012/29/EU, the
provision of information to victims is of the utmost importance. This
54 These comments have been made the object of one of the ‘Policy
Recommendations for National Lawmakers and Policymakers’ (see Annex in this
volume).
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right of the victim (and the correspondent duty of various authorities
and services) is in fact central and strategic, being strictly connected, in
the abstract provisions and in practice, to the access to support, justice,
and protection (chapter 2 of the Directive, but in fact other provisions
also envisage this right). Victims should be afforded the right to
receive information from the ‘first contact’ with ‘any competent
authority’. The content of the information to which the victim is
entitled is ample and broadly covers nearly all the (other) rights
attributed by the Directive. As stated in recital 26 (and again in recital
46 in relation to restorative justice) information is necessary for the
victim to ‘make informed decisions’ and ‘an informed choice’.
The right to information is also crucial in the field of corporate
victimisation, where it has specific aspects. Corporate victims, in fact,
need not only the ‘procedural’ and/or ‘legal’ information necessary to
‘make informed decisions about their participation in proceedings’ or
in restorative justice programmes (recitals 26, 46), but prior to this they
also need access to the information necessary to ‘discover’ and/or
become aware of their victimisation. 55 As mentioned above, these
pieces of information are intimately interwoven with access to justice,
and in fact they are truly a condition for access to justice: without this
information, the actual possibility of filing a report, making a
complaint, deciding whether or not to participate in a criminal
proceedings, accepting or rejecting an out-of-court settlement, and so
on, may be at stake.
This particular aspect of the right to information of corporate
victims is unique, and is strictly linked to another of the main purposes
of the Directive, that is the protection of victims from repeat
victimisation (see section 2.3.4).
Yet, as often recalled in this publication, transparent and correct
information may not be easy to access, because of the imbalance in the
informative power of corporations, on the one hand, and because of
scientific uncertainty or controversy (whether real or fabricated) on the
other hand.
Corporate victims’ right to information intersects with other
relevant areas where the ‘right to know’ is recognised and protected in
the European Union: information to consumers (see, eg Directive
2001/95/EC), access to environmental information (Århus Convention
and related Directives), disclosure of non-financial information
55 See the Introduction in this volume.
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(Directive 2014/95/EU), to name a few. By matching these different
facets, we assign a stronger meaning to the right to information due to
victims as individual persons, as citizens, and as consumers.
When implementing the Directive 2012/29/EU to cases of
corporate violence, some adjustments to certain provisions are
necessary. Such is the case, for instance, for the provisions of art
6(5) (and recital 32) regarding information about the release (or the
escape) of the offender ‘at least in cases where there might be a danger
or an identified risk of harm to the victims’ (emphasis added). The
notion of ‘identified risk of harm’ is very different when dealing with a
stalker, a violent partner, a serial thief, or a corporation carrying on
activities resulting in criminal offenses to life, health, physical
integrity, etc. More important than information about whether the
corporate offender has been released (cases of their detention are
infrequent) is the information about on-going, resumed, or new
activities that may again expose actual or potential victims to the same
or a novel risk of harm.
2.3.4. The Right to Protection
As has been mentioned (section 1.4), according to art 18 of the
Directive 2012/29/EU, Member States must ensure that victims and
their family members are protected from ‘secondary and repeat
victimisation, from intimidation and from retaliation’, and that their
physical integrity is safeguarded. Member States shall introduce the
necessary ‘measures’ to fulfil this objective. National legal systems in
the EU have generally adopted provisions in this regard that favour,
once again, ‘typical’ vulnerable victims with special protection needs:
yet these provisions (such as protection orders against family violence)
are of little or no use in cases of corporate violence and there is a lack
of specific and tailored measures aimed at avoiding repeat and future
victimisation through corporate activities. The protection from repeat
victimisation of actual corporate victims, and/or potential or future
corporate victims—be they common citizens, consumers, workers, or
inhabitants of polluted areas—seems to require ad hoc legal provisions
regulating a set of tailored measures to be adopted under judiciary
scrutiny and without prejudice to the rights of the suspect or accused
(physical or legal) persons. Measures of this kind might be, for
instance: the provisional stopping or reduction of production; the
provisional closure of plants; the delivery of thorough information to
consumers regarding the risks or toxicity of a product, and the way to
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avoid or reduce such risks or harms; the obligation to provide medical
assistance to the exposed population; the obligation to deepen the
scientific knowledge regarding the risks of a certain substance and the
obligation to publicly disclose the results, etc.
The capability of all the relevant public and private actors to detect
risks, especially unknown ones, and recognise every warning sign
coming either from epidemiological and scientific studies or the
investigations of enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies, or
coming from citizens and local communities, is crucial in implementing
the necessary protection of corporate victims.
Due to the complexity and harmful nature of corporate violence,
the protection of these—actual, potential, future—victims from the
repeated risks or from new or unknown dangers calls for the
implementation of an efficient network which proactively involves
regulatory agencies, inspecting authorities, enforcement agencies,
and the judiciary, together with the health system, the welfare state,
etc, in collaboration with the scientific community, trade unions,
corporations’ representatives and associations, NGOs, victims’
associations and other advocacy organisations. Only if these
stakeholders are capable of exchanging the relevant information
and working together (before and after a corporate violent crime is
committed), can they effectively aid the quick identification and
recognition of actual victims and potential or future victims, and
consequently ensure their protection in a timely manner. 56
2.3.5. The Dependence on the Offender
Article 22(3) of the Victims Directive draws attention to the
relationship between the victim and the offender ‘in the context of the
individual assessment’ required to ‘identify specific protection needs’.
This relationship, in fact, can cause the victim to become particularly
vulnerable when it entails a ‘dependence on the offender’.
This provision is of the utmost importance for recognising
corporate victims, and therefore correctly assessing their protection
needs. Criminal breaches of health and safety regulations in the
workplace, or of medical devices and drug safety regulations, almost
56 The observations set forth in this section have become part of the ‘Policy
Recommendations for National Lawmakers and Policymakers’ (see Annex in this
volume).
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invariably occur under various forms of dependence of the victim on
the (corporate) offender. This can be an economic dependence, as is the
case for workers, or an even more threatening technological or medical
dependence on a device or a drug that could be life saving if properly
produced.
There is another aspect of corporate violence that characterises the
relationship between the victim and the corporate offender, giving the
dependence of the former on the latter a particular nature which is
perhaps similar to the dependence of victim on offender in cases of
family violence or violence in close relationships: it is what we might
call the deceitful nature of corporate violence.
During the empirical research conducted in the frame of the
‘Victims and Corporations’ project, participants in interviews and
focus groups almost invariably reported a sort of tragic deception,
indeed a form of delusion, linked to the ‘promise’ of a better life
associated with the corporate activity or commercial product in
question, and due, even more tragically, to the initial experience of an
actual improvement of their life conditions (Giavazzi, Mazzucato, and
Visconti 2017: 23). Hailed as examples of scientific progress, these
advanced technological products, ‘wonder pills’, or the ‘new’ up-to-
date factory which would have brought welfare and economic growth,
instead, turn out to have an inner—and hidden—negative nature which
causes opposite consequences. What should have brought about social
and/or economic improvement, well-being, and better health condi-
tions, progressively reveals its lethal or harmful nature. And by the
time things became clear, it was already too late.
2.3.6. Crime as a Violation of Individual Rights
The Directive 2012/29/EU sees crime as a ‘wrong against society
as well as a violation of the individual rights of victims’ (recital 9). As
observed in section 1.1, recital 66 provides a list of some of the
fundamental rights and principles recognised by the Charter of the
European Union that become relevant for victims of crime: ‘right to
dignity, life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security, respect
for private and family life, the right to property, the principle of non-
discrimination, the principle of equality between women and men, the
rights of the child, the elderly and persons with disabilities, and the
right to a fair trial’.
Because of its complexity and the many fields where it takes
place, in addition to the list of rights quoted in recital 66, corporate
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violence may entail the violation or infringement of other fundamental
rights and/or principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union. The following are worth mentioning as
particular examples:
- art 11, Freedom of expression and information: right to receive
information;
- art 27, Workers’ right to information and consultation;
- art 31, Fair and just working conditions: respect for health, safety,
and dignity;
- art 34, Social security and social assistance: entitlement to social
security benefits and social services providing protection in cases
such as, among others, illness or industrial accidents;
- art 35, Health care: high level of human health protection;
- art 37, Environmental protection: high level of environment
protection; principle of sustainable development;
- art 38, Consumer protection: high level of consumer protection.
The precautionary principle, as outlined by art 191 TFEU in
relation to the protection of both the environment and human health, is
also of paramount importance when dealing with corporate crimes in
these fields, provided its use is consistent with fundamental safeguards
related to criminal law. 57
3. Open Issues
In the previous sections, we reflected on how knowledge of
common features of corporate victimisation may help in putting the
Victims Directive into practice.
As for theory, a set of issues emerges which is by necessity
provisional, although richly deserving of further sustained reflection
and review, due to their complexity and multi-faceted implications:
(a) A change of perspective is made possible by the search for
interactions and synergies between the Victims Directive and the
wider context of EU legislation in the fields for instance of
environment protection, food and drug safety, and consumer
protection. 58 On the one hand, this perspective enables a focus on
57 Manacorda and Gasparini, chapter three in this volume, frame the correct
limits and unique relevance of the precautionary principle in the domain of corporate
violence.
58 See in this volume chapter three, by Stefano Manacorda and Irene Gasparini,
which is a necessary complement.
60 CHAPTER I
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
the possible extent of the actual mutual enrichment of EU legal
resources; on the other, it would provide an interesting overview
of possible lacks, or weaknesses, which await further legal
developments.
(b) Corporate violence manifests a very particular capacity to
affect—and attract—nearly the whole set of European fundamental
rights, values, and principles, challenging in a unique way the
necessity inter alia ‘to strengthen the protection of fundamental
rights in the light of [...] scientific and technological developments’,
as described in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The ‘comprehensive’ negative nature of corporate violence may be
seen as further evidence of the relevance of this topic for the
European Union.
(c) The priority assigned by the EU to the protection of victims of
crime raises the question whether, having regard to art 82(2)
TFEU and the scope of its provisions, there is a need to establish
ad hoc minimum rules concerning the rights, support, and
protection of victims of (specific) criminal offences comprised
under the phenomenology of corporate violence—since these
particular victims may have specific needs that require more
targeted and integrated support than that granted by the Directive
2012/29/EU alone.
(d) Another question raised by the research conducted for this project
is whether the phenomena related to corporate violence, and their
ensuing forms of victimisation, may fall under the provisions and
scope of art 83(1) TFEU. That is, whether corporate violence has
‘developed’ as one of those ‘other areas of crime’ meeting the
criteria set out in art 83(1) TFEU, and therefore should be seen as
- being ‘particularly serious’, and
- having a ‘cross-border dimension’,
- ‘resulting from the nature or impact of offenses or from a
special need to combat them on a common basis’ (emphasis
added).
If this were the case, offences related to corporate violence could
potentially become the object of a Council decision identifying
corporate violence as an area of crime that meets the
abovementioned criteria, and then of a new ‘vertical’ directive
adopted having regard to art 82(2) and art 83(1) TFEU. This
imaginary directive would be similar, in its nature and broad
contents, to the existing directives concerning human trafficking
and the sexual exploitation of children. It could therefore
combine criminalisation of (certain) offences of corporate
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violence—aiming at corporate criminal liability and crime
prevention strategies (including corporate governance, corporate
social responsibility, compliance programmes, etc)—with victim
protection, within an integrated yet ‘specific’ ad hoc system.
This system of course should be designed in close and careful
coordination with already existing legal instruments in relevant
fields (environment, food safety, product safety, safety in the
workplace etc). Innovative responses to corporate violent
offenses, including reparation measures and other types of
redress and compensation, would have to be drafted, taking into
account, on one hand, the particular features of corporate crimes
and of corporate victimisation and, on the other, the promising
experience of ‘responsive regulation’ and restorative justice
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2002). 59 The role of
Member States in preventing corporate violence and their
obligations in setting up the proper measures to avoid
victimisation and the violations of fundamental rights in the
first place, and to protect victims from ongoing risks and repeat
victimisation, could also be addressed. This issue still requires
thorough analysis and further study in order to better address its
exact legal basis. Yet, provisionally, a combined reading of the
TFEU provisions may offer some hints towards a possible path in
the harmonisation of the rights of victims of criminal offences
falling under the criminological and victimological notion of
corporate violence.
The political and social implications of these issues, and especially
of the final questions we have raised, are great. The issues are thorny
59 Restorative justice seems to offer a practical response capable, to some extent,
of reconciling the corporation’s legitimate perspective and interests with the needs and
rights of corporate victims. The trend towards restorative approaches may prove
crucial for victims who need to be effectively protected from repeat or new
victimisation, or relieved from their feelings of dissatisfaction: imagine, for example,
the importance of remediation activities carried out voluntarily by a corporation at the
end of a restorative justice programme that involves the victims and the community in
the decision-making process. Restorative justice’s potential in cases of corporate crime
and corporate violence is still largely unexplored, although some foreign experiences
have proven to be extremely promising (eg, the US and Canadian experiences of
restorative justice in the environmental field).
On this challenging topic, see in this volume chapter nine, by Ivo Aersten.
The various guidelines for professionals and corporations designed within this
project (available online at www.victimsandcorporations.eu) generally devote a
chapter to the implementation of restorative justice in cases of corporate violence.
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and controversial. There are pros and cons. Fundamental rights of
European citizens and the interests of corporations in the EU are
involved. The constitutional and European legal basis for such actions
need to be carefully assessed. We leave these very delicate questions
open, awaiting the further discussion which will hopefully be
stimulated by the findings stemming from the empirical research and
other outputs connected to this project.
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CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF VICTIMS OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE
WITHIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
by Enrico Maria Mancuso * 1
CONTENTS: 1. Victims of Corporate Violence and the Directive 2012/29/EU. –
2. The Right to Receive Information and Assistance. – 3. The Right to
Interpretation and Translation. – 4. Corporate Violence Victims and Their
Participation in Criminal Proceedings: The Right to Be Heard. – 4.1.
Rights in the Event of a Decision Not to Prosecute. – 4.2. The Right to
Seek Compensation. – 4.3. The Participatory Rights of Cross-Border
Victims. – 5. The Right to Protection. – 5.1. The Specific Protection
Needs of Corporate Violence Victims.
1. Victims of Corporate Violence and the Directive 2012/29/EU
The Directive 2012/29/EU aims to establish minimum standards
on the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime, regardless of
their nationality and the place in which the crime was committed,
additionally with a view to consolidating victims’ procedural rights.
Moreover, in establishing the right of victims to protection, the
Directive pays special attention to victims of specific crimes, including
terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, violence in a close
relationship, sexual violence, exploitation, or hate crimes (art 22). 1
The framework is completed by directives specifically addressing
distinct categories of victims, such as the Directive 2011/36/EU on
trafficking in human beings and the Directive 2011/92/EU on
combating sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation, as well as the
recent Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism.
* Bartolomeo Romanelli, PhD student, contributed to the bibliographical
research.
1 See chapter one in this volume.
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In this domain, there is no specific provision aimed at addressing
the victims of financial crimes, which the European legislature appears
to have forgotten in its attempt at harmonisation (Allegrezza 2012:
14). 2
In outlining the procedural rights for victims of corporate
violence, a dual-level analysis appears necessary. On the one hand, it
is necessary to acknowledge the procedural rights granted to all victims
of crime. In this regard, one must bear in mind the discretionary
margins attributed to national legislatures in implementing the
Directive, which, in line with the approach taken by the former
Framework Decision 2001/220 JHA (art 9), 3 did not grant victims
legal status as a party to criminal proceedings (recital 20).
On the other hand, the provisions of the Directive put into place to
protect victims ‘with specific protection needs’ require analysis in
order to confirm whether victims of corporate violence actually fall
under this group.
2. The Right to Receive Information and Assistance
Pursuant to art 3, in terms of the victims’ basic right to understand
and be understood, the Directive sets out the information to be
provided to the victim by the competent authorities upon the first
contact with the latter (art 4).
The obligation to inform must be fulfilled prior to the victim filing
a formal complaint. This means that the investigating authority must
engage with a proactive approach: specifically, upon notification of a
crime, it must proceed to identify the potential victims. 4
This obligation could be particularly cumbersome regarding
corporate violence crimes, which more often than not consist in
widespread offences: this is the case for environmental disasters that
affect whole communities, or crimes committed in the healthcare and
2 See chapters one and three in this volume.
3 Council Framework Decision 2001/220 JHA, of 15 March 2001, on the
standings of victims in criminal proceedings, at www.eur-lex.europa.eu, last accessed
on 17 July 2017.
4 European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012, establishing minimum standards on
the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, at www.e-justice.europa.eu, p 14, last accessed
on 17 July 2017.
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food sectors in which whole consumer categories can appear to be
potential victims. 5 In such cases, the investigating authority may well
refer back to any formal complaint already on the record, in order to
identify any other individual in the same situation.
In providing the required information, the competent authority
must adopt a personalised approach (Bargis and Belluta 2017: 29),
taking into account both the victims’ specific needs and the nature of
the crime (art 4, para 2).
It is therefore necessary to tailor this information to the specific
needs of corporate violence victims. Cases of corporate violence often
share characteristics that are particularly complex from a scientific and
legal standpoint (take, for instance, the assessment of damages
concerning environmental crimes): for this reason, precise, detailed,
and comprehensible information concerning the available judicial and
extrajudicial remedies available and their likelihood of success must be
provided (Visconti 2017: 47). 6
The means for providing information must also be adapted
according to the nature of the crime: due to the widespread damage
inflicted by corporate violence crimes, online publications may be used
in order to reach the maximum possible number of victims.
Further information must be provided during proceedings where
necessary or appropriate: as determined by the European Commission,
the updating of information must not be confused with the discovery
obligation regarding the criminal investigation, which continues to be
regulated by national legislation. 7
Falling under the required information is ‘the type of support they
can obtain and from whom, including, where relevant, information about
access to medical support, any specialist support, including psycholo-
gical support, and alternative accommodation’ (art 4, para 1, lett a).
The European legislature hence requires the investigating
authority to channel the victim through support services (Bargis and
Belluta 2017: 30). This is based on the knowledge that those services,
in addition to aiming to achieve social solidarity, can incentivise the
victim to collaborate with the State authorities and therefore increase
their desire to report the crime immediately (Sechi 2017: 1246). 8
5 See chapter six in this volume.
6 See chapter seven in this volume.
7 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementation
of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 15.
8 See chapter eight in this volume.
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This information is also necessary in criminal proceedings against
corporate violence. One can think of cases in which victims have
suffered damage to health as a result of a crime, including suffering
from potentially stigmatised illnesses (for example contracted from
blood transfusions); or even of cases in which victims must abandon
their place of work or residence as a consequence of contamination by
toxic substances (Visconti 2017: 39).
The provision set out in art 4 (para 1, lett a) must therefore be
understood in the context of arts 8 and 9 on the access of victims to
support services.
On this matter, the Directive distinguishes between general
support services and specialist support services.
The former must provide information, advice, and support
concerning the victims’ rights and their role in criminal proceedings;
emotional and psychological support; advice relating to the practical
and financial issues arising from the crime; advice regarding the risk of
repeat and secondary victimisation, intimidation, and retaliation (art 9,
para 1).
Conversely, specialist support services are to provide shelter or
temporary alternative accommodation to victims in need of a safe place
due to the risk of repeat or secondary victimisation, as well as
supporting victims with specific needs, including victims of sexual
violence or violence in a close relationship (art 9, para 3).
Accordingly, when providing the information set out in art 4 (para
1, lett a), victims of corporate violence must be directed predominantly
towards general support services. However, in some cases information
concerning specialist support services may still be necessary, such as in
the abovementioned case of environmental pollution, in which the
victims find themselves compelled to abandon their place of residence.
The obligation to inform victims is provided for in art 6 of the
Directive, titled ‘Right to receive information about their case’. The
extent of the information provided to them, however, is widely left to
the discretion of the national legislature when transposing the Directive
into national law.
The European legislature confers on victims, irrespective of their
role in national criminal justice systems, the right to obtain, upon
request, information about any decision not to prosecute the offender,
as well as the date and place of the trial and the nature of the charges
against the offender (art 6, para 1). Conversely, the information
provided for in art 6, para 2 is adapted according to the victims’ role in
national criminal justice systems: that is, the right to be informed about
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the possibility of receiving a copy of the final judgment, as well as the
right to be informed about the state of the criminal proceedings.
Of particular interest is the provision set out in art 6, para 5 of the
Directive, according to which:
Member States shall ensure that victims are offered the opportunity to be
notified, without unnecessary delay, when the person remanded in
custody, prosecuted or sentenced for criminal offences concerning them
is released from or has escaped detention. Furthermore, Member States
shall ensure that victims are informed of any relevant measures issued for
their protection in case of release or escape of the offender.
Pursuant to art 6, para 6, Member States must ensure that such
information is provided to victims, upon the latter so requesting, ‘at
least in cases where there is a danger or an identified risk of harm to
them, unless there is an identified risk of harm to the offender which
would result from the notification’. The scope of an identified risk of
harm is defined in recital 32, according to which:
The reference to ‘identified risk of harm to the victims’ should cover
such factors as the nature and severity of the crime and the risk of
retaliation. Therefore, it should not be applied to those situations where
minor offences were committed and thus where there is only a slight risk
of harm to the victim.
The Directive thus adopts a characteristic approach which does
not limit itself solely to the type of crime, but values above all the
personal situation of victims, from which the true risk of retaliation can
be determined. In this light, notification of the offender’s escape or
release could also prove necessary in corporate violence proceedings
where victims, having filed a complaint, could be exposed to the risk
of retaliation.
In the framework of the Directive, this notification does not seem
to involve victims in any release procedures or in reviewing restrictive
precautionary measures; nor does it grant the right to appeal a decision
to release the offender. Nevertheless, the Directive leaves the
implementation of the minimum procedural standards to the Member
States, which, at their discretion, may establish these rights. 9
9 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementation
of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 19.
ROLE OF VICTIMS OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE 73
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
3. The Right to Interpretation and Translation
The Directive 2012/29/EU—in line with the provisions under the
defendant established by the Directive 2010/64/EU—dedicates ample
space to providing victims with linguistic assistance, which is seen as a
prerequisite for effective participation in criminal proceedings (Lupária
2014: 99).
This topic is particularly important for transnational victims—that
is, victims of crimes taking place in a State that is different to the State
for which they hold citizenship. Community law began paying
attention to these victims some time ago, 10 on the assumption that
effective protection for them hinges on principles of non-discrimina-
tion and free movement of people (Venturoli 2015: 121).
In relation to this point, one should bear in mind that certain
corporate violence cases might harm individuals who hold citizenship
in a different State to where the trial takes place. This refers not only to
victimisation cases where the free movement of people is a factor, but
also to cases of environmental disasters, which are potentially capable
of spreading harmful effects that go beyond the boundaries of the State
in which they occurred.
The protection of victims who do not understand or speak the
language of the competent authority is guaranteed right from the
beginning of the criminal proceedings. The Directive 2012/29/EU
grants victims the right to file a complaint in a language that they
understand or to receive the necessary linguistic assistance (art 5, para
2), as well as the right to receive a translation, free of charge, of written
acknowledgement of their complaint (art 5, para 3). The linguistic
assistance provided for in art 5, para 2 does not need to be supplied
through an interpreter: the use of an individual capable of providing a
translation is to be considered sufficient—for example, a friend or
relative of the victim—even if this individual does not hold any
interpretation qualification. 11
The right to interpretation and translation set out in art 7, in
contrast, remains somewhat more formal, calling for an interpreter to
provide assistance.
More specifically, it provides for assistance, free of charge, during
10 ECJ, Case C-186/87 Ian William Cowan v Tresor Public [1989]. See also
Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 20 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime
victims, in www.eur-lex.eu, last accessed on 17 July 2017.
11 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 17.
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victim questioning or interviews, as well as when actively participating
in hearings (art 7, para 1). Moreover, art 7, para 3 provides for the
translation of all information essential for participating in the
proceedings, free of charge, including at least any decision ending
the criminal proceedings and, upon request, a summary of reasons. In
any case, the right to interpretation varies according to the role of the
victims within national criminal justice systems.
The need for linguistic assistance is assessed by the competent
authorities (art 7, para 7). Therefore, contrary to what is set out in art 2,
para 4 of the Directive 2010/64/EU, there exists no need for the
Member States to put into place procedures and mechanisms to cover
interpretation and translation needs.
The victims’ ability to challenge a decision not to provide
interpretation or translation is determined by procedural rules of
national law.
Conversely—and contrary to that provided for the defendant under
arts 2 and 3 of the Directive 2010/64/EU—victims may not file an
appeal on grounds of the quality of the service provided. 12 This
limitation, most likely inspired by the failure of numerous States to
lend adequate linguistic assistance (Sechi 2017: 1244–45), negatively
affects the effectiveness of the right to interpretation and translation
(Bargis and Belluta 2017: 41).
The European legislature appears to be aware of the circumstance
that in criminal proceedings concerning a large number of victims—as
often occurs in cases of corporate violence—the complete protection of
the right to interpretation and translation impacts the duration of the
proceedings. With a view to finding an equilibrium between the
protection of the victims’ right and the duration of the trial, art 7, para
8 of the Directive specifies that ‘[i]nterpretation and translation and
any consideration of a challenge of a decision not to provide
interpretation or translation under this article shall not unreasonably
prolong the criminal proceedings’.
As specified in recital 36, the use of a rare language by victims
should not, in itself, be grounds to believe that interpretation or
translation might unreasonably prolong the criminal proceedings. In
addition to this clarification, finding an equilibrium between the right
to interpretation and translation and the reasonable duration of the trial
appears to be left essentially to the national legislature.
12 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 21.
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4. Corporate Violence Victims and Their Participation in Criminal
Proceedings: The Right to Be Heard
The third chapter of the Directive, dedicated to victims’
participation in criminal proceedings, comprises: the right of victims
to be heard (art 10); the right to request a review of a decision not to
prosecute (art 11); the right to safeguards in the context of restorative
justice services (art 12); the right to legal aid (art 13) and to
reimbursement of expenses (art 14); the right to return of property (art
15); the right to a decision on compensation from the offender in the
course of criminal proceedings (art 16); and the rights of victims
resident in another Member State (art 17).
Moreover, analysis of the relevant provisions highlights the
peculiar approach taken by the European legislature in the field in
question when compared to topics concerning the right of victims to be
informed: upon a comparative analysis with the latter, one notes a
conscious self-restraint in the domain of participatory rights (Catalano
2015: 194).
Art 10, para 1 of the Directive asserts that ‘Member States shall
ensure that victims may be heard during criminal proceedings and may
provide evidence [...]’. Corporate violence crimes share certain
features, including, for example, frequent scientific uncertainty
concerning the assessment of damages, or the fact that the crime is
the result of negligence or punished as a misdemeanour. Because of
these features, victims often complain that they are denied such status,
either by the corporation that committed the crime or by the general
public (Visconti 2017: 37). In this context, victims of corporate
violence view criminal proceedings as the only means by which to
assert their truth, bring it into the public eye, and seek redress for the
damages suffered. Thus, it is from here that the importance of granting
the victims the possibility of making their voice heard during criminal
proceedings stems. 13
Furthermore, art 10, para 2 of the Directive leaves it to national law
to determine the procedural rules under which victims can be heard in
criminal proceedings and provide evidence. Hence, the need arises to
establish whether the Directive imposes a minimum standard on national
law regarding the victims’ right to be heard during criminal proceedings.
In this respect, the previous Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA
remains relevant.
13 See again chapter seven in this volume.
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In the noteworthy case of Győrgy Katz v István Roland Sós, 14 the
Court of Justice differentiated the significance of art 3, para 1 of the
Framework Decision from the identical content of current art 10, para
1. In this specific case, the provisions of the Framework Decision were
invoked by the victim, the proponent of an action for a substitute
private prosecution granted by the Hungarian legislature, to affirm the
right to be heard as a witness during the trial. On this matter, the Court
of Justice specified that:
the Framework Decision, while requiring Member States, first, to ensure
that victims enjoy a high level of protection and have a real and
appropriate role in their criminal legal system and, second, to recognise
victims’ rights and legitimate interests and ensure that they can be heard
and supply evidence, leaves to the national authorities a large measure of
discretion with regard to the specific means by which they implement
those objectives.
However, in order not to deprive the first paragraph of Article 3 of the
Framework Decision of much of its practical effect or to infringe the
obligations stated in Article 2(1) of the Framework Decision, those
provisions imply, in any event, that the victim is to be able to give
testimony in the course of the criminal proceedings which can be taken
into account as evidence.
Based on the above, a minimum standard for victims as a source
of evidence can be affirmed: victims must be granted the right, and
necessarily so, to personally make a statement of evidential value
before the court, or even through alternative means of testimony
(Catalano 2015: 188).
Moreover, recital 41 of the Directive, in part, seems to lower this
minimum standard of protection, given that the right of victims to be
heard is satisfied upon being permitted to provide a statement orally, or
even in written form.
In any case, Member States are still entitled to develop the right of
victims to be heard, such as, for example, in determining the right to
request that their statements be recorded, or regulating victim impact
statements (a statement relating to the impact the crime has had on a
victim’s life, which is taken into consideration during sentencing). 15
Furthermore, it should be noted that this ability applies to the right
14 ECJ, Case C-404/07 Győrgy Katz v István Roland Sós [2008].
15 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 29.
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of victims to give evidence and have this taken into account. The
Directive, however, does not refer to the victims’ right to otherwise
contribute to the reconstruction of facts by presenting evidence to the
investigating authorities, 16 or requesting to submit evidence (oral,
technical, or documentary) to the court appointed for the hearing. The
granting of these rights, inevitably connected to the role of victims
within each Member State, remains at the latter’s discretion.
4.1. Rights in the Event of a Decision Not to Prosecute
The European legislature—despite not recognising the right of
victims to institute a private prosecution 17—acknowledges their right
to request the review of a decision not to prosecute (art 11).
This provision, innovative compared to the Framework Decision
2001/220 JHA, is connected to the informative rights set out under art
6, para 1, lett (a) of the Directive, according to which, upon request, the
victim has the right to be informed of any decision not to prosecute.
Furthermore, the right under art 11 of the Directive appears to be
set out in somewhat sheepish terms.
On the one hand, pursuant to recital 43, this right refers to the
decisions adopted by law enforcement authorities, by prosecutors, or
by the investigating judges, while it does not refer to those decisions
handed down by the courts. This limitation appears hard to understand,
since the alleged impartiality of the judge represents insufficient
grounds on which to negate the right to a review (Bargis and Belluta
2017: 52).
On the other hand, procedural rules for reviews are not regulated
(Sechi 2017: 1250), with the exception that the review must be carried
out by a different person or authority to the one that made the original
decision, unless the highest prosecuting authority is already concerned
(art 11, para 4).
Above all, the right to request a review is reserved for victims
holding a formal role in their national criminal justice system. The
provision set out in art 11, para 2, being the only exception thereof,
states the following:
Where, in accordance with national law, the role of the victim in the
16 See art 90, para 1 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code.
17 ECJ, Case C-404/07 Győrgy Katz v István Roland Sós [2008].
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relevant criminal justice system will be established only after a decision
to prosecute the offender has been taken, Member States shall ensure that
at least the victims of serious crimes have the right to a review of a
decision not to prosecute. The procedural rules for such a review shall be
determined by national law.
Moreover, it should be noted that the criteria to determine the
severity of the crime appear to be, at best, blurred: not even the
recommendations provided by the European Commission contribute
towards defining their boundaries, according to which the concept of
severity should be inferred from European legislation in criminal law
and from the existing standards in international criminal justice. 18
The breadth of this category seems to further justify the
application of this right also to specific cases that are traceable to
the notion of corporate violence, where more often than not the impact
is upon the lives and health of victims. One can think, for instance, of
atypical environmental disasters, contamination from infected blood-
derivative drugs, or the commercialisation of teratogenic drugs.
In this light, it seems reasonable to grant victims the right to a
review of a decision not to prosecute, in cases in which the victims’
national criminal justice system assigns their role after a decision to
prosecute.
4.2. The Right to Seek Compensation
As far as victims of corporate violence are concerned, art 16, on
the right to a decision on compensation from the offender in the course
of criminal proceedings, stands out from the other participatory rights
considered in the Directive. 19 Member States are granted the power to
decide whether a decision on compensation is to be made in other legal
proceedings, above all in civil proceedings. The Directive, therefore,
does not impose civil prosecution mechanisms on criminal matters,
which remain at the discretion of the Member States.
The provisions cover compensation from the offender and not the
potential award of compensation from the State, 20 which is in fact
18 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 30.
19 See in this volume chapter seven, by Stefania Giavazzi.
20 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 36.
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regulated by the Directive 2004/80/EC, relating to compensation for
victims of violent international crimes in cross-border situations.
However, the Directive 2004/80/EC does not cover the entire spectrum
of corporate violence crimes, despite referring to international
offences.
In the Directive’s overall design, the right to compensation is
coupled with an adequate set of informative safeguards (Bargis and
Belluta 2017: 43). More specifically, pursuant to art 4, para 1, lett (e),
the investigating authority, upon first contact with victims, must inform
them of how and under what conditions they may access compensa-
tion. Similar information is provided by victim support services, under
art 9, para 1, lett (a).
Damages from corporate violence tend to be either physical,
psychological, or financial. Significant physical damages can also
include death and severe forms of illness, psychological damage, and
emotional trauma, which can derive from a single traumatic event, for
example a disaster, or from stress arising due to physical detriment or
financial hardship. Finally, financial damages can consist of any
sustained medical expenses, loss of work, deterioration in one’s
capacity to work, or the necessity to change residence (Visconti 2017:
26–27). The situation is often compounded by the financial
dependence of the victim upon the corporation responsible for the
crime.
In this scenario, particular attention must be paid to the impact of
art 16, para 1, according to which compensation must be granted
within a reasonable time: prompt compensation can in fact facilitate
victim recovery.
Corporate violence victims often meet with difficulty in obtaining
compensation from the corporation, just as much in non-judicial as in
judicial proceedings, because of a disparity in resources and the degree
of legal assistance between the victims and the company.
With a view to levelling the playing field, the Directive—in line
with the provisions set out in art 9, para 2 of the Framework Decision
2001/220/JHA—requires the Member States to lay down measures to
encourage the offender to provide adequate compensation to victims.
The somewhat vague concept of ‘encouragement’ is partially
integrated from the recommendations provided by the European
Commission: more specifically, Member States could infer that
compensation is considered a favourable element for the offender, in
sentencing, in obtaining judgment on merit, and in requesting early
release.
In terms of corporate violence crimes, further encouragement
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measures may be adopted specifically regarding the liability of legal
persons for illegal activities: in this sense, Italian legislation is
symbolic in that it excludes debarment sanctions 21 and reduces the
financial penalties 22 to be borne by the corporation, following the
provision of compensation and reparation for the crime’s dangerous
and damaging consequences.
Furthermore, the introduction of restorative justice proceedings,
with respect to the safeguards adopted in art 12 of the Directive, may
well encourage the offender to reach an agreement regarding
compensation.
4.3. The Participatory Rights of Cross-Border Victims
As previously highlighted, the European legislature pays special
attention to the status of cross-border victims, that is, victims who
are resident in a Member State other than that where the criminal
offence was committed, a situation common in corporate violence
cases.
In general, pursuant to recital 10 of the Directive, the rights
recognised therein may by no means be dependent upon the residency,
citizenship, or nationality of victims.
More specific safeguards are adopted regarding the participation
of cross-border victims in criminal proceedings. Recital 49, relating to
the right to compensation, expressly establishes that cross-border
victims may not be denied this right. Elsewhere, art 17 illustrates a
range of safeguards that are intended as a prerequisite for the effective
participation of cross-border victims in criminal proceedings.
The article provides for an obligation on the competent authorities
to adopt measures to minimise the difficulties faced due to the cross-
border victim status. In addition, it provides that victims may file a
complaint in their Member State of residence, where they may not
have been able—or, in the case of a serious offence, wanted—to file
such a complaint in the Member State where the criminal offence was
committed (art 17, para 2). The additional obligation to promptly
transmit the complaint to the State in which the criminal offence was
committed also falls on the Member State, according to the existing
legal instruments of cross-border judicial co-operation, or even via a
21 Arts 17, 31 (para 2), 65, and 78 of d lgs 8 June 2001 n 231.
22 Art 12 of d lgs 231/2001.
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less formal route. 23 This is so unless the Member State in which the
complaint was filed has exercised the competence to institute the
proceedings.
The Directive also provides for the gathering of evidence from
cross-border victims immediately after the registration of a complaint.
To guarantee, in every case, the right of the accused to confront the
accuser (Bargis and Belluta 2017: 54), the European legislature calls
upon the use of video- and teleconferencing, which are considered the
appropriate means for taking a statement from the cross-border victim.
Reference must be made, in this regard, to the Convention of 29 May
2000, relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Member States of the European Union. 24
5. The Right to Protection
The right to protection appears central to the Directive, which, in
chapter 4, makes a clear distinction between general protective
measures, to be granted to all victims, and special measures for those
victims with specific protection needs (Sechi 2017: 1252). As regards
the general measures, art 18 states:
Without prejudice to the rights of the defence, Member States shall
ensure that measures are available to protect victims and their family
members from secondary and repeat victimisation, from intimidation and
from retaliation, including against the risk of emotional or psychological
harm, and to protect the dignity of victims during questioning and when
testifying. When necessary, such measures shall also include procedures
established under national law for the physical protection of victims and
their family members.
The Directive provides for the protection of victims from repeat
and secondary victimisation, as well as intimidation and retaliation,
above all in the form of the right to avoid contact with the offender
within the premises where the criminal proceedings are conducted,
unless the criminal proceedings require such contact (art 19, para 1).
23 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, pp 38–39.
24 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with art 34 of the
Treaty on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
between the Member States of European Union, in www.eur-lex.europa.eu (last
accessed on 3 October 2017).
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For this purpose, Member States must ensure that new court premises
have separate waiting areas for victims (art 19, para 2). The provision
of separate waiting areas, limiting the amount of physical contact
between the offender and the victim, is indeed sufficient in providing
the latter with a sense of security. At the same time, this reduces the
effects of secondary victimisation and the risk of repeat victimisation
or intimidation in the run up to giving testimony. 25
The Directive, in line with the recommendations already provided
by the European Court of Justice, 26 looks at taking a statement from
all victims at an early stage, regardless of the type of offence, and
exhibits a tendency to keep victim interviews to a minimum during
investigations.
More specifically, under art 20 of the Directive:
Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with
rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that during
criminal investigations:
(a) interviews of victims are conducted without unjustified delay after the
complaint with regard to a criminal offence has been made to the
competent authority;
(b) the number of interviews of victims is kept to a minimum and
interviews are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes
of the criminal investigation;
(c) victims may be accompanied by their legal representative and a
person of their choice, unless a reasoned decision has been made to the
contrary;
(d) medical examinations are kept to a minimum and are carried out only
where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal proceedings.
Finally, art 21 of the Directive imposes the adoption of suitable
measures to protect the private lives of victims.
The European legislature thus demonstrates awareness that the
public diffusion of information concerning the private lives of victims
risks increasing exposure to secondary victimisation (Delvecchio
2017: 108–109; Iermano 2013: 146), notably in cases that gain media
attention. This poses a risk from which victims of corporate violence
are not immune: for instance, cases of environmental disasters or
damages from healthcare covered by the media, from which prejudices
25 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementa-
tion of the Directive 2012/29/EU, pp 40–41.
26 ECJ, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005].
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can arise regarding the victims’ most intimate spheres, particularly
their health.
In the approach taken by the Directive, the protection of privacy
must also be graded in relation to the precise needs of victims, and
especially in relation to the results of the individual assessment carried
out as to the existence of any specific protection needs (Savy 2013:
96).
Alongside the protection guaranteed to all victims of crime, the
Directive imposes the obligation on Member States, as set out in art 25
of the Directive, to train judges, prosecutors, and lawyers so that, in
coming into contact with victims, they can adopt an approach that
respects victims’ needs. Moreover, the training must be both general and
specialised: it must concern particular types of victim, including those of
corporate violence. Regarding the latter, the legal professionals involved
must be trained to recognise general and specific protection needs, as
well as to know how to effectively put into place the individual
assessment described in art 22 of the Directive.
5.1. The Specific Protection Needs of Corporate Violence Victims
Art 22 of the Directive, titled ‘Individual assessment of victims to
identify specific protection needs’, represents a change in the approach
adopted by the previous framework decision 2001/220 JHA.
Specifically, in the framework decision itself, the intention was to
abandon the notion of ‘particular vulnerability’ (art 2, para 2), which
referred to macro-categories of victims determined by the type of
crime or subjective characteristics. Such an approach risked leaving
victims unprotected who, despite failing to fall under a distinct
category, still clearly had specific protection needs due to the
particularity of the case (Petralia 2012: 41).
Conversely, the Directive provides for an assessment of all victims
in order to identify any vulnerability (Venturoli 2015: 100). 27
Vulnerability must not be understood as an abstract category, but rather
as a direct link (Gialuz 2012: 62; Sechi 2017: 18), regarding a risk—of
secondary victimisation, of repeat victimisation, of intimidation or
retaliation—which, from time to time, enters into play.
The assessment follows mixed criteria, both situational and
personal: art 22, para 2 of the Directive invites the assessment to
27 See also chapter one and chapter six in this volume.
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consider the victims’ personal characteristics, the type and nature of
the crime, and its circumstances. These criteria are fluid, allowing
adequate coverage of the varying vulnerability profiles of corporate
violence victims.
Regarding personal characteristics, it must also be kept in mind
that victims of corporate violence can find themselves in inferior or
financially dependent positions compared to the corporation respons-
ible for the crime, or find themselves suffering on account of the crime
from severely debilitating illnesses. Regarding the type of crime, it has
already been highlighted that corporate violence cases are capable of
producing severe impacts on the lives and health of entire
communities, with a potential risk of secondary or repeat victimisation.
For instance, it is impossible for victims to abandon a place of
residence contaminated by pollution or pathogens due to the crime.
Finally, as far as the circumstances of the crime are concerned,
these often consist in a disproportion of resources in favour of the
corporation, a cross-border nature, and widespread victimisation
(Visconti 2017: 27).
The Directive takes care to provide indications which, since they
only represent one exemplary condition of particular vulnerability
(Bargis and Belluta 2017: 60), must be taken carefully into consideration
when individually assessing the victim; more specifically, according to
art 22, para 3:
In the context of the individual assessment, particular attention shall be
paid to victims who have suffered considerable harm due to the severity
of the crime; victims who have suffered a crime committed with a bias or
discriminatory motive which could, in particular, be related to their
personal characteristics; victims whose relationship to and dependence
on the offender make them particularly vulnerable. In this regard, victims
of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, gender-based violence,
violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation or hate
crime, and victims with disabilities shall be duly considered.
This list clearly refers to offences that are consistently different to
those of corporate violence. Having said that, some of the
abovementioned circumstances could still arise in the context of
corporate violence—for example, the prerequisites for ‘considerable
harm due to the severity of the crime’ or of the ‘relationship to and
dependence on the offender’, where this is essentially understood as
financial dependency or dependency due to employment. Another
example could be that mentioned above, of victims suffering from a
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disability due to the marketing of pharmaceutical products with
pathogenic effects.
The special protective measures are listed in art 23, paras 2 and 3
of the Directive, dealing with the investigation and hearing phases
respectively.
Regarding the investigation phase, art 23, para 2 sets out that:
The following measures shall be available during criminal investigations
to victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with
Article 22(1):
(a) interviews with the victim being carried out in premises designed or
adapted for that purpose;
(b) interviews with the victim being carried out by or through
professionals trained for that purpose;
(c) all interviews with the victim being conducted by the same persons
unless this is contrary to the good administration of justice;
(d) all interviews with victims of sexual violence, gender-based violence
or violence in close relationships, unless conducted by a prosecutor or a
judge, being conducted by a person of the same sex as the victim, if the
victim so wishes, provided that the course of the criminal proceedings
will not be prejudiced.
The measures set out in letters (a), (b), and (c) seem to be aimed at
reducing the risk of secondary victimisation, concerning the stress
arising from interviews: their adoption, in corporate violence criminal
proceedings, appears to stem from an appreciation for the vulnerab-
ilities of the victim deriving from the crime.
Regarding the hearing phase, on the other hand, art 23, para 3 sets
out that:
The following measures shall be available for victims with specific
protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1) during court
proceedings:
(a) measures to avoid visual contact between victims and offenders
including during the giving of evidence, by appropriate means including
the use of communication technology;
(b) measures to ensure that the victim may be heard in the courtroom
without being present, in particular through the use of appropriate
communication technology;
(c) measures to avoid unnecessary questioning concerning the victim’s
private life not related to the criminal offence; and
(d) measures allowing a hearing to take place without the presence of the
public.
The measures referred to in letters (a) and (b) appear to have the
aim of preventing secondary victimisation by reducing the impact of
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interviews and protecting against repeat victimisation, intimidation,
and retaliation.
Conversely, the measures referred to in letters (c) and (d) make
specific reference to the protection of the privacy of victims. In terms
of corporate violence, the application of these measures can prove
useful where the crime may have inflicted severe consequences on the
victims’ health, with a potential degree of stigmatisation. One example
is the contraction of diseases from infected blood-derivative drugs, or
the marketing of teratogenic drugs. In these cases, laying down
restrictions on questions concerning the private lives of victims and
conducting hearings behind closed doors can ensure that their needs
are adequately met, with positive consequences in terms of preventing
secondary victimisation.
It should also be noted that the Directive does not dictate the
procedural means by which to assess the protection needs of victims:
similarly, the selection procedure and the adoption procedure of special
protective measures have not been provided for (Sechi 2017: 19;
Simonato 2014: 110). Such procedures, therefore, continue to fall
within the scope of the discretion of Member States in implementing
the Directive.
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CHAPTER III
CORPORATE VICTIMS IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW:
THE ‘SOUND OF SILENCE’
by Stefano Manacorda and Irene Gasparini * 1
CONTENTS: 1. Introductory Remarks: Environment, Food, and Medical
Devices as Fields of Analysis. – 2. The EU Legislation and the Missing
Corporate Victim. – 3. Safeguarding Victims’ Fundamental Interests:
The Protection of Human Life and Health. – 4. Framing Individuals’ and
Legal Entities’ Liability for Corporate Misconduct. – 5. The Role of
Criminal Law in Tackling Corporate Misconduct. – 6. The Risk-Based
Approach and the Precautionary Principle. – 7. Concluding Remarks:
The ‘Sound of Silence’.
1. Introductory Remarks: Environment, Food, and Medical
Devices as Fields of Analysis
Directive 2012/29/EU (‘the Victims Directive’) 1 represents an
unprecedented benchmark for the protection of rights of victims of
crime at the EU level. It was drafted in order to establish minimum
standards on victims’ rights across the European Union, in pursuance
of the objectives of increasing the protection of vulnerable individuals
within the criminal proceedings, and enhancing mutual trust among
judicial organs. As to the first aspect, the provisions enshrined in the
Directive aim at guaranteeing assistance, support, protection from
repeated and secondary victimisation, information, and right to
participation in criminal proceedings to individuals who have fallen
* Sections 1 and 5–7 were drafted by Stefano Manacorda, while sections 2–4
were drafted by Irene Gasparini.
1 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of
victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.
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victim of a crime. 2 In particular, a number of provisions specifically
address the protection needs of victims who are particularly
‘vulnerable’, 3 therein including victims of specific offences such as
‘terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, gender-based violence,
violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation and hate
crime’, as well as disabled victims. As the Commission stressed in its
2011 Communication on strengthening victims’ rights, ‘without
effective EU-wide application of a minimum level of rights for
victims, mutual trust is not possible. [...] [T]he EU must ensure that
victims benefit from a level playing field’. 4
From a broader point of view, legal scholars have analysed in
depth the concern of EU institutions for the status of the victim of
crime, giving rise to a wide variety of positions (Lupária 2015). In
general, while a certain number of commentators emphasise the need
for a stronger consideration of individuals directly or indirectly
affected by criminal offences, considering them too long neglected
within the criminal justice system, others have raised sceptical
concerns (Forti 2000; Venturoli 2015). Among the elements that this
critical position has highlighted, the shift towards a victim-centred
approach in criminal procedure and criminal law is worth mentioning,
as it would threaten the traditional guarantees for the defendant and,
more broadly, strengthen the retributive function of criminal sanctions
(Hassemer 1990; Garland 2001; Tonry 2010). 5 Although we are surely
more sympathetic to the latter approach, this chapter will not directly
address the complex issues of whether the EU should pay closer
attention to the rights and needs of the victim in general.
On the contrary, the present analysis is specifically devoted to the
position that the ‘corporate victim’—or the victim of corporate
violations—currently holds within the EU legislation. In particular, the
research proves particularly relevant in relation to three sectors that in
2 See European Commission, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the
transposition and implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights,
support, and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA, 2013 (online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/
victims/guidance_victims_rights_directive_en.pdf, last accessed on 29 October 2017).
See also chapters one and two in this volume.
3 Art 22 of the Victims Directive.
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions Strengthening
Victims’ Rights in the EU (COM (2011) 274 final).
5 See chapter one in this volume.
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recent years have witnessed severe impacts from corporate misconduct
on vulnerable individuals and communities: the protection of the
environment, the safety of food, and the safety of medical devices.
As a first element, the study focuses on the absence of a special
status dedicated to corporate victims, both within the Victims
Directive and the EU sectoral legislations (section 2). Despite this
‘silence’, several elements demonstrate that the EU legislature pays a
certain attention to corporate victims, thereby giving rise to a complex
and fragmentary picture. First, the EU is significantly concerned with
certain fundamental human interests affected by corporate misconduct
(section 3). Having identified the ‘protected interests’, the chapter then
moves into examining specifically the types of protection to which
those interests are currently entitled under EU law in the three sectoral
fields of environmental protection, food, and medical device safety. It
specifically inquires into the applicable regimes of liability for
corporate infringements, by focusing, in particular, on the role of
criminal law (sections 4 and 5).
It then explores the degree of protection that human life and health
benefit from in those liability schemes, looking specifically at the risk-
based approach and the precautionary principle, which shape the
regulation of all three sectors (section 6).
Finally, before entering into the analysis, some elements are worth
highlighting that, although not specifically addressed in this chapter,
should be kept in mind as they significantly contribute to defining the
legal framework concerning corporate victims at the European level.
On the one hand, human rights law, which can be directly breached by
the criminal conduct of corporate actors, plays an important role in
defining the protected status of the victim. 6 Particularly in relation to
corporate crime, the recent case law of the European Court of Human
Rights in relation to (collective) environmental crimes clearly shows
how the dimensions of criminal law and human rights law are strictly
interconnected and how the latter is increasingly expanding (Vozza
2017). On the other hand, there is intense debate among scholars
concerning the extent and modalities of public participation in
decisions that potentially affect human health. 7 Entailing public
6 See chapter four in this volume.
7 See, for instance, in relation to public consultation for projects with a potential
environmental impact, the Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public
and private projects on the environment; and the Directive 2014/52/EU of the
CORPORATE VICTIMS IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 91
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
consultation and information, this instrument involves a broader,
participative, dimension of (potential) victims’ protection, which, with
specific relation to environmental matters, is strictly connected with
the well-known 1998 UNECE Århus Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making, and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters.
2. The EU Legislation and the Missing Corporate Victim
Despite their special vulnerability and particular needs, individuals
who have suffered from corporate crime and corporate violence 8 do not
benefit from an ad hoc protective framework under EU law.
The absence of an express concern for the corporate victim in the
three selected EU legal frameworks emerges clearly when analysing
two dimensions.
On one side, in the Victims Directive, the general—and so far
most important—EU legal document on victim protection, no mention
is made specifically of victims of corporate crime. 9 Significantly,
among the categories of offences whose victims demand particular
protection from secondary or repeat victimisation, 10 the Directive does
not include illicit behaviours related to corporations.
On the other side, Victims Directive’s concern for the victims of
crime (their vulnerability, needs, and rights) 11 is not mirrored in the
EU regulation on corporate infringements within the three sectors that
this research focuses on: environmental protection, food safety, and
medical device safety. This is partially due to the fact that two out of
the three selected fields—food and medical device safety—do not
expressly provide for criminal offences, which rules out the
applicability of a strict notion of corporate victim as ‘victim of
corporate crime’. However, even in the only field (out of the three)
where criminal offences exist—environmental protection—the notion
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/
EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment. See also, with specific reference to public consultation and information
of the public in relation to Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), the Directive
2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms.
8 On the concept of ‘corporate violence’ and the needs of victims of corporate
misconduct, see chapter six in this volume.
9 See, eg, chapter one in this volume.
10 Recital 57 of the Victims Directive.
11 See chapter six in this volume.
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of ‘victim’ appears to be completely absent, demonstrating, from the
outset, the scarce attention of the EU lawmakers to the criminological
category of ‘victim of corporate crime and corporate violence’.
In other words, while the general Directive guarantees protection
to vulnerable victims of crime without this specifically encompassing a
corporate victim, the three law frameworks that deal with some of the
most ‘violent’ infringements of the legal order perpetrated by
corporations do not seem to consider the victim of crime at all.
Numerous hypotheses can be offered as to the reasons for such a
lacuna within the EU legal framework in relation to corporate victims,
especially where infringements take the form of criminal offences.
As an explanation of the silent attitude, it could be argued that it is
the product of a negligent omission on the part of oblivious EU
criminal lawmakers. At first glance, such an explanation could seem
reasonable and acceptable, given the criticism that has arisen in
relation to EU criminal policy. As a matter of fact, in recent years, EU
criminal lawmakers have attracted numerous severe criticisms,
stressing the need for a greater consideration of basic principles of
criminal law and questioning the preponderance of rather symbolic and
functionalistic approaches to criminal offences (Faure 2004). Notably,
it has been observed that the EU influence on criminal policy,
enhanced by the Treaty of Lisbon, risks ending up misusing criminal
law as a mere tool to promote the objectives of the Treaty and in
particular their economic dimension (Satzger 2012). Such a ‘Dur-
kheimian turn’ is, in fact, encouraged by those commentators who
underscore the potential of criminal sanctions to express certain
judgements of disapproval and strengthen the common (moral) values
and strategic purposes of the Union (Nuotio 2005; Elholm and Colson
2016). In other words, with the aim of promoting mutual trust among
Member States, the creation of social consensus through criminalisa-
tion would be ‘part of a larger project to give political identity to the
EU’ (Elholm and Colson 2016: 58; Sotis 2007). After all, it is the
Commission itself that recognises, in its 2004 Green Paper on the
approximation, mutual recognition, and enforcement of criminal
sanction in the EU, that the ‘symbolic message’ put out by common
offences and penalties ‘would help to give the general public a shared
sense of justice’. 12 Accordingly, the ‘silent attitude’ of the EU
12 European Commission Green Paper on the approximation, mutual
recognition, and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union
(COM(2004)334 final) p 9.
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legislation in relation to corporate victims, whose vulnerabilities and
needs have been almost entirely unaddressed, could raise similar
concerns. Following such an approach, the European lawmakers could
be criticised for having ‘forgotten’ to establish minimum requirements
for the protection of this particular category of vulnerable individuals.
That said, one might wonder whether such a lacuna follows a quite
cognisant logic. In other words, the question arises as to whether this
represents a deliberate choice by EU legislators, who wish to leave the
complex issue of corporate victims outside the scope of the Directive.
As a matter of fact, neither scholars nor Member States have yet
reached a clear and widespread consensus on whether and to what
extent a role for corporate victims should be acknowledged (especially
in criminal law), due to the complexity as well as the recent nature of
the issues at stake. In other words, the ‘silence’ of the EU legislation is
not necessarily to be met with criticism, as it could be representative of
a (beneficial) moderate approach deliberately chosen by the European
institutions in a time where the status of corporate victims still appears
to be uncertain.
This paper wishes to contribute to the debate by clarifying a
certain number of crucial issues that arise from the legal analysis of the
three chosen sectors under a victim-focused lens. In particular, beside
the lack of a dedicated status for corporate victims, the initial
assumption that the latter are not entitled to any consideration within
the EU legal framework should, in fact, be nuanced. To this end,
however, a brief methodological excursion is needed. Although the
Victims Directive already adopts an extensive definition of ‘victim of
crime’ 13, in order to encompass in the present analysis areas of EU law
that do not include criminal provisions, the present chapter further
stretches the boundaries of the notion of ‘corporate victim’ so as to
13 For the purposes of the Victims Directive, art 2(1)(a) includes in the definition of
‘victim’ ‘a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental, or
emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by a criminal offence’, as
well as ‘family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a criminal
offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that person’s death’. In this case,
‘harm’ suffered by family members should be interpreted ‘in the context of the individual
emotional relationship and/or direct material inter-dependence between the deceased
victim and the relative(s) concerned’ (see DG Justice Guidance Document, p 10). Recital
19 further specifies that ‘[a] person should be considered to be a victim regardless of
whether an offender is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of
the familial relationship between them’.
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include therein victims of corporate violations regardless of their
specific (civil, administrative, or criminal) branch of regulation.
3. Safeguarding Victims’ Fundamental Interests: The Protection of
Human Life and Health
As has been mentioned, a blanket analysis of the EU legal
framework on environmental protection, as well as the safety of food
and medical products, shows that the victim of corporate violations is
not expressly entitled, in these three sectors, to an ad hoc protective
status.
On a closer look, however, the same legal documents, though not
expressly framing them as a ‘victim’, still provide a significant
safeguard to any human being who is actually (by harm) or potentially
(by risk) affected by corporate misconduct. They regulate the actual or
potential impact of illicit corporate acts on certain human ‘protected
values’, regarded at times in their individual dimension (individual life
and health), and at other times in their collective one (public health). In
other words, notwithstanding the absence of a formal status for the
corporate victim in those three specific sectors, human interests are
still deemed to deserve, under EU law, a ‘high level of protection’
against corporate illicit acts.
With specific reference to environmental law, it is widely
recognised today that EU law embraces a wide notion of the
environment, which also encompasses human beings. According to
the latest Environment Action Programme, 14 the safeguarding of
‘health and quality of life’ stands among the four priority areas of the
environmental strategy of the Union. It is a strategy that is attuned with
art 191(1) TFEU, which states that the Union policy on environment
aims at the protection, inter alia, of human health.
The two notions—environment and health—are so closely
intertwined across EU secondary legislation that EU environmental
law is divided between an ‘ecocentric’ and an ‘anthropocentric’
approach. In fact, it has been noted that, in the landscape of EU legal
strategies, the safeguarding of human health benefits from much less
attention than the environment tout court, and is in a sense ‘parasitic’
14 Decision 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living
well, within the limits of our planet’.
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on environmental regulation (Thieffry 2015). However, health issues
appear to significantly ‘reinforce’ environmental regulation as, by
engaging human protected values, the EU lawmaker thereby precludes
the ‘relaxation of safety requirements’ (De Sadeleer 2014: 38). At
times, the two notions are coupled in provisions that aim at
guaranteeing a ‘high level of protection of the environment and
human health’. Other times the ‘human factor’ is encapsulated in the
notion of environment or ‘environmental damage’ itself, which in
certain legal documents is outlined in such a way that it encompasses
the negative impact on human health as well. Suffice to recall, on this
point, that the 2004/35/EC Environmental Liability Directive (the
‘ELD’), with specific regard to soil pollution, comprises in the
definition of ‘land damage’ any land contamination that creates a
significant risk that human health is adversely affected by the
contamination of land with certain substances. 15
Accordingly, numerous legal documents in EU environmental
law nowadays expressly regulate the potential or actual adverse
effects of corporate activity on human life and health. One of the
most significant legal documents is undoubtedly the 2008/99/EC
Directive (examined in detail in section 5), in which significant
references can be found—both in the preamble and the text—to the
‘anthropocentric’ environmental perspective, in addition to the
‘ecocentric’ one. Without attempting an exhaustive recollection
here, it is worth mentioning the numerous legal tools that address
(though not necessarily with criminal law) the adverse effects on
human health of the production and use of chemicals; 16 the illicit
treatment, use, management, and shipment of hazardous waste
produced by all sorts of industrial activities; 17 ‘environmental noise’
caused inter alia by air traffic and industrial activity; 18 the
anthropogenic discharge of certain dangerous substances into the
15 Art 2(1)(c) of the Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and
remedying of environmental damage.
16 See, eg, Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the registration, evaluation, authorisation,
and restriction of chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency.
17 See, eg, Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 19 November 2008 on waste (‘Waste Framework Directive’); Regulation (EC)
1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on
shipments of waste.
18 See, eg, Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise.
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aquatic environment; 19 and emissions of atmospheric pollutants. 20
Concerns for human health are also widely present in the mentioned
ELD on environmental liability, which, acknowledging the numerous
polluted sites that present serious risks for human health, expressly
recognises the threat to human health caused by dangerous
professional activities. 21
Similarly, EU secondary legislation on food and medical device
safety aims to guarantee inter alia a ‘high level of protection of human
health’ and life. The recent Regulation 2017/745 on medical devices
specifically imposes obligations on manufacturers in order to protect
the life and health of patients and users, and describes as a ‘serious
incident’ caused by a defective device the death of a patient, the
serious deterioration of a patient’s state of health, or a serious public
health threat. 22 Similarly, the Regulation 2017/746 on in vitro
diagnostic medical devices describes a ‘serious adverse event’, caused
by a defective device, as death or serious deterioration in the health of
the patient. 23 On a parallel path stands also the recent Regulation
2017/625 on food safety, which aims at guaranteeing a high level of
protection of human health, by ensuring that the food placed on the
market is not unfit for consumption, contaminated, or in any way
injurious to health. 24
These tools are in line with the broader framework of principles in
the TFEU, which sets the standard at a high level of protection for
human health in numerous provisions that deal specifically with the
quality and safety of medicinal products and devices for medical use,
as well as consumer protection (art 114(3) and art 169(1)). Similarly,
19 See, eg, Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of
water policy.
20 See, eg, Directive (EU) 2016/2284 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 December 2016 on the reduction of national emissions of certain
atmospheric pollutants.
21 Recitals 8–9 of the ELD.
22 Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5
April 2017 on medical devices.
23 Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5
April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices.
24 Regulation (EU) 2017/625 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2017 on official controls and other official activities performed to ensure the
application of food and feed law, rules on animal health and welfare, plant health, and
plant protection products. See also Regulation (EC) 852/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs.
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the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for the right to life and
physical integrity (arts 2 and 3) and for a high level of consumer
protection in all Union policies (art 38).
The examination of the numerous legal documents in the field of
environmental protection as well as food and medical device safety,
does not merely demonstrate the substantial concern of EU lawmakers
for certain human protected values: it also attests, in a couple of rare
passages, a peculiar attention to the ‘vulnerability’ of those individuals
or communities that are potentially or actually affected by corporate
activity.
This is the case, for instance, for Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 on
the production and use of chemicals (‘REACH Regulation’), which
aims at guaranteeing a high level of protection for human health,
having regard to ‘relevant human population groups and possibly to
certain vulnerable sub-populations’. 25
Another significant example is Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 on
plant protection products, aimed at preventing such products or their
residues having immediate or delayed harmful effects on human
health. 26 The Regulation stresses that special attention should be paid
to the protection of ‘vulnerable groups’ of the population, 27 meaning
‘persons needing specific consideration when assessing the acute and
chronic health effects of plant protection products. These include
pregnant and nursing women, the unborn, infants and children, the
elderly and workers and residents subject to high pesticide exposure
over the long term’. 28 The same reference to ‘vulnerable groups’, with
an almost identical definition, is contained also in Framework
Regulation 528/2012 on biocidal products, which aims at providing
a high level of protection for human health by preventing and reducing
risks deriving from such products. 29
Overall, the examination of the framework allows us to elaborate
two significant first findings.
First, despite the lack of an express reference to the criminological
25 Recital 69 of the REACH Regulation.
26 Arts 4(2)(a) and 4(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant
protection products.
27 Recital 8 of the Regulation on plant protection products.
28 Art 3(14) of the Regulation on plant protection products.
29 Recital 3 and art 1(1) of Regulation (EU) 528/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and
use of biocidal products.
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specificities of corporate victims—both in the 2012 Victims Directive
and in the environmental, food, and medical device legal frame-
works—the recurring attention to the safeguarding of human life and
health in the examined EU legal frameworks proves the existence of an
‘intensified’ concern toward human beings affected by corporate
misconduct. In particular, the attention to categories of ‘vulnerable’
individuals, although fragmented and partial, carries a significant
potential for the three examined sectors to further elaborate on the
notion and protection of a corporate victim.
Second, although not specifically encompassing the notion of
‘victim’, all the examined legal documents have a potential impact on
national criminal justice systems and their application of EU law.
Namely, they could potentially serve as significant references in light
of the obligation of domestic jurisdictions to interpret national law in
conformity with EU law. The fact that a similar path was followed by
the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Pupino case in
relation to the status of the victim within Italian criminal proceedings
could further reinforce this hypothesis. 30 Nevertheless, it should be
kept in mind that the recourse to EU law by the criminal judge with the
deliberate purpose of strengthening the position of the victims can
further hinder the already delicate balance with the rights of the
accused and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (Fletcher 2005;
Sgubbi and Manes 2007).
4. Framing Individuals’ and Legal Entities’ Liability for Corporate
Misconduct
Despite the lack of a specific notion of ‘corporate victim’ at the
EU level, it has been demonstrated so far that the fundamental interests
of individuals and communities affected by illicit corporate acts benefit
from a ‘high level’ of protection in the EU legal frameworks on
environment, food, and medical devices. The question arises, then, as
to what types of responses exist, under EU law, to curb the
phenomenon of gross corporate violations and thereby indirectly
protect those fundamental human interests. The present section,
therefore, examines the schemes of liability adopted in EU sectoral
laws on environmental protection, food, and medical devices,
embracing, under a wide notion of ‘corporate liability’, the liability
30 ECJ, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005].
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of both the legal entities and the natural persons who operate in the
context of and in the interest of the corporation. 31
At first glance, across the EU legislation in all three examined
fields, a recurring provision shapes the contours of legal entities’
liability for potential or actual violations of human life and health, and
in a rather flexible manner. The provision requires Member States to
address corporate non-compliance with the required standards via an
appropriate framework of ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive
penalties’, thereby leaving the discretion on the type of applicable law
(administrative, civil, or criminal) entirely to the Member State.
The Court of Justice and the associated literature have greatly
contributed to the clarification of such notions of ‘effectiveness’,
‘dissuasiveness’, and ‘proportionality’. With particular reference to
criminal law and the environment (Faure 2010; Faure 2011),
effectiveness has been described as suitability to reach the goals
imposed by the legislature (ie a high level of protection of human
health), as well as restoration of the harm done and prevention of
future harm. Dissuasiveness would refer to Becker’s deterrence notion
and the economic theory of crime. And proportionality relates to the
balance between the seriousness of the infringement and the
fundamental interests at stake on one side, and, on the other, the
magnitude of the penalty which must not exceed what is necessary to
achieve the said goals. 32
In addition to this general provision, recurring in all three fields of
environmental protection, food and medical device safety, there are
legal documents whereby the liability scheme for legal entities’
violations is more narrowly identified.
The most recurring one is a regime of administrative or civil
liability, which, in a strict victim-focused perspective, sets out a
preponderantly remedial and compensatory apparatus.
A significant reference in this sense is the mentioned Environ-
mental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC), which establishes a scheme
of environmental liability based on the polluter-pays principle with the
aim of preventing and remedying environmental damage. The
31 See, for instance, the notion of ‘manufacturer’ adopted by the Regulation (EU)
2017/745 on medical devices, which includes both the ‘natural or legal person’ who
manufactures, refurbishes, or markets a device (art 2(30)).
32 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the
Regions Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU
policies through criminal law (COM(2011) 573 final) p 9.
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Directive creates a ‘double’ civil liability regime: on the one hand, a
form of strict liability for professional operators engaging in activities
that are able to cause a risk to human health and the environment
(Annex III). On the other hand, a less rigorous form of culpable
responsibility is provided for other entities (not included in Annex III),
which perform activities that are not intrinsically dangerous and that
cause, with fault or negligence, environmental damage to protected
species and natural habitats. In the light of victim protection, however,
it is important to point out that the ELD does not apply to individual
harm such as personal injury or—even more so—death, nor to damage
to private property or economic loss. 33 This aspect is somewhat
surprising, given the extensive emphasis placed by the Directive on the
impact of risky corporate activities on human health; in fact, this
omission has been criticised in the literature as ‘devoiding’ victims of
environmental damage of their very nature (Thieffry 2015). However,
the ELD has put in place a significant array of (primary,
complementary, and compensatory) 34 measures to ensure the remedy
of environmental damage, which—it is worth mentioning—qualifies as
‘significant’ if it entails ‘adverse effects on human health’. 35
On the contrary, liability for individual harm to human protected
interests is specifically addressed in the EU laws on food and medical
devices, which fall within the scope of application of the EU general
regulation on defective products. The ‘high level of protection of
consumers’ from defective products is a strategic goal in EU policy:
one that is strictly intertwined with the protection of human health in
the Treaty (art 169 TFEU) and that shapes food and health policies
thoroughly. Accordingly, in addition to the prescription of ‘effective,
dissuasive, and proportionate penalties’, the EU legislation on food
products and medical devices 36 contains express references to the
Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products, 37 thereby
33 Art 3(3) and Recital 14 of the ELD.
34 Art 6 of the ELD.
35 Annex I to the ELD.
36 See, eg, Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of
food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority, and laying down
procedures in matters of food safety (General Food Law); see also the Regulation (EU)
2017/745 on medical devices.
37 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the
laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
liability for defective products (‘Product Liability Directive’). See also the Directive
2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on
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triggering the general regime of civil liability without fault for those
who produce and place on the market unsafe products. An effective
example of this synergy between general product safety regulation and
sectoral EU law is provided by the recent 2017 Regulation on medical
devices, which prescribes that ‘the manufacturer shall, in a manner that
is proportionate to the risk class, type of device and the size of the
enterprise, have measures in place to provide sufficient financial
coverage in respect of their potential liability under Directive 85/374/
EEC’ in order to guarantee compensation to the victim. 38 Through this
reference, since potential damages paid to users of defective devices
represent increasing costs for the enterprise, the Directive on product
liability pushes corporations to ‘internalize’ (Rihtar 2013: 223) the
potential future compensation of damages, ie potential victims. As to
food safety, it is worth recalling that in 1999 liability of manufacturers
for defective products was extended specifically to agricultural
products. 39
Keeping in mind the protection of the fundamental interests of life
and health, it should be noted that the Directive on liability for
defective products takes specifically into account the liability (and
obligations of compensation) for manufacturers and importers of those
defective products that have caused (also) ‘death and personal injury’.
As the Green Paper on product liability clarifies, the Directive aims at
achieving a balance: protecting victims’ needs while avoiding a
‘crushing liability’ (Faure 2000) on the enterprise, 40 namely by
requiring the victim to prove the defect, the damage, and the causal
nexus between the two, 41 as well as limiting in time and quantity the
possibility of compensation. 42
general product safety (‘General Product Safety Directive’), whose perimeter of
application, however, does not interfere with that of the Directive 85/374 (art 17).
38 Art 10 of the Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices.
39 Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10
May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws,
regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability
for defective products.
40 European Commission Green paper: Liability for defective products
(COM(1999)396 final) pp 2, 18–19.
41 See art 4 of the Product Liability Directive. Although the burden of proof of
the defect, the damage, and the causal nexus between the two is on the victim, the
producers can be exempt from liability if they prove that they did not circulate the
product; or the defect was due to compliance with mandatory regulations issued by
public authorities; or the state of scientific and technical knowledge at that time did not
allow the detection of the defect (art 7).
42 Arts 10, 11, and 17 of the Product liability Directive. See also ECJ, Case C-
154/00 Commission v Greece [2002], where the Court expressly recognised that the
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5. The Role of Criminal Law in Tackling Corporate Misconduct
As has been mentioned above, out of the three sectoral legal
frameworks that are examined in this study, a specific regime of
criminal liability applies only to the field of environmental protection;
the laws on food and medical device safety do not yet comprise any
express criminal provision. Although reduced to environmental law
only, the use of EU criminal law to curb illicit corporate acts deserves
particular attention as it calls directly into question the criminological
notion of ‘victim’, although presenting certain problematic theoretical
issues.
The ‘turn’ toward criminal sanctions in EU environmental law has
been urged by the stated insufficiency of existing (civil and
administrative) penalties to achieve environmental compliance, as
well as the need to strengthen deterrence and demonstrate qualitatively
stronger social disapproval compared to non-criminal sanctions.
The issue of the EU competence in (environmental) criminal law
between the first and third pillar, as well as in the post-Lisbon era, has
been widely addressed in the literature (Vervaele 2014; Mitsilegas,
Bergström, and Konstadinides 2016). The ‘saga’ of the annulled 2003
Council Framework Decision on the protection of the environment
through criminal law 43 is well known, and the landmark judgment of
the Court of Justice in the case C-176/03 44 opened the way for EU law
makers to oblige the adoption of ‘effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties’ as a tool to combat serious environ-
mental offences. Yet, whether this tool represents an effective path to
curb harmful or dangerous corporate activities for vulnerable
individuals is still to be proved.
The most significant references for environmental protection at the
EU level at present are the 2008/99/EC Directive on the protection of
the environment through criminal law (or the ‘Directive on
environmental crime’), 45 and the 2009/123/EC Directive on ship-
limits to the scope of the Directive ‘are the result of a complex balancing of different
interests’, which include ‘guaranteeing that competition will not be distorted,
facilitating trade within the common market, consumer protection and ensuring the
sound administration of justice’, at 29.
43 See former Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on
the protection of the environment through criminal law.
44 ECJ, Case C-176/03 Commission of the European Communities v Council of
the European Union [2005].
45 Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law.
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source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements
(amending the 2005/35/EC Directive). 46
From a victim-focused perspective, the 2008 Directive on
environmental crime targets, under art 3, any activity that inter alia
‘causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person’.
Therefore, the actual harm (‘causes’) or endangerment (‘likely to
cause’) to human life and health is here clearly targeted through the
description of the criminal event (death and injury). However, it is
worth noting that, contrary to the 1998 Council of Europe Convention
on the protection of the environment through criminal law (not yet
entered into force)—where impact on human health aggravates
liability 47—the Directive does not distinguish damage to the
environment from damage to human life and health on a statutory
basis.
Observing closely the liability scheme designed by the Directive,
legal entities are held liable if, according to art 6(1)
the offences have been committed for their benefit by any person who
has a leading position within the legal person, acting either individually
or as part of an organ of the legal person, based on: (a) a power of
representation of the legal person; (b) an authority to take decisions on
behalf of the legal person; or (c) an authority to exercise control within
the legal person.
The liability regime for the legal person applies also where the
offence has been made possible by the lack of supervision or control by
such person (art 6(2)).
In order to amount to a criminal offence, under art 3 the activity
must be unlawful, ie in breach of the EU environmental legislation
listed in Annex A (comprising a number of regulatory measures on eg
pollution; discharge of materials or ionising radiations into air, soil, or
water; collection, transport, recovery, and disposal of waste; dangerous
activities or storage/usage of dangerous substances in the operation of
a plant), or of the Euratom Treaty or legislation adopted in its
pursuance. Alternatively, the conduct must infringe upon a law, an
administrative regulation, or a decision of a Member State that gives
46 Directive 2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
October 2009 amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the
introduction of penalties for infringements.
47 Art 2(1) of the 1998 Council of Europe Convention on the protection of the
environment through criminal law.
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effect to the mentioned Community legislation. From a subjective
point of view, the Directive requires that the individual conduct was
committed with intent or at least serious negligence, thereby positively
detaching the responsibility scheme from mere strict liability.
However, considering the long-persisting dependence of environ-
mental criminal law on environmental administrative law (Faure
2016), such an ‘open reference’ technique as used by art 2 to describe
the unlawful content of the conduct still raises concerns in light of the
fundamental principle of legality. This aspect, as well as the recourse to
vague notions (eg ‘negligible quantities’ or ‘dangerous activities’) has
been specifically addressed by the Manifesto on European Criminal
Policy, proposed by the European Criminal Policy Initiative, 48 as well
as some commentators who have demanded stricter coherence with
fundamental principles of criminal law (Faure 2011; Satzger 2012).
As to penalties, it should be highlighted that the Directive adopts a
double standard as to the nature of sanctions that apply to natural and
legal persons. The former must be expressly punished by Member
States through effective, dissuasive, and proportionate criminal
penalties (art 6), whereas the effective, dissuasive, and proportionate
penalties for legal persons need not necessarily be of criminal nature
(art 7). Therefore, the text partially differs from the one of the 1998
Convention on environmental crime, which expressly refers to
‘criminal or administrative sanctions on legal persons’ as effective
tools to prevent environmental crime. 49 The adopted solution clearly
reflects a compromise between the different legal cultures of Member
States across the EU in relation to the liability regime for corporations
(Fiorella and Stile 2012; Manacorda 2016). 50 However, the Directive
still frames those unlawful corporate conducts as ‘criminal offences’
and stresses that environmental compliance should be strengthened
48 ‘A Manifesto on European Criminal Policy’ was first published in 2009 (and
later adapted in 2011) in seven languages in Zeitschrift für Internationale
Strafrechtsdogmatik (www.zis-online.it) by criminal law scholars from ten different
European countries in order to propose a ‘balanced and coherent concept of criminal
policy’ in light of certain fundamental principles.
49 Preamble and art 9 of the Convention on the protection of the environment
through criminal law.
50 In its preparatory documents to the Directive on environmental crime, the
Commission expressly recognised that ‘for some Member States it might be difficult to
provide for criminal sanctions against legal persons without changing fundamental
principles of their national legal systems’. See the Explanatory Memorandum to the
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of the environment through criminal law (COM(2001)139 final) at 3 (c).
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through criminal penalties as they ‘demonstrate a social disapproval of
a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative penalties or
a compensation mechanism under civil law’. 51
On the same line, the only other reference in the EU
environmental criminal framework, the 2009 Directive on ship-source
pollution, criminalises as infringements under art 4 the discharge of
polluting substances (ie oil and noxious liquid) ‘if committed with
intent, recklessly or by serious negligence’. It is interesting to note that
the Directive initially required Member States to adopt ‘effective,
dissuasive and proportionate penalties’ to address the liable natural or
legal person, expressly including ‘administrative’ or ‘criminal’ ones,
whose content (length of imprisonment and amount of fine) was
specified by the mentioned annulled Framework Decision. However,
the amending Directive in 2009 has reshaped the sanctioning scheme
according to the same double standard mentioned above, reserving
criminal penalties for natural persons only. The liability scheme for
legal persons exactly reproduces the one in the 2008 Directive on
environmental crime. However, compared to the latter, the concerns for
fundamental human interests in this second legal tool are extremely
scarce, and the only reference to ‘human health’ is found in Annex II to
the original 2005 Directive in the description of the polluting
substances.
Overall, the examined framework certainly proves that environ-
mental protection represents a crucial sector in today’s EU criminal
policy. However, the issue arises as to whether the specific features of
this criminal law tool are suitable to provide for effective protection of
victims’ needs.
In proclaiming a ‘EU criminal policy by 2020’, the 2011
Communication of the Commission recalled that EU criminal law
measures should be firmly grounded in EU-wide standards for victims’
rights, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 52 It further
stated that EU criminal legislation can add important value to the
domestic criminal law systems and foster the confidence of citizens to
buy goods and services from providers by adopting minimum
standards inter alia for victims of crime. 53 It could hence be argued
51 Recital 3 of Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal
law.
52 COM(2011) 573 final, p 12.
53 COM(2011) 573 final, p 5.
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that shaping infringements as criminal offences demonstrates stronger
attention from the EU lawmakers to the most fundamental values of
vulnerable individuals. However, it could also be argued that, where a
criminal liability regime for corporations does not specifically take into
account the rights and needs of victims, criminalisation risks remaining
nothing but a void formula.
Overall, looking at the broader picture, while the highlighted
elements reveal designs in EU criminal policy to stigmatise corporate
misconduct through criminal offences and (potentially criminal)
penalties, it clearly appears that corporate criminal liability has not
been structured at the EU level in order to protect victims of
corporations. Not expressly required in the food and medical device
sectors, 54 it relies in the field of environmental protection on a
restricted number of provisions, some of which present problematic
features.
And what is more, even where criminalisation of corporate
conduct is the preferred choice of national lawmakers, effective
restoration for the victims is often left to civil justice, as shown in the
decision issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the
Giovanardi case. 55 Indeed, the array of solutions and remedial
schemes available to the victim of corporate violations, examined in
section 4, includes important alternatives to criminal law, which should
be examined and weighed carefully as potentially more impactful on
the interests of victims of corporate misconduct.
6. The Risk-based Approach and the Precautionary Principle
Having laid out the types of liability provided by the EU legal
framework with regards to curbing corporate misconduct, it is now
worth examining the degree of protection that fundamental human
interests enjoy under such liability schemes. At root, the EU strategy
for tackling corporate violations is predominantly risk-centred:
fundamental interests such as human life and health are protected
from illicit corporate acts as early as the stage of being exposed to risk.
54 It should be observed, however, that, despite not expressly framing provisions
in terms of criminal offences, the EU laws and the CJEU grant Member States a wide
margin of appreciation to criminalise corporate misconduct in the fields of food
(Simonato 2016) and medical device safety, as emerges from a recent comparative
report on (criminal) food regulation across national jurisdictions (Nieto Martìn 2016).
55 ECJ, Case C-79/11 Giovanardi [2011].
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Under such an approach, which is adopted across the EU legal
frameworks on environmental protection as well as on food and
medical device safety, it is precisely the creation of a (certain or
uncertain) ‘risk’ that triggers liability and remedial measures.
As a matter of fact, numerous legal tools on environmental
protection (eg waste management, use of chemicals), food (biocides,
pesticides, GMOs), and medical device safety expressly aim at
‘preventing’, ‘minimising’, or ‘reducing’ the likelihood of an
‘unacceptable risk’ to human health or the ‘endangerment’ of human
health. 56
With reference to food safety, the General Food Law, Regulation
(EC) 178/2002, specifically states that food law is aimed at the
reduction, elimination, or avoidance of a risk to health, which is defined
as a function of the probability of an adverse health effect and the
severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard. 57 As a consequence,
the determination of effective, proportionate, and targeted measures or
other actions to protect health is based on risk analysis (risk assessment,
risk management, and risk communication). 58
Similarly, with regard to the safety of medicinal products, under
Directive 2001/83/EC ‘risk’ is ‘any risk relating to the quality, safety,
or efficacy of the medicinal product as regards patients’ health or
public health’ (art 1(28)). It entails, for instance, that an application to
obtain the marketing authorisation for a medicinal product should
contain a risk-management system aimed at identifying, characterising,
preventing, or minimising risks related to medicinal products (art 8 and
art 1(28)(b)).
Things get more complicated, however, where the risk-based
policy needs to cope with uncertain risks to human life and health. The
increasing complexity and rapid evolution of technology (eg in a
highly technical field like medicine), as well as the increasing
56 See, eg, the numerous references in the preambles and texts of the mentioned
REACH Regulation; Regulation on shipment of waste; Waste Framework Directive;
Regulation (EU) 2017/625 on official controls and other official activities performed to
ensure the application of food and feed law; Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical
devices; Regulation (EU) 2017/746 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices. See, also,
the regulation on genetically modified organisms (GMO), which represents one of the
most significant examples of risk-regulation in EU law: Directive 2001/18/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release
into the environment of genetically modified organisms.
57 Art 3 of General Food Law.
58 Recital 17 of General Food Law.
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awareness of the effects of certain substances (eg used in industrial
activities and possibly contaminating the environment or foodstuffs),
trigger the application of the precautionary principle.
The latter was expressly established initially under art 191 TFEU
in the EU policy on environment only, although today it has been
extended to the regulation of food 59 and medical devices. It is widely
known that the principle allows the establishment of liability for risks,
despite scientific uncertainty about the potential harmful effects of
certain products. In fact, according to the Communication on the
precautionary principle adopted by the Commission in 2000, the
precautionary principle ‘may be invoked when a phenomenon, product
or process may have a dangerous effect, identified by a scientific and
objective evaluation, if this evaluation does not allow the risk to be
determined with sufficient certainty’. 60
The principle is strictly connected with product liability, although
it is in relation to criminal liability that the principle of precaution
shows its most problematic traits.
With specific reference to criminal law, it consists in a ‘preventive
action’ (Macrory 2014; D’Ambrosio, Giudicelli-Delage, and Mana-
corda 2018 forthcoming), whereby the threshold at which a conduct
amounts to an offence is set at the level of mere creation of an
uncertain risk, before the occurrence of a prejudice. The implications
and perils of the precautionary principle in EU criminal law have been
widely addressed in the literature, which has shed light on the
‘dilemma’ of the EU legislature in setting the delicate balance between
the freedom of persons and organisations involved in economic
activities on the one hand, and the risk of negative effects on human
life and health on the other (Macrory 2014).
As a first remark, it should be recalled that the EU legal texts do
not contain any obligation for domestic jurisdictions to have recourse
to such a precautionary approach in assessing the criminal liability of
individuals or corporations. Even so, the principle has generated
intense debate, both at the jurisprudential and scholarly level.
While precaution can prove a fruitful component of civil and
administrative liability schemes for potentially harmful industrial
activities, the attribution of criminal liability on the basis of a mere
59 The General Food Law introduced the precautionary principle as a
fundamental principle of EU food policy under art 7(1).
60 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle (COM
(2000)1 final).
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uncertain risk demands careful examination in the light of fundamental
principles of criminal liability.
In particular, the question arises as to whether the mandate of
criminal law to attribute individual culpability retrospectively can be
deemed compatible with the ‘protection of future generations’
(Castronuovo 2010). In fact, the precautionary principle is conceptu-
alised as a tool to guarantee future generations against uncertain
technological risks by adopting a diachronic perspective (Castronuovo
2010).
Under a strict criminal law perspective, then, the criminalisation
of behaviour on the basis of its uncertain future effects appears
problematically to lower the threshold of the offence even beyond
abstract endangerment and, consequently, to expand criminal liability
in a manner that calls into question the fundamental criminal law
principles of legality, extrema ratio, and culpability. However, at a
normative level, provided that proportionality is carefully assessed, a
restricted scope for precautionary criminalisation should not be
excluded, namely in case of misdemeanours related to the breach of
threshold limit values conventionally established for the exercise of
potentially dangerous activities.
On the contrary, what should be avoided is the application of the
precautionary principle not by the (criminal) legislator but by the
(criminal) judge, ie at the level of assessment of criminal liability. As a
matter of fact, especially in national legal systems where the
assessment of the causality nexus is based on the condicio sine qua
non rule, the most problematic issue lies in the possible use of the
principle as a substitute for causation in ascertaining the link between
the conduct and the harmful result (D’Ambrosio, Giudicelli-Delage,
and Manacorda 2018 forthcoming).
Overall, despite the criticisms—mainly connected to its use in
criminal law—the precautionary principle could, at first glance,
represent a significant protective tool for potential and future victims.
However, the direct impact it can offer to corporate victims seems to
be significantly limited, and coherent with the fact that provisions on
environmental protection, food, and medical device safety were not
originally designed to protect victims.
7. Concluding Remarks: ‘The Sound of Silence’
This research stemmed from a challenging premise: that the EU is
silent on victims of corporate crime. However, the examination of the
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sectoral legal frameworks on environmental protection, food, and
medical device safety under a victim-focused perspective has allowed
the emergence of a much more complex, diversified, and fragmented
picture.
To extend our metaphor, we may say that there is not complete
silence here. There is indeed a sound, and it is the product of the
potentialities as well as the limitations that shape the safeguards for
victims of corporate misconduct.
On one side, it has progressively been demonstrated that
contemporary EU law is characterised by an intensified attention
toward the fundamental interests of vulnerable individuals affected by
corporate misconduct. Although only partially triggering the applica-
tion of criminal law, the EU laws on environment, food, and medical
devices provide victims of corporate violations with a significant
protective framework, shaped by the different liability schemes for
both legal and natural persons. While criminal law in these fields
remains residual and often highly problematic, the remedial and
compensatory solutions offered by the regulations on environmental
damage and defective (food and medical) products seem, on the
contrary, to offer significant tools for victims of corporations.
On the other side, the analysis has shed light on the existing limits
of protection for victims of corporations. Mainly rooted in EU criminal
law, they are identifiable inter alia in the perils of unbalancing criminal
justice in favour of the victim, and applying the precautionary principle
as a substitute for causality and as an interpretative criterion in the
assessment of criminal liability. Given the unrelenting tension between
protecting vulnerable victims and preserving the integrity of
fundamental principles, the absence of ad hoc criminal liability for
corporate violations appears, perhaps, to indicate the enduring restraint
of EU lawmakers before barriers that, once removed, would
irreversibly extend the boundaries of criminal liability.
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CHAPTER IV
VICTIMS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
by Marc Engelhart
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. Victims and Human Rights. – 3. Victim’s
Rights under the ECHR. – 3.1 Positive Obligations and Horizontal
Effect. – 3.2. Protection under the Specific Rights. – 3.2.1. Art 2 - Right
to Life. – 3.2.2. Art 3 - Prohibition of Torture et al. – 3.2.3. Art 4 -
Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour. – 3.2.4. Art 6 - Fair Trial. –
3.2.5. – Art 8 - Right to Respect for Private and Family Life. – 3.2.6. Arts
10, 11 - Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Assembly and Association.
– 3.2.7. Art 13 - Effective Remedy. – 3.3. Conclusion. – 4. Convention
Rights and the Directive 2012/29/EU. – 5. Future Perspectives.
1. Introduction
This chapter explores the protection of victims of crime under the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; see Gialuz 2015;
Emmerson, Ashworth, and Macdonald 2012: 785). In recent decades,
the situation of victims of crime has increasingly been a focus of
attention in European and international law. The ECHR, which is wide-
ranging in application and is backed up by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), plays a major role in recognising victims’
needs and developing human rights law accordingly. In what follows,
we set out the general relationship between human rights and victims
of crime (section 2), before turning to an analysis of the ECHR with its
legal machinery of positive obligations (section 3.1) and specific rights
(section 3.2). After comparing the Convention rights with the Directive
2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support,
and protection of victims of crime (section 4), the contribution
concludes with some thoughts on the further development of victims’
rights (section 5).
The ECHR is not the only relevant instrument in regard to victims
of crime: the Council of Europe took up the subject in the 1970s, and
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
in 1983 drew up the European Convention on the compensation of
victims of violent crimes (Greer 1996; Muller-Rappard 1990). 1 This
was one of the first binding international instruments that tried to set
minimum standards for victims. The treaty was ratified by 26 countries
and is still in force, although many of its regulations have been
succeeded or amended by EU legislation. 2 The Council of Europe has
not set up another general treaty on victims since 1983, but has rather
concentrated on specific crimes and in this context included provisions
for the protection of victims. 3 Additionally, the Committee of
Ministers has issued various recommendations on assistance to crime
victims. 4
2. Victims and Human Rights
Victims and human rights is a topic that cannot claim to have a
long history, and on the international level it has received attention
only in the last two decades (Bassiouni 2006; Klug 2004). 5 Hence,
criminal law and the position of victims of crimes has developed
separately from human rights law. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
the distinction between victims of crime and victims of human rights
violations is not clear cut (Wemmers 2012; see also Cavanaugh 2016:
11). The term ‘victims of crime’ primarily refers to the fact of a person
being directly affected by a crime (as defined by national laws). In
contrast, human rights violations focus on the State neglecting its
national (often constitutional) and international obligations to protect
certain basic values. 6
Thus the class of victims of crime is not coextensive with the class
1 European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, 24
November 1983, CETS n 116 (entered into force on 1 February 1988).
2 Eg Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of
victims in criminal proceedings; Dir 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to
compensation to crime victims; Dir 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing
minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.
3 Eg the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS n 196, 2005) and the
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS n 197, 2005).
4 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2006)8 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on assistance to crime victims, adopted on 14 June
2006 with further references to previous recommendations.
5 See also chapter five in this volume.
6 See also chapter one in this volume.
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of victims of a violation of the ECHR, although victims of crime can
receive the status of victim of a violation of the provisions of the
ECHR where State authorities fail to discharge their obligations under
the Convention relating to the effective protection and prosecution of
criminal acts.
The term ‘victim of crime’ is not mentioned and ipso facto not
defined in the ECHR. A commonly accepted definition (Dijk 2005;
Cavanaugh 2016: 8) stems from the 1985 UN Declaration on basic
principles of justice for victims of crime and abuse of power, where
victims are defined as
persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm,
including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic
loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts
or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within
Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of
power. 7
In what follows, based on this broad definition which covers a
wide range of (potential) victims, the ECHR and its approach to
victims will be analysed in more detail.
Human rights law has taken up the subject of victims of crime at
a rather late stage of its development, as it has very much
concentrated on the rights of the defendant in the context of criminal
justice. This is a result of legal developments during the European
Enlightenment, when the victim of crime received the status of main
witness (among all available evidence) in order to guarantee
objectivity and impartiality in the proceedings (Weigend 1989: 86).
Victims therefore had a very limited role in the criminal justice
system.
Integrating victims into proceedings on the level of national and
international (especially European Union) law (Groenhuijsen 2013) is
a newer development in discussions of criminal justice, dating to the
second half of the 20th century (Weigend 1989: 377; Walther 2000:
297). In international law, therefore, we can now rely on an emerging
body of specific regulations and even acts pertaining to victims and
their rights in criminal and other proceedings (Bassiouni 2006: 211).
Yet, especially within discussions on criminal justice, there are still
7 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985
(http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r034.htm, last accessed on 15 October
2017). See again in this volume chapter five, by Gabriele Della Morte.
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fears that victims’ rights might impede the historically hard-won
defendants’ rights (Cape 2004; Kett-Straub 2017; see also Schüne-
mann 1986).
What remains? Becoming the victim of a crime does not
automatically constitute a human rights violation. There must in
addition be some (missing) State action that hinders the victim in
dealing with his situation as a victim. From a human rights perspective
this raises questions of how far a State has to protect individuals from
the acts of other individuals, and what kinds of remedies have to be
provided. This touches on the function of human rights as positive
obligations (see section 3.1).
3. Victim’s Rights under the ECHR
The ECHR does not explicitly provide for specific rights for the
victims of crime, nor does it even directly address victims of crime. As
a consequence, victims’ rights must be derived from the more general
Convention rights, a method that has been taken up and recognised by
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This jurisprudence shows that the
Convention has by no means left victims of crime out of the scope of
its protection, and indeed reveals that victims play a vital part within
the overall protection mechanism of the ECHR.
3.1. Positive Obligations and Horizontal Effect
A cornerstone for the protection of victims of crime is the
recognition of the doctrine of positive obligations of the State under the
ECHR, as this provides for a duty of the State to protect individuals
from the criminal acts of others (Than 2003).
This doctrine recognises that States not only have a duty to refrain
from violating the Convention rights by the actions of State authorities,
but also have the positive duty to prevent violations of certain rights by
the actions of State and non-State actors (Dröge 2003; Mowbray 2004;
Krieger 2014). The doctrine means that the State has to be proactive in
providing sufficient protection from threats created by other persons,
and in case of victimisation must take sufficient measures for remedy.
The reason for this approach is that individuals can only enjoy the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR if a certain level of
protection is reached. This doctrine has been key to triggering the
recognition of victims’ rights (Doak 2008: 39; see also in regard to
sexual violence Londono 2007).
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After the first decision referring to positive obligations, the
Marckx case in 1979, 8 which dealt only with the effective respect for
family life, it did not take long until the Court applied the concept to
protection in the sphere of criminal law. In the leading case of X and Y
v the Netherlands of 1985, where Dutch law did not provide for the
possibility of filing a complaint about the sexual abuse of a mentally ill
16-year old, the court stated that art 8
may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves. 9
The Court indicated that the values in question required the
application of criminal measures (and not merely civil regulations) in
order to guarantee a sufficient standard of protection. 10 The rights do
not only apply in the vertical setting between State and individual but
also have a horizontal effect between individuals. In the following
years the Court extended the concept not only to other articles of the
Convention but also developed the requirements in more detail (see
3.2). 11 In this respect, positive obligations for States have been
established regarding the right to life and the prohibition of torture, as
well as many other rights such as the prohibition of slavery and forced
labour.
3.2. Protection under the Specific Rights
The following sections provide a more detailed examination of
victims’ rights in regard to the right to life (3.2.1), the prohibition of
torture (3.2.2), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (3.2.3),
rights to a fair trial (3.2.4), the right to respect for private and family
life (3.2.5), the freedom of expression, assembly, and association
(3.2.6), and the right to effective remedies (3.2.7).
8 ECtHR, Marckx v Belgium [1979], para 31.
9 ECtHR, X and Y v the Netherlands [1985], para 23.
10 ECtHR, X and Y v the Netherlands [1985], para 27.
11 An overview is given by the Court in ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v Turkey [2000],
para 42.
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3.2.1. Art 2 – Right to Life
In regard to art 2 the Court has developed a substantial number of
victims’ rights based on a positive obligation of the State to protect the
lives of all persons within its territory (Meyer-Ladewig et al 2017: art
2, paras 21–31).
The landmark decision was Osman v UK in 1998, where the Court
held that the State has ‘to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives’
within its jurisdiction including ‘effective criminal-law provisions’, an
effective law enforcement system, and the recourse to ‘preventive
operational measures’. 12 This was a first big step towards more precise
requirements after the vague obligation to ‘adopt measures’ in the case
X and Y v the Netherlands.
A first line of argument here deals with the obligation of the State
to actively take up protective measures when the State reasonably
knows or should know about a threat against the life of a person
(Emmerson, Ashworth, and Macdonald 2012: 790), eg:
- a prisoner sharing a cell with a dangerous person, 13
- a journalist receiving death threats, 14
- a wife being threatened by her husband, 15
- in cases of the use of dangerous substances (such as HIV-infected
blood plasma 16 or asbestos in industrial production 17 ),
- in cases of environmental hazards (the running of a dangerous
waste disposal site 18 or the opening of a water reservoir 19 ).
As to the necessary protection mechanisms, the Court frequently
points to importance of criminal provisions in order to deter people
from the behaviour in question. 20
A second line of argument concerns the necessity of the State to
conduct effective investigations, especially in cases of intentional
killings or where dangerous environmental substances/circumstances
are involved. This implies a right to an effective judicial investiga-
12 ECtHR, Osman v UK [1998], paras 115–16.
13 ECtHR, Paul and Audrey Edwards v UK [2002].
14 ECtHR, Kılıç v Turkey [2000].
15 ECtHR, Kontrova v Slovakia [2007].
16 ECtHR, Oyal v Turkey [2010].
17 ECtHR, Brincat et al v Malta [2014].
18 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v Turkey [2004].
19 ECtHR, Kolyadenko v Russia [2012].
20 ECtHR, Oğur v Turkey [1999], para 88; Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz v
Germany [2001], para 86; Mastromatteo v Italy [2002], para 89; Siliadin v France
[2005]; Moncanu et al v Romania [2014]; Camekan v Turkey [2014], paras 51 ff.
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tion, 21 and includes taking up criminal investigations. 22 The
investigations must be timely as well as ex officio, ie not dependant
on actions of the victims. 23 The investigations must also be
independent and impartial, 24 and conducted in such a way as to
enable the State to punish the persons guilty of the crime, 25 meaning
that serious efforts to solve the case must be made. 26 Especially in the
context of serious violations, the Court speaks of a right to know the
truth about the circumstances surrounding the events in question
(Cavanaugh 2016: 27). 27
Although the Court requires criminal proceedings to be initiated
and conducted, there is no right to punishment granted to the victim. 28
Circumstances (such as a lack of sufficient evidence) can warrant the
ending of proceedings without punishment or reference to civil
(damages) proceedings (Meyer-Ladewig et al 2017: art 2, para 29). In
this respect, the Court affords States considerable flexibility concer-
ning the outcomes of criminal proceedings.
Conducting the investigation includes informing the victim (or the
victim’s relatives) about the proceedings, so as to enable them to learn
the truth and to take the necessary steps. 29 This means eg:
- involving the victim’s next-of-kin ex officio; 30
- providing information on the progress and the result of the
investigation and on procedural measures adopted; 31
- ensuring access to documents during the prosecution and the trial,
including witness testimonies 32 and other information used during
the proceedings; 33
21 ECtHR, Association ‘21 December 1989’ et al v Romania [2011], para 144.
22 ECtHR, Kılıç v Turkey [2000].
23 ECtHR, Estamirov v Russia [2006].
24 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v Turkey [2004], paras 64, 73.
25 ECtHR, Moncanu et al v Romania [2014].
26 ECtHR, Dündar v Turkey [2005].
27 ECtHR, Association ‘21 December 1989’ et al v Romania [2011], para 144.
28 ECtHR, Zavoloka v Latvia [2009], para 40. See also chapter one in this
volume.
29 ECtHR, Association ‘21 December 1989’ et al v Romania [2011], para 144;
Hugh Jordan v UK [2001], para 109.
30 At least in a case of violent death, see ECtHR, Slimani v France [2004], paras
44–47.
31 ECtHR, Association ‘21 December 1989’ et al v Romania [2011], para 140;
Güleç v Turkey [1998], para 82; Hugh Jordan v UK [2001], para 142.
32 ECtHR, Ogur v Turkey [1999], para 92.
33 ECtHR, Yvon v France [2003].
34 ECtHR, Hugh Jordan v UK [2001], para 142.
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- the right to a legal representative; 34
- the possibility of filing new motions to take evidence; 35
- legal aid to enable the victim’s or victim’s family’s effective
participation in the proceedings;
- a possible right to compensation. 36
3.2.2. Art 3 – Prohibition of Torture et al
The concept of positive obligations was broadened by the Court in
the 1990s by including art 3 on cases of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. The leading decision in this regard
was the case A v UK in 1998, where the Court considered that domestic
legislation failed to protect a nine-year-old boy from inhuman and
degrading treatment by his stepfather as national law regarded it as
‘reasonable chastisement’. 37 The Court emphasised that positive
obligations exist not only in regard to State authorities but also in
regard to private persons.
Since then the Court has stressed the obligation of the State to
carry out effective official investigations. 38 In the case M.C. v
Bulgaria the Court applied a three-step approach that requires States to
implement criminal measures, and to conduct effective criminal
investigations as well as prosecutions of the behaviour in question
(in this case rape, see Londono 2007: 161). 39 In this respect the Court
applied standards rather similar to those in art 2 cases, although it did
not use the term ‘preventive operational measures’.
3.2.3. Art 4 – Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour
Similar to the judgements in regard to arts 2 and 3, the Court has
applied the protective principle to art 4. Following the lines of
argument already established, in the leading decision Siliadin v France
35 ECtHR, Rajkowska v Poland [2007].
36 ECtHR, Association ‘21 December 1989’ et al v Romania [2011], para 144.
37 ECtHR, A v the United Kingdom [1998], para 22.
38 See, eg, ECtHR, Assenov et al v Bulgaria [1998], para 102; Selmouni v France
[1999], para 79; El-Masri v Macedonia [2012]; İbrahim Demirtaş v Turkey [2014];
O’Keeffe v Ireland [2014], para 172.
39 ECtHR, M.C. v Bulgaria [2003], para 153. Confirmed in, eg, O’Keeffe v
Ireland [2014], para 148.
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of 2005 the Court held that States have to penalise and effectively
prosecute acts that maintain persons in a situation of slavery or forced
labour. 40 In its 2010 judgment Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia the Court
emphasised the need for practical and adequate measures for protecting
potential victims as well as the need for effective prosecutions of
incidents. 41 Hence, art 4 entails a procedural obligation to investigate
situations, just as in arts 2 and 3. 42
3.2.4. Art 6 – Fair Trial
The jurisprudence in regard to art 6 is not only the most important
in practice for the accused in criminal proceedings (Meyer-Ladewig et
al 2017, art 6, para 1), but also of importance for the rights of victims
(Gialuz 2015: 26). As the term ‘criminal’ is interpreted quite
broadly, 43 these rights can apply to a substantial number of cases,
although the Court does not apply the same standards when an offence
of a more administrative character (malum prohibitum) rather than a
serious crime (malum in se) is concerned. 44
In the leading case of Doorson v the Netherlands the Court stated
that in certain cases the interests of the accused and his defence must
be balanced with the interests of the victim (eg as a witness). 45 The
fair trial principle enables the Court to strike a balance between the
rights of the accused and those of the victims. 46 Possible measures for
protecting victims are:
- allowing vulnerable victims as witnesses not to be cross-examined
(especially children or victims in sexual offences, see Londono
2007: 169), 47
40 ECtHR, Siliadin v France [2005], para 112.
41 ECtHR, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010], paras 284 ff.
42 ECtHR, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia [2010], para 288. Confirmed in C.N. v
UK [2012], para 69.
43 See, eg, ECtHR, Öztürk v Germany [1984], paras 50–54 on including
administrative offences (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) and Engel et al v the Netherlands
[1976], para 82 on disciplinary measures.
44 See ECtHR, Jussila v Finland [2006], para 43.
45 ECtHR, Doorson v the Netherlands [1996], para 70. See also chapter one in
this volume.
46 See, eg, ECtHR, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK [2011], para 146; N.F.B. v
Germany [2001].
47 ECtHR, W.S. v Poland [2007], para 57; S.N. v Sweden [2002], paras 47–52.
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- allowing anonymous witness statements in order to safeguard the
victim, 48
- allowing video testimonies and video recording in order to avoid
direct contact between the perpetrator and the victim. 49
Yet the ECtHR also makes clear that reducing the right of
confrontation of the accused in such cases should be otherwise
counterbalanced by the State courts, 50 and cannot lead to the complete
restriction of the right of the accused to confront a victim as a witness. 51
The ECtHR also decided that a victim of a crime can claim rights
under art 6 para 1 of the Convention even when he lodges a civil-party
complaint based on the offence: victims’ rights shall not be diminished
merely because national law does not provide for a criminal participation
right for compensation (but leaves this to civil procedure). 52 In this
respect the Court accepts the victim’s right of access to the courts for
compensation in cases of crime (Meyer-Ladewig et al 2017: art 6, paras
12, 41). The limits are drawn where victims merely seek ‘private revenge’
or demand an actio popularis, goals that are not covered by the
Convention. 53 Also, under art 6 the ECHR does not confer any right to
have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence. 54
Hence art 6 of the Convention in its civil alternative (‘civil rights
and obligations’) is applicable to victims who take part in the criminal
trial and seek compensation (even as a civil party), as well as to victims
who are not requesting a remedy for damage in the criminal
proceedings but where the remedy is requested in a distinct civil
lawsuit. This means, by contrast, that participation even in a criminal
proceeding without seeking compensation (eg for retributive reasons,
such as provided by the German ‘Nebenklage’, see Meyer-Ladewig et
al 2017: art 6, para 12) is not covered. 55
In so far as art 6 para 1 is applicable, it guarantees victims the right
of access to the file and to documents regarding the crime committed,
48 ECtHR, Krasniki v Czech Republic [2006], para 76.
49 On the limits in order to enable verification by the defence, see also ECtHR,
Gani v Spain [2013], para 48; W.S. v Poland [2007], para 61.
50 ECtHR, S.N. v Sweden [2002], para 47; Doorson v the Netherlands [1996],
para 75.
51 ECtHR, P.S. v Germany [2002], para 47; Doorson v the Netherlands [1996],
para 75.
52 ECtHR, Perez v France [2004], paras 70–72.
53 ECtHR, Perez v France [2004], para 70; Gorou v Greece (n 2) [2009], para 24.
54 Gorou v Greece (n 2) [2009], para 24.
55 ECtHR, Perez v France [2004], para 70; Garimpo v Portugal [2004].
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the right to be heard, and the right to receive a reasoned court decision.
However, in contrast to the rights of the accused, art 6 provides much
more limited procedural guarantees to victims.
3.2.5. Art 8 – Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Within the context of art 8 the Court has acknowledged that the
State has a duty to protect individuals from infringements of their
rights not only by the State but also by other persons, 56 including
environmental dangers caused by industrial production. 57 Similar to
the positive obligations under arts 2, 3, and 4, this can mean
implementing criminal measures and conducting effective criminal
investigations and proceedings. 58
Hence the mechanisms developed are now applied not only to
the most serious violations of rights but also to less grave acts
affecting individuals’ physical and mental welfare. Yet the Court is
quite cautious about creating obligations which are too strict, as it
seeks to strike a fair balance between the general interest of the
public and the competing interests of the victims. 59 Thus it affords
much flexibility to States as how to reach the necessary level of
protection.
3.2.6. Arts 10, 11 – Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Assembly and
Association
In regard to arts 10 and 11 the Court has also applied the principle
of positive obligations. The Court assumed that there is a duty of the
State to protect the right of freedom of expression, something which
may require positive measures of protection against violence in the
sphere between individuals. 60 Similar duties to protect were
56 ECtHR, E.S. v Sweden [2012], paras 57–59; Schüth v Germany [2010], para
55; Airy v Ireland [1979], paras 32–33.
57 ECtHR, Tatar v Romania [2009], paras 87–88.
58 ECtHR, X and Y v the Netherlands [1985], para 23; M.C. v Bulgaria [2003],
paras 152–53.
59 ECtHR, McGinley and Egan v UK [1998], para 98.
60 ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v Turkey [2000], para 43. See also ECtHR, Dink v
Turkey [2010], para 138. See also Stoll v Switzerland [2007], para 155 (need for
appropriate criminal sanctions to prevent the disclosure of certain confidential items of
information).
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considered in regard to the right to freedom of assembly and freedom
of association in art 11. 61 Although the State is obliged to take
measures, the Court is not very detailed about the kind of obligations
involved. Thus, similar to art 8, it leaves States great flexibility as to
how to achieve a minimum level of protection.
3.2.7. Art 13 – Effective Remedy
Art 13 amends the material obligations set out in other provisions
of the Convention. Especially in regard to violations of arts 2 and 3 it
creates a separate obligation for sound and effective investigations into
the incidents by State authorities. 62 Further, national law must provide
for adequate compensation mechanisms, 63 including compensation for
non-material damages. 64
3.3. Conclusion
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR in regard to the protection of
victims reflects the international and national development of human
rights law, from the duty of State authorities not to infringe rights to the
obligation to implement a more comprehensive protection mechanism,
including actively addressing possible violations of rights by private
parties (positive obligations).
Although this development is quite straightforward in its
ambitions to improve victim’s rights, it reveals a constant tension
between addressing persons as the victims of crime on the one hand
and being the victim of a human rights violation on the other. Being the
victim of crime entails being a human rights victim only in particular
cases. In this regard, two very different concepts from criminal law/
criminology/victimology and from public law come into contact. This
represents a rather new approach within the system of criminal justice,
61 ECtHR, Ouranio Toxo et al v Greece [2005], para 37. See also ECtHR,
Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v Austria [1988], para 32.
62 See ECtHR, CLR v Romania [2014], para 149 with further references.
63 ECtHR, O’Keeffe v Ireland [2014], paras 177 ff.; McGlinchey et al v UK
[2003], para 66; Aksoy v Turkey [1996], para 98.
64 ECtHR, Poghosyan and Baghdasaryan v Armenia [2012], para 46;
McGlinchey et al v UK [2003], para 66; Z et al v UK [2001], para 109.
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of integrating all these aspects into a human-rights-based view on
different stakeholders (including victims) (Doak 2008: 30).
Thus far, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has mainly pursued the
following lines: protect the victims of crime through the criminal
justice system on the one hand, and protect the victims from the
detrimental effects of criminal trials on the other (Gialuz 2015: 29).
Within the concept of positive obligations the Court has
established a duty to implement criminal measures as an effective
protection mechanism for deterring potential perpetrators. This
obligation, first recognised in respect to the right to life and the
prohibition of torture, has been extended to many other rights. In view
of the constant broadening of the concept, it can be expected that the
doctrine of positive obligations will be applied to even more rights and
protected values as a kind of general concept of the Convention. For
victims this means that the State duty to protect comprises a ‘right not
to be victimised’ (as a primary victim).
A constant line of reasoning concerns not only the implementation
of criminal measures but also their effective enforcement. The Court
stresses the importance of effective investigations and of putting
perpetrators on trial, although there is no right to have someone
convicted. 65 This emphasis on State practice shows that a number—
perhaps the majority—of shortcomings in States do not concern the
criminal law in the books but criminal law in action. We hence see a
specific victim’s ‘right to investigation’ being developed (but see
Gialuz 2015: 31).
When it comes to the details of how to protect potential victims
from crime, the Court not only seems to have no clear concept in mind
but indeed remains rather vague (Krieger 2014: 212; Klatt 2011: 711).
The Court very much leaves implementation to the States, with a wide
margin of appreciation. Their reasoning, however, seems to follow the
general rule that the more important the protected good, the more
detailed is the Court’s review. This at least indicates that the Court
follows a certain concept of legal goods (Rechtsgutskonzept). Also, the
Court requires stricter measures when vulnerable groups (eg children)
are concerned. What remains open, however, is the development of a
concept for operational and other measures that would form the
minimum standard for effective protection mechanisms.
Besides the preventive obligation to protect potential victims from
65 See again chapter one in this volume.
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crime, the Court has accepted several mechanisms that aim at
protecting victims during the proceedings of criminal trials (Emmer-
son, Ashworth, and Macdonald 2012: 823). In this regard one can
speak of a developing ‘right to avoid secondary victimisation’. Again,
the more vulnerable the victim, the stricter is the standard.
Interestingly, although the Court has accepted several rights of the
victim in regard to the criminal trial, it has not recognised a right to
participation in the trial. It is up to the States and their different legal
systems how they provide for sufficient information and reparation for
the victim, be it in criminal or other proceedings. This reluctance must
be seen in the light of the Court’s jurisprudence, wherein it is clear that
guaranteeing effective rights for the accused should not be impaired by
too far-reaching rights of victim participation. Hence it is to be
expected that the Court will continue its path of protecting specifically
vulnerable victims, but will tend not to accept more general
participation rights in criminal trials.
This shows the problems which human rights law has in dealing
with the traditional focus on the rights of the accused in criminal
proceedings. This has not only led to many years of neglect of victims’
rights, but also to a neglect to develop criteria for balancing the often
contrary interests of victims and the accused. Hence the ECtHR faces a
kind of dilemma: accepting victims’ rights in the criminal process can
pose the risk of diminishing the established rights of the accused. 66
Accordingly the Court more or less has to develop a balancing test
from scratch.
4. Convention Rights and the Directive 2012/29/EU
Comparing the standards set up by the ECtHR and the Directive
2012/29/EU shows that the Directive has taken up the basic line set by
the Court, and developed it into an overall victim-sensitive system with
very specific rights for victims of crimes. The Directive is the most
comprehensive and detailed program for integrating victims into the
criminal justice system on the international level. 67 It provides for
rights to protection, rights to receive information, rights to receive
support, participation rights, and rights for compensation. Both the
Victims Directive and the ECtHR concentrate on individuals and
66 This issue is addressed in this volume in chapter one by Claudia Mazzucato.
67 See chapters one and two in this volume.
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individual rights. Aspects of collective victimisation and approaches to
dealing with this have not been taken up so far.
A central element of Directive 2012/29/EU is to provide rights to
protection (arts 18–24), stating clearly that States should avoid
secondary victimisation. This is along the same lines as emphasised
by the ECtHR. The scope of the right to protection in art 18 is rather
broad, much as it is in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, covering family
members and extending to protection from ‘emotional or psychological
harm’. The protection mechanisms are very detailed—eg States shall
ensure that courts have separate waiting rooms for victims (although
this is restricted to new court premises). The Victims Directive (arts 23,
24) and the ECtHR concentrate on vulnerable victims, granting them
enhanced protection mechanisms.
Although this development and the emphasis on avoiding
secondary victimisation are to be welcomed, one must concede from
the point of scientific research that the empirical data is rather scarce
on the scope and conditions of secondary victimisation (Kölbel and
Bork 2012: 38; Bock 2013: 208). In order to extend and improve
measures for avoiding secondary victimisation, it is necessary to know
more about its mechanisms.
The effect on the rights of the accused are rarely mentioned in the
Directive 2012/29/EU, although art 18 States that victims’ rights are
‘without prejudice to the rights of the defence’. This is of course not
true if one looks eg at the protection mechanisms in art 23, para 3
granted to vulnerable victims. These restrictions on the defence can be
justified without violating fair trial rights (such as those of art 6
ECHR), but it would have been preferable if the Directive had stated
explicitly—as the ECtHR does—that victims’ rights have an effect on
those of the accused, and that a solution can only be found by
balancing both sets of rights.
Concerning the rights to receive information, the Victims
Directive is very specific (much more than the Framework Decision
2001/220/JHA was) and tries to put the victim in a situation to
understand their rights and the proceedings. The information rights are
very detailed, in many respects more than as established by the ECtHR.
A major difference is the underlying approach. The Directive 2012/29/
EU is very technical (language support, information about certain
stages, etc) whereas the ECtHR lays much more emphasis on the right
to be informed about the truth and the facts of the case. Such
information might also be received via the various rights in the
Directive, but the difference is that the Directive establishes a formal
position for the victim, whereas the ECtHR concentrates more on
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putting the victim in a position to understand what has happened in the
past and to cope with the situation now.
As far as the rights to receive support 68 are concerned (arts 8 and
9), the Victims Directive takes up an aspect which is scarcely touched
upon by the ECtHR. The Directive not only obliges States to set up
institutions (institutional guarantee), but also to task them with at least
basic support services. Although these are very general obligations,
leaving States much discretion in implementing them, and with much
depending on the availability of financial resources, the right to receive
support might be something the ECtHR could develop in more detail in
the future as a criterion for avoiding secondary victimisation.
Directive 2012/29/EU provides for a certain set of participation
rights, such as the right to receive written acknowledgement of a
complaint (art 5, para 1); the right to be heard, including the right to
provide evidence (art 10); and the right to legal aid (art 13). These
rights are very similar to the ones granted by the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR. What both regimes have in common is that neither provides
for a full right of participation in the proceedings or in the trial. Also,
the victim has no right to punishment. To this extent, then, the victim
has no right to be a formal party in the proceedings, although the
victim can initiate certain procedural steps and has certain control
rights. Under both regimes, however, it is important that the national
judicial systems have enough flexibility to settle criminal cases without
a judgment.
As for the rights to compensation, the Victims Directive does not
provide for a right for damages etc but merely gives a right to a
decision on compensation within the criminal trial (art 16), a right to
reimbursement of certain expenses (art 14), and the right to the return
of seized property (art 15). To this extent, EU law is still governed by
the Directive 2004/80/EC on the compensation of victims of violent
intentional crimes with the amendments of the Directive 2012/29/EU.
This means compensation is limited to certain crimes. It is not clear
whether the ECtHR goes any further in this respect, as it touches upon
compensation mainly in the context of serious violations of arts 2 and 3
ECHR.
Directive 2012/29/EU is also very cautious on the subject of
restorative justice, although it mentions it explicitly in art 12. 69
Overall, it gives States the opportunity to refer to such measures but
68 See chapter eight in this volume.
69 See chapter nine in this volume.
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sets no novel standard, and even seems to lag behind standard practice
in some national systems (Kilchling 2015; Bock 2013: 207; Kerner
2015). Hence the Victims Directive shows the same restraints as the
ECtHR in adopting new conflict solution models.
One aspect the Directive 2012/29/EU does not really take up, but
which is of great importance to the ECtHR, is the right to a speedy,
serious, and thorough investigation. The Directive very much depends
on trust in the national systems that investigations shall actually be
taken up either ex officio or following a complaint by the victim.
ECtHR jurisprudence, on the other hand, shows that in practice, and
especially in delicate cases (such as the involvement of public
authorities), in quite a number of instances this trust is not warranted.
In order to provide a solution to this problem, stronger victim rights
could be warranted, especially during the investigation period
(although without impeding public investigations).
Last but not least, the protection from becoming a victim plays a
major role in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Directive 2012/29/EU does
not specify any victim-specific policies in this regard, but leaves this
issue to the subject-oriented legislation. 70 Hence the general
preventive obligations set up by the ECtHR remain of special
importance.
5. Future Perspectives
The ECHR, and its implementation through the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR, have manifested an ongoing process of including and
expanding the rights of victims of crime within a human rights regime.
It demonstrates clearly that a modern human rights protection system
comprises detailed positive obligations on States not only to actively
prevent individuals becoming victims of crime, but also to support
victims. Yet the realisation of victims’ rights requires these principles
to be put into practice as enforceable rights, extending beyond a case-
by-case approach. 71 The Directive 2012/29/EU, with its detailed sets
of rights for victims, shows how this can be achieved. It can claim
significant progress on the international level as well as on most
national levels. As a consequence, the protection of victims is now
70 See, eg, Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating
trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, art 18.
71 See chapter seven in this volume.
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widespread not only in European criminal policy but also in legislation
and judicial practice (Schünemann 2011: 446). A decade ago, it would
have been fair to observe that the international legal system was far
from being victim-oriented (Bassiouni 2006: 278); but this has finally
begun to change. The stronger integration of victims has come to
characterise the criminal justice process, and is now a vital part of
doing justice (Schöch 2013: 233).
Whereas many victim rights are now regulated and governed by
EU law, with the possibility of involving the ECJ, the ECHR still
remains the ‘backbone’ for victims’ rights (especially in cases where
judicial systems are under stress). It not only guarantees an
unavoidable and legally enforceable threshold, but also allows for
‘checking’ whether rights are really observed in practice. It may be
expected that the ECtHR will continue its path of elaborating and
recognising victims’ rights, and will have recourse to Directive 2012/
29/EU as an example of a well-established set of rights.
Strengthening the position of victims in criminal proceedings
gives them a role far beyond being merely a witness (and in so far just
another piece of evidence): indeed, it has shifted them from a passive
to an active role (Herrmann 2010). But strengthening victims’ rights in
many cases conflicts with the rights of the accused; and hence the
ECtHR is very cautious eg in regard to restricting fair trial rights under
art 6, trying to balance them with victims’ rights.
Thus, more than ever, the development of far-reaching victims’
rights raises questions about the aim of criminal proceedings: Is the
procedure simply intended to determine the guilt of the accused?
(Which leaves the victim a rather limited role.) Is it rather intended as a
search for the truth within a framework of the rule of law? (Which
enables the victim’s interests to be considered within a much larger
scope.) Or is it indeed intended to restore legal peace? (Whereby the
victim can be integrated substantially within concepts such as those
offered by the restorative justice approach.)
Most judicial systems are still based on the structures of the
criminal process which were an outcome of the rationalisation
achieved during the Enlightenment (see Weigend 1989: 93): a
perpetrator is seen primarily as violating the public order and public
interests, and not only the private interests of the victim. Since that
time, therefore, the public task has been seen as one of reacting to this
breach of the peace; and this public reaction was (and is) not
necessarily driven by the same interests as the victim. Objective public
proceedings merely determine if the perpetrator has fulfilled the
elements of crime. This is often only part of the historic story
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(especially if the indictment has been limited to certain aspects), and is
thus frustrating for victims who are seeking both truth and
understanding. 72 Principles such as in dubio pro reo can add to this
frustration.
These dilemmas, between a limited criminal justice approach and
the broader interests of the victim, cannot be solved by granting
victims more rights. In this regard, criminal proceedings can serve
victims’ interests in only a very limited fashion. This must honestly be
conceded, especially in a time of punitive criminal policies that seek to
solve social problems by introducing new crimes and raising
sentences, and where a (counterproductive) tendency to exploit victims
for repressive purposes (Schöch 2013: 231) exists. The best that can
(and should) be achieved now is a victim-friendly system, but not a
victim-oriented one. This means effective rights to information,
support, and reparation, but only limited participation rights in
proceedings.
If one wants to include victims any further this would mean
adjusting the aim of the criminal process. Such efforts should not be
rejected simply because they would change the system, but we should
be clear that they would change the system. Restorative justice could
be one of the concepts that could better address social conflicts,
because it is much broader than relying on criminal offences alone,
and could provide for more sustainable solutions in regard to
restoring public peace. It could also take up measures in cases where
the collective dimension (collective victimisation) is a central
element. 73 Although restorative justice is at least now mentioned in
the Directive 2012/29/EU, it is far from being taken up in European
policy (Schünemann 2011: 460). Thus there is still much potential for
it to be used in future reforms. The ECtHR’s latest emphasis on
rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender into society as
mandatory factors for States’ penal policies, 74 opens the door to
seeking new models of participation for both victims and offenders in
public proceedings.
72 See chapter six and again chapter seven in this volume.
73 See again chapter nine in this volume.
74 ECtHR, Hutchinson v UK [2017], para 43.
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CHAPTER V
VICTIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
AN OVERVIEW
by Gabriele Della Morte
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. The Definition of Victim (Under International
Law). – 3. The Procedural and Substantial Dimension of Victims under
International Law. – 3.1. The Procedural Dimension. – 3.2. The
Substantial Dimension. – 4. The Right to Redress and Reparation. – 5.
Conclusion.
1. Introduction
It is true that ‘Victims’ rights have received over the years limited
attention in International Law’ (Van Boven 2015). 1 This is principally
because international law is primarily directed at the relationship
between States, and not individuals. 2
Nonetheless, there are instruments from which it is possible to
detect the elements that allow the recognition of a victim under
international law. We are referring to two documents in particular: first,
the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, adopted by United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985; and second, the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
1 For an introduction to the subject, see Bonacker and Safferling 2013; Gorski
2015; Stoitchkova 2010; Clapham 2006; Droedge 2006; de Greiff 2006; Shelton 2005.
2 Traditionally, since States were the original actors on the international scene,
individuals were regarded as a kind of ‘object’ mediated by the States. Nowadays, this
perception is changing, along with international law, as has been duly noted by Gorski
2015: ‘There is no definition of the term “individuals” in international treaties’.
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the
General Assembly on 16 December 2005. 3
2. The Definition of Victim (under International Law)
From a comparative analysis of these two documents, we can
deduce that the term ‘victims’ means, first of all,
persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or
omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member
States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power. 4
Under this definition, a person may be considered a victim
‘regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended,
prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim’. 5 Moreover, this provision
includes, if appropriate, ‘the immediate family or dependants of the
direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to
assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization’. 6 Additionally,
these definitions shall be relevant to ‘all, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, age, language, religion, nationality,
political or other opinion, cultural beliefs or practices, property, birth
or family status, ethnic or social origin, and disability’. 7
These principles allow for several different interpretations.
(i) A person is a victim because he or she has suffered physical or
mental injury, or even emotional suffering, economic loss, or a
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights;
3 It is worth mentioning that ‘serious violations’ are different from ‘grave
breaches’ in international law. In fact, the first term indicates a violation that could
constitute a crime under international law, irrespective of the national or international
context of armed conflict. On the other hand, the expression ‘grave breaches’ refers to
severe violations of humanitarian law carried out within the context of international
armed conflict.
4 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power (hereafter, General Assembly Resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985), para
A.1.
5 Ibid para A.2.
6 Ibid para A.2.
7 Ibid para A.3.
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(ii) There are direct victims as well as indirect victims (such as family
members or dependants of the victims);
(iii) A person could be a victim individually as well as collectively;
(iv) There are different kinds of harm or loss (that could be caused by
an act as well as by an omission).
Moreover, even though neither of these two instruments is
referring to legal persons or entities, this possibility is not excluded in
some specific areas (the so-called regimes of international law). It is
worth mentioning the regime of international criminal law, since Rule
85 of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) clearly states that victims may also include organisations or
institutions that have sustained harm to any of their property which is
dedicated to religion, education, art, etc. 8
3. The Procedural and Substantial Dimension of Victims under
International Law
The rights of victims under international law are encompassed in
two different spheres: procedural and substantial.
3.1. The Procedural Dimension
Starting with the procedural dimension, it is worth noting that arts
4 to 7 of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power (1985), as well as arts 12 to 14 of the Basic
Principles and Guidelines (2005), specify the content of the equal
access of justice to obtain effective remedies. The subject is well
known in international law as it has been explored in a large number of
8 See International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, s III
(‘Victims and witnesses’), sub-s 1 (‘Definition and general principle relating to
victims’), r 85 (‘Definition of victims’): ‘For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence: (a) “Victims” means natural persons who have suffered
harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to
any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or
charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and
objects for humanitarian purposes’. On the notion of ‘victim’ as a ‘natural person’
according to the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of
25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection
of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHAEU
law, see chapter one in this volume.
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international conventions and declarations adopted at a universal
level, 9 as well as at a regional one. 10
To summarise, what a victim can effectively do is set out in the
section of the documents dedicated to ‘Access to justice’.
First of all, victims have to be treated with ‘compassion and
respect’. 11 They are entitled ‘to access to the mechanisms of justice
and to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the
harm that they have suffered’. 12 These ‘mechanisms’, that are as much
judicial as administrative, should be established ‘where necessary’ to
obtain redress, 13 and include formal and informal process. 14 This
process should be facilitated by: ‘(a) Informing victims of their role
and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings; (b) Allowing
the views and concerns of victims to be presented; (c) Providing proper
assistance to victims throughout the legal process; (d) Taking measures
9 See, eg, art 3 of the Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (1907); art 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art 91
of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1, 1977); art 2
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); art 6 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1965); art 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); art 39 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (1989).
The definitions contained in these instruments are quite large. Hence, the General
Comment adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 29 March 2004 specifies that:
‘The obligations of the Covenant in general and article 2 in particular are binding on
every State Party as a whole. All branches of government (executive, legislative and
judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level—national,
regional or local—are in a position to engage the responsibility of the State Party’ (see
General Comment No. 31: ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant’). Moreover, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
States that (as an example): ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim
of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and
reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect
and dignity of the child’.
10 See, eg, art 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); art 25 of the American Convention of Human
Rights (1969); art 7 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981).
11 Art 4 of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power (1985).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid art 5.
14 Such as mediation, arbitration, and customary justice or indigenous practices.
Ibid art 7.
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to minimize inconvenience to victims; and (e) Avoiding unnecessary
delay’. 15
Furthermore, the Basic Principles and Guidelines (2005) provide
that, in case of gross violation of international human rights law or of a
serious violation of international humanitarian law, ‘Obligations
arising under international law to secure the right to access justice
and fair and impartial proceedings shall be reflected in domestic
laws’. 16 To that end, States should undertake ‘procedures to allow
groups of victims to present claims for reparation’, 17 and it is
highlighted that an ‘adequate, effective and prompt remedy for gross
violations [...] should include all available and appropriate interna-
tional processes in which a person may have legal standing’. 18
3.2. The Substantial Dimension
With regard to the duty to provide redress, the topic of reparation
is divided into different categories: (a) restitution, (b) compensation,
(c) rehabilitation, (d) satisfaction and, if necessary, (e) guarantee of
non-repetition.
Starting from (a) restitution, this includes a fair ‘return of property
or payment for the harm or loss suffered’ by ‘victims, their families or
dependants’. 19 States are required to ‘review their practices,
regulations and laws to consider restitution as an available sentencing
option in criminal cases’. 20 In addition, ‘in cases of substantial harm to
the environment’, restitution consists of ‘restoration of the environ-
ment, reconstruction of the infrastructure, replacement of community
facilities and reimbursement of the expenses of relocation’. 21 Finally,
if the harm is caused by an agent ‘acting in an official or quasi-official
15 Ibid art 6.
16 Basic Principles and Guidelines (2005), art 12. Consequently, States should:
‘(a) Disseminate [...] information about all available remedies [...]; (b) Take measures
to minimize the inconvenience to victims and their representatives [...]; (c) Provide
proper assistance to victims seeking access to justice; (d) Make available all
appropriate legal, diplomatic and consular means to ensure that victims can exercise
their rights to remedy’.
17 Basic Principles and Guidelines (2005), art 13.
18 Basic Principles and Guidelines (2005), art 14.
19 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power (1985), art 8.
20 ‘In addition to other criminal sanctions’, ibid art 9.
21 ‘Whenever such harm results in the dislocation of a community’, ibid, art 10.
VICTIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
capacity’ the victims will be entitled to receive restitution directly from
the State. 22
The standard concerning (b), compensation, States that the above-
mentioned principle should be provided ‘for any economically
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case’. 23 If compensation is
not fully available from the offender or other sources, States should
endeavour to provide financial compensation to some groups of
victims, in particular. These groups include: ‘(a) Victims who have
sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical or mental
health as a result of serious crimes; (b) The family, in particular
dependants of persons who have died or become physically or mentally
incapacitated as a result of such victimization’. 24 Finally, for that
purpose, ‘national funds for compensation to victims’ are encour-
aged. 25
Concerning (c) rehabilitation, this ‘should include medical and
psychological care as well as legal and social services’ (Basic
Principles and Guidelines (2005) art 21).
Regarding (d) satisfaction, this takes into account a large amount
of hypotheses, from ‘Effective measures aimed at the cessation of
continuing violations’ (art 22(a)) to the ‘Verification of the facts and
full and public disclosure of the truth’ (art 22(b)); from the search for
those who have disappeared (art 22(c)) to the official declaration or
judicial decision restoring the reputation of the victim (art 22(d)); from
‘public apology’ (art 22(e)) to ‘Judicial and administrative sanctions
against persons liable for the violations’ (art 22(f)); and from
‘Commemorations and tributes to the victims’ (art 22(g)) to ‘Inclusion
of an accurate account of the violations [...] training and in educational
material at all levels’ (art 22(h)).
Lastly, the (e) guarantee of non-repetition is expressly pro-
22 Ibid art 11.
23 Basic Principles and Guidelines (2005), art 20. In case of gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian
law, compensation should be provided in cases of: ‘(a) Physical or mental harm; (b)
Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits; (c) Material
damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential; (d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and
psychological and social services’.
24 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power (1985), art 12.
25 Ibid art 13.
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vided—‘where applicable’—in the Basic Principles and Guidelines
(2005), art 23. The measures include: ensuring civilian control of
military forces (art 23(a)); ensuring international standards of due
process (art 23(b)); strengthening the independence of the judiciary (art
23(c)); protecting in particular categories such as legal, medical, or
media, as well as human rights defenders (art 23(d)); consolidating
human rights and international humanitarian law education in all
sectors of society (art 23(e)); endorsing the observance of codes of
conduct and promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring
social conflicts and their resolution (art 23(f–g)); and strengthening
legislative reform that can contribute to fighting against gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law (art 23(h)).
4. The Right to Redress and Reparation
In general terms, a large number of human rights bodies, judicial
as well as quasi-judicial, envisage the possibility of the victim making
a claim. It is sufficient to recall the Human Rights Committee, 26 the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 27 the
Committee against Torture, 28 and the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women. 29
In any case, the most important contribution to the definition of
the concept of ‘victim’—apart from the European Union Victims
Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and
protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA, which is the subject of the present
research—derives from the experience of the regional courts of human
rights. We are referring, first of all, to the European Court of Human
Rights, secondly, to other courts or organisations, such as the Inter-
26 Under the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966).
27 The body of 18 independent experts who monitor the implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965).
28 The body of 10 independent experts who monitor the implementation of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1984).
29 The body of 23 independent experts who monitor the implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979).
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American Court of Human Rights, and, finally, to the African
Commission of Human Rights.
Starting with the European Court of Human Rights, 30 the
definition of the term ‘victim’, elaborated by judges sitting in
Strasbourg, recognises several stages of evolution that will be
examined subsequently. One of the topics directly connected to the
subject of this research is, for example, the attitude of the European
Court of Human Rights towards patients who have been contaminated
through blood transfusions. We refer, for example, to G. N. et al v Italy,
a judgement delivered on 1 December 2009. 31 The case, concerning
the discriminatory treatment applied in such contamination cases,
involves Italian nationals who have been made sick by viruses—such
as HIV—due to the transfusion of infected blood during medical
treatment. 32 Moreover, there is a rich jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights concerning environmental risks taken by the
States. 33 A large number of these cases concern the responsibility of
the State in having allowed the establishment of various companies on
Italian territory. These companies did not pay sufficient attention to the
environment. As a consequence, they caused health problems in the
local population and the European Court condemned those States that
had displayed a lack of vigilance or that had not provided effective
relief.
The Inter-American system of protection of human rights, the
Commission as well as the Court, has developed an interesting and rich
practice on the subject, especially in relation to the rights of indigenous
people. 34
Finally, it should also be noted that in the African system of
protection of human rights there is growing attention to this kind of
problem. It is sufficient to quote, for example, a case in which the
30 See in this volume chapter four, by Marc Engelhart.
31 ECtHR, G. N. et al v Italy [2009].
32 See also chapter three and chapter seven in this volume.
33 See, eg, ECtHR, Guerra v Italy [1998]. The case concerns the effect of toxic
emissions on applicants and their right to respect for their private and family life; more
specifically, it concerns the failure to provide the local population with information
about the risk involved, and how to proceed in case of accidents near the chemical
factory. The Court held that Italy did not fulfil its obligation to secure the applicants’
right to respect for their private and family life, in breach of art 8 of the Convention,
and that there was a violation of that provision.
See also chapter three and chapter seven in this volume.
34 Moreover, in 1990 the Commission established a special Rapporteur on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples with the mandate to coordinate actions in this regard.
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that the
Nigerian military government had exploited oil reserves through its
relationship with the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, with
no regard for the health or environment of the Ogoni people. 35
With respect to the international criminal law regime, the Rome
statute of the International Criminal Court grants victims the right to
stand in judicial proceedings by presenting their own views and
concerns before the Court.
The participation scheme includes various modalities. In particu-
lar, the statute of the International Criminal Court expressly provides
judges with the power to order a convicted person to pay compensation
at the end of the trial. The victims who will benefit from this
compensation payment may be individual or collective, depending on
the Court. Reparations may include both monetary and non-monetary
compensation (such as return of property, or symbolic measures like
public apologies). Furthermore, in order to collect the funds essential
to comply with the obligation of reparation, in the case that the
convicted person does not have sufficient resources to do so, States
Parties to the ICC Treaty have established a special fund (the ‘Trust
Fund for Victims that Can Contribute to Fighting’). 36
5. Conclusion
As stated in the Preamble of the Basic Principles and Guidelines
adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005, ‘in
honouring the victims’ right [...] the international community keeps
faith with the plight of victims, survivors and future human generations
and reaffirms international law in the field’.
Today, we are observing an increasing recognition of the rights of
35 See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria. In a decision on its merits, the Commission
stated that Nigeria had violated the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and
called for an end to Nigerian attacks against the Ogoni people. See African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 155/96 [2002].
36 Under art 79(1) of the statute of the International Criminal Court: ‘A Trust
Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of States Parties for the benefit
of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such
victims’. Under art 79(2): ‘The Court may order money and other property collected
through fines or forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund’.
This is the first incident of this kind in the global struggle to end impunity for the most
serious crimes.
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victims in international law. This heightened recognition is represented
by the establishment of human rights bodies, both judicial and quasi-
judicial, that are increasing the protection offered to victims, especially
in the fields of gross violation of human rights and the serious violation
of humanitarian law. Moreover, even though the Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985)
and the Basic Principles and Guidelines (2005) are soft law
instruments that are not legally binding for States, the principles
enshrined in those instruments are exerting an influence.
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PART II
VICTIMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

CHAPTER VI
CORPORATE VIOLENCE:
HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES AND VICTIMS’ NEEDS.
AN OVERVIEW
by Arianna Visconti * 1.
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction: Harmful Consequences of Crime and Individual
Assessment of Victims’ Needs. – 2. The Notion of ‘Corporate Violence’
and its Social Perception. – 3. Prevalence of Corporate Violence and
Harmful Global Effects. – 4. The Impact of Corporate Violence on
Individuals. – 5. Conclusion: A First Overview of the Needs of Corporate
Violence Victims.
1. Introduction: Harmful Consequences of Crime and Individual
Assessment of Victims’ Needs
As has been explained in previous chapters, the very definition of
‘victim’ given in the Directive 2012/29/EU, establishing minimum
standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims of crime,
revolves around the harm suffered by the person as a consequence of
the commission of a criminal offence. According to art 2(1)(a)
‘victim’ means:
(i) a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or
emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by a
criminal offence;
(ii) family members of a person whose death was directly caused by a
criminal offence and who have suffered harm as a result of that person’s
death.
Therefore, an overview of the harms caused to victims by
* Dr Marta Lamanuzzi, PhD, and Ms Eliana Greco, PhD student, contributed to
the bibliographical research.
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offences falling under the (criminological, as we shall see) category
of ‘corporate violence’ is per se relevant to the scope and purpose of
this study. Yet there is an even more compelling need for such a
review of existing literature on corporate violence’s harmful effects
(as well as for autonomous empirical research on this subject, the
results of which will be discussed mainly in the following chapters):
namely, the close nexus between harms suffered and the victim’s
needs, an issue which, in turn, lies at the heart of the Victims
Directive, and particularly of the provisions pertaining to the victim’s
right to protection.
The needs of victims (a subject never easy to define and
explore: see Walklate 1989) are indeed strictly related to their
reactions to the crime suffered and thus also to the typology and
extent of the related harms (alongside several other features, ranging
from the type and/or circumstances of the crime to the victim’s
personality traits, from the victim’s social status and education to
social context, etc). For instance (and while acknowledging the
present need for generalisation and, to some extent, simplification),
the deeper the feeling of loss of control suffered by the victim as a
consequence of the crime, the greater the need for information (as a
way to regain control over their lives and future); the more intense
their psychological distress as a consequence of the offence, the
greater the need to feel heard and recognised; the stronger the
feeling of vulnerability resulting from the traumatic experience of
crime, the greater the need for reassurance and protection (ten Boom
and Kuijpers 2012; Tizzani 2012).
The Victims Directive’s starting point is a consideration of
‘victims’ multiple needs when involved in criminal proceedings,
including the need to receive information, assistance, support,
protection and compensation’ (recital 62), which in turn, following a
trend supported by an ever growing (albeit heterogeneous) victims’
rights movement (Walklate 1989; Garland 2001; Strang 2001;
Bassiouni 2006; Richards 2009; Wolhuter, Olley, and Denham 2009;
Waller 2011), results in translating the (perceived, general) needs of
victims into as many victims’ rights (right to understand and to be
understood, arts 3, 5, and 7; right to receive information, arts 4, 6, and
11; right to support and legal aid, arts 8, 9, and 13; right to be heard and
to get a review of a decision not to prosecute, arts 10 and 11; right to
have access to safe and competent restorative justice services, art 12;
right to reimbursement of expenses, return of property, and to a
decision on compensation from the offender, arts 14–16; and right to
protection, including protection of privacy, arts 18–24). These are
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rights which should be granted—at least at a basic, or ‘minimum’,
level—in a uniform way in all Member States, irrespective of the
victim’s nationality or country of residence, as an expression of the
more basic right to non-discrimination and equal treatment of any
individual who happens to suffer a crime within the European Union
(Fonseca Morillo and Bellander Todino 2017). 1
As stated, amongst the needs—and ensuing rights—taken into
account by the Directive 2012/29/EU, the most prominent is certainly
the need for/right to protection. Specifically, according to art 18
Without prejudice to the rights of the defence, Member States shall
ensure that measures are available to protect victims and their family
members from secondary and repeat victimisation, from intimidation and
from retaliation, including against the risk of emotional or psychological
harm, and to protect the dignity of victims during questioning and when
testifying. When necessary, such measures shall also include procedures
established under national law for the physical protection of victims and
their family members.
It is with respect to victims’ protection needs that art 22
establishes a specific duty for Member States to ‘ensure that victims
receive a timely and individual assessment’ aimed at identifying such
specific needs, as well as determining ‘whether and to what extent they
would benefit from special measures in the course of criminal
proceedings’ provided for under arts 23 and 24.
It must be noted that art 22 does not specify how said assessment
should be made—a thorny issue even for victimology scholars
(Walklate 1989)—nor exactly who is to be charged with this task.
With respect to this second issue, it can be inferred from recital 61 2
1 See chapter one and chapter two in this volume.
2 Recital 61: ‘Any officials involved in criminal proceedings who are likely to
come into personal contact with victims should be able to access and receive
appropriate initial and ongoing training, to a level appropriate to their contact with
victims, so that they are able to identify victims and their needs and deal with them in a
respectful, sensitive, professional and non-discriminatory manner. Persons who are
likely to be involved in the individual assessment to identify victims’ specific
protection needs and to determine their need for special protection measures should
receive specific training on how to carry out such an assessment. Member States
should ensure such training for police services and court staff. Equally, training should
be promoted for lawyers, prosecutors and judges and for practitioners who provide
victim support or restorative justice services. This requirement should include training
on the specific support services to which victims should be referred or specialist
training where their work focuses on victims with specific needs and specific
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and art 25 3 that the process of individual assessment can involve a
plurality of different professionals, ie, all those who—directly, because
of their role in the criminal investigations and proceedings—‘are likely
to come into personal contact with victims’, as well as all those who, at
any stage, ‘are likely to be involved in the individual assessment’ (all
of whom should, therefore, be granted ‘appropriate initial and ongoing
training’). Thus, people charged with the individual assessment of
victims’ protection needs are, firstly and directly, ‘police officers’,
‘court staff’, ‘judges’ and ‘prosecutors’; but also ‘lawyers’ and any
person ‘providing victim support and restorative justice services’ can
become ‘involved’ in said evaluation, either prior to (or even in the
absence of) initiation of criminal proceedings, or at the request of one
of the professionals primarily charged with the task.
The Victims Directive, however, besides stressing the necessity
for individualisation of the assessment 4—which is reflected in the
psychological training, as appropriate. Where relevant, such training should be gender
sensitive. Member States’ actions on training should be complemented by guidelines,
recommendations and exchange of best practices in accordance with the Budapest
roadmap’.
3 Art 25: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that officials likely to come into contact
with victims, such as police officers and court staff, receive both general and specialist
training to a level appropriate to their contact with victims to increase their awareness
of the needs of victims and to enable them to deal with victims in an impartial,
respectful and professional manner.
2. Without prejudice to judicial independence and differences in the organisation
of the judiciary across the Union, Member States shall request that those responsible
for the training of judges and prosecutors involved in criminal proceedings make
available both general and specialist training to increase the awareness of judges and
prosecutors of the needs of victims.
3. With due respect for the independence of the legal profession, Member States
shall recommend that those responsible for the training of lawyers make available both
general and specialist training to increase the awareness of lawyers of the needs of
victims.
4. Through their public services or by funding victim support organisations,
Member States shall encourage initiatives enabling those providing victim support and
restorative justice services to receive adequate training to a level appropriate to their
contact with victims and observe professional standards to ensure such services are
provided in an impartial, respectful and professional manner.
5. In accordance with the duties involved, and the nature and level of contact the
practitioner has with victims, training shall aim to enable the practitioner to recognise
victims and to treat them in a respectful, professional and non-discriminatory manner’.
4 This is specifically stressed also in the European Commission, DG Justice
Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementation of the Directive
2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012,
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of victims of
crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, December 2013,
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provision that it ‘shall be carried out with the close involvement of the
victim and shall take into account their wishes’ (art 22(6)), as well as in
the duty to update it ‘throughout the criminal proceedings’ whenever
‘the elements that form the basis of the individual assessment have
changed significantly’ (art 22(7))—provides at least some indication
about the factual grounds for the assessment itself. Namely, art 22(2)
establishes that
The individual assessment shall, in particular, take into account:
(a) the personal characteristics of the victim;
(b) the type or nature of the crime; and
(c) the circumstances of the crime.
These three factual elements, to be ‘taken into account’ while
assessing the ‘protection needs’ of each and any individual victim, can
be read as an attempt at introducing into the legal framework of the
Victims Directive at least some of the conceptual achievements of the
long and multifaceted victimological debate on victimisation risks
(Sparks 1982; Walklate 1989; Miethe and Meier 1994; Saponaro 2004;
Scardaccione 2015; Wolhuter, Olley and Denham 2009; Scarcella
Prandstraller 2012), and particularly on the identification of possible
vulnerability factors, ie, elements—related to personal characteristics,
‘ecological’ settings, contingent circumstances, cultural features,
etc—which can produce ‘variations in proneness to victimization
among different types of persons, places, organizations, situations etc,
where proneness in turn is defined in terms of differences in the a
priori probability of victimization’ (Sparks 1982: 33).
The preamble to the Victims Directive elaborates more on possible
factual clues of specific vulnerability of individual victims, stating that
Individual assessments should take into account the personal character-
istics of the victim such as his or her age, gender and gender identity or
expression, ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, health, disability,
residence status, communication difficulties, relationship to or de-
pendence on the offender and previous experience of crime. They should
also take into account the type or nature and the circumstances of the
crime such as whether it is a hate crime, a bias crime or a crime
committed with a discriminatory motive, sexual violence, violence in a
close relationship, whether the offender was in a position of control,
whether the victim’s residence is in a high crime or gang dominated area,
p 4 (online at https://e-justice.europa.eu/fileDownload.do?id=05758a3a-9e2e-49a5-
a7ec-3737c3ad6876, last accessed on 7 August 2017).
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or whether the victim’s country of origin is not the Member State where
the crime was committed. [recital 56]
All the elements listed above—which, it might be worth noticing,
appear to refer to the ‘traditional’ typologies of ‘vulnerable’ victims, 5
ie, children, elders, victims of violence in close relationships, etc—are
to be taken as specifications and (mere) examples of the three basic
features to be considered according to art 22(2), ie, personal
characteristics of the victim, circumstances of the crime, and type or
nature of the offence. Under this last feature, it must be noted how the
negative consequences of the crime receive, once again, a central
relevance in the Victims Directive, as it is ‘the severity of the crime
and the degree of apparent harm suffered by the victim’ which can
justify adaptations in the ‘extent of the individual assessment’ of the
victim’s needs (art 22(5)).
It is thus self-evident how a thorough examination of the available
studies on ‘corporate violence’, its harmful consequences, the context
it provides for the ensuing victimisation and, on the whole, its impact
on individual victims, constitutes an essential starting point to try and
achieve a better understanding about the needs of this kind of victim,
the vulnerability factors they may be subject to, and the best way to
individually assess their protection needs. In the following paragraphs
the reader will, therefore, be presented with a discussion on the concept
of ‘corporate violence’ itself, its slow surfacing into the criminological
and victimological debate, and the reasons behind the difficulty in
understanding it as a form of ‘proper’ violence. An overview of the
harmful consequences—typically collective in nature—of this kind of
offence will follow, which is aimed at shedding some light on the
possible individual reactions and, ultimately, individual needs of
victims of corporate violence. 6
5 See chapter one in this volume.
6 Practical tools for the individual assessment of the needs of victims of corporate
violence, which have been developed as outputs of the project, are available online at
www.victimsandcorporations.eu. See Victims and Corporations (2017) Individual
Assessment of Corporate Violence Victims’ Needs. A Practical Guide (Milan,
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia
penale e la Politica criminale). See also, at the same address, the tools specifically
adapted for the three interested countries, in Italian, German and Dutch (all listed in the
section ‘Victims and Corporations Project Publications and Tools’).
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2. The Notion of ‘Corporate Violence’ and its Social Perception
The fact that ‘managers murder and corporations kill’ (Punch
2000) has been acknowledged by the criminological literature for
several decades. The term ‘corporate violence’ has come to be used to
refer to that ‘specific subset of corporate deviance’ (Punch 2000: 243)
that causes deaths, injuries, or illnesses to physical persons through
illegal or harmful behaviours that occur during the course of the
legitimate business activity of such economic organisations, basically
through violations of health and safety regulations and the consequent
harm to workers, the production and marketing of unsafe products, and
the pollution of air, water, and soil by industrial production or waste
disposal (Hills 1987; Mokhiber 1988; Clinard 1990; Punch 1996;
Stretesky and Lynch 1999; Friedrichs 2007; Tombs 2010; Klein 2014).
Thus, ‘corporate violence’ can be defined, in short, as any crime
committed by a corporation in the course of its legitimate activity,
which results in harm to the health, physical integrity, or life of a
natural person.
This definition, albeit apparently simple, conceals a wide range of
problems which have affected and still affect attempts at studying,
methodically and in depth, such a phenomenon, as well as its human
cost, and which also account for the scarcity of victimological data
(Walklate 1989) with which our research has had to contend. This
section will, therefore, be devoted to briefly acknowledging and
discussing such difficulties, in order to better understand the scope and
meaning of available information.
The first element that contributes to explaining why social
scientists have devoted, on the whole, very little attention to victims of
corporate crime—and, more specifically, of corporate violence—is
strictly related to the ambiguity concerning the ‘criminal’ status of such
behaviours, on the one hand, as well as their fitness to be defined as
‘true’ violence, on the other. With the exception of the few ‘extreme or
“monster” cases of corporate crime and harm that gain visibility’ in the
media and the public arena, the usual ‘pulverisation’ of corporate
crime and corporate harms, and their basic ‘everyday incidence’ in less
apparent forms (Tombs and Whyte 2015: 37), contribute to an
ambiguity which also affects, as we will see, the social perception of
the victims of such crimes as ‘proper’ victims, as well as their own
self-perception as such, with important consequences on report rates,
data availability, attitudes towards law enforcement, and the psycho-
logical impact on those affected.
While criminologists are nowadays well acquainted with definitions
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of ‘crime’ which do not just reflect what specific legal systems set as
‘criminal offences’, and which are therefore conceived to include a
wider range of illegal, deviant, or harmful behaviours (Brown,
Esbensen, and Geis 2010), it is nonetheless true that the social
perception of crime is still strictly related to what the law frames as such.
And when it comes to white-collar and corporate ‘crimes’, many of
these harmful behaviours, even when illegal under the law (which does
not always happen: see Mokhiber 1988), are often qualified as mere
administrative or civil offences, or, if criminal, as misdemeanours, or
have the traits of mala quia prohibita (ie ‘artificial’, ‘regulatory’
offences), which are very complex to understand for the general public,
and often entrusted to regulatory bodies instead of to ordinary police
forces for investigation and sanctioning. Alternatively, they may have
been criminalised only recently, and have therefore not yet penetrated
the social awareness of what is ‘properly’ criminal; or, even more
straightforwardly, they may not be uniformly criminalised under
different national legislations; or, finally, in many cases they are not
actually enforced and thus are ‘non-existent’ for all practical purposes.
All these occurrences contribute to a widespread social perception that
corporate crime is not ‘true crime’ and that its victims are, therefore, not
‘true victims’ (Sutherland 1949; Walklate 1989; Moore and Mills 1990;
Stitt and Giacopassi 1993; Croall 2001; Tombs and Whyte 2006;
Friedrichs 2007; Croall 2009; Hall 2013; Skinnider 2013; Tombs and
Whyte 2015; Hall 2016).
This is even more true for corporate violence, which, albeit
defined as such due to the specific kind of damage—to life, health and
physical integrity—it causes, does not match the requisites of what is
generally, and socially, understood as ‘violence’: that is, basically,
direct interpersonal violence, which, in turn, is commonly associated
with conventional predatory offences, voluntary homicide, organised
crime, and terrorism (Walklate 1989; Stretesky and Lynch 1999; Punch
2000; Friedrichs 2007; Tombs 2007; Bisschop and Vande Walle 2013;
Klein 2014; Pemberton 2014; Walters 2014; Lynch and Barrett 2015).
Even in recent decades, when—as widely stated in the literature—the
general public’s awareness of white-collar and corporate crime has
increased, together with its perceived seriousness (Piquero, Carmi-
chael, and Piquero 2008; Holtfreter, Van Slyke, Bratton, and Gertz
2008; Cullen, Hartman, and Lero Jonson 2009), corporate violence still
appears to fall well short of the levels of perceived seriousness and
punitive attitudes that public opinion displays towards common,
‘street’ crimes of comparable or lesser harmfulness (Michel 2016).
This is basically due to the structural traits of this specific kind of
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violence (Stretesky and Lynch 1999; Punch 2000; Friedrichs 2007;
Tombs 2007; Bisschop and Vande Walle 2013; Klein 2014; Pemberton
2014; Walters 2014; Lynch and Barrett 2015; Michel 2016). Firstly, it
is generally indirect, as it does not result from interpersonal
aggression, but, instead, from complex organisational policies,
decisions, and actions, undertaken on behalf of the corporation and
in the course of its legitimate business activity, which indirectly result
in the exposure of people to harmful consequences; this is true, for
instance, for all the cases directly examined during our empirical
research. 7 This also means that such damaging consequences are quite
often removed in space and time (in some cases this temporal distance
can amount to years or even decades, as is the case with long-latent
illnesses) from the actual corporate decision or action that triggered the
chain of events that ultimately led to people being injured or killed.
Another implication of this feature is related to frequent difficulties in
understanding, and/or demonstrating, the causal relationship between
the corporate action and its harmful effects, a difficulty which is, in
some cases, so insuperable that it leads to the failure, or even the
abandonment, of criminal prosecutions. 8 This same organisational
origin of corporate violence also accounts for its basically involuntary
nature, which in turn sets it apart from what is generally conceived as
‘violence’. Corporate actions leading to the harming of people are
basically motivated by the desire to increase corporate profits and/or
ensure corporate survival, and the ‘violence’ is a consequence, rather
than a specifically intended outcome, of such decisions. These
decisions arise from complex corporate hierarchies and procedures
that also often make it almost impossible to attach responsibility to just
one or several clearly identifiable individuals, as is the rule with
‘common’ violence.
The complexity and opacity of the phenomenon can be
further—and greatly—increased by the ever-growing globalisation of
production and distribution, where complex inter-organisational
relationships are now the rule, leading, for instance, to long and
transnational supply chains where pressure from the top corporate
actors to keep costs low imposes ever tighter margins down the chain
7 See Visconti, A (ed) (2017) Needs of Victims of Corporate Violence: Empirical
Findings: Comprehensive Report (Milan, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro
Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia penale e la Politica criminale), online at
www.victimsandcorporations.eu.
8 See chapter seven in this volume.
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itself, thus, at the same time, increasing the criminogenic pushes on
actors lower down the chain, as well as the passing down of blame and
responsibilities in case of ‘accidents’ (Tombs and Whyte 2015).
All these features explain why ‘corporate violence’ is not generally
framed as ‘violence’ either by scholars or by the general public, and thus
also contribute to accounting for the scarcity of empirical data and
scientific literature on the subject. In fact, some of the ‘structural’ traits
of these crimes also affect their reporting and, thus, the availability of
official statistics, as well as of reliable data about the scope of their
harmful consequences. As our knowledge of crime largely depends on
reports by the affected people, when—as it happens in these cases—they
are generally unable to perceive the harm for very long periods (or at
all), or to connect it with its causes, or to recognise its relevance under
criminal law (when provided for), any attempt at studying the
phenomenon will be severely influenced by a huge dark figure. As
has been observed, ‘the majority of those suffering from corporate crime
remain unaware of their victimization—either not knowing it has
happened to them or viewing their “misfortune” as an accident or “no
one’s fault”’ (Box 1983: 17). This feature of corporate violence also
affects the possibility of using victimisation surveys to (at least partially)
fill the gap in knowledge due to the unavailability of reliable official
crime statistics, as this kind of research tool, if applied with any degree
of success, would require that corporate violence victims be able to
identify themselves as crime victims, which they all too often are not
able to do (Walklate 1989). This, in turn, contributes to accounting for
the already mentioned comparatively scarce criminological and
victimological literature available to us, for the purpose of extracting
useful data on victims’ needs with specific regard to corporate violence.
Finally, the lack of public understanding of this form of violence
as ‘proper’ violence has repercussions on the way this class of
victims is perceived, both by public institutions and society at large
on the one hand, and by themselves on the other, which, in turn,
affects the propensity to report such offences and, as we shall see, the
scope and features of the harms caused and the victims’ consequent
needs.
3. Prevalence of Corporate Violence and Harmful Global Effects
The harmful effects of corporate violence are basically connected to
three main fields of activity (unsafe environmental practices, marketing
of unsafe products, and violations of health and safety regulations in the
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workplace), 9 and can be classified under three different typologies
(physical, economic, and emotional or psychological costs) according to
the consequences of such activities—consequences which, in turn, can
take different forms for different kinds of corporate violence.
Firstly, there is the damage connected to unsafe environmental
practices. It is likely that the various forms of pollution originating
from such practices constitute the most common and most far-reaching
form of corporate violence (Mokhiber 1988; Donohoe 2003; Tombs
and Hillyard 2004; Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007;
Hall 2013; Skinnider 2013; Klein 2014; Walters 2014; Lynch and
Barrett 2015; Tombs and Whyte 2015). Of course, environmental harm
does not arise from corporate actions alone (individual behaviours,
small farming, State-run facilities, etc, also account for a fair share of
global pollution), nor does it only affect humans. However, for the
purposes of this analysis, we are interested in all (and only) harmful
consequences to humans that can be related to environmental crimes
committed by corporations, which, in turn, may involve illegal
disposal of dangerous waste, toxic emissions in the air, and
contamination of water and/or soil.
The main common feature of damage related to these offences is
its particularly wide extent and long duration. Such contaminations,
both when due to long-term industrial activities (such as in the asbestos
cases, some of which we studied during the course of our empirical
research: see the next chapter in this volume and the data collected in
Visconti 2017; see also Clinard 1990; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman
2007) and to sudden and devastating ‘accidents’ (such as the notorious
Bophal disaster or Macondo oil spill: see also Punch 1996; Pearce and
Tombs 1998; Croall 2010; Garrett 2014; Steinzor 2015), generally
possess a particularly high diffusivity, both directly and indirectly.
Directly, the pollution (particularly air and water pollution) usually
spreads over large territorial areas and thus affects large sections of the
population; indirectly, the contamination has a tendency to enter the
food chain and thus to spread further, also thanks to the widening of
global markets.
Toxic chemicals thus released and disseminated may then produce
both immediate (as is the rule with ‘accidents’) and, even more
frequently, deferred effects, as they generally affect human health
through accumulation and/or combination, and many of the resulting
9 See chapter three in this volume for references to the European policies and
legislation.
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illnesses have long latency periods (as happens, for instance, with
asbestos-related mesotheliomas), or may even present themselves in
future generations, as with increased miscarriage rates or foetal
deformity rates related to exposure to certain substances (Lynch and
Stretesky 2001; Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007).
All of this, of course, in many cases, makes it even more difficult to
connect specific corporate and individual actors to specific respons-
ibilities for specific harms to individuals and communities, thus
contributing to the general opacity already mentioned as a common
feature in the study, as well as in the prevention and repression, of
corporate violence.
Secondly, dangerous industrial and commercial practices can lead
to the marketing of unsafe products, with negative consequences on the
health and safety of consumers (Hills 1987; Mokhiber 1988; Walklate
1989; Clinard 1990; Croall 2001; Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and
Tillman 2007; Croall 2008; Croall 2009; Croall 2012; Klein 2014;
Steinzor 2015; Tombs and Whyte 2015). Almost any kind of product
can be affected, from motor vehicles (as with the notorious Ford Pinto
case: see Hills 1987; Becker, Jipson, and Bruce 2000; Rosoff, Pontell,
and Tillman 2007) to children’s toys, from household products to
cosmetics, etc. For reasons already stated in the introduction to this
book, here we will mainly focus on food products, as well as drugs and
medical devices.
Illegal practices related to food manipulation and commercialisa-
tion do not always imply risks for human health: many criminal (or
civil, or administrative) offences in this field are related to frauds on
the origin, quality, or quantity of the product, without safety
implications, and therefore, even if the related economic harm to
consumers may be huge, they fall outside the scope of the present
work. Also, even though they may be related to harmful consequences
to people’s wellbeing, we will not specifically take into account the
marketing of foods and drinks rich in fats, sugars and the like, made
more pleasing (and even addicting) for consumers, and often
deceptively advertised (Croall 2009; Croall 2012). Food contamination
with dangerous substances is, therefore, the main focus of our
attention. It may arise from the abuse of chemicals and/or drugs in
farming, which then seep into processed foods and drinks (thus, in
some instances, overlapping with the environmental crimes just
described); or from a lack of adequate controls respecting the legal
limits for each dangerous substance; or it may stem from intentional
adulteration with the purpose of raising profits through an increase in
production volumes, food durability, or the like; or it may be the result
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of unsanitary conditions in the processing, transport, and conservation
of foodstuffs.
The harmful effects of such practices (Clinard 1990; Croall 2001;
Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Croall 2008;
Croall 2009; Steinzor 2015; Tombs and Whyte 2015; Leighton 2016),
besides generally involving a plurality of consumers (a collective
dimension of the offence being a constant of corporate crime and
corporate violence: see, amongst others, Sutherland 1949; Walklate
1989), can be both immediate, as is generally the case with severe food
poisoning due to bacteria or other very toxic contaminants, and
deferred, as is more common with chemicals and some biological
elements (such as, for instance, mycotoxins: see Wild and Gong 2010),
sometimes requiring the accumulation and/or combination with further
substances to produce perceivable harms to health. Such effects may
also largely vary in their severity, ranging from bland and transitory
diseases to fatal occurrences, particularly when the exposed person
presents other vulnerability factors (such as very young or very old
age, previous illnesses, etc).
When referring to pharmaceutical products and devices (Braith-
waite 1984; Walklate 1989; Clinard 1990; Punch 1996; Croall 2001;
Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Dodge 2009;
Klein 2014; Steinzor 2015; Tombs and Whyte 2015), harm to patients’
health can originate, once again, from unsafe production procedures
(such as, for instance, in the case of haemoderivative drugs extracted
from infected blood collected and/or processed without due precau-
tions, which will be discussed further on in this book), 10 as well as
from the concealment or downplaying of dangerous side effects or
flaws (such as in the notorious Thalidomide and mechanical heart
valves cases: Braithwaite 1984; Clinard 1990; Punch 1996; Rosoff,
Pontell, and Tillman 2007; see also Visconti 2017), and even, in some
cases, from downright fraud (such as in the notorious and recent case
of breast implants filled with industrial silicone instead of approved
medical silicone: Sage, Huet, and Rosnoblet 2012; Tombs and Whyte
2015). While in some occurrences the deadly or health-threatening
consequences make their appearance in a short space of time, once
again cases of long-delayed—and, often, long-lasting—harms are
10 See chapter seven in this volume and, for more details on the harmful
consequences on victims, the already mentioned Needs of Victims of Corporate
Violence: Empirical Findings: Comprehensive Report, online at www.victimsandcor-
porations.eu.
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frequent, occasionally (as in the aforementioned Thalidomide case,
where the drug produced severe foetal deformities) even affecting
future generations. Thus, also in these cases, problems of causality
arise, which in turn can lead to a lack of personal and/or social
perception of the offence, as well as to the impossibility of achieving a
declaration of criminal responsibility by any court of law.
Finally, the third field of activity affects the lives and health of
workers (in the form of both accidents and work-related illnesses). The
harmful consequences of corporate policies often result from violations
of health and safety regulations in the workplace, due to negligence on
the employer’s part and/or cost-cutting policies (Box 1983; Hills 1987;
Walklate 1989; Clinard 1990; Croall 2001; Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff,
Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Tombs 2007; Croall 2008; Snell and Tombs
2011; Bisschop and Vande Walle 2013; Tombs 2014; Steinzor 2015;
Tombs and Whyte 2015; Matthews et al 2016). Even if this specific
branch of corporate violence is not a direct object of our study (due to
the absence of EU legislation on the subject), criminological literature
on the victims of unsafe working conditions has also been taken into
account, as many of the physical, economic, and psychological
consequences suffered by these victims share common features with
those suffered by victims of corporate violence in general; in the
asbestos-related cases studied during our empirical research workers
were also typically affected, together with a broader range of local
population.
With respect to the different kinds of harmful consequences
experienced by victims of corporate violence, the first and most
obvious typology—the one which qualifies them, at least from a
criminological and victimological viewpoint, as ‘violence’—of course
relates to physical ‘costs’, ie personal injuries, illnesses, and loss of
life (Box 1983; Hills 1987; Mokhiber 1988; Walklate 1989; Clinard
1990; Poveda 1994; Punch 1996; Punch 2000; Croall 2001; Lynch and
Stretesky 2001; Donohoe 2003; Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and
Tillman 2007; Tombs 2007; Croall 2008; Croall 2009; Dodge 2009;
Tombs and Whyte 2009; Croall 2010; Snell and Tombs 2011; Bisschop
and Vande Walle 2013; Hall 2013; Klein 2014; Tombs 2014; Lynch
and Barrett 2015; Steinzor 2015; Tombs and Whyte 2015; Leighton
2016; see also Visconti 2017, for an overview of our empirical
research). As already stated, these physical harms can vary in
magnitude from transient, mild, short-term illnesses to life-long, often
disabling, maladies and life-threatening (and ultimately lethal)
conditions, and may even affect future generations, in the form of
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negative effects on human fertility, teratogenic effects on foetuses, or
the transmission of toxic substances to infants through mother’s milk.
Any attempt at measuring the scope of physical costs relative to
corporate violence is undermined by the previously mentioned huge
dark figure, as well as by the underlying problems in reconstructing
causation between specific actions and specific harms. For instance, it
has been estimated that as many as 800,000 premature deaths per year
can globally be attributed to air pollution, with at least 24,000
premature deaths yearly due to the same cause in the United Kingdom
alone (Tombs and Whyte 2009; Croall 2010), and an estimated 13,200
to 34,000 premature deaths per year due to small-particle emissions
from coal-fired power plants in the United States (Lynch and Barrett
2015). However, it is all but impossible to precisely calculate how
many of these deaths can be related to violations of environmental law
by private corporations (and, from a criminal law viewpoint, it is
generally not possible to demonstrate a specific causal connection
between a single death and the actions of a single corporation or of a
single individual).
With respect to environmental disasters, it can be slightly easier to
get a reliable account of the physical harm (or, at least, of the direct and
immediate harm) caused: for instance, the already mentioned industrial
‘accident’ of Bhopal, which occurred on 3 December 1984, caused,
through the release of a toxic cloud of metyl isocyanate, between 3,000
and 5,000 deaths and at least 200,000 recorded injuries and illnesses
(Punch 1996; Pearce and Tombs 1998; Croall 2010).
Similarly, bouts of food poisoning resulting in illnesses severe
enough to require medical care are generally recorded, even if lesser
(and, likely, more frequent) intoxications often fail to be reported to the
authorities, and/or be connected to hazardous corporate behaviours
(Croall 2010; Tombs and Whyte 2015). For instance, in November
2008 a single outbreak of salmonella due to the sale, on the US market,
of a stock of contaminated peanuts (which became infected with the
bacteria due to unsanitary conditions in the processing plants and were
distributed notwithstanding the management’s awareness of test
positivity for salmonella) caused nine deaths, 714 confirmed cases of
illness, of which 166 required hospitalisation, and an estimated number
of between 11,000 and 20,700 total cases of food poisoning (Leighton
2016). A previous episode also registered in the United States—an
outbreak of Escherichia Coli which, in 1993, involved 73 restaurants
of the ‘Jack in the Box’ chain—is reported to have caused the
(ascertained) infection of 708 people, the hospitalisation of 171 of
them, 45 of which were children, and four deaths (all children aged
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below seven), as well as several permanent injuries, including kidney
and brain damage (Roberts 2008; AAJ 2015).
Work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses are generally recorded,
at least for social security purposes (even if a certain amount of
unrecorded ‘accidents’ are also to be assumed, the extent of which will
likely vary according to various factors, such as the rate of illegal
work, the severity of injuries suffered, etc); but, once again, it is often
difficult to discern between actual fatalities and harmful effects which
are instead the result of health and safety law violations. A comparison
provided by Poveda (1994) between work days lost in the United
States in the year 1990 due to non-fatal injuries related to ‘street’
crime, and work days lost in the same nation and time due to non-fatal
work-related injuries and illnesses, shows a result of 5.9 million lost
days for the former, against 60.4 million for the latter. The World
Health Organization has estimated 11 that in 2004 asbestos-related lung
cancer, mesothelioma, and asbestosis from occupational exposures
resulted in 107,000 deaths and 1,523,000 Disability Adjusted Life
Years (not to mention the several thousands of deaths which can be
attributed to other asbestos-related diseases, as well as to non-
occupational exposures to asbestos, such as those—also analysed in
our empirical research—of family members of asbestos workers
contaminated via clothes, or residents in the neighbourhood of plants
where by-products of asbestos production were used in the civil
construction sector).
Once again, it is all but impossible to extract from such data the
exact amount of harm to health ascribable to corporate offences; but,
on the whole, it can be safely assumed that this kind of corporate
violence, while greatly underestimated in official statistics (Box 1983;
Tombs and Whyte 2015), causes a far larger amount of deaths, injuries,
and illnesses than common crime (Walklate 1989; Tombs 2007), or
even than the most-feared crime of terrorism (considering that,
according to the last available data, victims of terrorist attacks globally
amounted to a ‘mere’ 29,376 in 2015: see Institute for Economics and
Peace 2016).
But, of course, the kind of harm most intuitively related to
corporate crime in general is economic in nature (Poveda 1994;
Shover, Fox, and Mills 1994; Levi 2001; Friedrichs 2007; Croall 2008;
Croall 2009; Croall 2010; Snell and Tombs 2011; Hall 2013; Tombs
11 Data available at http://www.who.int/ipcs/assessment/public_health/asbestos/
en/ (last accessed on 7 August 2017).
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2014; Matthews et al 2016). Such economic harm is in no way easier to
measure than physical harm, both because it is not generally accounted
for in corporate balance sheets, being usually regarded as ‘extern-
alities’ (Tombs and Whyte 2015), but also because it encompasses both
direct and indirect costs (Friedrichs 2007).
Direct costs are typically defined in terms of the victims’
monetary losses, and are usually reckoned in relation to frauds,
financial crimes, antitrust violations, tax evasion, and the like. Even if,
also with respect to this kind of harm, precise estimations are hard to
achieve, it can be safely assumed that the overall economic losses due
to corporate crime dwarf those related to common crime (Sutherland
1949). Another comparison provided by Poveda (1994) gives us an
example of such disproportion, by matching the five billion dollar
losses due to conventional crime in the United States in the year 1990,
against the 200 billion dollar losses due (solely) to the Savings &
Loans scandal in the same period (see also Punch 1996; Rosoff,
Pontell, and Tillman 2007). Direct economic losses may, however, also
stem from episodes of corporate violence: consider the case of people
forced to relocate from a highly polluted area, or losing their jobs (and
therefore incomes) due to work-related accidents or diseases, or, more
generally, to injuries or illnesses resulting from any of the violations
reviewed above, or having to pay for expensive therapies for these
same injuries or illnesses.
Indirect economic costs are even harder to estimate, as they
include a wide range of negative collective effects, such as higher
insurance rates, higher law enforcement costs, higher public healthcare
expenditures, loss of investors’ confidence and consequent decline in
stock values or increase in bond interest rates, costs for soil or water
clearances that are ultimately shouldered by the citizenry, higher taxes,
etc. According to the most recent European Environment Agency
report, for instance, air pollution and greenhouse gases from industry
cost Europe between €59 and €189 billion in 2012 (while over the
period 2008–2012 the estimated cost was at least €329 billion and
possibly up to €1,053 billion), comprehensive of the negative
economic impact of a number of harmful air pollution consequences
including premature deaths, hospital costs, lost work days, health
problems, damage to buildings, and reduced agricultural yields (EEA
2014). Once again, to distinguish between costs related to actual law
violations by corporations and costs related to air pollution in general
is all but impossible; yet even if the former did amount to a tenth of
such costs, its impact would dwarf that of all indirect costs of street
crime.
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Finally, the emotional and psychological costs of corporate
violence should also be taken into account (Ganzini, McFarland, and
Bloom 1990; Shover, Fox, and Mills 1994; Croall 2001; Levi 2001;
Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Croall 2008; Snell
and Tombs 2011; Arrigo and Lynch 2015; Matthews et al 2016). The
literature is particularly scant with respect to such costs, the majority of
it focusing on the victims of fraud, instead of corporate violence (with
some exceptions for victims of workplace offences and for residents in
highly polluted areas). Yet we can assume (an assumption which found
confirmation in the interviews conducted during our empirical
research) 12 that some of the data collected in relation to economic
crime might also apply, at least to some extent, to corporate violence.
As the analysis of its psychological impact brings us more directly
within the perspective of the individual victim, however, we will
discuss this topic in the following section.
4. The Impact of Corporate Violence on Individuals
As we have just observed, the existing (and scant) literature on
corporate violence mainly focuses on the study of its harmful
consequences as a social phenomenon—which is understandable,
considering the usual collective dimension of these offences.
Consequently, said literature generally focuses on analysing the
general traits of corporate violence and on measuring, or at least
estimating, as precisely as possible its overall dimension. This,
however, means that studies and research that instead focus on the
individual perspective of the single victim (Walklate 1989), with their
specific losses, sufferings, fears, needs, etc, are even more rare—yet
this is exactly the perspective which is most directly relevant for an
effective implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU, as highlighted in
the first section of this chapter. Nonetheless, some useful information
can be collected through a review of the pertinent literature,
particularly thanks to case studies and a few victimisation studies
based on individual interviews. We can also observe that the results of
12 The sample, as stated in the above mentioned report, was not very numerous
(in total, 26 semi-structured interviews and 8 focus groups were carried out in the three
involved countries), but the methodology allowed for an in-depth analysis of victims’
and professionals’ perceptions of corporate violence harmful consequences.
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the empirical research carried out as part of our project basically
confirmed the information reported by the available literature.
The first trait common to all white-collar and corporate crimes is
related to an element of ‘violation of implied or delegated trust’ due,
basically, to the great asymmetry of information—and, more generally,
power—that exists between those (individuals or corporations) who
run a business and all the stakeholders (consumers, workers,
stockholders, creditors, public agencies, local communities, etc)
potentially affected by its negative, and in some case criminal,
outcomes (Sutherland 1940: 3; Sutherland 1949; Reiss and Biderman
1980; Shapiro 1990; Nelken 1994). This means that any form of
corporate crime—and thus, for our purposes, corporate violence—also
implies a breach of (at least implicit) trust against the victim. This is an
element absent in the majority of conventional crimes, but which is
immediately apparent in cases of product safety violations (imagine,
for instance, a person suffering from an illness requiring the
administration of a specific drug, who has no choice but to literally
place their health and life in the hands of the manufacturer of that
drug), as well as in any case of violations of health and safety
regulations in the workplace by the employer. The same feature,
however, can also be traced in environmental crimes: for instance,
residents in an area potentially affected by industrial plant emissions
can only trust in the corporation’s respect for environmental laws.
Thus, it can be expected that, once a victim of corporate crime
becomes aware of the violation suffered, feelings of betrayal, rage,
resentment, frustration, and mistrust will arise.
This expectation is confirmed by those studies (admittedly few),
based on interviews of victims of corporate crime (albeit of financial
fraud), which analyse the psychological impact of this kind of
victimisation (Shover, Fox, and Mills 1994; Ganzini, McFarland, and
Bloom 1990; Levi 2001; Spalek 2001). Such sentiments of mistrust
and resentment can also end up being directed towards all similar
economic and financial organisations and, especially when a failure to
act was perceived on the part of public regulatory agencies or,
following the reporting of the crime, on the part of law enforcement
agencies and/or the judiciary, victims may develop a wider feeling of
abandonment, insecurity, and distrust against public institutions and
the law. The victims interviewed in the course of our research often
expressed like sentiments of widespread distrust towards public as well
as private institutions; moreover, in some specific cases these feelings
got to some extent exacerbated by the implicit, and betrayed, promise
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of a better future they had attached, for instance, to a certain factory or
drug (see Visconti 2017 for all the details).
Such sentiments may be further fuelled by several specific
problems that victims of corporate crime can face while dealing with
law enforcement agencies: from a basic difficulty in picking the right
agency from within a maze of public bodies with overlapping
competences, to public officers treating them with a generally
bureaucratic and indifferent attitude; from a lack of effective support
programmes, 13 to a general—institutional as well as public—percep-
tion of them as being less ‘deserving’ of public sympathy, less
vulnerable, and on the whole less harmed than victims of common
crime, and so on (Moore and Mills 1990; Arrigo and Lynch 2015).
All in all, victims of corporate crimes and corporate violence may
experience secondary victimisation (ie the negative consequences a
victim may suffer because of the way in which others—particularly
law enforcement agencies, primary groups, and the broader com-
munity—respond to them and to the offence that occurred to them: see
Mawby and Walklate 1994; Wolhuter, Olley, and Denham 2009;
Scarcella Prandstraller 2012) at the hands of the legal system, due to a
general feeling of being ‘second-rate’ victims or just ‘bureaucratic
files’, abandoned by the public institutions that should protect and
‘avenge’ them, and often crushed under the powerful, and sometimes
quite aggressive, defence strategies that corporate actors can display
against them (Clinard 1990; Shover, Fox, and Mills 1994; Snell and
Tombs 2011; Arrigo and Lynch 2015).
Evidence that inadequate assistance provided by public agencies
(failure in providing information, support, counselling, and legal
‘closure’) greatly contributes to the victims’ distress, and appears to be
associated with the increased likelihood of the affected persons
developing a mental health condition, has emerged from a recent
survey of bereaved family members of workers killed on the job in
Australia (Matthews et al 2016).
Sentiments of shame, guilt, and self-blame are also reported,
particularly by victims of fraud (according to the common perception
that they, at least to some extent, ‘contributed’ to the crime), in many
ways similar to those experienced by victims of rape (Levi 2001), with
whom victims of fraud appear also to share higher rates of major
depressive episodes and generalised anxiety disorders after the crime
13 See also chapter eight in this volume.
168 CHAPTER VI
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
(Ganzini, McFarland, and Bloom 1990). It is probably not too far-
fetched to assume that similar feelings might be developed also by (at
least some) victims of corporate violence, particularly when a shared
public narrative exists which places at least part of the blame on them,
as is often the case with work-related accidents (because that job was,
after all, a ‘choice’ of the employee, or because the ‘accident’ was
‘victim precipitated’), as well as with illnesses or injuries suffered by
consumers (according to the common mentality of caveat emptor!)
(Tombs 2007; Croall 2008; Bisschop and Vande Walle 2013).
In actual fact, bereaved family members of victims of work-
related deaths display rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
prolonged grief disorder (PGD), and depressive disorder (MDD) even
higher than family members of victims of homicide or fatal accidents,
as well as high levels of anxiety, feelings of isolation, mood swings,
fear, and guilt (Matthews et al 2016). One medical professional
interviewed in the course of our research stated that some family
members of people deceased because of asbestos-related illnesses also
developed like mental conditions, probably related to multiple
bereavements as well as to the fear of developing the same disease
due to like environmental exposure (see Visconti 2017).
The quality of life of victims of corporate violence can obviously
also be severely affected by a set of more immediate and practical
negative consequences (Shover, Fox, and Mills 1994; Croall 2001;
Levi 2001; Friedrichs 2007; Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Croall
2010; Snell and Tombs 2011; Matthews et al 2016), which many of the
people interviewed in the course of our research also experienced.
Damage to health and/or physical integrity may imply the need for
complex therapies that may disrupt a person’s—and often their
family’s—economic and psychological wellbeing, cause the loss of
jobs and incomes, and place a strain on social and affective
relationships. The death of a loved one, besides often depriving the
family of its ‘breadwinner’, or anyway affecting its income, is a
traumatic event for their relatives, which can be further exacerbated by
the failure to find out the ‘truth’ about causes and responsibilities,
which is an all-too-common occurrence in cases of corporate violence
(Snell and Tombs 2011; Matthews et al 2016), as already noted above.
In some very serious cases of environmental pollution, individuals or
whole communities may even be forced to relocate, with a severe
disruption of their social bonds and identity (Arrigo and Lynch 2015;
Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007, also with specific reference to the
examples of the Love Canal dumping site and of the Times Beach case:
142–189).
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For those unable to take such extreme measures, however,
repeated victimisation is a concrete risk (Friedrichs 2007; Croall
2008; Croall 2009): people working in unsafe establishments who
cannot find other jobs in a safer environment, residents unable to leave
a polluted territory, etc, will thus remain exposed to those same
elements that have once caused harm to them or to their relatives and
friends. This is especially likely when multiple vulnerability factors
happen to add to each other, as is the case for instance with the
documented tendency to find the most polluting factories, or the largest
waste dumping sites, in the proximity of the poorest communities
(Stretesky and Lynch 1999; Croall 2001; Lynch and Stretesky 2001;
Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Croall 2008; Croall 2010; Bisschop
and Vande Walle 2013; Hall 2013; Walters 2014; Arrigo and Lynch
2015; Tombs and Whyte 2015). But the intertwining of vulnerability
factors may occur also with respect to other social groups, as happens,
for instance, with the marketing of unsafe drugs or medical devices
specifically targeted at women (Friedrichs 2007; Dodge 2009; Croall
2009), or with the already mentioned increased risks for the very
young and very old, as well as for the already ill, when exposed to
adulterated food (Croall 2009; Steinzor 2015).
5. Conclusion: A First Overview of the Needs of Corporate
Violence Victims
On the whole, the preliminary data drawn from the criminological
and victimological literature, as largely confirmed by the results of our
empirical research, hint at a series of needs of corporate crime and
corporate violence victims (see also Croall 2008; Matthews et al 2016),
which an effective implementation of the Directive 2012/29/EU should
provide.
It seems that this type of victim will often experience a need for
specific psychological and emotional support 14 that is in no way lesser
than the one experienced by victims of ‘common’ crimes and ‘true’
violence and, due to the greater legal and regulatory complexities
implicit in these offences, also an increased need for information and
legal support, particularly in order to deal with the great disproportion
of resources that usually opposes victims and offenders in this area.
With respect to practical support needs, the majority of these
14 See chapter eight in this volume.
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victims appear likely to require specialised medical and social
assistance, especially in all cases of long-term and/or disabling
diseases, as well as in all cases of exposure to the risk of contracting
long-latent illnesses, which imply a further, specific need for
preventive screening.
More generally, it can be safely assumed that victims of corporate
violence, whether they are aware of it or not, are characterised by a
need for further research and advocacy, due to the structural features of
crimes that, as of today, remain opaque and underestimated in the eyes
of both the general population and public institutions. This need is
actually expressed by some of these victims, by organising themselves
into associations which not only provide their members with
information and support, 15 but also often work to shape new public
policies to help people who have suffered the same kind of offences.
Finally, and connected with the previous assumption, it does not
appear too far-fetched to suppose (and has been indeed confirmed by
some of the people interviewed in the course of our empirical research)
that these victims, whom society and institutions often fail to recognise
and treat as such, may experience on occasions an even greater need of
recognition of their ‘victim status’ 16 and of the wrongs they have
suffered, than many victims of ‘common’ crimes, thus placing an
(even) greater value on ‘moral’ redress (including a reasonable
assurance that no further offences and, therefore, no further
victimisation, will happen) than on instrumental outcomes (see also
Garrett 2014; Hall 2016).
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CHAPTER VII
VICTIMS OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
NEEDS, EXPECTATIONS, AND RELATIONSHIPS
WITH CORPORATIONS
by Stefania Giavazzi
CONTENTS: 1. The Survey of Case Law: An Overview. – 2. Victims’ Access to
Justice: Obstacles and Problematic Issues. – 3. Victims’ Participation in
Criminal Proceedings: Needs, Expectations, and Obstacles. – 4. Victims’
Right to Obtain a Decision on Compensation. – 5. The Role of
Corporations in Avoiding Victimisation.
1. The Survey of Case Law: An Overview
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a general
overview of the position of the victims of corporate violence within
criminal proceedings, from the investigation phase to the final
judgment outcome, in the light of some European leading cases as
well as the project’s empirical findings. The contribution will focus on
the obstacles arising out of the criminal proceeding as regards
guaranteeing victims’ rights, and responding to victims’ needs and
expectations in terms of justice. Further, attention will be paid to the
position of corporations in dealing with this type of victims when
criminal proceedings do take place, and in avoiding victimisation.
The review of case law as well the empirical findings have
confirmed some of the project’s assumptions: the victims of corporate
violence are not a minority, they are vulnerable, and there is a lack of
awareness of their victimisation among the judicial operators and the
providers of social services. The survey of case law also offered hints
at a more general understanding of the context and framing of the
notion of corporate violence. Within the environmental field, for
example, questions arose concerning whether the category of so-called
disasters (calamitous events that cause severe human, material, and
economic or environmental losses) is compliant with the notion of
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
corporate violence. 1 Of course, corporate violence occurs only when
the disaster may be ascribed to the criminal behaviour of a corporation
or its representatives. Problems arise when we look at the effects
caused by disasters; in fact, corporate violence can be considered to
have occurred only when events have simultaneously caused harm to
human life and to the environment, while harm to environment is not
enough to qualify the fact as violent. This distinction, however, has
proved to be quite difficult to maintain in practice, because the ‘double
damage’, even when present, is not always charged in the count of
indictment. In fact, depending on the public prosecutor’s choices and
the nature of national criminal systems, environmental disasters may
be charged indifferently as criminal offences against human life/health
or public safety, and/or environmental crimes. This consideration has a
consequence not only for the definition of a case as one of corporate
violence, but also on the victims’ right to access justice. In fact,
offences that focus only on harms to public safety or to the
environment may exclude the right of individual victims to participate
in criminal proceedings, because they cannot be strictly considered as
‘victims’ according to the type of offences charged to the defendants,
and the harms they suffer cannot be directly related to the specific
crimes under judgment.
Some general remarks specifically relate to the field of food safety,
where the project has found very few cases that fit the notion of
corporate violence. The reasons for this may be summarised as
follows. Firstly, more than other sectors and especially so in Europe,
the food sector seems to benefit from the precautionary approach 2,
which prevents the dissemination of diseases as well as contamination
on a large scale. In fact, it’s more frequent to find frauds against
consumers being related to rotten or unsafe food—as in the horsemeat
scandal or the cases of salmonella in European countries—the majority
of which raise specific issues of food quality, while only rarely causing
severe and widespread harm to people’s health. Also, in other well-
known food scandals—for example the Chinese milk scandal or the
sprouts with E. Coli in Germany 3—the perpetrators, or the sources of
contaminated raw materials, were located outside Europe.
1 On this notion see in this volume chapter six, by Arianna Visconti.
2 Addressed by Stefano Manacorda and Irene Gasparini, chapter three in this
volume.
3 For references, see Giavazzi 2016a.
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Secondly, most of cases belonging to this sector present three
permanent characteristics: (a) harms usually affect single individual
victims or small groups (thus, they rarely cause widespread
victimisation); (b) defendants are often farmers, small operators
(non-incorporated), or small firms; (c) the food industry has a long
supply chain, in which corporations normally occupy the final place
(they just package and distribute the products). These features mean
that it is quite difficult to determine in which phase the contamination
or the poisoning of food occurred, not to mention the related liabilities
of food corporations. Such characteristics are present, for example, in
well-known cases, such as ‘Mad Cow disease’, 4 and the poisoned wine
(methanol contamination) which occurred in Italy in the 1990s 5 and in
the Czech Republic in 2012. 6
General remarks can also be made concerning the different
approaches to corporate violence adopted by in the various European
countries’ criminal systems. In fact, assuming that the same type of
harm is suffered as a consequence of similar types of corporate
violence, the effective opportunity to obtain a criminal judgment varies
from one country to another. For example, there are many criminal
proceedings involving asbestos-related diseases in Italy, while in
Belgium the sample is significantly less extensive, and in Germany
apparently it does not exist at all. A difference in approach among the
European countries has also been identified with respect to the role of
victims’ associations. In Italy, these are widely admitted to participate
as parties in criminal proceedings, while in Germany participation is
limited to victims as individuals. In Belgium and Germany, victims
may count on victim support services, while in Italy such services do
not yet exist. In addition, in Germany victims’ associations are
4 ‘Mad cow disease’ (BSE: Bovine spongiform encephalopathy) was first
discovered in the United Kingdom. By June 2014, 177 people in the United Kingdom,
and 52 elsewhere, had fallen ill and died as a result. The BSE crisis led to the European
Union banning exports of British beef with effect from March 1996; the ban lasted for
ten years before it was finally lifted on 1 May 2006. For references, see Giavazzi
2016a, pp 137–38.
5 Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 16 April 1994 n 4426, Cassazione penale (1994)
186.
6 In 2012, forty people in the Czech Republic and Poland died—and many others
were taken to hospital—as a result of methanol poisoning. The poisonings continued
for several years after the main wave; as of April 2014, there were 51 dead and many
others had suffered permanent health damage. For references, see Giavazzi 2016a, p
137 n 2.
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supported both by federal and State funds, while in Italy no public
funding is available to support similar associations. 7
With reference to all three sectors, a common, general finding can
be pointed out: for many cases with an evidently high level of
victimisation, criminal proceedings never start or else take decades to
reach the trial phase or a judgment. It is a matter of fact that in many
scandals with hundreds or thousands of victims all over Europe, there
is no evidence of criminal judgments against the corporations or their
representatives. The reasons for this will be examined below, but we
may anticipate that many obstacles affect, with different consequences,
the victims’ right to access justice, the victims’ right to obtain a
decision on the compensation for damages, and the victims’ right to be
protected from secondary victimisation during criminal proceedings. In
brief, the relevant topics are: the lack of information about the risks or
the effects caused by consuming unhealthy food, using toxic products,
or being exposed to harmful substances for a long period of time;
difficulties in collecting evidence about the causation link between the
intake of or exposure to a risky substance and the harm to a single
individual’s health; difficulties in collecting evidence about the
liability (guilt) of corporate representatives; lack of competence and
resources among first responders; and the negative attitude of
corporations in dealing with victims.
Despite the abovementioned difficulties in the selection process,
victims or professionals involved in some key cases (such as the
Thalidomide case, the Infected Blood case, the Asbestos-related
Disease cases, the Exxon Franking case, the Eschede Disaster, the
Holzschutzmittel case, the Ghislenghien Disaster, the Train Accident
in Wetteren, the Kik Karachi Pakistan case, or the German Airport
Detectors case) have participated in project activities and shared their
experiences. 8 Several European cases of corporate violence which
have led to criminal proceedings have been identified and analysed in
Italy, Germany, and Belgium. Some of them—such as the Poly Implant
Prothèse (PIP) case, the ‘Land of Fires’ case, ‘Mad cow’ disease,
Glyphosate, relevant accidents at work, and some disasters—have been
7 See chapter eight in this volume.
8 For a list of cases involved, as well as interviews and focus groups conducted in
Italy, Germany, and Belgium, see the country-specific Methodology and Cases
sections in Needs of Victims of Corporate Violence: Empirical Findings: Compre-
hensive Report (Giavazzi, Mazzucato, and Visconti 2017; Engelhart, Hillemanns, and
Schenk 2017; Lauwaert 2017).
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considered as additional benchmark cases, while, according to the
project criteria, fourteen criminal proceedings have been used as
leading cases to test a range of key factors: the victims’ specific needs
in accessing justice, victims’ status within the criminal proceedings,
problems related to victims’ participation in the criminal proceedings,
information and support received by victims before and during the
criminal proceedings, and the role of corporations. 9
All the selected leading criminal proceedings involve a significant
number of victims: hundreds or even thousands of individuals, and in
many cases entire communities. The type of victims varies widely, but
they usually belong to the categories of workers, ex-workers, citizens
living in the area where the plants are placed or the disaster took place,
patients, and consumers. 10
As regards asbestos-related diseases, the Italian criminal proceeding
Eternit Casale (also known as the Eternit case) may be considered the
leading case, for many reasons. It concerns thousands of people who
contracted asbestos-related diseases caused by the exposure to Eternit, a
fibre-cement used for the preparation of tiles, sheets for building
construction, and water pipelines. The case involved the workers of a
number of Italian plants, as well as residents living in the surrounding
areas, who were harmed by the widespread use of the material in the
cities and in the building of infrastructure. The first criminal proceeding
was closed in 2015 with no conviction due to the statute of limitation,
but a second criminal proceeding concerning the same facts is now
ongoing. As far as asbestos-related diseases are concerned, the project
also took into consideration the Ivrea Olivetti Italian case, which is now
ongoing. 11 In the environmental field, several criminal proceedings
related to harmful pollution or environmental disasters have been
selected as leading cases: (a) the Bussi sul Tirino Italian case, which
represents one of the most significant cases of water pollution caused by
industrial activities in Italy. (b) The Ilva Taranto Italian case (also
known as the Ilva case), which concerns an environmental disaster
related to industrial activity carried out since 1995 in a plant located in
9 For the list of criteria, methodology, and a detailed analysis of each case,
including the mapping of numbers and types of victims, see Giavazzi 2016b.
10 For numbers and a detailed analysis of the victims involved in each case, see
Giavazzi 2016b.
11 Also in this case the inhaling of asbestos fibre dust is supposed to have caused
severe injuries and the death of several workers who, having worked without any
protective disposals and without being informed of the risks, had been exposed to the
substance for a long period.
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Taranto, and to the effects such activity had on both the workers’ and the
population’s health. The environmental disaster is linked to the
dissemination of highly toxic substances in the air, the water, and the
soil, posing a threat to human beings, animal life, and the environment.
Its particular relevance comes from the social and political conflict it
created between corporations, workers, citizens, and public institutions,
as well as from the wide impact the industrial activities allegedly had on
the environment. The trial is ongoing. (c) The Porto Marghera Italian
case, which is the first and seminal case of historical pollution in Italy.
The investigation concerned industrial activity carried out at the
Marghera petrochemical plant (in the Venice lagoon) over more than
thirty years. Under scrutiny were, in particular, the damage (mainly
types of cancer) caused to human health by toxic chemical substances
(vinyl chloride monomer (CVM)/polyvinyl chloride (PVC)) as well as
the damage caused to the environment by productive activities around
the chemical complex. The criminal proceeding ended in 2006. (d) The
Tamoil Cremona Italian case, which concerns the alleged production of
site contamination due to the industrial activity of a refinery located in
the city of Cremona, along with failures in waste management. The
release of toxic substances has led to the contamination of the site where
the refinery lies, and subsequently—as a dynamic consequence of the
pollution—the contamination of groundwater and of natural resources,
particularly the waters of the Po river. The criminal proceeding is now
before the Court of Appeal. (e) The Spinetta Marengo Italian case,
which concerns water poisoning and the failure to carry out clean-ups as
required by the law in the Spinetta Marengo chemical area, which has
been operating since the beginning of the twentieth century, and includes
plants for the production of plastic, rubber, and fluorine lubricants. The
first instance judgment was issued in 2015. The appeal is ongoing. (f)
The Holzschutzmittel German case, which concerns certain wood
protection agents containing pentaclorofenol (PCP) and gamma-
hexachlorocyclohexane (lindane) and certain production-related conta-
mination substances such as dioxin and furan. The criminal proceeding
ended in 1995. (g) The Waste Dump of Mellery Belgian case, which
concerns the dumping of illegal toxic waste at the waste dump of
Mellery, which is supposed to have caused the pollution of the water,
soil, and air over a wide area. The final judgment was issued in 2003.
As examples of disasters the following criminal proceedings have
been selected: (a) the Train accident of Eschede German case, June
1998, when a train’s rubber-sprung wheel broke due to material fatigue
at a very high speed, causing the train to derail and to collide with a
road bridge, which collapsed instantly. The criminal proceeding ended
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in 2003. (b) The Gas Explosion in Ghislenghien Belgian case, which is
the biggest technological disaster ever in Belgium. The case concerns
an enormous explosion in July 2004, following an accidental gas leak
in a high-pressure gas pipe underneath the industrial zone of
Ghislenghien, where construction work was taking place. The
explosion caused an enormous fire and the temperature at the disaster
scene reached 300°C. The final judgment was issued in 2012.
In the pharmaceutical and medical devices sector, the following
criminal proceedings have been examined in particular: (a) The UB
Plasma German case, which relates to the contamination with HIV of
plasma supplied to hospitals. In order to save money, UB Plasma
pooled the blood of several donors before testing, which was
considered an unacceptable laboratory practice. This practice rendered
the well-established/prevalent HIV and hepatitis tests less sensitive,
with the consequence that the HIV infection of certain donors was not
detected in time. Moreover, for financial reasons the company did not
observe the standard quarantine period for storage of the blood plasma.
Final judgment was issued in 1996. (b) The Tri Heart Valves Italian
case, which concerns artificial cardiac valves of poor quality, not
compliant with legal standards for the materials, whose breakages
caused many deaths. The criminal proceeding is closed.
Consideration of these judicial cases tells us that access to justice,
the obtaining of a judgment in a reasonable time, the recognition of the
corporation’s liabilities, and the compensation for damages, amount
altogether to a real ‘obstacle course’.
2. Victims’ Access to Justice: Obstacles and Problematic Issues
One of the most important, general observations emerging from
the project findings is that the number of victims potentially injured or
harmed by the fact of corporate violence does not equal the number of
victims who could effectively have access to justice or participate in
the criminal proceeding. This consideration depends on a number of
factors and obstacles, most of which may be considered typical of
criminal proceedings involving corporate violence.
Firstly, the opportunity to access justice implies the identification of
victims, while the decision to access justice assumes that victims are
aware of their being victims. It is a matter of fact that except for
disasters, where victims are clearly identified as people harmed by the
event, in many cases a complete identification of all potential victims by
the public authorities is only partially possible at the time when the
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investigation starts. This is true in almost all cases concerning diseases
related to pollution or contamination which lead to harm over a long
period of time—where etiopathogenesis takes place over a very long
period, and often the effects are latent—or where widespread damage is
produced in extensive areas of land (Forti 2017; Centonze and
Manacorda 2017). The lack of identification may result in a lack of
victims’ awareness of their status, and vice versa, with serious limitations
to their right of access to justice. Difficulty in identifying victims often
also leads the public prosecutors to start additional investigations and a
new proceeding against the same perpetrators, charging the same
offences, simply because they have discovered new victims.
It may be argued, therefore, that for some well-known cases not all
the victims have yet been identified. In the Eternit case, for example, a
complete identification of all victims was only partially possible at the
time of first investigation and trial. Those who filed no complaint, who
were not identified as victims by the relevant associations, or who were
not informed or guided by the associations to ask for compensation,
had no chance to access justice. This ‘black hole’ was not entirely
remedied even when the second criminal proceeding (the so-called
Eternit bis) opened in relation to deaths and diseases discovered after
the beginning of the first trial. In the Ilva case the true number of
potential victims may be much higher than those who have joined the
ongoing criminal proceeding, because the damage, as well as the
number of those potentially harmed, is still partially unknown. The
chemistry and epidemiology reports lodged within the criminal
proceeding showed that the continuing exposure to the toxic and
polluting substances dispersed in the air as a consequence of the plant
activity is still causing a decline in the population’s health conditions.
In the Ivrea Olivetti case it is quite certain that the victims identified
within the current criminal proceeding are only a limited part of the
potential victims, as the experts declared that many other deaths are
expected for the period between 2017 and 2020. In the Bussi sul Tirino
case, pollution has been carried on for forty years and the potential
victims could number in the thousands, based on the number of
persons who have been using water in the contaminated area over the
timeframe for contamination of the water. In Holzschutzmittel case,
around 200,000 people were estimated to have suffered physically
from contact with the substances, but in the trial only 29 of the alleged
44 personal injuries were found attributable to the relevant products.
The identification of victims of corporate violence in the criminal
proceeding usually depends on the public prosecutor’s activities, but the
role of victims themselves, or that of other subjects, is not
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negligible—indeed, it is fundamental. When such victims are alone, they
rarely report the crime or have enough information, resources, or
strength to proceed individually. Of course, the responsibility for
checking the potential facts concerning corporate violence and potential
victims, as well as of reporting the potential crime to enforcement
agencies, should primarily pertain to public operators (operators of the
healthcare system, in primis) or public agencies, the bodies and entities
responsible for protecting public health, the environment or workplace
safety (Rotolo 2017). However, data and findings do not provide
particular evidence of the effectiveness of the role played by these actors
in cases of corporate violence. Of course, corporations could also play a
role in the identification of victims, as well as informing them,
especially when harmful conduct is discovered by the corporation itself
before the investigation starts. Unquestionably, however, when the case
has severe implications in terms of penalties and reputational damages,
it cannot be expected that the corporation will report the case to the
public authorities, due to the employment of defensive strategies and
cost–benefit assessments (Giavazzi 2017). 12
It therefore seems fair to affirm that ‘corporations do not disclose’
and ‘public agencies arrive too late’. Instead, media and social
operators play a significant role in informing victims about their status,
reporting the crime to judicial authorities and legal practitioners, and
supporting victims in managing the first access to public authorities.
If you want to have control, you have to know and in order to know you
have to receive information. In so far it is extremely important that the
victims are filled in and put in the position to decide. That is key; because if
I am able to decide, I regain a certain amount of control. [German lawyer]
The most relevant problem from the victims’ point of view is information,
especially at the very beginning of the proceeding [...] the difficulties are
related to the fact that victims are so many and not necessarily connected,
[so] obtaining information even on access to justice is a problem [...] when
the information exists, it is offered by the associations, which are private
associations with their [own] interests. I’ve never seen a public association
or entity informing victims on their rights. [Judicial professional. Italian
focus group on environmental cases]
In fact, it is often only thanks to investigations or research
12 For more details on this topic, see the section on preventing repeated
victimisation, in Guidelines for corporations: Preventing Victimisation and Dealing
with Victims of Corporate Violence (Giavazzi 2017, c III s 5).
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conducted by environmental and consumer associations, labour unions,
or journalists that victims realise that they have been harmed or
potentially harmed by an environmental crime, or exposed to toxic
substances produced by industrial production. It can also be affirmed
that sometimes these subjects—together with the associations of victims
that come into existence immediately after the concern becomes
evident—are the only ones giving voice to victims’ complaints, or
making the existence of an investigation public. Many leading cases can
be quoted in this respect. The role played—at a worldwide level—by the
associations of the victims of asbestos-related diseases is well known. In
particular, before and during the Eternit Casale criminal proceeding, the
Italian association Afeva provided assistance in victim identification,
establishing direct contact with them, and supplying coordination, legal
information, and legal assistance through their own lawyers. In the
Holzschutzmittel case, the victims’ association played a fundamental
role in giving information on the potential harm, helping detect
damages, and identifying the link with the harmful substances. In the
Ilva Taranto case, some associations and institutions significantly
contributed to the start of the proceeding by filing criminal complaints
and providing the Prosecution Office with information and evidentiary
elements, while in the Spinetta Marengo case associations not only filed
several criminal complaints, but also promoted epidemiological studies
and published fliers and letters addressed to the population living in the
area surrounding the plant, encouraging all who deemed themselves to
have contracted diseases from water pollution to file claims for
damages. In the Tamoil Cremona case, the local newspaper wrote
articles and dossiers on the environmental contamination of the area,
while an environmental association conducted a campaign and
undertook several activities to promote community awareness about
the site contamination. In the Waste Dump of Mellery case a non-
governmental environmental organisation lodged the criminal law suit
and pushed for and obtained the cleaning up of the site.
Despite this pro-active role of third parties, however, victims may
still lack awareness of being victims. The lack of information about the
risks or the effects caused by consuming unhealthy food, using toxic
products, or being exposed to harmful substances for a long period of
time, is a factor which can preclude the case ever being known, and can
explain why victims do not file complaints or seek access to justice. 13
13 See also the Introduction in this volume.
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The imbalances of information between corporations and victims
(or potential victims, or the public in general) is an inescapable factor
in these cases. Equally inescapable is that corporations may remain
forever—or at least for a long period of time—the only holders of
information about what went wrong and why. Especially when the risk
of being prosecuted is significant, corporations evince a tendency to
protect their information until public concerns or judicial accusations
arise. The aim is clear and understandable: to assess what behaviour
would be more beneficial in the event of, and only in the event of, a
specific judicial accusation being lodged (Giavazzi 2017). 14 Although
the disclosure of sources of risks and damages does not and should not
in itself imply the admission of guilt, it is true—especially in those
systems adopting the mandatory prosecution principle—that such
disclosure to victims or potential victims can result in the case being
reported to public authorities and in a criminal investigation. Due to
these circumstances, self-defensive considerations induce corporations
to protect what they already know from undue reporting to public
authorities, and to the public in general.
Time is another factor which may influence access to justice (for
its relevance to secondary victimisation during criminal proceedings,
see the following paragraph). Health problems caused by pollution,
defective drugs, and contaminated food may show their effects by
accumulation after years, which can create a lack of awareness that
delays or prevents the making of a complaint and thus bars access to
justice, as well as posing huge difficulties in producing scientific proof
(Forti 2017). Time influences the access to justice also because the
time span covered by the criminal behaviour is often unclear or, at
least, not grasped by citizens, workers, or consumers (Centonze and
Manacorda 2017). Victims can find the facts under investigation
confusing and overwhelming, and have no chance to understand the
link between the criminal behaviour and their diseases. Therefore, the
awareness of being a victim may arise too late, when the statute of
limitation or the procedural deadlines to take part in the criminal
proceeding have already run out. On the other hand, when
investigations and criminal proceedings start many years after the
facts, memories are confused and sometimes forgotten, or victims may
prefer not to reopen a past they do not want to remember.
The technicalities which characterise this type of cases have been
14 For a deeper analysis, see Giavazzi 2017, c III s 4.
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reported as an additional obstacle from many perspectives. From a
subjective point of view, when the accusation broaches scientific topics
and complex legal issues, and the investigation file comprises
thousands of documents, an understanding of the right to access the
criminal proceeding may be outside the victims’ scope of knowledge or
direct control without the support of lawyers or experts.
Difficulties linked to technicalities are also closely related to the
burden of proof, both in terms of the causation link and scientific
evidence (Forti 2017). Even when a complaint is filed, it often proves
impossible from the very beginning to demonstrate—at least according
to the principles required by criminal liability—the link of causation
(and therefore the guilt of the corporation) between the specific
corporate representative’s action or omission and the harms suffered by
each individual victim.
I would opt for the criminal proceeding only when the scientific
evidences have been consolidated, not in the case of hypotheses, because
otherwise the proceeding does not lead to a result and creates only
illusions. It’s difficult but possible to build a criminal proceeding for the
asbestos-related diseases, but it should not be done for many other
matters, because you cannot condemn someone without being sure that
he effectively caused the event. [Italian Prosecutor]
Some obstacles in terms of the causation link may also be due to
the involvement of foreign corporations or products imported from
abroad, which create difficulties in finding documents and identifying
which corporation is responsible. The lack of a collective judicial
option for victims in the European Union means that victims are
expected to jointly claim damages in other jurisdictions, leading to
extremely high costs, as well as the burdens of accessing justice and
participating in criminal proceedings in a foreign country. A relevant
example is the well-known Poly Implant Prothèse case (PIP case), for
which thousands of victims all over Europe can be counted. 15 Three
15 The Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) corporation produced defective breast
implants and sold them to hundreds of women. The fraud remained undetected until
2010. In March 2010, PIP silicone implants were withdrawn from the European Union
market following an observed increase in implant ruptures, and confirmation by the
French regulator AFSSAPS (Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Produits de
Santé) of the use of substandard silicone in the manufacture of the implants. Later,
AFSSAPS also found that the gel, which contained non-approved silicone, was an
irritant, and that leaks could give rise to inflammation and pain. For references to the
criminal judgments, victims involved, and legal concerns, see Giavazzi 2016a.
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criminal proceedings have started in France (where the corporation is
located), one more recently started in Spain in the face of many
difficulties, while another is ongoing in Germany against the
certification authority (which is located in Germany). The scandal
has been cited as an example of failure of and gaps in the existing
regulatory European framework on medical devices, 16 but also as a
blatant case of consumers not only incurring serious physical harm but
also being denied the means to claim compensation for harm and costs
of remedial medical treatment and surgery.
Again concerning the burden of proof, one might remark that an
individual victim may not have the capacity to provide appropriate
documentation or other elements to legitimate his/her status and to
prove that a direct harm was suffered at the time when the criminal
proceeding takes place.
One significant example is the Infected Blood case:
The police officer was telling me that my doctor made a mistake in
prescribing that drug to the child [...] twenty years later [...]. I felt I was a
victim again, because the justice system started too late, too late! [Victim
of haemoderivative infected drugs]
We had difficulties accessing the justice system. When we started to
think about a judiciary action, we found many difficulties in proving
causation, because even though it’s true that the drug was widespread on
the market, we could not prove we had taken that particular one. We took
the drug available in the medical centre at the moment we needed to take
it. Our priority was to survive. Therefore we did not ask about the brand
of the drug. [Victim of haemoderivative infected drugs]
Another relevant case where access to justice was denied due to
time and difficulties in collecting evidence is the well-known
Thalidomide case. 17 In 1968 a large criminal trial began in Germany,
charging several representatives of Grünenthal, the corporation which
16 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
medical devices, and amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) 178/2002 and
Regulation (EC) 1223/2009.
17 Thalidomide was originally prescribed as a ‘wonder’ drug for morning
sickness, headaches, coughs, insomnia, and colds, thus notably for use in pregnant
women. Shortly after the drug went on sale in West Germany, between 5,000 and 7,000
infants were born with phocomelia (a malformation of the limbs). Only 40% of these
children survived. Throughout the world, about 10,000 cases were reported of infants
with phocomelia due to thalidomide; only 50% survived. Thalidomide was pulled from
the market in 1961.
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developed the drug, of negligent homicide and injury. After the
corporation settled with the German victims, the trial ended in a
sentence of no finding of guilt. 18 In Belgium and Italy no criminal
judgments have been checked. In Belgium a complaint against the
State (rejected in the first instance and followed by an appeal) was
filed, and a Parliamentary resolution finally adopted, in order to
partially grant compensation to victims. Almost the same occurred in
Italy, where the State provided funds for the partial compensation of
some categories of victims. In a public event in 2012, fifty years after,
the Grunenthal corporation partially recognised its liability and
apologised for having failed to reach out ‘from person to person’ to
the victims and their mothers. 19
Obstacles concerning scientific evidence arise for two reasons: the
opportunity to access (and pay) the best lawyers and experts, and the
scientific uncertainty in itself (which extends or limits the categories and
number of victims potentially involved). With respect to the first issue,
this type of criminal proceedings is marked by a strong asymmetry of
defensive means between victims and defendants. Corporations may
appoint the best lawyers and experts, while victims most of the time may
only count on legal aid offered free. The opportunity to pay the best
experts gives a crucial advantage to corporations, because the proof of
causation link mostly depends on scientific arguments:
In these kind of criminal proceedings you need the experts and there is
the huge problem of the relationship between science and justice [...] a
prosecutor should know who are the experts and what they did in other
proceedings, because you need someone who does not have a conflict of
interest. [Professional. Italian Prosecutor]
But, as said, frequently it is the lack of scientific evidence in itself
18 As part of the settlement, Grünenthal paid 100 million DM into a special
foundation; the German government added 320 million DM. See Giavazzi 2016a, p.
139.
19 The public statement also includes the following passages: ‘Grünenthal has
acted in accordance with the state of scientific knowledge and all industry standards
for testing new drugs that were relevant and acknowledged in the 1950s and 1960s. We
regret that the teratogenic [capacity to result in a malformation of an embryo] potential
of thalidomide could not be detected by the tests that we and others carried out before
it was marketed [...] Instead, we have been silent and we are very sorry for that’. The
public statement is available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20120901184544/; and at
http://www.contergan.grunenthal.info/grt-ctg/GRTCTG/Stellungnahme/Rede_anlaes-
slich_Einweihung_des_Contergan-Denkmals/224600963.jsp.
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which interferes with the demand for justice. For example, the
harmfulness of glyphosate—the key ingredient in the world’s most
used herbicides—is highly disputed in science and politics. The whole
discussion still revolves around the possible risks or the threshold for
accepting risks. Given the uncertainty of the risks, a comprehensive
scientific assessment was carried out by the Member States and EFSA
according to the rules for renewal of active substance approvals, to
confirm that glyphosate complies with the new approval criteria laid
down in the 2009 EU pesticides legislation. Following this, the
European Commission has adopted the act to renew the approval of
glyphosate for five years. 20 The International Agency for Research on
Cancer, 21 potential victims, and the public seem to have a different
opinion and expressed many concerns. On October 2017 the European
Commission officially received the submission of the 4th successful
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). Over 1 million citizens called on
the European Commission to propose that Member States ban
glyphosate, reform the pesticide approval procedure, and to set EU-
wide mandatory reduction targets for pesticide use. 22 Victims also
claimed damages before civil courts in France. French courts (in 2009,
and in 2015) found Monsanto guilty of lying, falsely advertising its
Roundup herbicide as biodegradable, environmentally friendly, and
that it left the soil clean, and ordered compensation for damages for a
French farmer. 23 The Monsanto Company has been found guilty of
‘ecocide’, including because of the use of glyphosate, by the
International Monsanto Tribunal, a civil society initiative aimed at
assessing harmful agrochemical practices. 24
20 The proposal is available at https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/
docs/pesticides_glyphosate_commission_proposal_revision4.pdf (last accessed 17
January 2018).
21 IARC, Monographs Volume 112: Evaluation of Five Organophosphate
Insecticides and Herbicides, 20 March 2015, available at https://www.iarc.fr/en/
media-centre/iarcnews/pdf/MonographVolume112.pdf (last accessed 17 January
2018).
22 On the citizens’ initiative, see Communication from the Commission on the
European Citizens’ Initiative Ban glyphosate and protect people and the environment
from toxic pesticides (C(2017) 8414 final, 12 December 2017); see also EFSA
(European Food Safety Authority), ‘Conclusion on the Peer Review of the Pesticide
Risk Assessment of the Active Substance Glyphosate’, 13 EFSA Journal (2015) 107.
23 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lyon, 13 February 2012 n 2012/144; Cour
d’Appel de Lyon, Chambre 6, 10 September 2015 n 12/02717 (online at http://
bacaly.univ-lyon3.fr/index.php/l-arret-du-bulletin, last accessed January 2018); Cour
de Cassation, Chambre mixte, Arrêt n 284, 7 July 2017 n 15-25.651.
24 http://www.monsanto-tribunal.org/.
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The uncertainty and incoherence of epidemiological studies and
scientific data may be also mentioned with reference to the Italian case
known as ‘The Land of Fires’, which is one of the most significant
environmental disasters in Europe. It has been proven that for decades,
parts of the Campania Region (the so-called Triangle of Death, or Land
of Fires) have been used for the illegal dumping, burning, and disposal
of toxic waste. 25 The connection between contamination and the
prevalence of severe diseases (especially cancer) remains contentious.
The absence of information on the real risks, as well as effective
answers from public authorities, has increased the State of anxiety and
fear within the population, and led therefore to social conflict. Despite
many complaints lodged by victims and their associations, an effective
answer from the criminal justice system and the State more generally
has not been obtained. Certain investigations into illegal waste
trafficking have brought to light facts and crimes, but many of these
proceedings have run afoul of the statute of limitations. The largest of
all investigations on the trafficking of toxic waste, called Cassiopeia,
ended in a no prosecution judgment. 26 No effective measures have
been put in place by the State in order to completely restore the
contaminated sites. Fires of toxic waste still continue today. The
European Court of Justice condemned Italy for its long-running failure
to manage waste adequately in the Campania region, or to implement
sanctions. 27
Finally, strong limitations in accessing justice may arise due to a
lack of competence, experience, expertise, and resources among the
first responders of the judicial system. The circumstance is particularly
evident in some geographical areas or in small public prosecutors’
offices. Within any given country, there may be public prosecutor’s
offices that cannot afford these kind of criminal proceedings because
they lack the specialisation required, or the resources to investigate the
case. In other areas, the criminal proceeding goes so slowly that the
crimes become time-barred. In order to obtain a quick response, these
types of cases would instead require a high level of commitment on the
investigation side, appropriate skills to understand the relevance of the
25 The agro-economy of the region has also been adversely affected by the
pollution. At the same time, the absence of judgments and the lack of effective
remediation activities have been claimed as concerns by the victims for over twenty
years. For more details, see Giavazzi 2016a.
26 For references, see Giavazzi 2016a.
27 ECJ, Case C-297/08 Commission v Italy [2010]; ECJ, Case C-653/13
Commission v Italy [2015].
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evidence, and proper time and resources to guarantee the continuity of
action.
The large number of victims potentially or actually involved
(sometimes entire communities) also inhibits the chance of taking care
for each individual victim’s needs and rights. In fact, both as regards the
victims’ right to be recognised and to be individually informed, it is
notable that individual victims’ needs blend in with the others (often,
dozens or hundreds) in a kind of collective action. The collective
dimension which permeates the demand for justice in all corporate
violence cases, together with the lack of time and resources, may be an
obstacle to guaranteeing that each single victim is informed and
protected. This consideration must be read together with the fact that
investigators normally are not able to know an individual victim’s
personal history and, often, they do not have the expertise to understand
the disease and the related consequences; in summary, they do not
always seem prepared to enter into dialogue with these type of victims in
particular. Discomfort in approaching the criminal justice system has
been reported by many victims participating in the project. 28
Well, the next obstacle: there was an extreme ignorance on the side of the
German judiciary towards facing such kinds of cases. [Professional. KiK
case]
Some victims said they had difficulties coping with the
interrogations conducted by the public authorities and, in general, in
entering into dialogue with the investigators and the first responders.
Such limitations should be mitigated by improving the awareness,
competence, and specialisation of all the operators involved (including
doctors, institutions, agencies, and media) on how to manage such
cases and relate to such victims.
3. Victims’ Participation in Criminal Proceedings: Needs, Expec-
tations, and Obstacles
According to the three national procedural systems studied in this
project, victims have the right to take full part in the criminal
28 For references, see the country-specific sections on public sector justice in the
comprehensive report of the project’s empirical findings (Giavazzi, Mazzucato, and
Visconti 2017, s 3.6.4; Engelhart, Hillemanns, and Schenk 2017, s 3.6.4; Lauwaert
2017, s 3.6.4).
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proceedings as a directly injured party (or as family members of a
victim), provided that three conditions are met: a criminal offence must
have been committed; the injury or loss must have been caused directly
by the offence; the damage must be personal to the victim, existing and
current. The precise modalities of the mechanisms of participation, as
well as the formal role attributed to victims in the relevant criminal
justice system, are determined by national law. Under the Victims
Directive, the victim’s right to information and his/her right to
protection from secondary or repeated victimisation, intimidation and
retaliations, as well as the protection of private life, should influence
every phase of the criminal proceeding, and also extend somewhat
outside the perimeter of the proceeding.
Many victims consider the role that they may play in the
investigation phase and in the trial to be extremely important; and the
project findings confirm that their role is, indeed, not minor. 29 Victims
collaborate with the investigators in the reconstruction of the relevant
facts and provide active support in the gathering of evidence, including
through their defence counsel and experts when available. They
usually participate actively in the trial, as plaintiffs, audiences, or
witnesses. It is also notable that victims continue to participate in the
hearings regardless of the withdrawal of their right to claim damages
due to any extrajudicial agreements reached with the corporation. This
need to participate evidently goes beyond the aim of obtaining
economic compensation, and it should be seen as a need to follow, step
by step, the process of the ascertainment of truth.
In exercising their rights to participate in criminal proceedings, the
particular vulnerability of victims of corporate violence should be
considered by all the operators, and appropriate protection measures
should be adopted to prevent the risk of secondary and repeated
victimisation, intimidation and retaliations, or damage to privacy.
Nevertheless, the judicial system seems not to be aware of these needs
and vulnerabilities.
The victims’ role inside the criminal proceedings involves two
different orders of problem. The first is linked to the physical
attendance of victims at the trial; the second, to the forms of secondary
victimisation caused by the mechanisms and the outcomes of the
criminal proceeding.
In general, criminal proceedings—aimed at ascertaining personal
29 For references, see Giavazzi 2016a.
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liability—are not able to embrace the collective dimension of the
victim’s status or the collective demand for justice, nor to find
collective solutions in terms of reparations and compensation. With
regards specifically to physical attendance, the participation of high
numbers of victims at the trial stage requires a collective strategy,
which is not always available. To this aim, courts should identify
beforehand one or more appropriate trial courtrooms, as well as
coordinate with the victims who intend to participate in order to respect
their needs. In the case of particularly vulnerable victims, specifically
those afflicted by illness or infirmity, audio-visual-linked courtrooms
with separate and appropriate areas to receive the public are needed.
Victims’ awareness of their rights and the mechanisms of criminal
proceedings seem to be key to building a positive spirit of
collaboration with the public authorities and so to manage the trial
effectively. 30
The active participation of victims means that they will have high
public exposure during investigations, trial, and even after the final
judgment. The disclosure of personal data and personal histories can
often become a negative, but inevitable consequence of the publicity of
the trial hearings. Due to the fact that corporate violence may affect
entire communities, extensive regions of land, or strategic productive
activities, which are important providers of jobs, public opinion and
public issues must always be considered relevant. In the Eternit case,
for example, victims faced overexposure in the media; in the Porto
Marghera case, public opinion was constantly informed about the
proceeding by press reports, associations, web sites, and local and
national media; in the Spinetta Marengo case, many websites followed
and commented upon the case; in the Telecom Olivetti case, hearings
were published online. 31 This public interest, as well as the
dissemination of victims’ experiences, has both advantages and
disadvantages. Public opinion and media participation are instruments
of information, but also instruments of pressure on public authorities,
as well as on corporations, at least in terms of reputation. But the
victims themselves become involved, consciously or unconsciously, in
the storytelling of their lives: consequently, it is not always possible to
balance privacy, personal integrity, and personal data with the freedom
of information, as well as to guarantee that victims are protected from
secondary victimisation. The most significant example of this
30 For details and findings, see Giavazzi 2016a.
31 For other cases and more details, see Giavazzi 2016b.
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undesirable result is the German UB plasma case, where surviving
victims and their heirs did not participate in the criminal proceeding
and did not want to testify in Court (probably because of the stigma of
HIV).
Physical attendance and the emotional involvement of victims
may expose victims to the stress of the conflict between prosecutor and
defendants. This participation is not always seen as a positive factor by
the judicial authorities and legal practitioners. In fact, the presence and
voices of victims in the trial hall can transform it into a sounding board
for the conflict. At the court hearing stage, the trial often takes on the
character of a media spree or a forum for protest, where it becomes
difficult to maintain civil order, the restraint required by the nature of
the place, or the respect owed to the accused and to the bench. During
the hearing, there may be audible public comments on the examination
of witnesses or consultants; the public may express its disagreement
with the bench’s decisions; the victims present in the courtroom may
openly express their dissent; and victims might protest outside the
court house with marches or placards. 32 But the presence of victims in
the trial is also perceived by many judicial operators as a factor which
may influence judges’ personal feelings:
Judges are not robots and therefore personal feelings count. The presence
of victims during the trial makes the judge feel more responsible. What
do they [judges] normally do? They ask not to have the civil parties
present, so as to work more easily [...] But the victim should not become
victimised by the proceeding, because victims who are there but in the
end do not obtain anything will feel really upset [...] Some judges think
that the victims are a marginal element inside the proceeding and ask that
they not occupy too much space, because victims are seen as an obstacle
to the regular conduct of the trial. [Italian victims’ lawyer]
With regards to the issue of secondary victimisation, instead, it
must be highlighted that the criminal trial is the forum where the
demand for justice for victims of corporate violence is manifested with
greatest strength. Victims have a particular need to ascertain the truth,
gain recognition of their status from the State and the corporation
itself, call public attention to their plight, prevent future harms, and
32 In the Porto Marghera case, after the first acquittal, the judges and indeed the
whole justice system were strongly perceived as unjust. After the reading of the
acquittal, victims present in the room occupied the bench. The judges who issued the
first instance judgment left the room (after having read the judgment) under guard.
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attain a decision on compensation. In the absence of other forms of
prior recognition, criminal justice becomes the only path to satisfy
these needs. The application for justice is thus charged with needs and
expectations related to the fact that every other path to justice may be
blocked. But these strong expectations are often disregarded, with
potential negative effects in terms of secondary victimisation.
In fact, the project findings point to a significant lag between the
initial expectation of justice and the effective outcomes of criminal
proceedings. At the end, the confidence in the criminal justice system
is enormously reduced and victims also become ‘victims of the
criminal proceeding’. This undesirable result is influenced by a number
of circumstances. Criminal proceedings have inescapable limitations
resulting from their very nature and operating mechanisms, which
inevitably contrast with victims’ expectations, especially when victims
are not adequately informed, supported, and protected. In addition,
criminal proceedings on corporate violence also suffer from patholo-
gical—not expected—limitations, which contribute to increasing the
gap between expectations and outcomes: the inefficiency of inve-
stigation tools, the lack of specialisation and competence, the delay in
providing answers or indeed a lack of answers tout court, the duration
of the proceeding, or an ineffectiveness in guaranteeing the victims’
rights to be informed and protected.
Analysing these limitations, it must be firstly said that the public
prosecutor’s choices may have a significant impact on the victims’
expectations, and vice versa.
Complacency does not equal efficiency [...] It may be—and in these
crimes it is more frequent, in others not so much—that the public
prosecutor, who is also under an understandable pressure, may be
inclined to show complacency towards victims, and therefore, between
all the legally possible ways that exist, he may choose the one that yields
immediate greater satisfaction for the victims, but which does not
necessarily work for the better, and often is the opposite, it is the one the
leads the victims, ultimately, to the greatest disappointment. It is a very
dangerous dynamic, but frequently seen. Obviously, if I incriminate
someone who has caused extensive damages for an even more serious
offence, I meet approval. But one must never forget that the public
prosecutor makes an hypothesis that is then subject to verifications.
Therefore, the public prosecutor should have the ability, especially in
crimes with a wide pool of victims, to have the calm and the technical
knowledge to foresee the way that is actually practicable, and which will
then survive the verification of the process. [Professional. Italian
Prosecutor]
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Secondly, victims may not be aware about the rules governing the
criminal investigation, due to the followings: the lack of ex post
explanations and ex ante information on the rights of the defence
(victims should understand that the criminal proceeding is a drama not
only for them, but also for the defendants, and the dimension of the
rights of the defendants is often underestimated); the mechanisms for
evidence within criminal proceedings (the uncertainty of scientific
evidence, proof beyond any reasonable doubt, conflicting case law);
and the effects of the course of time (not only with reference to the
duration of investigations and trial, but also and especially as regards
rulings to dismiss the proceedings and the extinction of the crime due
to the statute of limitations). An identical need for explanation and
understanding arises with respect to court decisions associated with a
lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, especially where that lack is
linked to the mens rea of the crime. Difficulties and a sense of injustice
have also been reported when victims are called to understand court
decisions for acquittal justified by the judge by upholding scientific
theories (often very complex) pleaded by the defence, specifically in
the case of conflicting case law on the issue, with opposing decisions
in similar cases. In fact, unequal treatment of victims, harmed by
identical corporate behaviours with identical consequences for human
health, may depend on accidental factors: the circuit court where the
trial takes place, the prosecutor’s ability and commitment in collecting
evidence and in identifying victims, the availability of epidemiological
data, and experts’ opinions. The lack of a unique model for
compensation for damages—using the same criteria and rules—in-
creases the salience of the issue.
Often victims think that the criminal proceeding and the conviction are
their only option to obtain justice. Due to this expectation, it’s very
difficult to make them understand the judicial mechanisms, which may
not lead to identifying a responsible individual according to the criminal
justice rules. [Professional, focus group on environmental cases]
Secondary victimisation is also evident when the criminal justice
system ends up being ineffective exclusively for time reasons. Despite
evidence for the perpetration of offences harming victims, statutes of
limitation may preclude a judgment on the corporate representatives’
liability, and consequently on victims’ requests for compensation. In a
significant sample of cases, the final judgment stated that defendants
should not be prosecuted or that conviction was not possible, due to the
fact that the crime was or had become time-barred. A relevant example
is the Eternit Casale case: in 2015 the Italian Supreme Court established
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that the charge of disaster ceased to be applicable when the spread of
asbestos dust and production waste—caused by the facilities managed
by the defendant—ended; thus, the tempus commissi delicti was
considered to be June 1986, when the Eternit bankruptcy was declared.
The limitation period for the crime, which is fifteen years, therefore
started in 1986 and so expired before the first degree sentence in 2012.
Despite the first and second degree sentences stating the compensation
for victims, according to the Italian Criminal Procedural Law a final
sentence of non-prosecution due to the statute of limitation prevents
plaintiffs from obtaining the compensation for damages already awarded
in the previous judgments. In the Porto Marghera case, for almost all the
cases under examination the court’s findings could not in the end lead to
conviction because the injury charges had become time-barred. In the
Holzschutzmittel case, compensation claims were often denied by the
courts because of time limitations, as the victims were raising claims in
the 1990s (probably due to extensive media coverage) for acts
committed in the 1970s/early 1980s.
In case of such final judgments, the reaction is alternatively great
disappointment, misunderstanding, resignation (where the negative
outcome was predictable), or desperation; in most cases, therefore, it
amounts to secondary victimisation.
I didn’t see justice and many victims will never have it. [Victim, focus
group, Eternit case]
It’s clear what happened. We are victims twice. [Victim’s family
member, focus group, Eternit case]
After ten years, they told us that liabilities were proved, but the crime
was time-barred and therefore it was not possible to sentence. That was a
kind of joke. And we did not even obtain the compensation for damages,
which could, in some ways, soften the blow. [Victim, Eternit case]
Too many loopholes, which allow different interpretations, and
anachronistic interpretations: if the disaster is still ongoing, why do
you judge that it is time barred? This is the worst way to deny victims’
rights. [Victim’s family member, focus group, Eternit case]
As the public interest is often involved, the State’s decisions may
also impact on and interfere with the outcomes of criminal justice. The
most significant example is the Italian Ilva case. In 2012, despite the
persisting danger from the plant, freezing orders previously issued by
the judicial authority were revoked by the Italian government, thereby
allowing the restarting of the industrial activity, and the sale of a number
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of products which had also been previously subject to the freeze.
However, the restarting of the plant activity was subject to the adoption
of measures aimed at protecting the environment. The decree was
subsequently challenged, but the Italian Constitutional Court upheld it.
The relevant opinion highlights that the Court deemed that the decree
correctly balanced two different constitutional rights: the right to health
on the one hand, and the right to work on the other, taking under due
consideration the need to protect occupation. The case was brought
before the European Court of Human Rights. 33 In particular, between
2013 and 2015 about 180 people filed complaints, contending that they
had suffered health damages as a consequence of the plant’s activity and
that the Italian State failed to take all necessary measures to protect the
environment and their health. They also criticised the government’s
decision to authorise the restarting of the plant’s activity. Further to the
filing of the complaints, the European Court of Human Rights formally
accused the Italian State of having failed to protect the life and health of
the people living in Taranto, and in the plants’ surroundings, from the
harmful substances dispersed by Ilva. 34
Despite all these undesirable results, in terms of substantive justice
from the victims’ perspective, the criminal proceeding remains an
irreplaceable path to ascertaining the truth and establishing liabilities.
The criminal justice system is felt to be a necessary and useful means
to raise interest and draw attention to the case; to collect evidence
when victims have no means to proceed alone; to obtain compensation
when all other systems have failed or corporations refuse dialogue; and
to achieve public recognition of victims’ status.
I’ve lost any expectation and hope for what concerns the conviction of
the corporations involved. But I think it should be a sentence, because it’s
a necessity to establish a public recognition. Without this, a State is dead.
[Victim of infected haemoderivative drugs]
If we had been able to get a conviction, this would have changed a lot.
Everything would have changed. I do not have a punitive way of thinking
[...] but I think that a society works only if it can guarantee the
recognition of liabilities and the effectiveness of sentences, not for
revenge, and not only to ascertain the facts, but to empower. [Victim’s
family member of infected haemoderivative drugs]
33 The ECtHR case law concerning victims’ rights is addressed by Marc
Engelhart, chapter four in this volume.
34 ECtHR, Cordella et al v Italy [2013], and Ambrogi Melle et al v Italy, [2015]
(online at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng, last accessed 11 January 2018).
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There is a common need to know the truth, it would be very important to
know what really happened [...] and it would be more satisfactory if who
caused the damages also admitted the truth [...] I mean to find the
perpetrators and prove their liability. [Victim of Thalidomide]
One thing is a trade unionist who says, ‘there is death in that factory’ [...]
Another thing is a court verdict that affirms: ‘In the name of the Italian
people [...] this worker died because of that job’. [Victims’ association.
Eternit case]
Finally, it is worthy of remark that in cases of acquittal or non-
prosecution judgments, victims continue to demand ‘justice’ through
appeals, petitions, press releases, Parliamentary questions, or active
web-sites. This circumstance indicates that, in the context of corporate
violence, the victims’ need to be informed and supported remains even
after the end of the criminal proceeding, especially when the judgment
was not able to answer to their requests in terms of reconstructing the
truth and liabilities, obtaining compensation for damages, and
recovering from environmental disasters. Victims’ requests are
addressed to the corporation, as well as to the public authorities, even
if it is almost always States which take initiatives of so-called
remediation ex post. In the Train Accident of Eschede case, for
example, the victims’ association fought publicly for an official
apology; only in 2013, on the fifteen-year anniversary of the accident,
did the chairman of the corporation apologise for the tragedy on behalf
of Deutsche Bahn AG at the victims’ memorial. In the Holzschutz-
mittel case, in 2014, several parliamentarians questioned the
government on the victims’ situation. The government stated that the
Holzschutzmittel case was taken as a starting point for finding a
European solution that was finally reached with the biocidal products
Directive 98/8/EC of 16 February 1998 (now replaced by the biocidal
products Regulation 528/2012 of 22 May 2012), and that damages
arising from such products must be considered sufficiently covered by
private law product liability regulations. The Coalition against Bayer
Dangers continues today to campaign publicly against the corporation
through publications and protests at annual shareholder meetings. In
the Bussi sul Tirino case, after the judgment of acquittal and non-
prosecution, the investigation into the extent of the contamination due
to the corporation’s activity has been entrusted to a Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry on illegal activities and environmental crimes
related to the cycle of waste. In the period 2014–16 the Commission
conducted several analyses and initiatives, including parliamentary
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hearings with the delegates of environmental associations, local
institutions, and members of the National Institute of Health. A
Commission for the management of economic, social, and environ-
mental crisis has also been established. In the UB Plasma case, in 1993
the German Parliament set up an Inquiry Commission on HIV
Infections through blood and blood products, whose main focus was to
inquire if and to what extent the federal government and administration
bore (legal) responsibility and was accountable in the context of the
scandal. The commission was also mandated to clarify the financial,
social, and legal situation of the victims (mainly haemophiliacs) and
their relatives in order to formulate proposals in the victims’ interest to
the legislator. A final point was to assess the safety of blood and blood
products and what needed to be done to improve them. The final report
by the Inquiry Commission, which was criticised for its weakness and
softness, and for not having vigorously challenged the legal status quo,
was published on 25 October 1994. One of the main outcomes for
victims was the institution of a foundation financed by the federal
government, the German State, the German Red Cross, and the
pharmaceutical industry. The establishment of the foundation implied
that any further claim against the federal government, the Red Cross,
and the pharmaceutical corporations, is extinguished. The financial
support provided to the victims (a pension scheme) was, however,
comparatively moderate. Today, the question of how to sustainably
support the victims is still unresolved. The funds will be exhausted in
the near future. To this day, persons with a hepatitis C infection
through contaminated blood products have not received any form of
financial compensation in Germany. In the Thalidomide case in
Belgium a complaint against the State (rejected in the first instance and
followed by an appeal) has been filed, and a Parliamentary resolution
adopted, in order to recognise the responsibility of the State and to
partially grant compensation to victims, who had never received any
offers from the corporations, nor decisions from the criminal justice
system. Almost the same process occurred in Italy, where the State
provided funds for the compensation of victims in the absence of any
other solutions. In the Gas Explosion in Ghislenghien case, a number
of initiatives were taken outside the context of the criminal trial and
after it, which provided recognition to the victims: two donations were
made by gas company Fluxys to partially compensate the victims; and,
as a consequence of the disaster, a law was adopted according to which
victims of a technological disaster are compensated for physical
damage without them having to wait until legal responsibilities have
been determined through juridical procedures. This was a response to
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the complaints of many victims who had had to wait for years before
receiving compensation. A fund was created to make this early
compensation possible. Insurance companies contribute to the fund,
and after the legal procedures they mutually arrange the division of the
compensation as decided by the court. Every year a commemoration is
held at the site of the disaster. In the Waste Dump of Mellery case, a
parliamentary commission was set up in 1993 to investigate the
regulations and policies developed in Wallonia concerning the
treatment of waste, and their actual implementation, in order to draw
lessons for the future.
4. Victims’ Right to Obtain a Decision on Compensation
Victims who participate in criminal proceedings primarily make
claims for economic and moral damages directly caused by the crime.
Art 16 of the Victims Directive aims to ensure that the victim obtains a
decision on compensation for damages, accompanied by the provision
that such a decision is secured within a ‘reasonable time period’ and by
the duty of Member States to promote (para 2) measures to encourage
offenders to provide compensation. The objective of the Directive is to
ensure that the victim obtains a decision on compensation for damages,
with an evident inclination towards a decision in the criminal
proceeding, when such a decision is expected to be an option in the
legal system concerned.
The size and type of damages claimed for depends, of course, on
the type of offence and its consequences. It is quite notable that in
cases of corporate violence the economic losses may concern an entire
community or the safety of the environment of an entire region, and
moral damage may also take the shape of a fear of being harmed in the
future, due to the long latency of harms. These types of damages may
not be easily claimed for within criminal proceedings for corporate
violence, and therefore they often remain underestimated and
uncompensated. In two leading cases, however, the courts, not without
difficulties, significantly extended the recognition of damages to cover
those related to future expected ones. In the Tamoil Cremona case, the
citizen participating at the trial as a civil party representing the interests
of the entire community also claimed for moral damage suffered by the
municipality due to the severe pollution of surrounding areas,
interpreted as a fear of being personally contaminated and of
continuing to run the risk of getting sick because of exposure to
toxins. Such a fear depends also on the awareness that under those
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 205
circumstances the etiopathogenesis (as the secondary effect of
contamination of environmental resources) spans a very long period,
and is often even latent; this is therefore a case of victimisation related
to danger rather than to damage. The judgment awarded this citizen
(representing the entire community) one million Euros in damages. In
the Spinetta Marengo case, the court expressly stigmatised the strategy
of filing of civil claims in relation to damages which will never be
ascertained in the context of that criminal proceeding (because
unrelated to the charges). Individual victims who had filed civil
claims for damages arising from the exposure to poisoned water were
not awarded damages when they could not prove they had drunk or
used poisoned water. Likewise, no damages were awarded to those
who supported their claim only by indicating that they lived in the
plant surroundings, since the claims were very general and it had not
been possible to ascertain even their actual ‘suffering’ as arising from
the awareness or the fear of having been exposed to toxic substances.
The Court, however, affirmed the principle that the right not to be
alarmed about one’s own health conditions and not to spend a lifetime
with health concerns arising from polluting activities is a need
deserving of legal protection, in that it is part of the broader right to
health, which also includes the right to peace of mind. On this basis,
approximately thirty individuals were awarded damages: those who
had worked in the plant, or who had filed blood analyses with the
Court showing the presence of particular metals in their blood, or who
had reported having changed their life habits as a consequence of the
Chromium Emergency scandal (eg who used to water their home
vegetable garden with water drawn from wells connected to the plant,
and who had to stop and start drinking only mineral water).
One of the findings of the project is that in many leading cases of
corporate violence, the criminal proceeding does not provide
compensation to victims. There are various different reasons for this.
A first obstacle is linked to certain restrictive procedural burdens,
which prevent individual victims claiming for personal damages. Many
victims or potential victims cannot prove they suffered a direct damage
at the time and place where the trial takes place. Where damage is
caused by the normal management of industrial activities, in fact,
crimes charged are often those aiming to protect collective and not
individual interests; the nature of certain crimes of corporate
violence—crimes of danger or crimes with no result—requires only
the evidence of collective damage (eg crimes consisting in the
exposure to pollution or contamination caused by industrial activities).
In these cases, despite the fact that the crime has also caused harm to
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human health, individual victims have no opportunity to participate in
the criminal proceeding by claiming for personal compensation,
because individual harms are not related to the type of crime charged to
the defendants. But even when manslaughter or injuries are charged
and victims can claim for individual damages, the relevant problems in
terms of burden of proof (the causation link between the corporation’s
actions or omissions and individual harms, and personal intention or
negligence), or the lack of scientific evidence, can lead to acquittals
which preclude any form of compensation. Conflicting judgments,
justified by appealing to different scientific theories, are perceived as
unequal treatment by victims who reasonably expect to have the same
compensation as that obtained by other persons in exactly the same
situation.
Due to all these obstacles, and despite the fact that harm or danger
of harm is ascertained, many criminal proceedings end with no
decision or the denegation of any form of compensation for damages
suffered by individual victims. In the Bussi sul Tirino case, as
ascertained by the judgment, surface waters and groundwater in that
area had certainly been polluted since 2002, because of the verified
presence of toxic substances. Public safety—rather than personal
health—was alleged as damaged: therefore, no individual victim could
claim for damages, because they could not be strictly considered a
‘victim’ according to the type of offences charged to the defendants,
being premised on water poisoning rather than on water contamination.
At the time of the proceeding, no personal harm—despite diseases or
pathologies being known to be certainly related to the contamina-
tion—was proved such as to allow a conviction. This circumstance was
due to the lack of evidence of a correlation between the exposure to
toxins and the occurrence of harms to health. At the time of
proceeding, no epidemiological research and no cancer register had
been created, so data on disease occurrence and on the incidence of the
contamination on human health were not available. Only recently, after
the trial, have epidemiological findings on the incidence of the increase
in cancer cases in the contaminated area contaminated become
available. 35 In the Train Accident of Eschede case, no decision on
damages was taken by the courts within the criminal proceeding.
Compensation was not available because the case did not meet the
legal preconditions (intentional crime—prosecution was for negligent
35 For more details on the case, see Giavazzi 2016b.
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injury and negligent killing). In the Holzschutzmittel case, the criminal
proceeding ended without judgment, and no decision on victim
compensation was taken. Before and after the trial, civil suits by
victims participating and not participating in the criminal proceeding
were filed, but have not been successful. The main problem for victims
was, again, to establish a causation link between their illnesses and the
sold product: the connection between damages and the product was not
sufficiently scientifically clear.
Another order of limitations is linked to defendants’ decisions not
to go to trial, entering, for example, into plea agreements or other kind
of settlements with public authorities which do not involve
compensation for victims. In many judicial systems the plea bargain
does not imply a ruling on the claim for damages, and may exclude the
injured party from exercising or continuing the civil action in the
criminal trial in order to obtain damages against the party who had
plea-bargained. Therefore, the victim is forced to take the route of civil
justice. The fact that the decision on compensation cannot be reached
in criminal proceedings due to the contingent circumstance of a plea
bargain appears, at the very least, to be a downsizing of the rights of
the victim and engenders unfair treatment as regards those victims who
may have fully exercised their right to a criminal decision.
Furthermore, a victim who had already lodged a civil action in the
criminal proceeding would have unnecessarily employed time, money,
and energy in the criminal trial, without obtaining any advantage. The
position of the victim is further complicated by the circumstance,
which is entirely probable for trials concerning corporate violence, that
only one or some of the accused may have accepted a plea bargain,
while others may have gone to trial, with the consequence that the
victim would have to act in the criminal court against some and in the
civil court against others.
Finally, the right to obtain a timely decision on compensation for
damages may also be severely limited by criminal court procedures
which simply transfer to the civil court the responsibility to come to a
decision on the exact quantification of the damage. In this case, the
civil party is forced to establish a civil case in court, incurring costs in
terms of times and money which may be difficult to sustain, but which
are at that point unavoidable.
Of course, other judicial or extra-judicial paths (civil justice,
public funds, corporations’ initiatives) could constitute possible and
appropriate alternatives to obtain compensation for damages. The
ability to access civil or administrative justice basically depends on the
legal system to which victims belong. In Italy, access to criminal
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justice seems to be the preferred choice, while in Germany and
Belgium civil lawsuits seem to be an option to which victims
frequently revert, as an additional course of action or as an alternative
to the criminal justice system. The reasons underlying such a
difference in approaches are complex and cannot be investigated here,
but it is a fact that bringing civil lawsuits in separate proceedings (ie
not within the criminal proceeding) appears as an exception in the
Italian cases reviewed, while it is more frequent in Germany and
Belgium. However, victims and professionals reported doubts on the
real effectiveness of this alternative option. Civil justice seems to
suffer from the same or even more of the limitations as criminal
justice: it does not embrace the collective dimension (because class
actions are not yet available), evidence-gathering is not economically
affordable by private persons, and it is more time-consuming.
Empirical research has shown that victims often consider an order in
a civil court as an impossibility, due to the length of the proceedings
and the non viability of costs, mainly related to the almost constant
need, in this type of crime, to collect information that is not available
to a private subject, and to satisfy the burdens of proof through
extremely complex technical investigations and scientific tests to
which only criminal prosecutors could have access. Another
consideration concerns the access to civil justice simultaneously with
or after a criminal outcome. Once examined and then decided upon by
the criminal court, facts should be relevant for a corresponding civil
claim as well. This could be done through rendering binding effect to
the criminal judgment—which is not, for example, provided by
German law. When the two proceedings proceed together, the risks of
final conflicting judgments is considerable. 36
The outcomes of civil proceedings do not seem, indeed, to be
more favourable for victims. In the Holzschutzmittel case, for example,
before and after the trial, civil suits by victims participating and not
participating in the criminal proceeding were filed, but have not been
successful. In the Waste Dump of Mellery case, besides the criminal
law suits, civil law suits were engaged and lasted for many years.
When the criminal suit ended in an acquittal of all the accused persons,
36 For references, see the Italian and German country-specific sections on public
sector justice in the comprehensive report of the project’s empirical findings (Giavazzi,
Mazzucato, and Visconti 2017, s 3.6.4; Engelhart, Hillemanns, and Schenk 2017, s
3.6.4).
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the civil law suits were concluded by a ‘conciliation’. The victims’ side
perceived the conciliation as a ‘bad agreement’.
As already mentioned, when the criminal proceeding does not start
or does not provide for compensation, victims may address their
requests to the State. This is very interesting from the victims’
perspective, as well as in an extra-judiciary context: access to national/
public compensation funds may prevent victims attacking the
corporation from the very beginning, or exonerate corporations from
repairing the consequences of their actions. In some cases, instead of
‘encouraging’ offenders to pay compensation to victims, States play a
subsidiary role in advancing alternative, public compensation. This is,
of course, a desirable result when a convicted offender fails to provide
compensation or the final judgment does not decide on the victims’
requests (see, for example, the public initiatives taken in the
Thalidomide case, Gas Explosion in Ghislenghien case, and the UB
Plasma case, mentioned above). 37 It is a less desirable result, in terms
of substantial justice, when the corporation refuses or uses loopholes
not to compensate and repair.
As public health and safety is always concerned, remediation
activities sometimes need to be negotiated between the corporation and
the public authorities. Even in this case, the ‘bargaining chip’ is the
withdrawal of the public entities’ rights to participate in the criminal
proceeding. In the Tamoil case, for example, the municipality and the
corporation agreed on the remediation procedures which the
corporation should activate; the agreement also included the Ministry
for Economic Development, local administrations, and trade unions.
The existence of the agreement may have influenced the choice of the
municipality to give up its right to take part in the criminal proceeding.
In the Eternit case, the corporation offered the Casale Monferrato
Municipality sixty million Euros to repair the damages. The
municipality declined the offer. The refusal of the offer was also
motivated by the official assurance from the Italian government of
direct economic intervention. As a matter of fact, at the end of the trial,
after the Supreme Court ruling of non-prosecution due to the statute of
limitations, the Italian government provided the Municipality with an
amount of money almost equivalent to the corporation’s offer.
37 Another notable example concerns the Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP case)
where, as the defendants were not able to pay, it may ultimately be up to the French
State to pay the damages awarded by the Criminal Tribunal through specific indemnity
funds.
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5. The Role of Corporations in Avoiding Victimisation
The Victims Directive does not apply to corporations, which,
therefore, do not constitute an immediate target group. 38 But, as far as
the victims of corporate violence are concerned, corporations do form
a highly relevant intermediate target group. In fact, corporations’
attitudes to victims may play a decisive role in reaching the substantive
aims of the Directive: they are involved in respect of preventing
primary and repeated victimisation, cooperating in avoiding secondary
victimisation, and dealing with victims in an appropriate manner when
a criminal proceeding takes place.
Preventing repeated victimisation, for example, depends essen-
tially on the corporate commitment to take action as soon as possible to
terminate, remove, or repair the source of damage. In fact, it is a
common situation in cases of corporate violence that if the source of
damage is not eliminated at the early stage, a single case of harmful
misconduct may turn into widespread behaviour, or a specific
misconduct which at the beginning affected few individuals may
change into something more harmful, affecting many persons or an
entire community.
Secondary victimisation, meanwhile, is strictly linked to the level
of conflict between victims and corporations. A relationship—and also
the conflict inherent in that relationship—between victims and
corporations may obtain ‘at times before’ and ‘in arenas other’ than
the criminal proceedings themselves. But the project findings report
that, once the criminal proceeding begins, the conflict increases. In
fact, accusation and defence strategies—often mediated by lawyers,
prosecutors, and the mass media—normally prevail over any other
considerations and change the perspectives, expectations, and aims of
both parties. The project results reveal, for example, that when the
victim is aware, informed, and assisted, access to criminal justice
becomes a strategy to put pressure on the corporation to obtain
compensation. At the same time, given the lack of any prior dialogue
with the corporation, criminal proceedings are seen as the only option
to obtain a reconstruction of facts and a recognition of responsibilities.
From the corporation’s perspective, instead, the attitude to dialogue
and negotiation seems to depend only on ‘judicial convenience’, in
terms of accessing incentives offered by judicial systems such as a
reduction of sanctions, as well as on the chance to obtain an acquittal.
38 See chapters one and three in this volume.
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Certain exogenous factors contribute to feeding the conflict. In fact, the
relationship between the two parties often exists and persists outside
the trial, both spatially and temporally. Frequently, the corporation’s
activities are still ongoing despite being under investigation, often with
no remediation measures having been put in place; or, frequently,
products suspected of being harmful are still available on the market.
Victims may continue to work or live in the relevant environment,
close to the same sources of risks which caused the damage.
Consumers may indeed need to continue to use products which are
suspected of being harmful.
There are also endogenous factors which amplify the dimension of
conflict, with a significant impact on the corporation’s reputational
dimension and victims’ expectations. Some of these factors are related
to the peculiarities of these types of criminal proceedings—and in
particular to the status of these victims within the criminal
proceeding—which have been underlined in the prior paragraphs. It
is a matter of fact that the conflict with the corporation tends to
increase inevitably until the criminal proceeding is the only possible
path to reconstructing the truth, calling public attention to the case,
preventing future damages, and attaining a decision on the compensa-
tion for damages. But criminal proceedings are bound up with the
victims’ needs and expectations also because any prior dialogue with
the corporation has failed. The project findings highlight that the
corporations’ denegation of any dialogue or negotiation—on one
side—and the victims’ refusal to accept anything from the corpora-
tion—on the other—charge the criminal justice system with a role of
‘mediator of conflicts’, which is not one of its prerogatives.
One of the assumptions of this project is that, due to the specific
characteristics of these crimes, it would be desirable as soon as
possible (once harmful events or products are discovered) to establish a
relationship or a channel for dialogue between the victim and the
corporation (Giavazzi 2017). 39 A proactive dialogue might mitigate
the level of conflict during the trial, and decrease the number of parties
and claims for compensation that need to be adjudicated. But it must be
taken into consideration that when a criminal investigation opens, the
victims and the corporation are no longer the only parties involved, and
many external factors or subjects influence the attitude of both parties
towards cooperation and negotiation. For example, the reconstruction
39 For more details on this topic, see Giavazzi 2017, c III ss 1, 4, 5.
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of facts and liabilities, the identification of victims, and the
determination of consequences and damages caused by the crime,
are the duty of the public prosecutor. The amount and the types of
damages also depend on the type of offence charged. Due to the extent
of the interests in question, and at the same time the limitations of the
issues at stake, the relationship is more complicated and the chances of
opening a dialogue with a positive attitude are lower. It is also
conceivable that, from the victim’s perspective, having to establish a
dialogue with all those individually accused, each with their own
individual position and defence strategy, will be much more complex
than having only the corporation as the sole representative. On the
contrary, from the corporation’s perspective, the proliferation of
interlocutors—lawyers, prosecutors, and the mass media—complicates
the approach and decreases the chance to understand the victims’ needs
and requests as addressed to the corporation. Therefore, in the context
of the criminal proceeding, the dialogue is often forced into a
predetermined framework, dictated by the offences charged, the
judicial mechanisms, and the grounds for accusation and defence.
Victims’ requests are reduced to a claim for compensation for
damages, while the corporations’ actions and behaviours are
influenced by the expectations in terms of a judicial outcome.
Everything comes into the public domain.
Victims and court staff who have shared their experiences for our
empirical research report that corporations usually take action vis-à-vis
the victims almost exclusively after the criminal proceeding has been
initiated, that is, when a trial is forecast against corporate representa-
tives or against the corporation, specifically where this potentially
involves a large number of victims or public institutions bringing a
civil action against the corporation. It may be said that the existence of
a criminal proceeding favours attempts to agree at least monetary
compensation. Rarely, instead, corporations spontaneously take the
initiative to recognise victims, and apologise or remediate the
consequences of crimes. But even where recognition is present, it
arrives too late, when liabilities are no longer under discussion. In the
Eschede train accident Deutsche Bahn took 15 years, and in the
Thalidomide case Grünenthal over five decades, to formally express
their apologies.
The need first to be recognised [was] the most important one, prior to any
material claim or hope, they [the company] did not even concede it [...]
sometimes it would already help a lot if you just acknowledge a mistake
and say we have made a mistake, we are sorry. [Wood protection agent
victim]
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One of the objects which almost always characterises the request
from victims to corporations is, of course, the compensation for
damages, which may be negotiated outside the criminal trial, through
extrajudicial agreements. These agreements undoubtedly imply
significant withdrawals of some of the victims’ rights: in particular,
in exchange for economic compensation, victims withdraw their right
to participate in the criminal proceeding as a party, or withdraw their
lawsuits as a civil party when these have already been brought. But it is
also true that the early settlement of the issue tied to damages may be
the only possible form of compensation, especially should the criminal
trial end with a ruling dismissing the proceeding due to the crime’s
statute of limitations, or in a case of acquittal. When the agreement is
closed in the initial stages of the proceeding, the risk of accepting an
‘unfair deal’ is borne by both the parties. Despite this risk, it should be
in the corporation’s interest to attempt to open negotiations with the
victims at the investigation stage, not only to prevent a future civil
action, but also in terms of protecting its reputation, as well as for
defensive strategy reasons, linked for example to obtaining a plea
bargain or any other bargain in its favour.
From the corporation’s perspective, in fact, the decision to
negotiate compensation and remediation activities may be also based
on the convenience of accessing the incentives offered by the judicial
systems where the criminal investigation or the criminal proceeding
takes place. Many cases confirm that attempts by corporations to close
extrajudicial agreements after the proceeding starts are quite frequent.
Some examples of this kind of negotiation may be taken from the
leading cases (Eternit case, Porto Marghera case, UB Plasma case).
The vast majority of victims did consent to this agreement because of a
series of legal challenges which made speedy compensation rather
unlikely. 40 The data also indicate that when the victim is alone—wi-
thout the intermediation or the support of an association or an
experienced attorney—he/she can hardly take any kind of initiative,
often even failing to identify the representatives inside the corporation
with whom to establish contact. Therefore, initiatives are often an issue
that specifically depend on corporations’ decisions to attempt to
contact victims and negotiate with them.
Victims’ needs to receive appropriate support and protection also
in this context must be considered one of the project’s findings. In fact,
40 For references, see Giavazzi 2016a.
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in the extra-judicial negotiations individual victims are particularly
vulnerable, and not only due to the asymmetry of information
concerning substantially all the data which would support a critical
evaluation of the proposal. Some victims reported that they perceived
the acceptance of a corporation’s offer as a form of dismissal of their
demand for justice, or indeed as a source of shame. Therefore, victims’
decisions concerning entering into negotiations, accepting a proposal,
and understanding the meaning of the withdrawal of their rights, all
require legal and psychological assistance.
In case a relationship never starts, if it fails, or should victims not
accept any form of dialogue, the inclination of the corporation to
indemnify and compensate for damages should be encouraged by the
State. Accordingly, in light of the instruction in art 16, para 2 of the
Victims Directive (‘Member States shall promote measures to
encourage offenders to provide adequate compensation to victims’),
the legislator should introduce effective tools to achieve this goal. 41
However, even within the limits of the discretion of the investigating
authorities and the judges, and of the spaces permitted by the rules in
force (which often do not impose, but do not hinder, such initiatives),
there are many opportunities for law enforcement agencies to act as
competent ‘mediators of the conflict’, favouring on the one hand, and
on the other hand rewarding, forms of compensation and reparation for
the crime’s consequences. 42
Many European judicial systems, however, still contain judicial
mechanisms designed to attain the goal of promoting dialogue between
the victims and the corporation. In fact, it is highly likely that the
company’s willingness to negotiate with the victims and to compensate
for the consequences of the crime will generally be greater where the
corporation itself is investigated or charged (corporate criminal
liability). As is well known, corporate liability has been introduced
in almost all the European jurisdictions, enabling courts to sanction
corporate entities for their criminal acts (Mongillo 2012; De Maglie
2005). In those countries where there is no criminal liability per se,
there is quasi-criminal liability. The advantages of this model are
41 See in this volume the Annex ‘Policy Recommendations for National
Lawmakers and Policymakers’.
42 See the respective national guidelines for enforcement agencies and court staff
for Belgium, Germany, and Italy, resulting from the ‘Victims and Corporations’
project, online at www.victimsandcorporations.eu (available in Dutch, German, and
Italian).
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evident: on one side, the accusation may escape the bottleneck of the
imputation of personal liabilities; on the other side, it may incentivise,
from the investigation phase onwards, reparation and compensation
activities. Promoting compensation is also favoured by those legal
systems which encourage and reward corporations’ remediation
measures (Giavazzi 2017). Many punitive models for legal entities
should have, in fact, the purpose of rewarding not just corporations that
ex ante implement crime prevention systems, but also corporations that
ex post—once investigated—prove their intent to remedy and repair,
both in terms of internal reorganisation as well as compensation for
damages. For the purpose of granting a reduced sentence, some
punitive models also require not only full and effective compensation
for damages, but also the elimination of the crime’s harmful or
dangerous consequences. 43
Where the attempt to negotiate fails, a victim-sensitive approach
and the safeguarding of the reputational dimension both indicate that
the corporation should arrange alternative forms of compensation, such
as collective funds for relevant research, for the health care of the
community involved, or for victims suffering from the pathology in
question. The establishment of public funds or corporations’
spontaneous grants implies, of course, the prior recognition of the
victims’ status. Again, it is often only thanks to criminal proceedings
that unheard voices emerge from the silence and the case becomes one
of public concern. As already underlined, States often play a subsidiary
role in advancing alternative, public compensation, while only in rare
cases do corporations act spontaneously or cooperate in the initiative.
As examples of collaboration, it is possible to mention the Train
Accident of Eschede case, where—without any legal compulsion—the
corporation consented to treat victims as if the company had acted with
guilt and compensated the victims accordingly; the UB Plasma case,
where the public foundation established for victims was also financed
by the pharmaceutical industry; and the Holzschutzmittel case, where
corporations agreed to invest money into a research chair at the
university.
In conclusion, a system where State and corporations do not
recognise the victims’ status, do not enter into dialogue with victims,
nor even attempt to answer to their basic needs, increases the sense of
injustice among victims and their family members. A system where the
43 Restorative justice may also play a role at this regard: see chapter nine in this
volume.
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outcomes of criminal proceedings and decisions on the compensation
for damages are linked to accidental circumstances (such as time,
location, personal commitments, resources, or corporations’ initiatives)
increases the sense that corporations may violate the rules without
consequence.
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CHAPTER VIII
VICTIM SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS
OF CORPORATE CRIME AND CORPORATE VIOLENCE
by Alexandra Schenk
CONTENTS: 1. Victim Support in the European Union and the Directive 2012/
29/EU. – 1.1. The Concepts of Victims of Crime in the Different Legal
Frameworks. – 1.2. Aspects of Victim Support. – 2. Victim Support
Services in the European Union. – 2.1. Structural Differences in the
Member States. – 2.2. International Organisations. – 2.3. Support for
Specific Groups of Victims. – 3. Quality Standards. – 4. Conclusions.
1. Victim Support in the European Union and the Directive 2012/
29/EU
Victims’ rights have been strengthened immensely in recent years
(Kilchling 2010; Kury 2010). After having played a minor role in
criminal proceedings for many years, the legislation, both national and
supranational, has recently acknowledged the importance of partici-
pation for victims in recovering from the consequences of victimisa-
tion. The Directive 2012/29/EU plays a significant role in promoting
victims’ rights on a supranational level. 1
Victim support represents an integral component to enable victims
of crime to benefit from these improvements. Accordingly, the
European Commission declares the right to support (arts 8 and 9) as
‘one of the core rights in the Directive’. 2 To reduce negative
1 The Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection of
victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L
315, 14.11.2012, pp 57–73, European Parliament and Council of the European Union).
2 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementation
of the Directive 2012/29/EU, p 24 (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ criminal/files/victims/
guidance_victims_rights_directive_en.pdf, last accessed on 12 October 2017).
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
consequences for the victims and society, victim support should be
available as soon as possible after the crime and irrespective of a
formal complaint. The Victims Directive further requires victim
support services to operate confidentially and free of charge. As a
minimum, they should offer information and support concerning the
rights of victims, reparation programmes, and criminal proceedings,
including the preparation for participation in court. Often victims are
not aware of their rights and legal options and struggle with feelings of
shame and guilt, especially in cases of corporate violence. 3
Furthermore, the Directive requires provision of information on
specialised support services, emotional and psychological support,
and consultations regarding financial and practical questions. These
minimum standards should be ensured by all EU countries, throughout
their territories. 4 Generally, the Directive considers every victim as an
individual with specific concerns, and asks Member States to provide
support according to their needs (art 8). However, in cases of corporate
violence, the victimisation typically has a collective character, either as
the result of a severe accident or disaster, or due to products (such as
foodstuffs or medication) being consumed by a large quantity of
people. Furthermore, the general status of victims in the legal
framework differs considerably from one Member State to another,
which influences the approach of victim support services, on the one
hand, and sets the basic condition for victims’ legal options, on the
other. Based on data from the project ‘Victims and Corporations:
Implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU for Victims of Corporate
Crimes and Corporate Violence’ this chapter focuses on the situation in
the participating States of Italy, Belgium, and Germany. 5
1.1. The Concepts of Victims of Crime in the Different Legal
Frameworks
As laid out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental
3 Major problems for victims of corporate violence also include considerably
long latencies, the difficulty of establishing a causation link between the actions (or
omissions) of the corporation, and a lack of recognition. Furthermore, the persons
harmed often do not even identify themselves as victims of crime. See also chapter six
in this volume.
4 DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and implementation
of Directive 2012/29/EU, pp 24–27. See also chapters one and two in this volume.
5 For further information on the project, see http://www.victimsandcorporations.eu
(last accessed on 29 October 2017).
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Rights (FRA 2015), Member States, due to their own unique historical
and legal development, manifest three different basic models which
have emerged from their respective national legislations: the victim as
witness (common law approach), a damage-focused approach
exhibited by most of the States (including Belgium and Italy), and
an approach emphasising the rights (violation) of the victim (for
example, Germany). However, these categories are not exclusive and
their practical application may not correspond entirely with the
regulations. In countries where the victim is primarily a source of
testimony, support focuses on the prevention of secondary victimisa-
tion and assistance in coping with the consequences of the harm done,
rather than helping victims participate actively in proceedings. 6 The
second model emphasises the damage that victims have experienced
and enables them to seek compensation within criminal proceedings.
In this way, the role of the victim resembles that of a civil party. In
such systems, supplementary forms of prosecution, alongside or
instead of the public one, are available. For instance, private
prosecution is an option in Belgium. The third approach combines
aspects of the first two and, in addition, stresses the violation of the
rights of the victim. In line with this concept, empowering the victim is
crucial and victims can assume an active part in the criminal
proceeding (FRA 2015).
1.2. Aspects of Victim Support
In addition to the provisions in arts 8 and 9, the Victims Directive
also contains provisions regarding rights which contribute to a broad
concept of victim support, such as access to legal aid, referral to the
relevant institutions, and the prevention of secondary victimisation at
trial. Although each State has an obligation to guarantee these rights,
other actors need to be integrated into the process to ensure an effective
practical implementation. The specialised knowledge and dedication of
non-governmental actors are not only advantageous for the victims, but
they also lighten the load on the State.
The provision of legal aid in Belgium, Germany, and Italy is
shared between the State and victim support services. Legal aid, in
terms of free legal advice, is available to all victims of crime in
Belgium and Italy. In Germany, however, only certain categories of
6 In particular, Cyprus, Ireland, and the UK.
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victims (for example, minors) and financially eligible victims can
receive legal advice free of charge. In all three countries, free legal
representation depends on various criteria such as, for instance, an
economic means test. In cases of corporate violence, the victims often
face economic hardship; however, the income threshold for receiving
legal aid is extremely low, so few people qualify for benefit. 7 Similar
preconditions apply to receiving a pro bono lawyer. Moreover, the
remuneration paid to the lawyer does not cover the in-depth
consultation which most cases of corporate violence require (FRA
2015).
To prevent secondary victimisation at trial, EU Member States
supply a range of rights to victims. The right to be questioned in a
respectful and protected manner is guaranteed in Belgium, Germany,
and Italy, as in the majority of other Member States. However, separate
waiting areas for victims in court and the right to be accompanied by a
support person are not as widespread and, of the three countries under
discussion, only assured in Belgium and Germany but not in Italy
(FRA 2015).
As discussed in the previous section, the role of the victim in
criminal proceedings is built upon different legal frameworks and,
therefore, this influences the range of rights guaranteed to victims.
2. Victim Support Services in the European Union
As stated above, the Victims Directive requires Member States to
provide victims with support ‘in accordance to their needs’ (art 8)
before, during, and after the criminal proceeding. To receive access to
victim support, the filing of a formal complaint should not be
mandatory. Furthermore, these services have to be confidential and
free of charge. Because of the broad definition of the term ‘victim’
underlying the Directive, family members are also included in this
provision. 8 States shall facilitate the referral to victim support services
7 For instance, the net income in Italy has to be below €10,766 per year; in
criminal cases the limit increases by €1,033 for each family member living with the
applicant. Regardless of income, legal aid is always granted, eg in cases of sexual
violence or sexual acts with minors. See ‘Improving Protection of Victims’ Rights:
Access to Legal Aid. Research Paper on the Present Legal Framework and Best
Practices’, p 54 (http://victimsrights.eu/general-report, last accessed on 31 October
2017).
8 At the same time, European Member States have the possibility to limit the
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by the competent authority and foster the establishment of comple-
mentary specialised services. At the same time, the organisational
structure of the services has not been determined, allowing it to be
public or non-governmental in nature, and function on a professional
or voluntary basis (art 8). In this way, the European Union takes into
account the many diverse conditions of its Member States.
Amongst the minimum standards, art 9(1) of the Directive requires
that victim services present information about the victim’s rights, the
options for reparation, the victim’s role in the criminal proceeding, and
assist victims with their preparation for and participation in the trial.
Furthermore, its provisions stipulate that services offer information
about specialised assistance available, provide emotional and psycho-
logical support, and counsel on financial and practical issues. Victim
support services are also required to focus especially on the needs of
victims suffering from the severe consequences of crime (art 9(2)),
which can apply to many victims of corporate violence.
2.1. Structural Differences in Member States
Taking into consideration the diverse historical, legal, and political
development of different Member States, models of generic victim
support services vary substantially. With regard to the main sources of
funding, governmental responsibility, regionalisation, and reliance on
voluntary workers, Italy, Belgium, and Germany demonstrate very
different approaches.
Whereas Italy does not offer any generic victim support service
(Giavazzi, Mazzucato, and Visconti 2017: 43), and therefore fails to
implement art 8 of the Directive in this respect, Belgium provides
victim support almost exclusively as a State-led service. In contrast,
the principal operator in Germany is a non-governmental organisation
that does not extensively rely on State funding (FRA 2015).
The absence of an institutionalised network of victim support
services in Italy puts victims in general, and victims of corporate
violence in particular, at a high risk for repeat and secondary
victimisation. 9 Furthermore, this situation challenges the criminal
number of dependants who benefit from the rights foreseen by the Directive (recital
19).
9 Except local offices for minors in cases of (sexual) abuse, and public or private
contact points for persons—mainly women—affected by domestic violence, stalking,
etc. For the picture of status quo of victim support service in Italy, see among the
‘Victims and Corporations’ project outputs Mazzucato 2017: 62 ff).
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justice system by demanding (social) services for the protection of
victims which cannot be sufficiently provided (Giavazzi, Mazzucato,
and Visconti 2017; Visconti 2017). Consequently, victims attempt to
fill this gap by setting up their own victims’ associations, as in the case
of the Association of Families of Victims of the Mafia. Founded by
relatives of mafia victims, the association functions to establish equal
treatment for all victims without labelling and stigmatising them.
While such organisations can help with recognition and information, a
lack of funding and professional support structures limits their scope of
action significantly. On a regional level, Emilia Romagna established a
foundation for victims of crime, 10 allowing several cities and
municipalities of the region to participate in the provision of immediate
support to victims who face the consequences of serious crimes. As the
first foundation of its kind, the organisation offers financial support
and information ‘without incurring the administrative constraints of the
government’. 11
In Belgium, no new legislation has been adopted in order to
implement the Victims Directive. However, some regulations have
been altered and victim support has been expanded. As the first
contact point, the police provide victims with initial assistance and
information. In especially challenging cases, they can also rely on
the in-house victim assistance unit. On a federal level, the courts
include victim reception units which are specialists in dealing with
victim-related requests. For instance, they accompany affected
persons to trial or offer consultation on the proceeding (Lauwaert
2017).
Apart from assistance within the criminal justice system, victims
in Belgium have access to a number of generic support services: in
Flanders and Brussels there are 11 general welfare centres (Centra
Algemeen Welzijnswerk) each containing a division to assist victims
of crime. They offer psychological, practical, and legal support for
victims and their families. In the German-speaking part of the country,
a non-governmental organisation provides assistance to all victims of
crime. The social-psychological centre (Sozial-Psychologisches Zen-
trum) employs a multidisciplinary team of psychologists, therapists,
10 See http://www.fondazionevittimereati.it (last accessed on 13 October 2017).
11 Help and Support for Victims of Crime (Italy), European Union e-Justice
website, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_rights_of_victims_of_crime_in_criminal_-
proceedings-171-IT-maximizeMS-de.do?clang=en&idSubpage=4&member=1 (last
accessed on 30 October 2017).
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and social workers applying an individual approach. 12 Victim support
services (Service d’Aide aux Victimes—Slachtofferhulp) that provide
assistance to victims of crime are also established on the regional level,
as well as on the community level, in Flanders and Wallonia (FRA
2015).
In 1994, a national forum for victim support policy was
established to connect the relevant State actors, as well as non-
governmental organisations, involved in assisting victims of crime.
Unfortunately, the productive initial collaboration has recently been
declining as a result of poor funding (Lauwaert 2017). Additionally,
specialised support exists for certain categories of victims, such as
victims of child abuse, human trafficking, partner violence, family
members of missing persons, and for victims of road traffic accidents
(see section 2.3, below).
Germany explicitly implemented parts of the Victims Directive
through the adoption of the Third Victims’ Rights Reform Act on 21
December 2015. 13 The bill’s entry into force took place 10 days later
on 31 December, with the exception of the provisions on the so-called
psychosocial support, which, in turn, came into force on 1 January
2017. Improvements were made in regards to such areas as:
participation in criminal proceedings, means to get in contact with
victim support services, information concerning rights in criminal
proceedings, and notification about steps undertaken in criminal
proceedings, amongst others. 14 In contrast to the mentioned
amendments of existing sections of the criminal procedural code, the
law on psychosocial assistance was newly introduced and goes well
beyond the requirements of the Directive. 15 In some German States the
possibility to obtain psychosocial support for certain groups was
already in practice. This possibility manifests through specialised non-
legal assistance before, during, and after the main hearing for
12 Help and Support for Victims of Crime (Belgium), European Union e-Justice
website, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_rights_of_victims_of_crime_in_criminal_-
proceedings-171-BE-maximizeMS-en.do?clang=en&idSubpage=4&member=1 (last
accessed on 30 October 2017).
13 Gesetz zur Stärkung der Opferrechte im Strafverfahren (3. Opferrechtsre-
formgesetz), Act of 21.12.2015, Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl.),
part. I of 30.12.2015, pp 2525–2530.
14 For an overview, see Engelhart 2016.
15 Gesetz über die psychosoziale Prozessbegleitung im Strafverfahren, Act of
21.12.2015, Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl.), part. I of 30.12.2015,
pp 2525, 2529.
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especially vulnerable victims. Furthermore, victims are provided with
information and qualified support during the entire criminal procee-
ding with the objective of reducing strain and preventing secondary
victimisation. At the same time, psychosocial support, as provided by
the recently enacted law, bases itself on the principle of neutrality
towards criminal proceedings, and excludes the element of consulta-
tion. Legal advice and clarification of facts are not seen to be a part of
the responsibility of psychosocial support. Such assistance must not
interfere with the witness or the testimony. Even though the support in
general is accessible for all victims, its assignment by the court is only
carried out upon request, for instance, in cases of sexual abuse or
human trafficking. This assignment is free for the victim and,
furthermore, obligatory in cases connected to minors. Once again,
especially vulnerable victims appear to be synonymous with the
‘traditional’ victim categories. Victims of sexual violence, for instance,
can frequently rely on more comprehensive support instruments (see
section 2.3, below).
The main organisation providing generic victim support in
Germany is the ‘Weisser Ring’, working with about 100 staff members
and more than 3,000 volunteers in 420 local contact centres. Founded
in 1976 as a non-profit association to help victims of crime, today the
Weisser Ring has approximately 50,000 members and, moreover, is the
only German victim support group operating nationwide. Its funding is
made up of membership fees, donations, fines, and testamentary
bequests. In this regard, it is worth noting that, in contrast, State
subsidies are not utilised as a source of financing. The organisation
offers telephone and online counselling, accompanies victims to court,
facilitates access to legal, medical, and psychological consultation, and
provides financial support. Furthermore, its members are committed to
lobbying for victims’ interests and see themselves as guiding figures
who help victims interact with competent authorities. 16
Apart from the Weisser Ring, professional victim support services
(Opferhilfe e.V.) are found in six federal States and are supplemented
by volunteer structures in other parts of Germany. 17 Many of those
centres participate in the Working Group of Victim Support in
Germany (Arbeitskreis der Opferhilfen ado), a non-governmental
16 https://weisser-ring.de/weisser-ring/der-verein (last accessed on 29 October
2017).
17 For the development of the professional victim support service in Germany,
see Hanauer Hilfe 2009.
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umbrella organisation that coordinates networking and information
exchange between the different bodies (FRA 2015).
2.2. International Organisations
On the European level, there are several umbrella organisations
operating to promote and coordinate generic or specialised victim
support. 18 Victim Support Europe, one major representative, is an
international umbrella organisation connecting 41 non-governmental
victim support services from 26 different European countries. 19 To
fulfil membership requirements, support services have to provide a
range of general services free of charge, operate on a State or national
level, and should not campaign regarding the sentencing of offenders.
The organisation is policy-oriented and is consulted on victim-related
topics by various structures, inter alia by the European Commission. 20
Considering related initiatives, the World Society of Victimology and
the European Forum for Restorative Justice contribute to the field of
generic victim support via advancing further research and practices
(FRA 2015).
Regarding the interests of specific groups of victims, there are
various international organisations, such as Women Against Violence
Europe (WAVE) covering 46 European countries, and the International
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC), with a
worldwide coverage including four EU Member States. La Strada
International focuses on victims of human trafficking in nine European
countries, four of them part of the EU. Further associations exist on a
European level concentrating on the combat of racism (European
Network Against Racism, ENAR), victims of road traffic accidents
(European Federation of Road Traffic Victims, FERV), and victims of
terrorism (Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism, NAVT)
(FRA 2015).
18 See FRA (2015) for a more detailed listing, including also organisations
operating worldwide.
19 The Steunpunt Algemeen Welzijnswerk in Belgium, and the Arbeitskreis der
Opferhilfen and the Weisser Ring in Germany, all hold full membership. Since Italy
does not have a generic victim support service, the following organisations are only
associated: Associazione Aleteia Associazione LIBRA Onlus, Associazione Rete
Dafne ONLUS, I-CARE – Associazione Italiana di Supporto Vittimologico. See
https://victimsupport.eu/find-an-organisation (last accessed on 30 October 2017).
20 See, eg, DG Justice Guidance Document related to the transposition and
implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU, p 26.
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2.3. Support for Specific Groups of Victims
In line with the Victims Directive, particularly vulnerable victims
are usually considered to be part of certain categories: ‘In this regard,
victims of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, gender-based
violence, violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation
or hate crime, and victims with disabilities shall be duly considered’
(art 22(3)). To a large extent, this is due to the fact that such categories,
as well as child victims, tend to experience a high rate of secondary
and repeat victimisation, of intimidation, and of retaliation, as pointed
out in recital 57 of the Directive.
Likewise, many support services grew up around the time of the
women’s movement in the 1970s (Leuschner and Schwanengel 2015). In
Italy, for instance, the National Association of Centres against Violence
connects independent anti-violence centres and shelters in order to evoke
cultural change in Italy regarding male violence against women. Another
example is the Doppia Difesa Foundation, a non-profit foundation
established in 2005, which provides legal assistance, psychological
support, and protection to victims of discrimination, violence, and abuse.
Moreover, the foundation attempts to raise public awareness concerning
such issues. In the German-speaking part of Belgium, minors who are
victims of crime, and their parents, can receive support in cases of child
abuse from Jugendhilfedienst. Furthermore, in the French-speaking
region, in the Flemish province, and around Brussels, the Federation of
SOS Children’s Service and the Child Trust Centres provide specialised
assistance for victimised children and their relatives. In Germany, the
Working Group of Victim Support connects victim support offices in 10
federal States, providing assistance for victims and witnesses in general,
as well as for particular categories of victims of right extremist violence,
anti-homosexual violence, and for minors. 21
3. Quality Standards
Whereas the various aspects of victim support are clarified in arts
8 and 9 of the Victims Directive, the instrument does not contain
detailed provisions regarding quality standards. To a certain extent, it
limits itself to the wording of recital 63, stating: ‘it is essential that
reliable support services are available to victims and that competent
21 https://www.opferhilfen.de/verein (last accessed 30 October 2017).
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authorities are prepared to respond to victims’ reports in a respectful,
sensitive, professional and non-discriminatory manner’. Exploring
indicators and performance standards in Europe, the FRA (2015) found
that less than half of generic victim support services in the Member
States work with such indicators.
Although some Member States have begun to establish certain
quality standards, for instance, Belgium and Germany, even there they
do not address all aspects of the services and, furthermore, are lacking
a common approach. In Belgium, victim support services have to be
approved by the government in order to be recognised and receive
funding. Quality requirements concern, inter alia, specific criteria for
staff training. The Working Group of Victim Support in Germany has
developed standards for professional support including good practices
and key principles. In order to ensure and provide victim support
services complying with the requirements of the Directive throughout
the European Union, a more comprehensive regulation of this feature
of victim support is necessary.
In order for the amendments to be drafted, a large body of research
needs to be carried out. A starting point can be the analysis of data
collected in accordance with art 28 that stipulates that Member States
report on how victims have accessed the rights stated in the Directive
on a regular basis.
4. Conclusions
During the past few years, numerous Member States have increased
their efforts regarding victim support in order to comply with the
Victims Directive. 22 Nonetheless, certain shortcomings still need to be
addressed and further improvements should be aimed at a comprehen-
sive support network for all victims of crime throughout the Union.
Victim support plays a crucial role in facilitating access to justice
and promoting recovery. Accordingly, the absence of generic victim
support services in Italy and other European States 23 constitutes one of
22 Belgium, Italy, and Germany have all stressed—irrespective of the adoption of
new legislation required to implement the Directive—that their existing legal
framework already contains an elaborated orientation towards victims of crime, and
offers them an active role in criminal proceedings (Engelhart 2016; Lauwaert 2016;
Mancuso 2016).
23 In particular, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and
Slovenia (FRA 2015).
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the main obstacles for victims to fully enjoy their rights. As already
stated, in cases of corporate crime and corporate violence, victims
frequently suffer from a lack of recognition, and insufficient
knowledge and information, while dealing with a wide array of severe
physical, psychological, and financial consequences. This is illustrated,
to some extent, by the statement of a medical doctor who expressed the
need for support for victims in the case of a noxious wood protection
agent: ‘Therefore with these negative impacts only someone from the
outside could have helped, but by their own efforts they were not able
to do more.’ 24
In particular, victims of corporate violence, who are not
considered to be part of any especially vulnerable group, suffer from
the absence of a generic support network. The focus on specific
categories of victims, like persons affected by sexual violence, human
trafficking, or child abuse, can therefore cause unintentional side
effects. Without a doubt, such victims are particularly vulnerable in
some respects and, consequently, need special assistance to succes-
sfully cope with their experiences; one of the reasons for their
vulnerability arises from the fact that they typically exhibit a strong
dependency on their perpetrators, in an emotional, financial, physical,
or other manner. Victims of corporate violence share this feature, thus
also finding themselves in an especially vulnerable position.
Commonly, the relationship between the corporation and the victim
is characterised by an enormous imbalance of information and power
(Victims and Corporations 2017). Moreover, the victim may depend on
the company’s product, for example in pharmaceutical cases, may be
employed by the organisation, or may live in an area which has been
polluted. Defining the structured reliance on the perpetrator as a
characteristic of elevated vulnerability, victims of corporate crimes
deserve to be recognised amongst the categories of victims in
especially vulnerable positions. Experts criticise the unequal treatment
of victims, which can result in disadvantages for less visible groups
such as, for instance, migrants (FRA 2015). Even within the group of
victims of corporate violence, the treatment they experience differs
considerably. In cases of sudden and visible events, such as disasters,
victims receive a high level of public attention and consideration by
institutions. This immediate recognition and the comprehensive
approaches to support such victims is driven by the impression that
24 Interview, 14 September 2016, Germany, translation by the author (Engelhart,
Hillemanns, and Schenk 2017: 82).
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society is affected as a whole. However, victims in less obvious cases
are unable to count on these mechanisms, even though the personal
consequences might be equally harmful. Taking into account the
enormous resources companies have in contrast to their victims,
empowering and comprehensive victim support is crucial to improve
the situation of the latter. The extent of public attention should thereby
not be the decisive factor (Victims and Corporations 2017).
Furthermore, even the existing structures frequently suffer from
poor funding, which in turn affects the quality of services. As a result,
professional staff are lacking with experience and training varying
widely. Moreover, only a few organisations work with quality
standards and performance indicators (FRA 2015). This is highly
detrimental since, apart from the negative consequences for the victims
themselves, victim support promotes trust in the criminal justice
system and can elevate the report rate of crimes. If, instead, victims do
not have access to victim support, or are not treated in a respectful
manner, crimes may not be reported and trust in the justice system may
decline (FRA 2015). Therefore, a well-functioning network of support
institutions has also positive consequences for society as a whole. In
such a network, non-governmental organisations can play a significant
role assisting victims of crime when State initiatives are lacking.
Likewise, voluntary work, in addition to professional services, can
improve the capacity of victim support in general. International
umbrella organisations promote victims’ rights on a higher level and
assist in creating mutual benefit for the participating organisations. At
the same time, the application of shared quality standards, going
beyond the provisions of the Directive, should be duly considered. On
the one hand, the variety of models and structures involved in victim
support might be seen as an advantage in responding to victims on an
individual level. On the other, the hesitant use of quality and
performance indicators could be considered alarming. Further research
is needed to review how victims make use of their rights as guaranteed
by the Directive, and to develop comprehensive quality standards for
victim support services.
Another important point to consider is the potential negative
outcomes of strengthening victims’ rights. Some legal professionals
are concerned that the rights of the accused may be adversely affected,
or that proceedings may become prolonged and more complex.
Besides, the support given during the criminal proceeding can have
counterproductive repercussions: even if it helps the victim, the
presence of an assisting person can weaken the position of the victim
in court. The recent elevation of victims’ rights may also hold ‘the risk
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of leading to “victim fatigue” on the part of the officials responsible for
the operation of the criminal justice system’ (Groenhuijsen 2014: 31).
Thus, the objective of a balance between the needs of victims of
crimes, the rights of the accused, and the requirements of efficient
criminal procedure, should be pursued. In cases of corporate violence,
the imbalance of power between the victim and the accused makes
equal treatment of the participants even more relevant.
The support of victims of corporate violence involves yet another
dilemma: even though it seems that victims can rely on a diverse and
well elaborated victim support network, there are no specialised victim
support services for those cases to date, excluding the associations
established on victims’ own initiatives. 25 The lack of public awareness
of their situation, the difficulties which the criminal justice system has
with the respective cases, 26 and their own struggles with often long-
term health conditions further impede adequate support and leave
victims of corporate violence almost invisible. Identifying such victims
as a highly vulnerable group could help improve their situation. At the
same time, focusing on specific categories in principle, be it victims of
corporate violence or others, tends to limit the circle of recipients of
assistance, which is in opposition to the Directive’s intention to employ
a comprehensive approach on an individual basis. Nonetheless, this
volume represents a first step towards raising the particularities of
cases of corporate violence and the consequences for such victims as
regards support services, the judiciary, politics, and the public. To be
recognised as a victim of crime, notably by victim support services,
would already present a significant improvement for most of the
victims of corporate violence.
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CHAPTER IX
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
FOR VICTIMS OF CORPORATE VIOLENCE
by Ivo Aertsen
CONTENTS: 1. Dealing with Corporate Violence: Problem Statement. – 1.1.
About Corporate Violence. – 1.2. Corporate Violence Victimisation. -
1.3. Responding to Corporate Violence. – 2. Restorative Justice:
Potential, Conditions and Challenges. – 3. Applicability of Restorative
Justice to Cases of Corporate Violence. – 3.1. The Victim Dimension. –
3.2. The Offender Dimension. – 3.3. The Community Dimension. – 3.4.
Participation. – 3.5. Restoration. – 4. Conclusions.
In Brussels and Turin, no feelings of revenge appeared ... In the past,
felons have hung for less! I have to take care for not revolting all the
time, that would be empty and in vain. In the turmoil of life it is better to
take a moment to reflect on what is essential. I read somewhere about
forgiveness. It is a noble idea I would like to cherish. Yet it is still too
early to consider it. When I think of all dramas caused - now and in the
future - by asbestos barons and their industry, it is not even certain that I
once will be able to forgive. Still, forgiveness alleviates resentment and
enables peace and quiet. [Eric Jonckheere (2017: 156), having lost his
father, mother and two brothers through asbestosis, commenting on the
criminal trials in Brussels and Turin (translation IA)]
1. Dealing with Corporate Violence: Problem Statement
1.1. About Corporate Violence
For the purpose of this publication within the context of the EU
co-funded research project ‘Victims and Corporations’ 1 we consider
1 Victims and Corporations. Implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU for
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‘corporate violence’ taking place ‘when corporations in the course of
their legitimate activities commit criminal offences which result in
harms to natural person’s health, integrity or life’. 2 Hence, ‘corporate
violence’ is a form of ‘corporate crime’ and can be situated in a
broader conceptual framework of ‘white-collar crime’. The crimino-
logical concept of ‘white-collar crime’, as initially defined by
Sutherland (1940), can be split up into ‘occupational crime’ on the
one hand, and ‘corporate crime’ on the other: while the first one refers
to transgressions committed by individuals or small groups in relation
with their professional activities, the second deals with corporations
(and public and non-profit organisations) or their employees
committing offences in line with the objectives of the organisation
(Clinard 2007). 3 As a next useful distinction, ‘corporate crime’ can,
according to its type of activities, first relate to abuse of power, fraud
or economic exploitation (oriented to a variety of possible targets
including citizens, consumers, competitors and creditors) and, second,
to ‘corporative violence’ (Friedrichs 2007). Target groups of
‘corporative violence’ can consist of the public, consumers and
employees, and has been defined in literature as ‘any non-accidental
behaviours committed for organizational gain within a non-criminal
purpose organization that participates in, condones, or demonstrates
wilful ignorance of a governmentally punishable act within that
organization that risks physical harm to human beings’ (Green and
Shou 2015: 59).
As referred to in the literature (Clarke 1990; Croall 1992) and
largely demonstrated within the ‘Victims and Corporations’ project on
the basis of research in Belgium, Germany and Italy, corporate crime
has, in comparison with other types of crime, a number of specific
characteristics that to a large extent makes effective responses more
complicated. These include: low visibility of the crime and the harm,
victims of corporate crimes and corporate violence, co-funded by the conjunt
programme “Rights, Equality and Citizenship” and “Justice” of the European Union
(Agreement number - JUST/2014/JACC/AG/VICT/7417) (project website www.vic-
timsandcorporations.eu).
2 See chapter six in this volume.
3 Another useful definition of corporate crime is this one: ‘Corporate crimes are
actions by corporate persons that create avoidable harms to persons or property that
involve a violation of private or public trust. These corporate actions are intended to
provide financial advantage to the corporate person (i.e., the chartered organization
and its management hierarchy) or maintain or extend its power and privilege. By this
definition such actions are rational, harmful, and not limited to violations of
established law.’ (Russell and Gilbert 1999: 61)
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high degree of complexity of the offence, unclear distribution of
responsibilities and diversity of types of victimisation.
The type of cases of corporate violence dealt with in the ‘Victims
and Corporations’ project mainly concerned environmental crime, food
safety violations and offences in the pharmaceutical industry.
1.2. Corporate Violence Victimisation
Victimological research has convincingly pointed to the contin-
gent nature of victims’ identities and attributes (Fattah 1994; Sebba
2000; Dignan 2005). With the emergence and the growth of the victims
movement since the 1960s, a stereotypical image of ‘the ideal victim’
has come to the fore (Christie 1986). This is the image of the individual
victim affected by conventional crime: predatory offences against
persons, including property, physical violence and sexual abuse crimes.
They are the types of offences that are most easily recognised not only
by the victims themselves, but also by the police, legal professionals,
victim support workers and restorative justice service providers. In
responses to victimisation, there is an ‘over-emphasis on such types of
criminal behaviour where there is an easily identified individual
victim’ (Anttila 1974).
The empirical reality greatly differs from this ideal-typical picture,
with many types of victimisation largely under-reported and thus
remaining under the radar, the phenomenon of blurring and
overlapping categories of victims and offenders, and large concen-
trations of victims in particular populations. Which groups of harmed
persons are recognised as victims and receive a victim status depends
on social processes of identification and definition, not seldom
determined by vested cultural, political or economic interests (Green
2007; Strobl 2010). Therefore, manifestations of wrongdoing in many
instances may not be unambiguously recognised by the public as
‘criminal’, and also not by the criminal justice system. Moreover,
victims, for example of corporate fraud, are not always aware that they
have been victimised, or they may find it hard to admit that they have
been cheated (Dignan 2005: 21).
More recently however, both research and practice reveal a
growing attention to previously ‘hidden’ forms of victimisation and to
neglected and emergent experiences (Spalek 2006). New themes
include victims of fraud, money laundering, internet/cyber crime,
environmental crime, conflict and post-conflict crime and sex
trafficking (Goodey 2005: 218-224). But these fields remain difficult
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to study as far as it concerns the impact on victims. These crimes often
evoke an abstract victim. Even when we are confronted with cases of
individual suffering and countries deploying a growing criminalisation
and penalisation of these types of crime, the final meaning and impact
on people, institutions and society at large is not known sufficiently
and therefore also not responded to adequately. For example,
understanding and responding to environmental crime requires a
restoration of the ‘loss of social thinking’ and a re-conceptualisation of
ideas of social responsibility to each other and to the environment
(Goodey 2005: 222).
Victims’ experiences are often looked at through the separate
effects the crime has on the victim: financial/economic consequences,
physical injuries, psychological harm and social/relational/professional
consequences. However, the overall consequences cannot be adequa-
tely understood if we do not place the victimisation experience in its
dynamic context. Therefore, we must also look at the impact of a crime
as distinguished from its effects: the impact refers to the product of the
perceived seriousness or intensity of the effects and their duration from
the victim’s own perspective (Dignan 2005: 23-25). Significance and
subjective meaning are decisive. In the aftermath of the crime,
meaning making will then be an important element of the recovery
process, in which the experience and recognition of wrongfulness
become key in the person’s perception of justice (Pemberton and
Vanfraechem 2015).
In this approach, typical features of victimisation appear in the
case of corporate violence, as also observed in the ‘Victim and
Corporations’ project (Visconti 2017). These specific characteristics
relate to: (1) the severity and pervasive impact of the harm, (2) the
collective nature and dimension of the victimisation, (3) the
complexity of corporate victimisation and vulnerability of victims,
(4) the deceitful nature of corporate violence, and (5) the persistence of
time of corporate violence. As for other types of victimisation, the
harm caused by corporate violence is diverse and impacts different
areas of life. The complexity of the consequences becomes clear when
listening to personal life stories. Harm caused by corporate violence
often takes years to manifest. Physical harm (death, disability and
disease) can be an immediate effect of the event, but in many cases
there are long term consequences, of which the causal relationship with
the transgressions might remain unclear. Financial or economic harm
often results indirectly, through permanent or temporary disability of
the victim, from costs of medical care and revalidation, and loss of
income. Psychological harm can result from uncertainty of the
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
238 CHAPTER IX
consequences, lack of clarity and transparency with regard to
responsibilities and accountability, and the prolonged absence of
financial compensation. Social consequences are experienced with
respect to implications on the victim’s employment, changed
relationships and social stigmatisation or isolation.
Victims’ needs in cases of corporate violence are often intertwined
and reflect the need for recognition, protection, information and
support (Victims and Corporations 2017). 4 Public recognition of the
wrongful behaviour is a central need of victims. The need for
protection varies from protection against retaliation and intimidation at
the individual level (fear of dismissal by the corporation) to protection
from threats of relocating the company resulting in loss of collective
employment. Additionally, preventive protection by public institutions
and protection against repeat victimisation must be provided. With
respect to the latter, continuous exposure to harmful effects has been
reported in the project’s findings, for example in the cases of asbestos
or Thalidomide, where harmful products were still distributed many
years after the effects were known by the companies. 5 Indifference and
inactivity by public institutions has been reported as a form of
secondary victimisation. The need for adequate information relates to
the status of the personal health situation and prognosis, but also to
matters about accountability and understanding of the background and
reasons of the incident(s), the legal and procedural options, and
available mechanisms of financial compensation. Support is needed to
address the medical harm, as well as the social, psychological, legal
and economic consequences of the crime. The role of the media is
important, and can range from negative and sensational to supportive
in terms of public recognition and action. Most importantly, if there is
one need in common, it is that ‘all victims want to talk to the
corporation’.
1.3. Responding to Corporate Violence
How does society respond to corporate violence, taking into
account the specific nature of the effects, impact and meaning of this
type of offence to the life-world of victims, their families and their
communities? So far, in international literature much attention is given
4 See also chapters one and six in this volume.
5 See chapter seven in this volume.
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to legal responses and their challenges: ‘If the criminal justice system
has a general problem with addressing victims’ needs, this problem is
intensified and multiplied when it comes to white-collar crime’
(Gabbay 2007: 432). Awareness of the massive impact of white-collar
crime, and of corporate crime in particular, has increased significantly
in the USA since the wave of corporate scandals beginning with the
Enron case in 2001. Corporate executive misconduct led not only to
bankruptcy of big corporations, but also to billions of harm to
creditors, to the State, to infrastructure and to families. The many
large-scale corporate crimes also took an enormous toll on the criminal
justice system, often perceived by the public as not being able to treat
victims adequately, to reduce this type of crime and to fulfil public
expectations of fairness and justice (Gabbay 2007). Even without clear
indications of a real increase of corporate crime during last decades,
US governmental policies changed dramatically after 2001, resulting in
a substantial increase in indictments of high-level corporate executives,
who were then given long prison sentences by (mainly) federal courts.
Prior to 2001, many white-collar offences were not addressed at all, or
were dealt with by civil and administrative law. If offenders were
charged and convicted by criminal law, their sentences were often
fines, probation or community service. However, it is generally
recognised that in the post-Watergate era, punitive attitudes to white-
collar crime have increased, with research showing ‘a serious
confidence gap’ between public demand for justice and the system’s
‘ability or willingness to administer adequate punishment’ (Gabbay
2007: 433-437). Because of the complexity of collecting evidence in
such criminal investigations, the system relies heavily on inside
information and testimonies (against colleagues) which are obtained
thanks to ‘whistleblowing’ or through plea bargaining. This in turn
results, from the victims’ perspective, in disparities in outcome and
injustice. Even though US federal criminal law encourages financial
compensation, many victims will never receive restitution in reality,
while civil law procedures in such cases put a large and long-lasting
burden on the victims. Furthermore, long prison sentences or other
forms of incapacitation will often negatively affect the capacity of
corporate offenders to make amends to society or to their victims.
Also Chiste (2008) wonders why—in (some) common law
jurisdictions—white-collar crime, in contrast to conventional crime,
is often discussed within a strong retributive rhetoric. Additionally, the
focus is on the behaviour of individuals within organisations, leaving
out other, non-individual responsible actors. An inverse shift occurred
in European countries around the turn of the century, from a purely
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punitive approach to one of prevention and direct or indirect structural
intervention (Heine 1999 as cited by Löschnig-Gspandl 2003: 151).
Corporate punishment might then entail fines or other monetary
sanctions, restrictions on business activities or exclusion from
advantages, as well as various orders and conditions including
corporate probation focusing, for example, on a mandatory re-
organisation of the enterprise. Therefore, sanctions on corporations
can have a reactive, preventive or proactive character. However, in
European countries restorative elements can hardly be identified in
criminal sanctions (Löschnig-Gspandl 2003). A major problem might
be that in the majority of the cases the victims of corporate crime are
either an anonymous group of people that cannot precisely be defined,
or even the general public. Damages in terms of financial costs cannot
easily be quantified, although this does not exclude symbolic
restitution.
Business ethics reveal different approaches in dealing with crime:
from an individualistic standpoint, orienting accusation to an
individual CEO, to a more communitarian approach, where the moral
community’s responsibilities are addressed. In cases of corporate harm,
the role of different managerial styles and organisational climates has
been stressed as well. Sullivan and Tifft (2010: 136-140) report various
examples of ‘managerial violence’ in the US from the 1970s onwards
in which a company’s officials knowingly withhold information about
serious threats for the health and even life of employees, thereby
causing preventable and avoidable harm. One of the cases studied was
an asbestos manufacturing plant in which workers had contracted
asbestosis.
White-collar offenders in criminal investigations of this nature
often deny responsibility, and an admission of ‘guilt’ is reached largely
in a forced way using a plea bargaining procedure. Crimes are
therefore ‘objectivated’ and abstracted from the social context in which
they took place (Cooley 2002, cited by Chiste 2008: 96); though the
social costs (the ‘externalities’) may be the most damaging, they are
also unlikely to be addressed by criminal justice processes. Criminal
law and other public responses ‘are often substantively unrelated to the
nature of the social harm and non-responsive to the nature of the larger
structural and cultural contexts within which the decision to harm
others was made’ (Sullivan and Tifft 2010: 146). Where research has
indicated that the attitudes of white-collar criminals tend towards
irresponsibility, undependability, disregard for social rules and norms
and a segregation of their private and professional environment in
terms of social empathy and commitment, these personal traits are not
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challenged by a retributive criminal justice approach. In a milieu of
social distrust and resentment, a criminal law process does not offer
victims of white-collar crimes tools to better understand what
happened within the corporation, including the personal role of a
CEO. 6 All of these elements make clear that a broader approach than
an individualising or interpersonal one must be developed and that
responses must be offered in a more inclusive way in order to cope
with this type of crime adequately. Civil or administrative law alone is
not sufficient to recognise the wrongfulness of the harm or to achieve
general or individual prevention; at the same time, within a criminal
law context, punishment must be seen as the ultima ratio (Löschnig-
Gespandl 2003). According to Chiste (2008), corporate crime in
particular lends itself to innovative forms of comprehensive restorative
action (infra).
2. Restorative Justice: Potential, Conditions and Challenges
Against the background of the problem statement sketched
above—related to the nature of corporate crime and corporate violence,
aspects of victimisation and existing criminal law responses—the
question arises whether, how and to what extent restorative justice
could offer a more inclusive, encompassing and effective approach.
Until recently, restorative justice has been criticised because of its
exclusive focus on interpersonal, conventional types of crime.
Although the predominant focus in European countries is on relatively
minor crimes for which mainly victim-offender mediation applies
(Dünkel et al 2015), there is a gradual shift and broadening of the
scope into the direction of developing restorative justice for different
types of (more serious) crime and in a variety of settings. A series of
European and other projects testifies to the enlargement of the
perspective to large-scale violent conflict (Aertsen et al 2008),
domestic violence (Drost et al 2015), sexual violence (Zinsstag and
Keenan 2017), child victims (Gal 2011), historical institutional abuse
(Keenan 2014) and terrorism (Letschert at al 2010; Pascual Rodriguez
2013; Bertagna et al 2015). Restorative justice in prison settings has
become a popular topic (Lummer et al 2015; Barabas and Fellegi 2014;
Johnstone 2014), and European studies have been set up on models of
conferencing (Zinsstag and Vanfraechem 2012) and peacemaking
6 See chapter seven in this volume.
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circles (Weitekamp 2015). Moreover, the relationship between
transitional justice and restorative justice mechanisms has been
analysed (Clamp 2016). However, the applicability of restorative
justice to issues of financial, economic, fiscal and corporate crime
remains largely understudied in Europe and other regions.
One of the challenges when exploring the relevance of restorative
justice in cases of corporate crime relates to what extent restorative
justice practices are able to surmount stereotypical and ideal-typical
images of victims, offenders and notions of restoration (Dignan 2005:
167-178; Bolivar 2010; Aertsen 2017; Maglione 2017). On the basis of
what is observed above, it is clear that in order to make restorative
justice suited to corporate crime, its concepts of offenders, victims,
harm, crime and community have to be modified and models have to
be adopted in order to involve all stakeholders in practice (see eg
Mazzucato 2017).
There may be many limitations to restorative justice, just as there
are many opportunities (Cunneen and Hoyle 2010; McGeer and Pettit
2015). We consider restorative justice as a field of ongoing
development, both in theory and practice, which does not need one
uniform definition of its approach that is applicable worldwide and for
all types of crime. 7 We rather believe that restorative justice represents
a set of values and principles that are able to fundamentally guide daily
practice within a variety of responses to crime. Therefore, restorative
justice cannot be reduced to its well-known models of victim-offender
mediation, conferencing and peacemaking circles. Effective guiding
principles of restorative justice can be found in international standards
and regulations, such as UN ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 8 and
Council of Europe Recommendation R(99)19. 9 These, together with
standards from national restorative justice services, offer a valid basis
for restorative justice practices in cases of corporate crime as well.
7 Nevertheless, from a policy making point of view, disposing of a workable
definition of restorative justice might be necessary in a given context. For EU Member
States, the 2012 Victims Directive in its art 2 provides such a definition, completely
inspired by a previous definition by the Council of Europe: ‘“Restorative justice”
means any process whereby the victim and the offender are enabled, if they freely
consent, to participate actively in the resolution of matters arising from the criminal
offence through the help of an impartial third party’.
8 UN ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 on Basic Principles on the Use of
Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters.
9 Recommendation N R(99)19 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States
concerning Mediation in Penal Matters.
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Safeguards from the perspective of the victim are provided by the
European Union Directive 2012/29/EU. 10 For cases of corporate
violence specifically, where health and physical integrity of victims are
at risk, the Victims Directive’s safeguards and protection mechanisms
must be emphasised. For the Directive, family members of deceased
victims are equally considered as victims. With respect to restorative
justice, art 12 of the Directive stipulates that Member States must take
measures to safeguard the victim from secondary and repeat
victimisation, from intimidation and retaliation when providing
restorative justice services. The following conditions apply: (a)
restorative justice should only to be used if in the interest of the
victim; (b) the victim must be provided with full and unbiased
information about the process and the potential outcomes and about the
procedures for supervising the implementation of any agreement; (c)
the offender must accept the basic facts of the case; (d) agreements
must be reached at voluntary and may be taken into account in
proceedings; (e) confidentiality must be respected. The Directive also
obliges Member States to facilitate the referral of cases appropriate to
restorative justice services, but it does not formally oblige Member
States to introduce or to generalise the availability of restorative justice
services (Lauwaert 2013).
Some of the main restorative justice principles and values can be
described as follows: (a) Restorative justice is a model of doing justice
that is rooted in an immediate connection to the personal and social
life-world of people and that aims at restoring the harm resulting from
the crime as completely as possible; (b) Restorative justice seeks to
balance the needs of all involved. This inclusive approach entails
bringing together the victim, the offender, the community and other
actors in a common response where the ‘justice needs’ of all
stakeholders are addressed; (c) Parties in restorative justice are
considered moral subjects able to participate in a process of dialogue
and to encounter the other, on the condition that there is a mutually
respectful environment created and an appropriate space and support
provided for the encounter.
Within the context of exploring new fields of application for
restorative justice, the categories of values as listed by Braithwaite
(2002a) might offer guidance as well. He distinguishes between
10 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of
crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.
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constraining values (such as respectful listening, non-domination by
one party, empowerment and equal concern, respect for fundamental
human rights), maximising values (including restoration of human
dignity, property loss, safety/injury/health and environment, emotional
restoration, a sense of duty as citizen and prevention of further
injustice) and emergent values (such as remorse, apology, mercy).
Let us now return to the field of corporate crime in order to
explore the possible role of restorative justice.
3. Applicability of Restorative Justice to Cases of Corporate
Violence
When considering the possibilities of restorative justice for
corporate crime, we enter into a world of systemic injustices, extreme
power imbalances and high victim vulnerability. Victimisation in these
cases often has a collective and community dimension, and
accountability for the crime cannot be personalised easily. To deal
with these forms of ‘faceless’ crimes, we must adopt another mind-set,
a move from the micro-level to the macro-level when looking at
causes, consequences and reactions. Therefore, restorative justice
responses to these manifestations of man-made harm must also relate
to social justice (Price Lofton 2004).
Reflecting about the possible role of restorative justice in cases of
corporate crime results in a recognition of its limits for the one, and a
belief in its potential for the other. Authors such as Chiste (2008) argue
that corporate crimes specifically—more than white-collar crime in
general—are a good fit for restorative justice because the corporation
can be clearly identified as the offender. Gabbay (2007: 440-441)
demonstrates that adding a restorative justice intervention to the public
response ‘is not only appropriate and theoretically justified but
technically possible and pragmatically useful as well’; as a matter of
principle, ‘it promotes justice in a more complete way’. For him,
restorative justice in these cases is an additional form of punishment,
not an alternative to punishment. On the one hand, he argues,
restorative interventions can be combined with retributive punishment,
where the restorative component must be taken into consideration in
the overall determination of the offender’s deserved sentence. On the
other hand, a restorative intervention can additionally reinforce the
utilitarian function of punishment in terms of deterrence: research on
corporate crime has shown that a general and specific deterrent effect
of criminal sanctioning occurs when it is accompanied by informal
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sanctions, such as social censure, shame and loss of respect (Gabbay
2007: 448-449).
In what follows, we will discuss how in cases of corporate
crime—with a special attention for corporate violence as defined
above—restorative justice’s constitutive elements (may) appear. We
will briefly refer to more general conceptual frameworks which may
underpin a restorative justice construction for corporate crime. In
international literature, the conceptual exercise to apply restorative
justice has mainly been done in the field of environmental crime.
3.1. The Victim Dimension
Who are the victims in cases of corporate violence, and how can
their needs be understood and met? For corporate crime in general, the
distinction can be made between victims internal to the company, and
external victims. Internal stakeholders are employees and their
personal circles, but possibly also shareholders and investors. External
stakeholders are harmed people with no personal relationship to the
company, as well as institutions, other corporations or governmental or
public bodies. The broad scope of victimisation becomes clear when
the distinction is made between primary (direct victims), secondary
(relatives and first responders) and tertiary (or vicarious) victims. The
latter represents all members of society who experience indirect or
direct harm caused by the crime.
In cases of corporate crime, there may not always be an
identifiable victim or a tangible harm. Corporate crime can be
amorphous, and its harms more diffuse and aggregative than in the
case of conventional crime; therefore harm may also be more difficult
to measure. In some cases, as already mentioned, victims are even
unaware of their victimisation (Gabbay 2007: 461). This problem
exists to a lesser extent—also in terms of applying restorative
justice—in cases of corporate violence, where harm on personal
victims may be more evident. A complicating factor, however, is the
long latency period which often occurs with corporate violence: the
harmful effects on health or life only become visible many years after
the events. Collecting evidence about the causal link between the
initial event and long-lasting effects is therefore extremely difficult. In
other cases, the statute of limitations may preclude criminal
prosecution. To remedy this, autonomous restorative justice mecha-
nisms should be put in place, based on the moral obligations and
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commitments of corporations, possibly to be enhanced by social
pressure (infra).
In the case of corporate violence, restorative justice mechanisms
can address the needs of both internal victims (employees and their
relatives) and external victims (bystanders or witnesses, and citizens
who have experienced harm as consumer or otherwise). All these
categories should be able to receive recognition from the company for
the harm suffered, information on the causes, circumstances and
responsibilities around the harmful events, and financial compensation
or restitution in natura for material and non-material harm. A central
need for victims is to be heard and to tell their story. Within the
‘Victims and Corporations’ project we have indeed observed how
important it is for victims of being able ‘to talk to the company’. While
many of these services to victims must be offered at the individual
level, and require a personalised approach including direct or indirect
dialogue, some of them can also be performed at a group level. Finally,
victimless crimes should also be dealt with restoratively; for example,
in the case of harm to the natural environment, delegates of interest
groups or public bodies can represent the victim.
3.2. The Offender Dimension
The biggest challenge for restorative justice in terms of the
offender may be the creation of a space for open, non-defensive
communication so that the disconnection between harmer and harmed
is lifted, and the corporation’s representatives can begin considering
their responsibilities as a corporation. As is the case for restorative
justice practices at the individual level, acknowledging the basic facts
of the crime should not be automatically considered as a legal
admission of guilt or as evidence in criminal proceedings. This may be
unrealistic in some cases, such as those in which the corporation fears
considerable financial claims through judicial procedures. 11
In many cases, social or judicial pressure will be needed to bring
the corporation to the table. Their motivation will be different from an
individual offender’s, although in both cases self-interest may increase
willingness to participate. Financially advantageous deals through
negotiation with the victim(s) may be attractive, but most authors
11 See chapter seven in this volume.
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argue that the company’s reputation and public image is the most
important motivational factor (Boyd 2008; Braithwaite 2002b).
For Chiste (2008: 112), the idea that corporate crime (more than
white-collar crime in general) and restorative justice have a ‘natural
affinity’ has to do with the fact that ‘corporations have every reason to
maintain trust and right relation with their specific consumer bases and
with the societies can contain and enrich them’. A ‘proactive approach
to corporate social responsibility and the voluntary imposition of high
standards’ upon themselves supports a positive relationship with
governmental bodies. In other words, cases of corporate crime seem to
lend themselves to a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic types of
motivation in a particular way (see also Walgrave 2008: 68-100 for the
role of common self-interest and the socio-ethical foundation for
restorative justice in general).
Looking at the process and possible outcomes for a corporate
offender through participation in restorative justice interventions, the
role of shame as deterrent comes to the fore. Barnard (1999) analysed
the role of shaming in (American) corporate sentencing processes, and
she stressed the importance of the personal appearance of the CEO in
the courtroom. She describes the social environment of leading
executives and points to their high susceptibility to shaming rituals and
their sensitiveness to the opinions of their peers.
Gabbay (2007: 450) refers to research showing the preventive
effect of shaming in cases of white-collar crime, ‘by way of
publicizing the identity of the offender and the details of the offence’.
One of the findings revealed that self-imposed shame is often viewed
as more certain and more severe than State-imposed punishment.
‘Embarrassment’, as a socially imposed punishment, can also be an
effective deterrent. At the practical level, it is mainly restorative justice
interventions such as group conferences and circles that seem to foster
these deterrents. Here, and in particular in cases of victimless corporate
crime, shaming operates through the active and deliberate involvement
of external stakeholders, by preference peers or representatives of the
close (professional or social) community of the offender (the ‘small
town’ of corporate executives). It is in particular the concept of
‘reintegrative shaming’ that offers a theoretical basis for effective
sanctioning through restorative interventions, in the case of corporate
crime and, more generally, with regulatory offences (Braithwaite 1989,
2002b, 2003). An important factor that makes a sanction effective is its
social embeddedness: expressions of community disapproval take
place, followed by gestures of reacceptance in the community of law-
abiding citizens. External stakeholders should be selected in such a
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way that they are able to induce a real feeling of shame. Indeed,
disapproval by judicial or public authorities is often less effective than
‘naming and shaming’ by those the offender deeply respects or when
he fears for a serious impact on his personal environment. It goes
without saying that a process of personal shaming can also be induced
in a powerful way when the company’s representatives are confronted
with the personal suffering of the internal victims of corporate
violence, such as victim-employees, their families and local commu-
nity members.
Finally, as we have also learnt from experiences working with
victims of (historical) institutional violence, spokespersons of the
offender’s organisation who participate in restorative justice encoun-
ters can represent the company in order to show their respect on behalf
of the corporation to the victims or harmed community. They should
hold a position high enough to take decisions, including concluding
agreements, and to exercise control and follow-up of commitments
(Löschnig-Gspandl 2003).
3.3. The Community Dimension
With environmental crime in particular, there is a community
dimension that appears in many shapes (Preston 2011). Elements of the
community that can be harmed are: communal natural resources (private
or public propriety, communal propriety such as air, water and forests,
and unowned propriety such as light), public infrastructure, heritage,
environmental meaning (sense and use of the environment by a
community) and future generations. On the basis of the well-known
assumptions, Preston (2011) conceptually investigates objectives and
principles of restorative justice in literature, and how these diverse
elements of the community (as well as the personal victims and the
offenders) can participate, or be represented, in restorative justice
processes. The community is often embodied by representatives of
communities or interest groups, or by surrogate victims or governmental
representatives. A specific emphasis and approach might be needed; for
example, in cases of non-human victimisation (environmental harm), the
surrogate victim needs to be able to bring an ‘ecocentric’ rather than an
‘anthropocentric’ perspective to the restorative process.
Again with regard to environmental crimes, Boyd (2008)
investigates the relevance of the frameworks of therapeutic jurispru-
dence and restorative justice. From a restorative justice point of view,
she introduces ‘sentencing circles’ and ‘community impact panels’ as
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potential practical tools for active community participation. Sentencing
circles are open to all members of the community who feel affected in
one way or another, and in consultation with public prosecutor or
judge, a sentence can be proposed. A community impact panel consists
of the offender(s), community representatives, a trained facilitator and
possibly a police officer. Boyd (2008) also warns of possible problems
with these approaches when applied to cases of environmental crime.
These can include power imbalances in the group, an insufficient or
incomplete assessment of the environmental impact by individual
community members, a lack of uniformity in sentencing and the risk of
double jeopardy.
By engaging all stakeholders, restorative justice practices can also
be considered a way for a community to develop its social capital, its
social networks and civic interconnectedness. Restorative justice offers
opportunities for social participation, norm clarification and political
debate (Dzur 2011). This society activating approach might also apply
to dealings with corporate violence. What is much less possible by
prosecution in these cases may be offered by restorative justice through
its participatory processes: an opportunity for citizens to explore and to
challenge ‘the morality of commerce, or socioeconomic inequity, or
the temptations of great wealth, or the responsibilities of the powerful,
or what “represents the law of the land”, in a purposeful and
meaningful way’ (Chiste 2008: 99-100). Together with this social-
emancipatory potential, restorative justice processes may also offer an
opportunity for restoration of public trust in business.
3.4. Participation
Participation of all stakeholders is crucial in restorative justice. In
cases of corporate violence, however, there may be a plurality of
stakeholders, and therefore the common models of restorative justice
such as victim-offender mediation, group conferencing or circles are not
easily applied, or else will have to be adapted considerably. In order to
do so, Gabbay (2007) finds inspiration in the model of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which has several important
advantages: its innovative public character, the transparency of the
process, the possibility to exercise censure and public condemnation
(and shaming), the ability to deal with large numbers of victims and
offenders and to include peers and members of the community, and
finally the possibility to provide different types of restoration depending
on the needs (for example, social housing or educational services). The
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elements of story-telling and truth as a pre-condition for reconciliation
and healing may also be relevant for our case: truth not only to be
considered in its legal and factual sense, but also in a narrative, relational
and dialogical context (Aertsen et al 2008).
Luedtke (2014) also refers to existing community-based and
traditional justice mechanisms when exploring the applicability of
restorative justice for white-collar crime. He develops a theoretical
model based on the six elementary questions listed by Zehr and Gohar
(2003) in their practical blueprint for initiating a restorative justice
process: Who has been hurt? What are their needs? Whose obligations
are these? What are the causes? Who has a stake in this situation?
What is the appropriate process to involve stakeholders in an effort to
address causes and put things right? After a look at the possible
benefits and drawbacks of restorative justice in cases of white-collar
crime, he presents a three-stage proposal, allocating decision-making
authority equally amongst the courts, victims, offenders, and
communities: (1) a decision on the participants and harms to be
included, (2) the type of restorative justice programme to be offered,
and (3) the establishment of its relationship to criminal justice.
Umbreit, Geske and Lewis voice a practical concern when
applying restorative justice to cases of crime by multinational
corporations (2015). As a response to an earlier proposed restorative
justice model for extra-territorial white-collar crime, they urge adding
‘empowered dialogue’ between parties and draw attention to practical
questions such as: Who facilitates the discussions, and how are they
structured?
3.5. Restoration
In general, victims strongly prefer compensation directly by the
offender (Strang 2008). While a voluntarily accepted agreement by the
offender on financial or non-financial reparation has an important
psychological value for the victim, imposed restorative sanctions
should not be excluded in the case of corporate crime. Many such
practices exist internationally. In terms of environmental crime. White
(2017) develops a model of ‘reparative justice’ focusing on restorative
sanctions imposed by the court. Because of the regularly changing
positions of senior managers, a personalised restorative justice
approach would be less effective. White bases his model on the
problem-solving jurisprudence by the New South Wales Land and
Environment Court (Australia), where sanctions and orders are issued
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to corporations creatively on an ad hoc basis, combining punitive and
reparative elements. Orders may include an obligation for the
offending company to publicise the offence and its consequences, to
carry out specified projects for restoration or the enhancement of the
environment, to pay a specified amount to the Environmental Trust, or
to organise a training course for its employees.
The opportunities for restorative justice as a ‘new form of
environmental criminal justice’ are discussed by Pain, Pepper,
McCreath and Zorzetto (2016), who compare legislation and
jurisprudence in New Zealand and the States of Victoria and New
South Wales in Australia—three jurisdictions where restorative justice
for environmental crime is possible as part of a sentencing process or
separate from the criminal justice system. They find the New Zealand
framework the most comprehensive, where courts have adopted
restorative justice processes to a large extent. Community conferences
offer ‘the opportunity to the offender to directly apologise to victims,
understand how his or her actions have affected the lives and
livelihoods of the victims, and commit to targeted actions to redress
this harm’. Besides the educational possibilities, conferences also
enforce—ideally speaking—the importance of compliance with
environmental law and reduce the likelihood of recidivism.
Special attention is given to the process of restorative justice in
cases of environmental crime, for example in the form of conferences,
in Scotland by Croall (2017). She argues for the involvement of
‘appropriate community and environmental groups along with
enforcers and prosecutors’. Outcomes of such restorative justice
processes may be, for example, that firms breaching health and safety
regulations are asked to conduct research into safety issues as well as
improving safety procedures. In the case of food crime, food
manufacturers and supermarket executives could be directly confron-
ted with the physical consequences for people, and could be asked to
compensate damages and to contribute to food banks, amongst other
forms of reparation.
In restorative approaches that leave room for non-material
elements and which focus on communication between the stakehol-
ders, an apology or statement of regret may be an important additional,
or sometimes the only, way to accommodate the victims. Distinctions
have been made between different categories of apologies, as also
made clear by corporate offenders in the USA: tactical apologies (for
example in the context of a plea bargaining procedure), explanation
apologies (justifying his behaviour without admitting wrong),
formalistic apologies (without remorse, under the demand and pressure
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of an authority figure), and happy-ending apologies (where responsi-
bility is accepted and remorse expressed). Apologies, issued by high
profile individuals, commercial ventures or religious institutions, have
been described as a ‘growth phenomenon’, and reference is made to a
trend in legislation in the USA, Australia and Canada to pass ‘Apology
Acts’ which allow for apologies without having to admit legal liability
(Macleod 2007 as cited in Chiste 2008: 109-111). In order to avoid
secondary victimisation, it is clear that the process of offering
apologies should not become a routine or automatism, or a justification
for a lenient sanction. Apologies must also be accepted, and this
process requires an appropriate forum, which restorative justice may be
able to offer (Gabbay 2007: 422).
4. Conclusions
This chapter explored the possibilities to apply restorative justice
processes in cases of corporate violence. This was done in the
framework of the EU co-funded project on ‘Victims and Corporations’,
focusing on different types of corporate violence in three European
countries. We first looked at the phenomenon of corporate violence, its
typical victimisation processes and the challenges to offer inclusive
responses. We then briefly introduced restorative justice and some of
its leading principles and values, in order to inquire its applicability to
cases of corporative violence, or, more generally, corporate crime. For
this, a conceptual exercise was undertaken examining five of
restorative justice’s constitutive elements as they may appear in
corporate violence cases: the dimensions of victim, offender and
community, and the prospects of participation and restoration. This
chapter did not aim at developing an encompassing theoretical
framework, nor a uniform model that could be applied in practice.
However, taking into account the characteristics of the phenomenon
and its devastating impact on large groups of people over a longer
period of time, we can learn from restorative justice models in adjacent
domains. Promising practices and realistic perspectives exist world-
wide (Wright 2017). Restorative justice theory and principles offer
conclusive arguments to bring ideas into practice also in complex cases
of corporate violence. A distinct socio-ethical orientation should allow
for re-thinking corporate responsibility. What we now need, is more
advanced test cases (and proper evaluation) where victims and their
organisations, together with public authorities and corporations
courageously explore new avenues.
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 253
References
Aertsen I. (2008) ‘Racak, Mahane Yehuda and Nyabyondo: Restor-
ative Justice between the Formal and the Informal’ in I Aertsen, J
Arsovska, H Rohne, M Valiñas & K Vanspauwen (eds), Restoring
Justice After Large-Scale Violent Conflicts. Kosovo, DR Congo and the
Israeli-Palestinian Case (Cullompton: Willan Publishing).
—— (2017) ‘Recalibrating Victimhood through Restorative Justice:
Perspectives from Europe’ 3 Restorative Justice: An International
Journal 352, 367.
Anttila, I (1974) ‘Victimology: A New Territory in Criminology’ 5
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology 7, 10.
Barabas, T and Fellegi, B (eds) (2012) Responsibility-Taking,
Relationship-Building and Restoration in Prisons (Budapest, Foresee).
Barnard, J W (1999) ‘Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing’
Southern California Law Review 959, 1007.
Bertagna, B, Ceretti, A and Mazzucato, C (eds) (2015) Il libro
dell’incontro. Vittime e responsabili della lotta armata a confronto
(Milano, il Saggiatore).
Bolívar, D. (2010) ‘Conceptualizing Victims’ “Restoration” in
Restorative Justice’ International Review of Victimology 237, 265.
Boyd, CC (2008) ‘Expanding the Arsenal for Sentencing Environ-
mental Crimes: Would Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Restorative
Justice Work?’ 2 William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review 483, 512.
Braithwaite, J (1989) Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
—— (2002a) ‘Setting Standards for Restorative Justice’ British
Journal of Criminology 563, 577.
—— (2002b) Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation (Oxford,
Oxford University Press).
—— (2003) ‘Restorative Justice and Corporate Regulation’ in EGM
Weitekamp and H-J Kerner (eds), Restorative Justice in Context.
International Practice and Directions (Cullompton, Willan Publishing).
Chiste, KB (2008) ‘Retribution, Restoration and White-Collar Crime’
The Dalhousie Law Review 85, 121.
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
254 CHAPTER IX
Christie, N (1986) ‘The Ideal Victim’ in E Fattah (ed), From Crime
Policy to Victim Policy (Hampshire, Macmillan).
Clamp, K (ed) Restorative Justice in Transitional Settings (London,
Routledge).
Clarke, M (1990) Business Crime: Its Nature and Control (Cambridge,
Polity Press).
Clinard, M (2007) ‘Corporate Crime: Yesterday and Today - A
Comparison’ in M Clinard and P Yeager (eds), Corporate Crime (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).
Croall, H (2001) Understanding White Collar Crime (Buckingham,
Open University Press).
—— (2017) ‘Corporate Responsibility?’ 5 Scottish Justice Matters 6, 7.
Cunneen, C and Hoyle, C (2010) Debating Restorative Justice
(Oxford, Hart Publishing).
Dignan, J (2005) Understanding Victims and Restorative Justice
(Maidenhead, Open University Press).
Drost, L, Haller, B, Hofinger, V, van der Kooij, K, Lünnemann, K and
Wolthuis, A (2015) Restorative Justice in Cases of Domestic Violence
(Utrecht, Verwey-Jonker Instituut).
Dzur, A (2011) ‘Restorative Justice and Democracy: Fostering Public
Accountability for Criminal Justice’ 4 Contemporary Justice Review
367, 381.
Dünkel, F, Grzywa-Holten J and Horsfield P (eds) (2015) Restorative
Justice and Mediation in Penal Matters: A Stock-Taking of Legal
Issues, Implementation Strategies and Outcomes in 36 European
Countries (Vols 1, 2) (Monchengladbach, Forum Verlag Godesberg).
Fattah, E (1994) The Interchangeable Roles of Victim and Victimizer
(Helsinki, HEUNI).
Friedrichs, D (2007) Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in
Contemporary Society (Belmont, Wadsworth).
Gabbay, Z D (2007) ‘Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice
Paradigm: Restorative Justice and White-Collar Crime’ Cardozo
Journal of Conflict Resolution 421, 485.
Gal, T (2011) Child Victims and Restorative Justice: A Needs-Rights
Model (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 255
Goodey, J (2005) Victims and Victimology. Research, Policy and
Practice (Harlow, Pearson Longman).
Green, S (2007) ‘Crime, Victimisation and Vulnerability’ in S Walklate
(ed), Handbook of Victims and Victimology (London, Routledge).
Green, G and Shou, H (2015) ‘Operationalizing Organizational
Violence’ in G Barak (ed), The Routledge International Handbook of
the Crimes of the Powerful (London, Routledge).
Johnstone, G (2014) Restorative Justice in Prisons: Methods,
Approaches and Effectiveness (PC-CP (2014) 17 rev) (Strasbourg,
Council of Europe)
Jonckheere, E (2017) Asbest. Leugens, chantage en mensenlevens
(Antwerpen, EPO).
Keenan, M (2014) Sexual Trauma and Abuse: Restorative and
Transformative Possibilities? (Dublin, School of Applied Social
Science, University College Dublin).
Lauwaert, K (2013) ‘Restorative Justice in the 2012 EU Victims
Directive: A Right to Quality Service, but no Right to Equal Access for
Victims of Crime’ 3 Restorative Justice: An International Journal 414,
425.
Letchert, R, Staiger, I and Pemberton, A (eds) (2010) Assisting Victims
of Terrorism: Towards a European Standard of Justice (Dordrecht,
Springer).
Löschnig-Gespandl, M (2003) ‘Corporations, Crime and Restorative
Justice’ in EGM Weitekamp and H-J Kerner (eds), Restorative Justice
in Context: International Practice and Directions (Cullompton, Willan
Publishing).
Luedtke, A (2014) ‘Progression in the Age of Recession: Restorative
Justice and White-Collar Crime in Post-Recession America’ 1 Brooklyn
Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 311, 344.
Lummer, R, Hagemann, O and Reis, S (2015) Restorative Justice at
Post-Sentencing Level in Europe (Kiel, University of Applied
Sciences, Faculty of Social Work and Health).
Maglione, G (2017) ‘Embodied Victims: An Archaeology of the ‘Ideal
Victim’ of Restorative Justice’ 4 Criminology & Criminal Justice 401,
417.
Mazzucato, C (2017) ‘Restorative Justice’ in S Giavazzi (ed),
Guidelines for Corporations: Preventing Victimisation and Dealing
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
256 CHAPTER IX
with Victims of Corporate Violence (Milan, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Centro Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia penale e la
Politica criminale), online at victimsandcorporations.eu/ [last accessed
on 25 January 2018].
McGeer, V and Pettit, Ph (2015) ‘The Desirability and Feasibility of
Restorative Justice’ 3 Restorative Justice: An International Journal
325, 341.
Pain, N, Pepper, R, McCreath, M and Zorzetto, J (2016) Restorative
Justice for Environmental Crime: An Antipodean Experience Paper
presented at International Union for Conversation of Nature Academy
of Environmental Law Colloquium, Oslo 22 June 2016.
Pascual Rodriguez, E (ed) (2013) Los Ojos del Otro. Encuentras
Restaurativos Entre Víctimas y Ex Miembros de ETA (Santander, Sal
Terrae).
Pemberton, A and Vanfraechem, I (2015) ‘Victims’ Victimization
Experiences and Their Need for Justice’ in I Vanfraechem, D Bolivar
and I Aertsen (eds), Victims and Restorative Justice (London,
Routledge).
Preston, BJ (2011) The Use of Restorative Justice for Environmental
Crime Paper presented to EPA Victoria Seminar on Restorative
Environmental Justice, Melbourne 22 April 2011.
Price Lofton, BP (2004) ‘Does Restorative Justice Challenge Systemic
Injustices?’ in H Zehr and B Toews (eds), Critical Issues in Restorative
Justice (Cullompton, Willan Publishing).
Russell, S and Gilbert, MJ (1999) ‘Truman’s Revenge: Social Control
and Corporate Crime’ Crime, Law & Social Change 59, 82.
Sebba, L (2000) ‘The Individualisation of the Victim: From Positivism
to Post-Modernism’ in A Crawford and J Goodey (eds), Integrating a
Victim Perspective in the Criminal Justice System (London, Routledge).
Spalek, B (2006) Crime Victims. Theory, Policy and Practice. (New
York, Palgrave Macmillan).
Strang, H. (2008) Repair or revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice.
(Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Strobl, R. (2010) ‘Becoming a Victim’ in SG Shoham, P Knepper and
M Kett (eds), International Handbook of Victimology (Boca Raton,
CRC Press).
Sullivan, D and Tifft, L (2010) Restorative Justice. Healing the
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 257
Foundations of our Everyday Lives 2nd edn (Boulder, Criminal Justice
Press).
Sutherland, E (1940) ‘White-Collar Criminality’ 1 American Sociolo-
gical Review 1, 12.
Umbreit, M, Geske, J and Lewis, T (2015) ‘Restorative Justice Impact
on Multinational Corporations?: A Response to Andrew Brady
Spalding’s Article’ Ohio State Law Journal 41, 49.
Victims and Corporations (2017) Individual Assessment of Corporate
Violence Victims’ Needs: A Practical Guide (Milan, Università
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla
Giustizia penale e la Politica criminale), online at www.victimsand-
corporations.eu [last accessed on 15 January 2018].
Visconti, A (ed) (2017) Needs of Victims of Corporate Violence:
Empirical Findings: Comprehensive Report (Milan, Università Cattolica
del Sacro Cuore, Centro Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia penale e
la Politica criminale), online at www.victimsandcorporations.eu [last
accessed on 15 January 2018]
Walgrave, L (2008) Restorative Justice, Self-Interest and Responsible
Citizenship (Cullompton, Willan Publishing).
Weitekamp E (ed) (2015) Developing Peacemaking Circles in a
European Context. Results of a Joint Research Project in Belgium,
Germany and Hungary. Main Report (Tübingen, TüKrim).
White, R (2017) ‘Reparative Justice, Environmental Crime and
Penalities for the Powerful’ Crime, Law and Social Change 117, 132.
Wright, M (2017) ‘Three Decades After the Bhopal Disaster, a New
Approach Offers Hope’ December 7 Prospect, online at https://
www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/three-decades-after-the-bhopal-
disaster-a-new-approach-offers-hope [last accessed 21 January 2018].
Zehr, H and Gohar, A (2003) The Little Book of Restorative Justice
(Intercourse, Good Books).
Zinsstag, E & Vanfraechem, I (eds) (2012) Conferencing and
Restorative Justice. International Practices and Perspectives (Oxford,
Oxford University Press).
Zinsstag, E and Keenan, M (eds) (2017) Restorative Responses to
Sexual Violence. Legal, Social and Therapeutic Dimensions (London,
Routledge).
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
258 CHAPTER IX
ANNEX
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL LAWMAKERS
AND POLICYMAKERS
CONTENTS: 1. Introduction. – 2. Recommendations of General Interest. – 3.
Recommendations for Belgian Lawmakers and Policymakers. – 4. Recom-
mendations for German Lawmakers and Policymakers. – 5. Recommenda-
tions for Italian Lawmakers and Policymakers. – 6. Summary of the
Recommendations.
1. Introduction
We here summarise some of the policy recommendations for
national lawmakers arising from the two-year project ‘Victims and
Corporations’, which has been a complex and multifaceted research
exercise on the practical implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support, and protection
of victims of crime.
Corporate crimes and corporate violence have been a subject of
both academic and political interest for some time, yet the focus on the
victim at the international, EU, and national levels is something new,
especially in these fields, as is the recognition of victims’ rights: the
topic therefore calls for further reflection, and our understanding of
how to deal with this particular form of victimisation needs to be
deepened.
We make no pretence to have covered all the possible elements
still requiring implementation or improvement in the three countries
examined—ie Belgium, Germany, and Italy—nor would our observa-
tions necessarily be valid in respect to other EU Member States. Yet,
considering the low visibility, and consequent low priority, generally
characterising corporate violence victimisation (as has emerged from
the analysis in the previous chapters), it would not seem far-fetched
that several of the following recommendations could be straightfor-
wardly extended beyond the countries of focus, and could even open
the way for a broader consideration of ‘atypical’ victims in
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
general—which, as previously stated, is one of the purposes, as well as
one of the most innovative features, of the Victims Directive.
In the first section of this Annex we summarise the most general
suggestions, which appear applicable to all three States here
considered (and possibly, as just remarked, to several other
countries). These policy recommendations are aimed primarily at
national lawmakers, who are in the best position to make the
structural, organic, and systematic reforms needed for better
protection and support for victims of crime in general, and of
corporate violence in particular. This, of course, does not exclude
that, in respect to some specific issues (such as, for instance, that of
compensation funds), a commitment by European Union institutions
would also be extremely relevant in facilitating desirable reforms
and/or their uniform implementation through national legal systems.
Nor should national policymakers be considered the only target of
these recommendations, considering how important a raising of
public awareness would be for a more effective implementation of the
Victims Directive in general, and specifically for its application to
victims of corporate violence. As we have seen in the previous
chapters, victims’ associations, NGOs, local experimental program-
mes for victim protection and victim support, etc, remain important in
triggering and pushing for improvements in policies aimed at
asserting in principle, and granting in practice, rights for the victims
of crime and standards for their assistance and protection; therefore,
we also consider these associations, NGOs, and local programmes to
be powerful potential actors in the development of new strategies to
better the condition of victims of corporate violence.
The later sections of this Annex are devoted to more specific
recommendations aimed respectively at Belgian, German, and Italian
lawmakers, building on the direct experience gathered in the course of
the project through interviews and focus groups with victims of
corporate violence and with experts and professionals in law
enforcement, victim support, victim advocacy, legal aid, mediation
and restorative justice, etc, as well as from the training sessions and
dissemination activities carried out in the three countries. Some of
these recommendations are specifications of the more general ones set
out in the first section, tailored and adapted to national features and
problems; others are more strictly related to each country’s specific
features.
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2. Recommendations of General Interest
2.1. Invest, at all levels, in public awareness and sensitisation
regarding corporate violence victimisation
Currently, victims of corporate violence are rarely considered in
public policy, and even less frequently is their specific vulnerability
taken into account. This often appears to lead to forms of secondary
victimisation, as well as to an increased risk of (at the very minimum)
repeat victimisation. In the main this can be traced back to a
widespread lack of knowledge, as well as the structurally low visibility
and indeed opacity of the phenomenon itself. Hence a commitment to
broadening and deepening the research on corporate violence,
including an appropriate investment of resources, appears urgently
needed; such research would aim to gather the necessary information
to make reasoned and effective reforms to prevent, as far as possible,
this kind of victimisation, and to support and protect present and future
victims.
A better knowledge of the features and scope of corporate
violence victimisation also appears indispensable to lay the founda-
tions for effective public awareness campaigns, which, in turn, would
be pivotal in supporting legal reforms and the work of law enforcement
agencies and victim support services.
These agencies and services, in turn, appear to be in stark need of
information and training on how to deal effectively with such
victims—particularly because the latter tend to fall ‘below the radar’,
and on the occasions when they do emerge into wider consciousness,
find that services are not well prepared to receive them.
Awareness raising is necessary also in order to help ripen the
political and academic debate with regard to victims of corporate
violence, and to contribute to research, education programmes,
exchange of best practices, and the creation of European networks,
as recommended by art 26 of the Directive.
2.2. Recognise the special protection needs of the victims of corporate
violence, and introduce ad hoc legal measures of protection, without
prejudice to the rights of the accused and the defence
The fulfilment of the obligations deriving from arts 18–24 of the
Victims Directive in cases of corporate crimes, and especially of
corporate violence, is particularly complex, and seems to require ad
hoc policies, advanced training programmes, specialist and targeted
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support services, and particular adaptations in both carrying out the
individual assessment of the protection needs and in implementing
adequate protection measures.
The timely and individual assessment of specific protection needs
(art 22) of victims of corporate violence is particularly difficult and
calls on all those concerned to exercise particular skill and care. This
difficulty arises notably from the complexity of corporate victimisa-
tion, the scientific uncertainty which often accompanies it, the
potentially high number of victims concerned, the frequent imbalances
of power between the victim(s) and the corporation, the dependence of
the victim on the corporation, etc. A general recommendation here is to
approach victims of corporate violence with no less accuracy,
sensibility, respect, and non-discrimination than ‘typical’ vulnerable
victims with special protection needs.
As regards protection measures, legal systems in the EU have
generally introduced provisions concerning ‘typical’ vulnerable
victims with special protection needs: yet these provisions (such as
protection orders against family violence) are of little or no use in
cases of corporate violence, and there seems to be a lack of specific
and tailored measures aimed at avoiding repeat and future victimisa-
tion by corporate activities for, say, consumers or inhabitants of
polluted areas, who can number in the hundreds or thousands. Since
protection measures of this kind may impact on the rights and
safeguards of the accused and of the corporation, national lawmakers
are recommended to take into due consideration the introduction, with
all the necessary guarantees, of ad hoc legal provisions regulating
measures to be adopted under judiciary scrutiny with the aim of
protecting actual, potential, or future victims from repeat victimisation
or primary victimisation from the same dangerous source. Measures of
this kind might be, for instance: the provisional stopping or reduction
of production; the provisional closure of plants; the delivery of
thorough information to consumers regarding the risks or toxicity of a
product, and the way to avoid or reduce such risks or harms; the
obligation to provide medical assistance to the exposed population; the
obligation to deepen the scientific knowledge regarding the risks of a
certain substance and the obligation to publicly disclose the results, etc.
2.3. Tackle the collective dimension of corporate violence victimisation
As stated throughout this volume, corporate violence almost
invariably has a collective dimension, which can extend to hundreds or
262 ANNEX
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even thousands of victims, who may also be scattered across different
countries. National legal systems and law enforcement agencies appear
in general poorly prepared to deal with the issues raised by this
collective feature, which concern virtually all of the victims’ rights,
from respect to private life and individual dignity, to effective access to
justice, from the right to get proper assistance and support, to that of
achieving a decision on compensation in a reasonable time, etc.
The large numbers of victims affected by each single episode of
corporate violence place a huge stress on the resources and
organisation of police forces, judicial authorities, support and
mediation services, etc; and these services, as remarked above, appear
to be neither accustomed nor adequately trained to deal with the
particular features of this kind of victimisation.
Building on the experience which the majority of national systems
already have in the management of collective emergencies and
disasters, as well as on the practices developed locally by police units
and judicial offices which have experience of proceedings involving
large numbers of victims, and, finally, on the information and expertise
which victims’ associations can provide, national policymakers should
consider systematising (and adequately funding) protocols and best
practices to tackle the practical, organisational, and logistical problems
arising from the collective impact of corporate violence.
2.4. Adopt a preventive strategy, recognising risks in a timely fashion
by paying due attention to every warning sign
The complexity of corporate violence, and the specific character
of the harm it engenders, calls for the adoption of a preventive strategy,
EU-wide and nationwide, whose ingredients would in brief be
grounded on the capacity of all the relevant public and private actors
to recognise risks, especially unknown ones. This would involve
paying due attention to every warning sign, whether arising from
epidemiological studies and other scientific findings, the investigations
of enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies, or recurrent judicial
judgments in commercial, civil, labour matters, and criminal
convictions. Important warning signs might come also from citizens
and local communities, and these must not be neglected. Faced with
suspected adverse events, NGOs, trade unions, and advocacy entities
also play an important role in ‘blowing the whistle’ and in catching the
attention of the inspecting and controlling authorities and of
enforcement agencies.
The reporting of administrative violations and/or of minor
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criminal offences is of signal importance in preventing small issues
escalating into cases of corporate violence that result in harms to life,
health, and safety.
Omissions in crime reporting on the part of public officials or any
other subjects tasked with so reporting must be stigmatised and, when
the law provides, prosecuted.
Investigative and judicial attention to ‘warning crimes’ (such as
bribery in public procurement, corruption, money laundering, financial
crimes, etc) is also of paramount relevance in addressing corporate
violence at an early stage, and in avoiding more severe harms and
consequences.
Lack of investigations, incomplete investigations, or delays in
reporting and in prosecuting or proceeding, may result in a violation on
the part of the State of its positive duty under the ECHR to protect life
and major human rights.
2.5. Implement an integrated and cooperative multi-level network
involving all the relevant institutions and agencies, and encourage all
the subjects concerned to take responsibility
The complexity and harmful nature of corporate violence calls for
the implementation of a multi-level system, at least nationwide, based
on an efficient network which involves regulatory agencies, inspecting
authorities, enforcement agencies, and the judiciary, together with the
health system, the welfare state, etc, in collaboration with the scientific
community, trade unions, corporations’ representatives and associa-
tions, NGOs, victims’ associations and other advocacy organisations.
These stakeholders shall work together before and after a corporate
violent crime is committed in order to, for instance: circulate relevant
information, exchange experiences and practices, create databases and
registries, report violations, report crimes, exchange the findings from
criminal or administrative investigations, and aid the quick identifi-
cation and recognition of actual victims and potential or future victims.
National policymakers and lawmakers shall support the implemen-
tation of the network and promote its efficiency and efficacy, adopting
the necessary policies and taking appropriate financial and organisational
measures. Where necessary, they should pass laws to encourage the
disclosure and the exchange of information; create synergies between the
various actors; support ‘whistleblowing’ (and protect ‘whistleblowers’);
promote crime reporting; and incentivise the taking of responsibility by
all the relevant actors, including public control agencies, putting
prevention strategies, compliance programmes, the correction of
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organisational errors, and reparation and remediation at the core of the
strategy to protect actual and potential victims.
In such a strategy, criminalisation and punishment are left in the
background, so as to allow prevention and protection to take centre stage.
2.6. Facilitate and encourage compensation for victims of corporate
violence
Related to the issue of the collective dimension of corporate
violence victimisation is the difficulty for victims to ‘obtain a decision
on compensation by the offender, within a reasonable time’ (art 16).
The large number of parties involved generally lengthens the (civil or
criminal) proceedings; furthermore, not all national legal systems
allow for collective actions, which are the only means to reduce the
usually high disproportion of resources and information between the
individual victims and the corporate offenders. In addition, due to
issues of time limitations, long latency periods, difficulties in
establishing evidence of causal relations, etc, as well as the frequent
occurrence that the corporation itself ceases activity (due to
bankruptcy, relocation, etc), it can be almost impossible for the
victims to get any kind of redress for the harm they have suffered.
To improve this situation, which severely affects the quality of life
of victims of corporate crime on both practical and emotional levels,
national lawmakers should consider, on the one hand, introducing a
system for effective collective actions for compensation (or improving
such systems as are already in place), and on the other, introducing
collective compensation funds for victims of corporate violence (or
systematising those which already exist). The latter would be
implemented, for instance, by the States’ right of subrogation to the
rights of the victims against the offenders, as well as by way of
mandatory contributions by the industrial sectors concerned. In this
respect, due attention should be paid to the principle according to which,
if compensation is not fully available from the offender or other sources,
States should endeavour to provide financial compensation to some
groups of victims (which include ‘victims who have sustained
significant bodily injury or impairment of physical or mental health as
a result of serious crimes’, as well as ‘the family, in particular
dependants of persons who have died or become physically or mentally
incapacitated as a result of such victimisation’), also providing for
‘national funds for compensation to victims’ where needed. This
principle is also endorsed by the 1985 UN declaration of basic principles
of justice for victims of crime and abuse of power (see arts 12 and 13).
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2.7. Enhance corporate social responsibility and explore alternative
dispute resolution models
Given the complexity of technical issues often involved in cases of
corporate violence, as well as the huge disparity in knowledge and
resources between corporations and potential or actual victims (and
also, often, between corporations and law enforcement agencies), the
best chance for protecting this kind of victim from repeat victimisation
(including retaliation or intimidation) and enabling them to get
compensation would be through integrating policies of respect for
victims’ rights into corporate ethical codes and corporate social
responsibility programmes, as well as into their compliance models in
so far as different national legal systems allow.
This, in turn, will require a commitment of national policymakers
to provide both positive and negative incentives to encourage
corporations in following this path of victim-awareness and victim-
sensitivity. Negative incentives could for instance consist of broade-
ning criminal or quasi-criminal corporate liability (when present in the
legal system) to cover all offences which may qualify as corporate
violence, or introducing such liability where non-existent. Positive
incentives could encompass punishment mitigation (or even full
diversion) in exchange for remedial and compensatory actions
beneficial to victims. The reaching of agreements actually providing
effective protection and redress for victims of corporate violence could
also be eased by a possible integration of alternative dispute resolution
models into the legal system. Given the aforementioned disparity in
power and resources, such openings should be enacted with great
caution; yet the use, in particular, of restorative justice programmes to
tackle harms and conflicts arising from episodes of corporate violence
appears particularly promising, and national lawmakers should take
this into due consideration.
2.8. Increase public investments in educational resources aimed at
improving expert knowledge and skills within public administrations
and communities
Art 26, para 2 of the Victims Directive requires Member States to
take appropriate action aimed at ‘reducing the risk of victimisation,
and minimising the negative impact of crime and the risks of secondary
and repeat victimisation’, by targeting, in particular, the groups at risk.
Art 26 further states that such action may include, among others,
‘research and education programmes, where appropriate in cooperation
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with relevant civil society organisations and other stakeholders’. In the
field of corporate violence this action has unique features, and due
attention should be paid to the way educational resources and media
engagement can contribute to awakening and reinforcing a social
awareness of the problem of corporate violence victimisation, as well
as of the risks stemming from unduly profit-seeking approaches in
corporate management.
Many high schools and universities already run courses which
accommodate legal, ethical, and scientific knowledge related to
industrial risks, and in which the prevention of corporate violence
could be further discussed. For this task the educational institutions
could avail themselves of the contribution of magistrates, investiga-
tors, technicians, and professional and public officials who have
scientific expertise and operational experience in the field, including
members of specialist authorities that have been set up in recent
years—provided they have a record of total independence from
corporate influence.
3. Recommendations for Belgian Lawmakers and Policymakers
3.1. Extend the recognition of victims of corporate violence, especially
beyond the specific case of disasters
There is an appalling difference in the way Belgian law and policy
treat the victims of disasters (and other situations of visible, sudden,
and massive victimisation) on the one hand, and the victims of other
less visible, less sudden, and less massive situations of corporate
violence on the other. Although the handling of disasters in Belgian
law is in general far from perfect, victims of disasters can count on fast
recognition, a great deal of (political) goodwill and flexibility, and firm
action. Meanwhile, other victims of corporate violence struggle for
recognition. They fall largely under the radar of the regular services
offered to all victims of crime, such as victim support, mediation, and
compensation, and encounter many problems accessing justice through
civil or criminal legal proceedings. Work needs to be done with these
different sectors to raise awareness about the existence and needs of
corporate violence victims, as well as to discuss how this group fits
into their fields of work, and to collaborate with them in order to
address the many obstacles such victims encounter.
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3.2. Improve judicial management of collective victimisation
In Belgium there is a need to think through and adapt both legal
frameworks and professional practice to situations of collective
victimisation. Except for the situation of disasters, the collective
nature of corporate violence victimisation is addressed very poorly.
Specific approaches are required in order to respond to the
phenomenon adequately, be it at the level of legislation and legal
proceedings, or of social services. In all these fields, specific types of
intervention are at present only embryonic.
In a criminal justice context, collective victimisation raises
practical problems such as the organisation of adequate information
provision to many victims (or eventually to the victims as a group), the
organisation of official registration for big groups as injured persons or
civil parties, and managing the presence of many victims at the trial. At
present there is a total lack of adaptation to these problems. Although
ad hoc solutions have been organised in the past in the case of
disasters, in other cases of corporate violence these issues have not
been addressed adequately at all. This can be interpreted as a lack of
recognition on the part of the justice system for the particular situation
of this group of victims, which is very painful for those concerned.
This situation requires action at policy level, and it is also at policy
level that structural solutions can be framed. Besides the practical
problems, changes in the legal context are also necessary to address the
collective nature of corporate violence.
At present for many victims it is financially risky if not impossible
to initiate legal proceedings. The cost of launching the proceedings in
civil cases, which has to be done by each individual victim, is beyond
the financial capacity of vulnerable victims. The costs of legal
assistance in corporate violence cases are often high, as the cases are
complex and last a long time, requiring a high level of expertise and
the long-term involvement of legal counsels. These problems could be
at least partially addressed by allowing collective legal action, in line
with the class action suits which are possible in some other countries.
Although victims can choose the same lawyer to represent them, in the
present legal context this lawyer has to represent each individual
victim separately.
3.3. Improve and systematise collective compensation funds for
corporate violence victimisation
Several compensation funds co-exist in Belgium, such as the fund
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for victims of intentional violence, the fund for professional diseases
and labour accidents, a fund specifically for victims of asbestos, and
funds created ad hoc for specific disasters; some employers have even
their own compensation funds. There is little to no communication
between these funds, and for victims this is a complex situation. The
development of this field has mainly proceeded ad hoc, in the absence
of any comprehensive, coordinated policy development. This poses
questions of equality between categories of victims.
In this regard, there is an urgent need for an integrated vision,
especially as it has become clear that individual attempts to obtain
compensation through civil and criminal proceedings are hazardous
and often unsuccessful. Access to and transparency about compensa-
tion funds should be increased. Moreover, a frank public discussion
needs to take place about where the money for compensation funds
should come from. The asbestos fund, for example, is financed through
small contributions by all Belgian companies, not mainly by the sector
causing the harm. Moreover, victims making use of the asbestos fund
are not allowed to file additional legal proceedings. This immunity rule
is difficult to understand from a victim’s perspective, and again
triggers the question of to which extent we want corporations to be
responsible for the harm they cause.
3.4. Improve knowledge and effective application of corporate criminal
responsibility
In Belgium there is a general lack of knowledge and expertise
related to the idea that an offender can be a corporation. The
consequences of the adoption of criminal responsibility for corpora-
tions has clearly not yet trickled down to all parts of the criminal
justice system, nor to the work of the various support services; this
implies, in turn, a particularly severe need for information and training
on this specific topic.
3.5. Consider strategic changes to the criminal law legislation in order
to facilitate access to justice by victims of corporate violence
Cases of corporate violence often raise technical problems in
criminal proceedings, and these need to be addressed at policy level.
One of the major issues is the often delayed effects of the activities,
where harms can appear many years later. The long latency period may
cause the extinction of the criminal or civil procedure due to statutes of
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limitations. This problem should be addressed in legislation by
extending the limitation period or redefining its starting point. Another
problem relates to a lack of substantive criminal law categories which
specifically address corporate violence. Where the harmful behaviour
has had lethal effects, the legal category often used in Belgium is
involuntary manslaughter, since proving that the harm was intentional
is most of the time nearly impossible. One option here might be to
propose specific aggravating circumstances or a separate criminal
offence for certain situations of corporate violence.
3.6. Adapt and improve the organisation of victim support services and
mediation services and provide training to institutions and professio-
nals
In the field of victim assistance and victim support, work with
groups of victims is not yet well developed: individual work with
victims and offenders is still the norm. However, those who work on
victim assistance and victim support can build on their experience with
disasters in terms of organising crisis intervention and managing
effective collaboration between responding teams. They can also learn
from other situations in which they encounter collective victimisation,
such as robberies of banks and shops. Alongside collective briefings
and information sessions, other methodologies for working with
groups should be developed and structurally integrated into working
practice, while taking into account the limited available financial
means and the often maladapted criminal justice context.
Greater collaboration between victims’ associations and the
official services charged with victim assistance and support would
be productive. Notably, victims’ associations, with their more activist
profile, have a particular role to play as regards activities aimed at
gaining recognition and developing counter-power against the
dominant position of the corporation. Such associations are particularly
good at identifying fellow sufferers and forming a group, bringing out
their fate in the media, gathering information, and collectively exerting
public pressure when legal cases are not taken forward.
Victim-offender mediation in Belgium is another sector where
working with individual victims is the dominant method in daily
practice. This does not mean that there is no experience at all with
organising dialogue with a group of victims, however. Mediators can
build on and learn from the occasional use they make of peace-making
circles or conversation groups between victims and offenders
concerning non-related criminal facts; from the mediation practice
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specifically developed for the case of historical abuse in the church and
in institutions such as boarding schools; and from the neighbourhood
mediation used for dealing with conflicts between groups of citizens or
between groups of citizens and the local authorities.
If there is to be such collective work by victim assistance and
support services and mediation professionals, however, support at
policy level will be crucial. Only if the relevant authorities clearly
communicate that dealing with groups of victims should be an integral
part of the support services’ work, and only if this is adequately
reflected in the mission and financing mechanisms of the organisations
concerned, can we expect real developments.
Finally, victim support workers and mediators are not well
acquainted with the legal context of corporate offending and criminal
responsibility of legal persons. And the challenge of involving
corporations or their representatives in their daily work requires that
they rethink their practice. Who is the corporation? How should they
approach a legal entity? Who should represent the corporation in its
contact with victims? Their unfamiliarity with this new field makes
support services hesitant to engage with corporate violence cases—and
this is in sharp contrast to the need of corporate violence victims to be
approached proactively. Training is needed to better acquaint victim
support and mediation professionals with the specific context of
corporate violence; and the sharing of experience will help them learn
how to adapt the practice context to this specific situation. Moreover,
in order to reach this target group, the victims of corporate violence
should be explicitly mentioned in folders, on websites, and in public
campaigns.
Working ‘with or around’ the power of corporations is another
challenge faced not only by victims but also by the professionals who
work with them. ‘Out-of-the-box’ thinking is needed to help
professionals join forces to tackle this challenge. One possibility is
the creation of interdisciplinary fora to which corporate violence cases
can be referred, and where information can be exchanged and action
coordinated. The cases we have studied demonstrate especially that
socially vulnerable people who become victims of corporate violence
end up in absolutely dreadful situations. Only with external help of
engaged lawyers, medical doctors, social workers, victims’ associa-
tions, and the media are they able to bring about any change in their
difficult situations. Networks of professionals are thus needed,
working in an emancipatory way, and tackling not only the individual
situation of the victims but also more structural issues.
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3.7. Improve the involvement of the businesses concerned through
development of corporate social responsibility and transparency
A major challenge at policy level concerns the work to be done
with the businesses concerned. How can policymakers work around
the fact that businesses rarely seem ready to take responsibility? Is it
possible to find a win-win? Public image and fear of criminal trials
seem to be important incentives for a company to do something for
its victims. Is it possible to engage in discussions that go beyond this
level and also tackle issues of social responsibility and social
justice? Together with, or additional to, criminal proceedings (if
any), awareness-building and discussions should be engaged in as
regards the moral responsibility of companies to victims and
communities.
Professional employers’ organisations and/or their supporting
structures should be encouraged to develop appropriate ethical
guidelines within their sectors (as, for example, private insurance
companies are doing concerning the treatment of road traffic
victims). Finally, companies could be asked, or legally obliged, to
integrate practical and ethical guidelines (to be applied in case of
victimisation) into their prevention and health programmes, which
thus far are only oriented internally, to the needs of their own
employees.
In cases where victims are concentrated in a certain geographical
area, action should be undertaken by companies and (local) public
authorities to restore the relationship between the company and the
local community after collective or serious forms of victimisation
have happened. In Belgium, examples exist of memorialisation
initiatives, but these are rather scarce. Repairing the relationship
between the corporation(s) and the local community, for example by
offering special services or support, can be of huge symbolic
significance for victims, but there is very little experience in this
field.
Finally, a special dimension of corporate violence concerns the
intertwined interests of local and national politicians and corporations.
It seems that public authorities have difficulty striking a balance
between the economic well-being of a region and providing for
sufficient protection of the citizens. It may be time, however, to
consider corporations as fully fledged members of society, which—just
like natural persons—have an obligation to act responsibly and take
into account the long-term consequences of their behaviour. This will
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require a change of mentality on the parts of citizens, politicians,
authorities, and the corporate world itself.
4. Recommendations for German Lawmakers and Policymakers
4.1. Invest in awareness-building programmes and training on
corporate violence
In Germany, victims of corporate violence are not seen as groups
of vulnerable victims; this fact exacerbates their plight and leads to
secondary victimisation.
Neither police officers, nor professionals in the judicial sector
(judges, prosecutors, and lawyers), nor professionals working in the
area of victim support are aware of the phenomenon of corporate
violence or the broad range of needs and challenges that characterise
its victims.
Thus, we strongly recommend further investment in awareness-
building programs and training of all stakeholders. Since our
endeavours have clearly showed that voluntary participation only
yields marginal participation, we recommend including the topic of
corporate violence as a mandatory part of the training curricula for the
stakeholders concerned, or else massively enhancing the attractiveness
of participation in those training sessions which already exist, eg by
offering credits.
4.2. Invest in capacity building and specialisation for law enforcement
agencies and inspection and regulation authorities
The resources of the German police are clearly stretched, and they
do not have the personnel nor the expertise to deal with such factually
and legally complex cases. Although the police forces in the various
Bundesländer are soon to be enlarged, we know of no plans to
restructure the police in order to deal effectively with cases of
corporate violence.
Therefore, we recommend the creation of specialised task forces
in each Bundesland, properly trained and equipped to tackle cases of
corporate violence. These task forces should build up expertise,
databases, and procedures to deal with and effectively process these
cases and to offer resources to the police departments involved in the
respective cases.
The same holds true for the judiciary, ie prosecutors and judges,
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where again there is a lack of personnel and expertise. A massive
investment in capacity-building is needed. The number of positions
within the judiciary will have to be significantly increased at all levels
and in all Bundesländer as soon as possible. There is a heavy
investment backlog, which has led to an overburdened justice system.
Moreover, we recommend creating so-called Schwerpunktstaatsan-
waltschaften, ie prosecutor’s offices, which will be charged with
addressing cases of corporate violence in order to build up expertise in
this area.
Inspection authorities and regulatory agencies will also have to be
better equipped and trained to enable them to live up to their
obligations, including comprehensive and long-term data collection, eg
of emissions into the environment. Stronger control mechanisms will
have to be put in place, and, especially in small communities, political
and economic dependencies on strong corporations will have to be
made more visible and transparent.
Therefore, we recommend strengthening the relevant authorities,
and encouraging affected communities to engage in an open and frank
dialogue with their populations and with the corporation concerned on
how to best tackle the problem at hand.
4.3. Set up specific training for victim support services
Victim support organisations in Germany deal exclusively with
victims of common violent crime. An informal internal inquiry by one
of the major German victim support organisations revealed that none of
the member organisations had dealt with victims of corporate violence.
This is congruent with our observation that victims of corporate violence
tend to organise themselves, and do not seek help from the normal
victim support organisations. Given their very limited financial and
personal capacities and structures, the victim support organisations are
not well suited to deal with this very different sort of crime.
We recommend creating focus points in each Oberlandesgericht-
sbezirk (regional appellate court), mandated to direct victims of all sorts
of crime including corporate violence to the services needed in each case.
4.4. Explore new compensation models and alternative dispute
resolution models
The German justice system is only barely able to deal effectively
with cases of corporate violence, due to their factual and legal
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complexity. Further inquiries will have to be made as regards how best
to address such cases, not only in the criminal justice system but also in
other branches of the law, possibly also considering and strengthening
alternative dispute resolution models.
The challenges detected (such as collective victimisation and a
corresponding high number of victims who wish to participate in the
proceedings, long latency periods and lack of reliable data, unequal
power of actors, disjuncture between the management and control
structures in large multinational corporations, international dimension
of certain corporations vs national justice systems, etc) will need to be
better accommodated in civil and criminal proceedings. Further
strengthening of the participation rights of victims in criminal trials
has been seen rather critically as raising false expectations on the
victims’ side and often running counter to an effective criminal trial.
Therefore, we recommend initiating a dialogue on how best to address
cases of corporate violence in Germany, including though inquiry
commissions, ombudspersons, and compensation models, which are
detached from the outcome of legal trials but which could better serve
the immediate and long-term needs of victims.
4.5. Introduce the rights of victims of corporate violence into the
debate on corporate social responsibility, and foster its actual
implementation
Corporations, and especially large ones, are aware of and have taken
part in recent debates on corporate social responsibility, good governance,
and compliance programs at international, European, and national levels.
We recommend capitalising on this momentum by including and laying
emphasis on the rights and needs of victims of corporate violence, and the
challenges evoked thereby; a broader dialogue in this policy debate
should thus be initiated, including relevant ministries, chambers of
commerce, employers’ associations, trade unions, and victims’ support
organisations. Victims’ rights should be brought to the forefront when
developing new soft and hard law instruments.
5. Recommendations for Italian Lawmakers and Policymakers
5.1. Establish a definition of ‘victim’ under national law, and overcome
the present legal gaps
In Italian criminal law and the criminal justice system there is no
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such notion as ‘victim’: rather, the legally binding notion is that of
persona offesa (literally: ‘person harmed/offended by the crime’). The
term ‘victim’ appears only very rarely—and incoherently—in the
criminal procedure code, alongside that of persona offesa (eg art 498
Criminal Procedure Code). A general notion of ‘victim’ is used,
however, in the territorial legislative provisions issued by the Regioni
with regard to access to welfare services and/or specific local funds or
educational programmes.
The strict legal term persona offesa refers (only) to the actual
holder of interests protected by the criminal provision. The legal term
does, though, include both physical persons and legal entities.
Therefore, the EU definition of ‘victim’ according to art 2 of the
Victims Directive and the Italian legal definition of persona offesa do
not coincide, the former being at the same time broader and narrower
than the latter. When transposing Directive 2012/29/EU with d lgs 15
December 2015 n 212, the Italian legislature chose merely to amend
the existing Criminal Procedure Code by introducing provisions
mainly concerning information and procedural rights, and a few
provisions ensuring protection rights to ‘particularly vulnerable’
subjects (art 90-quarter Criminal Procedure Code): these rights are
recognised, and granted, to the persona offesa only. This raises a set of
legal problems concerning, on the one hand, the actual fulfilment by
the Italian State of the obligations deriving from the Directive and, on
the other, the correct identification of those who can actually benefit
from the new participatory and procedural rights, also in light of the
exclusion of legal persons from the definition of ‘victims’ set out by
the Directive, following the ECJ rulings under the Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA (ECJ, Case C-205/09 Eredics and Sápi
[2010]; ECJ, Case C-467/05 Dell’Orto [2007]).
A clarification of the use of the terms ‘victim’ and persona offesa
within the Italian legal system is therefore needed. The EU definition of
‘victim’ must be correctly transposed, regardless of the actual linguistic
choice the Italian lawmaker makes in naming, and defining, the ‘person’
whose rights and protection are to be incorporated into the national
criminal justice and welfare systems. For the sake of the victims and for
the safeguarding of the accused, no doubts should exist with regard to
the beneficiaries of the rights set out by the Directive 2012/29/UE.
5.2. Introduce structured, uniformly distributed, and adequately funded
territorial victim support services
The current situation for victim support in Italy does not appear to
276 ANNEX
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
be compliant with the Victims Directive. Although specific support
programmes and services—particularly for victims of domestic
violence, children, and in some instances victims of organised
crime—do exist, and in some cases have developed very effective
protocols and practices, they are basically the result of local initiatives
and temporary funding; as a result they are unsystematically scattered
throughout the Italian territory, and are often precarious in their ability
to provide long-term assistance. This means that Italy currently appears
to be non-compliant with both the requirement to introduce provisions
to ‘allow all victims’ adequate access to support ‘from the moment the
competent authorities are aware of the victim and throughout criminal
proceedings and for an appropriate time after such proceedings’, and
the requirement to ensure ‘sufficient geographical distribution across
the Member State’ of said support (recital 37; arts 8 and 9).
This, of course, also affects the victims of corporate violence who,
due to the peculiarities of their victimisation, never match the targets
even of the existing victim support programmes. They therefore have
to manage on their own (or, when they are lucky, with the aid only of
victims’ associations), faced with huge informational and bureaucratic
difficulties, in seeking assistance from the plurality of social services
who may be competent. These services range from social security to
the national healthcare system, and from the regulatory agencies
competent for inspections and control over eg work safety or
environmental violations, to those providing legal information and
assistance (the latter almost never accessible free of charge), etc.
Therefore, to the basic and general need to introduce structured,
uniformly distributed, and stable victim support services, a further
need is added, namely for specific units and/or programmes aimed at
assisting victims of corporate violence with their complex needs of
protection, information, and support.
5.3. Foster awareness of and sensitisation to corporate violence
victimisation
Italy shares in the general problem of the lack of knowledge and
awareness about the phenomenon of corporate violence victimisation.
Although some judicial districts have had to develop experience and
organisation in dealing with huge episodes of collective victimisation
from corporate violence, these remain isolated practices or practical
solutions stemming from the personnel’s ‘good will’ rather than being
guided by any overarching theory or institutionalised regulation. In
addition, small judicial and police districts also face a more general
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lack of personnel, resources, training, and specialisation, even while it
is not infrequent that major corporate violence episodes occur within
these smaller jurisdictions. Existing social and medical services—w-
hich, as stated above, currently are the only, scattered sources of
support for victims of corporate violence in Italy—are in turn not
accustomed to dealing with this form of collective victimisation, and in
general not prepared for the specific, complex needs of such victims.
The more general lack of public and political awareness about the
phenomenon leads to these victims feeling isolated, abandoned, and
unrecognised, and therefore to high risks of secondary victimisation.
It therefore appears particularly urgent to invest in awareness-
building programmes for all those institutions and professionals
potentially involved with victims of corporate violence, as well as in
training to provide them with basic knowledge and competences to
respond to these victims’ specific needs for protection, information,
and support.
5.4. Improve organisation and specialisation of law enforcement
agencies
Besides general sensitisation to the features of corporate violence,
the efficacy of law enforcement agencies in the identification and
protection of victims of corporate violence would most definitely
benefit from improved specialisation and organisation.
While much could be done autonomously by the judicial offices
themselves—as we have proposed in the Linee guida nazionali per la
polizia giudiziaria, le Procure della Repubblica e i magistrati
giudicanti (Italian national guidelines for law enforcement agencies,
available online)—it is undeniable that a more systematic and general
reorganisation of competences could be helpful, especially with cases
of corporate violence which involve very large numbers of victims (eg
fifty or more). Such cases are hard for smaller local offices to manage,
and could therefore benefit greatly from the relevant competence being
mandatorily assigned to the district courts and prosecutors, which
generally possess more personnel (thus susceptible of being organised
in specialised units), larger structures (also better suited to organise the
participation of considerable numbers of victims in the proceedings),
and quite often have previous specific experience.
The development of shared databases on corporate violence cases
should also be systematically encouraged, as should the circulation of
information and best practice.
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5.5. Recognise the special protection needs of the victims of corporate
violence, and legally introduce ad hoc measures of protection
In Italy as in other legal systems, provisions concerning the
recognition of protection needs and measures for protection from
secondary and repeat victimisation are tailored to ‘typical’ vulnerable
victims (ie victims of gender or domestic violence, stalking, sexual
crimes, human trafficking and modern slavery, etc, alongside children,
women, the elderly, people with disabilities, etc).
As mentioned above, victims of corporate crimes, and especially
of corporate violence, do not fit into these ‘groups’; and yet they also
are vulnerable, having very special and highly complex protection
needs. Their protection requires the adoption of ad hoc social policies
which should be integrated and coordinated, based on legal provisions,
with national and/or local systems of health, welfare, social insurance,
etc.
In particular, for the fulfilment of the obligations deriving from
arts 22 (individual assessment of specific protection needs) and 23
(protection from secondary victimisation of victims with specific
protection needs), specialist support services should be put in place,
together with the recruitment and training of personnel.
In order to fulfil the obligations deriving from art 18, and
especially for the purpose of protecting victims of corporate violence
from repeat victimisation, the Italian lawmakers should: (a) expressly
add the purpose of the protection of corporate violence victims to the
scope of already existing pre-trial, pre-conviction, or post-conviction
measures (misure precautelari, misure cautelari, misure interdittive),
or (b) carefully enrich, where appropriate, the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code and of d lgs 231/2001 with a set of new ad
hoc measures, similarly to what was done against domestic violence.
Such provisions would better comply with the principle of legality and
therefore limit judicial discretion; such provisions, of course, should
also carefully ensure the rights of the defence and of the accused or the
convicted physical or legal person, and not be aimed at intensifying the
criminal justice system against them.
The national lawmaker should integrate a system of measures of
protection from repeat victimisation into the preventive, proactive, and
responsive approach to corporate liability outlined by d lgs 231/2001,
thus resulting in forms of diversion, aversion from conviction, and
reduction of sanctions better able to ‘reconcile’ the victims’ protection
and the corporation’s interests and defence.
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5.6. Extend corporate responsibility to all offences of corporate
violence
Currently, the catalogue of criminal offences which, according to d
lgs 8 June 2001 n 231, can give rise to administrative corporate
liability basically only covers environmental crimes and personal
injuries and deaths due to violations of work safety rules. But, as we
have seen in this volume, these offences are not the only ones which
qualify as corporate violence. In order to improve the victims’ chances
of being protected from repeat victimisation, from intimidation and
from retaliation, we propose it would be helpful to extend corporate
quasi-penal responsibility to all personal injuries and deaths due to
violations of safety rules in the production and commercialisation of
any product (in primis drugs and medical devices, and foodstuffs).
This, in turn, would encourage corporations to introduce protocols for
the prevention of these kinds of offences into their compliance models,
including channels for safe reporting on the part of employees, and
(should an actual alleged offence occur) procedures for taking remedial
and compensatory actions, beneficial to corporate violence victims, to
avoid precautionary interdictive measures and mitigate possible
punishment.
Alongside the relevance of corporate liability in cases of corporate
violence, a normative reconsideration by the Italian lawmakers of the
role of the ‘victims’ (according to the EU legal definition) in
proceedings against a corporation could be useful: this would finally
resolve a long-lasting national debate, and would also perhaps, in light
of the Victims Directive, push a step forward the ruling of the ECJ in
the Giovanardi case under the Council Framework Decision 2001/220/
JHA (ECJ, Case C-19/11 [2012]).
5.7. Reinforce judicial mechanisms to attain the goal of promoting
reparation by corporations
The inclination of the corporation to indemnify and compensate
for damage should be encouraged. Accordingly, in light of the cited
instruction in art 16, para 2 of the Directive (on which we provide
further details below), the legislature is best placed to introduce
effective tools to achieve this goal.
A corporation’s willingness to negotiate with victims and to
compensate for the consequences of the crime is generally greater
where the corporation itself is being investigated or charged.
The preventive, proactive, and responsive dynamics designed by d
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lgs 231/2001 should be used as a model to encourage and reward
corporations’ remediation measures. Corporate liability models that
require, for the purpose of granting a reduced sentence, not only full
and effective compensation for damage, but also the elimination of the
crime’s harmful or dangerous consequences, are certainly more
effective. To this aim, the lawmakers should enhance the implementa-
tion of the Decree. The rules currently in force do not clearly require
the prosecutors to investigate and charge corporations on the basis of
Decree 231. A legislative reform, introducing mandatory action against
the corporation each time the conditions provided by Decree 231 are
present, should be seriously considered. This reform would also favour
a more uniform application of d lgs 231/2001 by different local
prosecutors’ offices.
On the side of the responses ex post to criminal offences, policies
and strategies concerning prevention of and reparation for harm should
be integrated in the laws as a form of normative compliance (such as
the recent law on the disclosure of non-financial information to
consumers and stakeholders). All these measures, when effectively
implemented, should be recognised and valorised by the law as the best
standard to prevent corporate crimes, as well to repair their negative
consequences.
Laws and regulations concerning health and safety in the
workplace, as well as environmental, food, and drug safety, all
incentivise corporations to prevent corporate violence and repair its
consequences whenever they include, as a form of hard compliance
(mandatory obligations), the adoption of the best standards of
prevention and reparation. Such a model is already in force in the
Italian legislation on health and safety in the workplace (d lgs 81/
2008), and it should be extended to other sectors (such as
environmental laws, and food and drug safety laws).
In addition, the proactive and responsive dynamics designed by d
lgs 231/2001 could be integrated with the formal recognition and
valorisation, as a form of normative compliance, of all the corporate
policies that have been adopted to implement the international
standards of corporate social responsibility, including the respect of
business and human rights.
Such recognition and the other incentives, within the context of d
lgs 231/2001, should be introduced also with reference to the internal
investigations process, as well as all those initiatives spontaneously
adopted by corporations to reconstruct the facts and disclose
information about causes, liabilities, and consequences of their actions
or omissions.
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5.8. Improve the chances of obtaining a decision on compensation for
victims of corporate violence
The chances of Italian victims of corporate violence receiving ‘a
decision on compensation by the offender, within a reasonable time’
(art 16) currently appear particularly poor. Although the Italian legal
system allows them the alternative to seek redress within the criminal
proceedings or through a separate civil action, neither of these
solutions appears very effective. On the one hand, civil proceedings in
Italy are especially long and costly for victims, who, particularly in
complex cases of corporate violence, have to shoulder the huge costs
associated with the multiple and complex forms of expertise required
to support their claim, as well as the difficulties in gathering enough
evidence on their own—also considering that the model of collective
action available to them in the Italian legal system is a far cry from a
proper ‘class action’, and does not allow for major improvements on
the length and costs of this kind of proceedings. On the other hand, if
the civil action is undertaken within criminal proceedings, victims are
faced with a more stringent burden of proof (often impossible to satisfy
in these cases, especially in respect to issues of causal relation),
compelling time limitations (which, due to the complexity of these
kinds of cases, often run out before a final decision can be achieved),
and specific problems whenever the proceedings are defined through a
plea bargain, as compensation is generally not considered a condition
of such a form of agreement being made available. All these
difficulties add to those arising from the inability to identify an
individual offender (frequently due to the long time lag between the
offence and the manifestation of its harmful consequences), or to
involve the allegedly responsible corporation in the proceedings (due
to bankruptcy, relocation, etc), neither of which are infrequent
occurrences.
To improve the chances of compensation for victims of corporate
violence, the Italian lawmakers should consider, on the one hand,
changing the current two-stage structure of ‘collective’ civil actions, as
well as broadening the (currently too strict) income thresholds to
access publicly funded legal aid. On the other hand, the current
situation of collective compensation funds appears inadequate to deal
with this kind of widespread and very harmful victimisation, and
should be reformed and systematised. In Italy there are only a few such
funds, aimed only at victims of specific episodes of corporate violence
(ie asbestos, Thalidomide, infected blood and haemoderivative drugs),
generally enacted only after decades-long struggles by victims’
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associations, and often implemented in a way that is desultory,
ineffective, and unfair (to the victims). The system should be re-
thought, providing systematic and sustainable access to compensation
for all victims of corporate violence.
5.9. Invest in educational resources
In recent years the Italian public administration has suffered from
a huge decay of the skills and expert knowledge which are needed—as
stated in the ‘Recommendations of general interest’, section 2
above—in order to recognise risks, especially unknown ones, and
thus to pay due attention to every warning sign thereof. Such technical
capabilities are even more necessary for regulators and public
agencies, who must exercise dynamic and constant vigilance over
the corporations involved in risky activities. Such vigilance is
dependent upon their ability to maintain continuous interaction with
corporations, so as to enable a timely prevention of violations while
also channelling corporate activities into good practices that are duly
respectful of human rights and attentive to potential victimisation. But
any interaction of this kind is doomed whenever the knowledge gap
between regulators and regulated organisations is too large. There is
therefore an urgent need for public agencies, as well as private
philanthropic organisations with an interest in human rights, to invest
in the educational resources needed to redress the epistemic asymmetry
between the public sector and large corporations.
6. Summary of the Recommendations
Recommendations of General Interest
1. Invest, at all levels, in public awareness and sensitisation
regarding corporate violence victimisation.
2. Recognise the special protection needs of the victims of corporate
violence, and introduce ad hoc legal measures of protection,
without prejudice to the rights of the accused and the defence.
3. Tackle the collective dimension of corporate violence victimisa-
tion.
4. Adopt a preventive strategy, recognising risks in a timely fashion
by paying due attention to every warning sign.
5. Implement an integrated and cooperative multi-level network
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involving all the relevant institutions and agencies, and encourage
all the subjects concerned to take responsibility.
6. Facilitate and encourage compensation for victims of corporate
violence.
7. Enhance corporate social responsibility and explore alternative
dispute resolution models.
8. Increase public investments in educational resources aimed at
improving expert knowledge and skills within public administra-
tions and communities.
Recommendations for Belgian Lawmakers and Policymakers
1. Extend the recognition of victims of corporate violence, especially
beyond the specific case of disasters.
2. Improve judicial management of collective victimisation.
3. Improve and systematise collective compensation funds for
corporate violence victimisation.
4. Improve knowledge and effective application of corporate
criminal responsibility.
5. Consider strategic changes to the criminal law legislation in order
to facilitate access to justice by victims of corporate violence.
6. Adapt and improve the organisation of victim support services and
mediation services and provide training to institutions and
professionals.
7. Improve the involvement of the businesses concerned through
development of corporate social responsibility and transparency.
Recommendations for German Lawmakers and Policymakers
1. Invest in awareness-building programmes and training on
corporate violence.
2. Invest in capacity building and specialisation for law enforcement
agencies and inspection and regulation authorities.
3. Set up specific training for victim support services.
4. Explore new compensation models and alternative dispute
resolution models.
5. Introduce the rights of victims of corporate violence into the
debate on corporate social responsibility, and foster its actual
implementation.
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Recommendations for Italian Lawmakers and Policymakers
1. Establish a definition of ‘victim’ under national law, and
overcome the present legal gaps.
2. Introduce structured, uniformly distributed, and adequately funded
territorial victim support services.
3. Foster awareness of and sensitisation to corporate violence
victimisation.
4. Improve organisation and specialisation of law enforcement
agencies.
5. Recognise the special protection needs of the victims of corporate
violence, and legally introduce ad hoc measures of protection.
6. Extend corporate responsibility to all offences of corporate
violence.
7. Reinforce judicial mechanisms to attain the goal of promoting
reparation by corporations.
8. Improve the chances of obtaining a decision on compensation for
victims of corporate violence.
9. Invest in educational resources.
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PROJECT PUBLICATIONS AND TOOLS
The following publications and tools are amongst the outcomes of
the project Victims and Corporations: Implementation of Directive
2012/29/EU for victims of corporate crimes and corporate violence.
These publications and tools mainly adopt a practical approach, and
are directed at specific professional and national categories. They are
listed accordingly.
All the documents cited below are freely available from the
project’s website, at www.victimsandcorporations.eu.
Victims and Corporations: An Overview
Victims and Corporations. Data Collection on Leading Cases,
English, May 2016.
Victims and Corporations. Rights of Victims, Challenges for
Corporations. Project’s First Findings. Mid-Term Report, English,
December 2016.
European and International Selected Legal Resources and Case
Law. Appendix to Mid-Term Report, English, December 2016, updated
July 2017.
Empirical Research
Needs of Victims of Corporate Violence: Empirical Findings.
Comprehensive Report, English, March 2017-December 2017.
Needs of Victims of Corporate Violence: Empirical Findings.
National Report: Italy, English (Italian translation available), March
2017.
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Individual Assessment of Victims’ Needs
Individual Assessment of Corporate Violence Victims’ Needs: A
Practical Guide, English, April 2017.
Linee guida per la valutazione individuale dei bisogni delle
vittime di corporate violence, Italian, May 2017.
Die Berücksichtigung individueller Opferinteressen in Fällen von
Corporate Violence. Ein Leitfaden, German, August 2017.
Strafbaar gedrag van bedrijven en schending van fysieke
integriteit: ervaringen en noden van slachtoffers. Een praktijkgids,
Dutch, November 2017.
Guidelines for Professionals
a) Enforcement Agencies and the Judiciary
Implementazione della Direttiva 2012/29/UE per le vittime di
corporate crime e corporate violence. Linee guida nazionali per la
polizia giudiziaria, le Procure della Repubblica e i magistrati
giudicanti, Italian, July 2017.
Strafbaar gedrag van bedrijven en schending van fysieke
integriteit. Richtlijnen voor politie en magistratuur, Dutch, November
2017.
Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2012/29/EU Im Hinblick auf Opfer von
Unternehmensstraftaten und Corporate Violence. Ein Leitfaden für
Polizei, Staatsanwaltschaft, Richterschaft und GerichtsmitarbeiterIn-
nen, German, November 2017.
b) Victim Support Services, Restorative Justice Services, Social
Services
Implementazione della Direttiva 2012/29/UE per le vittime di
corporate crime e corporate violence. Linee guida nazionali per i
servizi sociali, le organizzazioni che offrono assistenza alle vittime e i
centri di giustizia riparativa, Italian, September 2017.
Strafbaar gedrag van bedrijven en schending van fysieke
integriteit. Richtlijnen voor slachtofferzorg en diensten herstelrecht
en bemiddeling, Dutch, November 2017.
Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2012/29/EU Im Hinblick auf Opfer von
Unternehmensstraftaten und Corporate Violence. Leitfaden für Opferun-
terstützungsdienste, German, November 2017.
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c) Lawyers
Implementazione della Direttiva 2012/29/UE per le vittime di
corporate crime e corporate violence. Linee guida nazionali per gli
avvocati, Italian, September 2017.
Strafbaar gedrag van bedrijven en schending van fysieke
integriteit. Richtlijnen voor advocaten, Dutch, November 2017.
Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2012/29/EU Im Hinblick auf Opfer von
Unternehmensstraftaten und Corporate Violence. Leitfaden für die
Rechtsanwaltschaft, German, November 2017.
d) Corporations
Implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU for Victims of Corporate
Crimes and Corporate Violence. Guidelines for Corporations:
Preventing Victimisation and Dealing with Victims of Corporate
Violence, English, November 2017.
Digital Stories
Victims and Corporations. Digital Stories, video testimonies,
Dutch-German-Italian with English subtitles, November 2017.
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PROJECT TEAM AND PARTNERSHIP ORGANISATIONS
COORDINATION
Gabrio Forti (Coordinator in chief)
Full Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Director of the
‘Federico Stella’ Centre for Research on Criminal Justice and Policy,
Dean of the Faculty of Law, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore,
Milan (Italy).
Stefania Giavazzi
Senior Researcher, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for Research on Criminal
Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Claudia Mazzucato
Associate Professor of Criminal Law, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for
Research on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Arianna Visconti
Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for
Research on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
NATIONAL UNITS
Belgium
Ivo Aertsen
Full Professor of Criminology, Leuven Institute of Criminology,
University of Leuven (Belgium).
Luc Boone
Research Assistant, Leuven Institute of Criminology, University of
Leuven (Belgium).
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Katrien Lauwaert
Affiliated Researcher, Leuven Institute of Criminology, University of
Leuven (Belgium), Bianchi Chair in Restorative Justice, Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam (the Netherlands).
Germany
Marc Engelhart
Head of Research Group and Head of Economic Crime Section, Max-
Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht,
Freiburg i.Br. (Germany).
Carolin Hillemanns
Scientific Coordinator of the International Max Planck Research
School on Retaliation, Mediation, and Punishment (REMEP), Max-
Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht,
Freiburg i.Br. (Germany).
Alexandra Schenk
Research Fellow, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und interna-
tionales Strafrecht, Freiburg i.Br. (Germany).
Italy
Gabriele Della Morte
Associate Professor of International Law, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Gabrio Forti
Full Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Director of the
‘Federico Stella’ Centre for Research on Criminal Justice and Policy,
Dean of the Faculty of Law, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore,
Milan (Italy).
Stefania Giavazzi
Senior Researcher, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for Research on Criminal
Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Stefano Manacorda
Full Professor of Criminal Law, Università della Campania Luigi
Vanvitelli, Naples (Italy).
Enrico Maria Mancuso
Associate Professor of Criminal Procedure, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre
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for Research on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Claudia Mazzucato
Associate Professor of Criminal Law, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for
Research on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Arianna Visconti
Assistant Professor of Criminal Law, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for
Research on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy).
Davide Amato, Pierpaolo Astorina, Matteo Caputo, Paola Cavanna,
Francesco Centonze, Francesco D’Alessandro, Alain Dell’Osso, Marina
Di Lello Finuoli, Irene Gasparini, Eliana Greco, Marta Lamanuzzi,
Alessandro Provera, Giuseppe Rotolo, Fabio Gino Seregni, Biancamaria
Spricigo, Benedetta Venturato—all members of the ‘Federico Stella’
Centre for Research on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica
del Sacro Cuore, Milan (Italy)—generously contributed to the research.
Alberto Redighieri (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) was the
video producer for the Digital Stories.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Alessandra Amato, Research Office, Università Cattolica del Sacro
Cuore, Milan (Italy).
SECRETARIAL TEAM
Elena Grassi and Federica Elli, ‘Federico Stella’ Centre for Research
on Criminal Justice and Policy, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore,
Milan (Italy).
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PARTNERSHIP ORGANISATIONS
Partners
Centro Studi ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia penale e la Politica
criminale—CSGP (‘Federico Stella’ Centre for Research on
Criminal Justice and Policy), Università Cattolica del Sacro
Cuore, Milan, Italy
The coordinating organisation for the project, the CSGP, is a research
centre on criminal law and criminal policy, committed to promoting
theoretical and applied interdisciplinary research aimed at improving the
criminal justice system. Its activities, projects, and expertise cover a
wide range of themes, including business criminal law, corporate
liability, criminal law reform, restorative justice and victim support,
environmental law, law and the humanities, and law and the sciences.
An Advisory Committee of prominent scholars, judges, and leading
experts in juridical, economic, philosophical, and psychological
disciplines coordinates its scientific activities. Since November 2017
CSGP has become Alta Scuola ‘Federico Stella’ sulla Giustizia Penale
(ASGP), the school for high studies in criminal law and criminal justice
of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore.
Leuven Institute of Criminology (LINC), University of Leuven
(KU Leuven), Leuven, Belgium
The University of Leuven is charter member of the League of
European Research Universities; European surveys rank it among the
top ten European universities in terms of its scholarly output. The
Leuven Institute of Criminology (LINC) is composed of about seventy
professors and researchers involved in criminological research and
teaching. LINC continues the Leuven tradition of combining solid
research with a deep commitment to society, a goal achieved through
fundamental as well as policy-oriented research. LINC consists of
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eight ‘research lines’, one of which is on ‘Restorative justice and
victimology’.
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Stra-
frecht (Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Criminal Law – MPICC), Freiburg i.Br., Germany
The research projects undertaken at MPICC are comparative,
international, and interdisciplinary in nature, focusing on empirical
studies of criminal law, crime, crime control, and crime victims.
Research also encompasses: harmonization and assimilation of
criminal law and criminal procedure in EU Member States; and
development of criminal law based on insights into existing legal
solutions to social problems, and functional criminal and extra-
criminal law alternatives.
Associate Partners
Scuola Superiore della Magistratura (Italy)
Associazione Familiari e Vittime dell’Amianto, Casale Monferrato
(Italy)
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